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ABSTRACT
During the years preceding the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 
Britain's Ambassador to Japan was Sir Robert Craigie. His period in Tokyo 
has since been the object of a good deal of controversy, with some 
observers criticising him for being an abject appeaser while others have 
praised him for his skilful diplomacy and for his realism. Similarly his 
counterpart, the Japanese Ambassador to London, Shigemitsu Mamoru, has had 
his career much scrutinised, and has been variously labelled as an 
Anglophile liberal and as a puppet of the Japanese military. Apart from 
the dispute over their reputations, ,an analysis of the diplomacy of these 
two Ambassadors during the years 1937-1941 is important because both men 
were deeply disturbed by the steady deterioration in Anglo-Japanese 
relations, and sought to alleviate the growing tensions by espousing 
alternatives, designed to establish the grounds for a new understanding,to 
the policies pursued by their respective governments.
This study analyses both the practicality and the practicability of the 
policies put forward by Craigie and Shigemitsu, and also shows the 
influence they exerted on the course of Anglo-Japanese relations. This is 
done by investigating not only their roles in the major crises that shook 
relations during this period, such as the Tientsin crisis of 1939, the 
Burma Road crisis of 1940 and the events immediately prior to the outbreak 
of war, but also the whole range of issues that led to increased tensions. 
In particular, emphasis is put on the effect that economic forces had on 
the relations between the two countries, and how the rivalry arising first 
from the Depression and second from the outbreak of the war in Europe in 
1939 drove London and Tokyo apart; a process which the two Ambassadors were 
powerless to stop. It is hoped that this will prove to be a useful
contribution to the study of the origins of the Pacific War.
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On 8 December 1941 the Japanese Charge d'Affaires in London, Kamimura 
Shinichi, was called to the Foreign Office to be presented with a British 
declaration of war on his country. This document stated in the lofty tones 
of diplomatic language-
'On the evening of December 7th His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom learnt that Japanese forces, without previous warning either in the 
form of a declaration of war or of an ultimatum with a conditional 
declaration of war, had attempted a landing on the coast of Malaya and 
bombed Singapore and Hong Kong. In view of these wanton acts of unprovoked 
aggression committed in flagrant violation of international law and 
particularly of Article 1 of the Third Hague Convention, relative to the 
opening of hostilities, to which both Japan and the United Kingdom are 
parties, I have the honour to inform the Imperial Japanese Government in 
the name of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that a state of 
war exists between the two countries.'*
This short communication was the culmination of a decade in which, from the 
time of the Mukden Incident of 18 September 1931, the interests of Britain 
and Japan in East Asia had come increasingly into a state of collision; but 
the question arises, was this war unavoidable?
To a number of observers on both sides the depth and range of the clash of
interests between the two countries, with Britain as defender of the status 
quo in East Asia and Japan a revisionist power seeking to expel Western 
influence from the region, meant that a conflict was inevitable. To other 
interested parties, however, the mutual antagonism between Britain and 
Japan, the erstwhile allies, was not a cause for fatalism; there were 
groups in both countries who believed that though the problems that had 
arisen were serious they were not insoluble, and that in the long term the 
interests of the two Empires were not incompatible. To these believers in
a rapprochement it seemed expedient for Britain and Japan to sit down and
negotiate in a spirit of compromise and determination to overcome the 
obstacle of mutual misunderstanding. There was, however, in the ranks of 
those who pushed for this policy a further division. On one side there was
the group who were at heart sentimentalists and yearned to return to the 
Elysian days of the Alliance, while on the other there were those who, for 
reasons of Realpolitik, saw a closer relationship as a vital necessity in 
the harsh international climate of the 1930s. This difference in 
motivation meant that there existed different levels of conformity within 
each of the two groups. The first, because of its belief that closer ties 
were an end in themselves, showed an identity of view between its members 
in the two countries. In the second group, because the British and 
Japanese members saw reconciliation in terms of their own countries' self- 
interest, they were frequently pursuing different and at times directly 
contradictory ends: this was a significant disadvantage as the members of 
this group tended to wield the greater influence in their respective 
countries.
Two figures who can be seen as belonging to this latter group were Sir 
Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador to Japan from September 1937 to 
December 1941, and Shigemitsu Mamoru, the Japanese Ambassador to Britain 
from November 1938 to December 1941. Both diplomats played a vital role in 
the years leading up to the Pacific War, they were deeply disturbed by the 
steady deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations, and sought to alleviate 
the growing tensions by espousing alternatives to the negative policies 
pursued by their respective governments; thus they hoped to establish the 
grounds for a new understanding. In addition, in 1941 they both were aware 
of how events were pushing the two countries towards war, and urged their 
respective governments to make compromises to avoid this catastrophe. The 
fact that these ambassadors shared the view that war could and should be 
averted, and that their opinions on this matter were rejected by their 
respective governments, is an important comment on the origins of the 
Pacific War. It raises a number of questions about such issues as why the 
views of those who were closest to the heartbeat of Anglo-Japanese 
relations were ignored, how policy was made, what roles the ambassadors 
took in this process, and most importantly whether a viable alternative 
actually existed to the path that eventually led to war.
There is, however, a problem here, because the use of Shigemitsu and 
Craigie as examples of responsible diplomats making realistic assessments
of Anglo-Japanese relations is to beg a very large question, as the 
academic debate over the reputations of both these diplomats has never 
reached a firm consensus about their position in history. On the subject 
of Craigie, one extreme view is the criticism levelled by his 
contemporaries in Whitehall and by some later historians that he was an 
unrealistic and abject appeaser. A fairly moderate example is the comment 
made by the Japanese historian Professor Sato Kyozo who wrote in his recent 
essay 'The Historical Perspective and What is Missing' of Craigie's belief 
in the importance of the pro-British faction by stating that 
'He held the ill-founded and over— optimistic belief that each concession on 
the British part would encourage this faction and thus help bring about a 
redirection of Japanese policy.... He tended to conceive of Britain's East 
Asian policy solely in terms of Anglo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . '2 
This view of Craigie is balanced by those who have praised him for both his 
skilful diplomacy and his vision. An example of this can be seen in the 
work of Professor Donald Cameron Watt, who praised Craigie in his book How 
War Came for his 'toughness and negotiating skills' and also noted that he 
was-
'... the ablest member of the British diplomatic service in this period to 
fail to win proper recognition for his stature and achievements from his 
fellow countrymen.... He was stigmatized, quite unfairly, as an 
appeaser...'3
Shigemitsu, for his part, has stirred up an even wider disparity of 
opinions, in a debate which is complicated further by the fact that he was 
one of the defendants at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. To some Shigemitsu 
was an anglophile liberal struggling against the virulent nationalism in 
Japan, a view which is most clearly seen in the works of contemporary 
commentators such as Kase Toshikazu in Japan and Lord Hankey and Major—  
General F.S.G. Piggott in B r i t a i n . 4 They saw Shigemitsu as a sincere 
opponent of the war and as a keen proponent of friendly relations with the 
West. Kase, who had been Shigemitsu's Private Secretary at the end of the 
war, described the diplomat in his book Eclipse of the Rising Sun as- 
'... a man of confirmed liberal views, consistently opposed to any policy 
of aggression and aggrandizement. Firmly convinced that the triangular 
cooperation of the major naval powers was the key to world peace, he
unswervingly supported the policy of friendly collaboration with England 
and America.*5
In contrast to this very favourable assessment three articles by the 
Japanese historian Usui Katsumi have portrayed him as a supporter of 
expansionism and as a closet ally of the military.6 In particular Usui has 
studied Shigemitsu's role as the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs from 
1933 to 1936, and this has led him to write in one essay-
'The Amo declaration, the abrogation of the naval disarmament treaties, the 
obstruction of the British loan to China and co-operation with the army in 
its separatist manoeuvres in north China, all these important policies and 
measures may safely be regarded as part of Shigemitsu’s ovei— all design.’7 
Usui also contends that the idea of the need for Japanese expansion in East 
Asia continued to shape Shigemitsu's mind while Ambassador to Britain.
Although the controversy over these two diplomats complicates an assessment 
of their policies and influence, the actual nature of the disputes qver 
their reputations has its positive side in that it helps to shed light on 
other issues which are relevant to the origins of the Pacific War. For 
example, the denigration of Craigie as an appeaser provides a focus for 
studying the influence of Britain's appeasement policy in Europe on 
attitudes towards Japan, while the differing assessments of Shigemitsu are 
valuable as an entry into the question of what constituted a liberal in 
1930s Japan, and whether a powerful moderate pro-Western faction actually 
existed at all in that country. The troubled reputations are also 
important because they underline the necessity not to look simply at the 
ambassadorships of the two men in isolation, which might be the temptation 
if there was a consensus about their respective positions, but to study how 
their ideas developed, how and to what extent they exerted influence in the 
years before their assignment, and finally why they were actually appointed 
as ambassadors.
Before delving into the questions raised by this last passage of the role 
of the ambassadors before they travelled to their respective posts, it is 
necessary to say a little about the upbringing, early career and character 
of the two men. To start with Robert Leslie Craigie, he was born in 
Southsea in 1883 into the family of a naval officer who went on to become
an Admiral. At the age of seven the young Leslie, as he preferred to be 
called, visited Japan for the first time while his father was stationed at 
Hong Kong, but it was not really until the signing of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance in 1902 that the East began to impinge significantly on his 
conscience. He recollected later in his memoirs 'Behind the Japanese Mask' 
that this event caused him to develop a sneaking admiration for the 'go- 
ahead little Island Empire'. In 1907 he entered the Foreign Office, but it 
was not until 1916 that he took up his first important foreign posting at 
Berne. After staying in Switzerland for four years Craigie was assigned to 
the United States and from July 1920 to July 1923 he served as First 
Secretary at the Washington Embassy. This posting meant that for the first 
time he began to develop the acquaintance of a number of influential 
Japanese figures, a process that was assisted by the holding of the 
Washington Conference from November 1921 to February 1922. In 1923 he 
returned to London and, after a brief secondment to the Department of 
Overseas Trade, entered the Foreign Office's American Department as deputy 
to Robert Vansittart, and it was here that he began to build up the
reputation that was to lead to his rapid promotion in the 1930s.8
By this time Craigie had developed into a very able diplomat with 
a particular aptitude for solving complex diplomatic problems through a 
mixture of patience, flexibility and optimism; an ability that was to serve 
him well in the coming years. He was a meticulous and conscientious worker
and won the respect of most of his colleagues and political superiors. He
was not, however, a figure who garnered affection, which was largely the 
result of his shy and serious nature. This tendency towards isolation was 
made the greater by the closeness of his marriage, which limited his desire 
to socialize, and thus tended to cut him off from his peers and his
juniors. His wife Pleasant was the daughter of an American newspaper owner 
from Virginia and possessed a brusque character, and, as Professor Cameron 
Watt has noted, 'she left behind her a trail of wounded susceptibilities in 
the Tokyo Embassy and elsewhere’.9 This lack of social graces on the part 
of the couple is important to take into account when dealing with reports 
of Craigie by his contemporaries.
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Craigie's Japanese counterpart, Shigemitsu Mamoru was born in 1887 in Oita 
prefecture on Kyushu. While still in his teens he decided he was going to 
become a diplomat, and, after studying German law at Tokyo Imperial 
University, he entered the Gaimusho in 1911 and was soon sent to the 
Japanese Embassy in Berlin, where he stayed until 1914. At the outbreak of 
the First World War he was transferred to London and for the first time was 
brought into contact with Anglo-Saxon ideas of political culture. This had 
a marked effect on his thinking, giving him a more cosmopolitan outlook 
than he had previously, and this development was furthered in 1918 by his 
posting as Consul to Portland, Oregon. Shigemitsu's stay in the United 
States was, however, quite brief, as he was soon called to join the 
Japanese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, where he worked 
alongside diplomats such as Arita Hachiro, Matsuoka Yosuke, and Yoshida 
Shigeru who were also to rise to prominence in the 1930s. He then returned 
to Tokyo and during the next five years worked on a series of missions for 
the Gaimusho, which included a tour of the ex-German mandates and a visit 
to Canton, where he met Sun Yat-sen. In 1925 he became First Secretary at 
the Peking legation and was involved in the complicated diplomacy of the 
Tariff Conference. He stayed in China until 1927 when he was posted once 
again to Berlin, but this stay in Europe was only to last about six months 
and in 1929 he was transferred back to China^this time as Consul-flenera1 in 
Shangha i . 10
Shigemitsu had thus in his early career a very balanced range of posts with 
exposure to both Europe and China, a development which aided his ability to 
understand Japan's interests in both regions. As a diplomat he had a 
reputation for hard work and for possessing a very straightforward manner 
in negotiations, which is a polite way of saying that he was a master of 
the tart remark if provoked. There is evidence for this in a number of 
British assessments of Shigemitsu in the 1930s where he is variously 
described as 'abrupt', 'outspoken' and 'independent'•11 The most important 
part of his make-up, however, was that he was devoted to his Emperor and 
his country. This is particularly important because there has been a 
tendency amongst Western writers to overemphasize his attachment to Anglo- 
Saxon ideas to the detriment of stating that he was, above all else, a 
Japanese patriot.
10
Despite the great difference in character between Craigie and Shigemitsu, 
it can be seen that there were important similarities in their career 
pattern. They were both steeped in the diplomatic tradition of their 
respective foreign ministries, and were very experienced career civil 
servants who did not owe their early advancement to political patronage or 
family connections but rather to their ability to cope with and flourish 
under pressure. Significantly neither of them could be considered as an 
expert in the field of Anglo-Japanese relations; Shigemitsu had only served 
in London as a very junior diplomat for three years and Craigie never had a 
posting in East Asia until his appointment in 1937. Nor did either of them 
have any overwhelming sentimental attachment to the other nation; they 
arrived in the late 1930s in their respective posts dreaming of making a 
success of their tour of duty and hoping for the appearance of a 
rapprochement, but neither was prepared to achieve this end without 
qualification and at the cost of sacrificing their own countries' self- 
interest .
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'Personally I think it is a mistake to try Shigemitsu and I understand it 
is being done under Russian pressure because Shigemitsu was known to be 
very strongly anti-Communist and was in office at the time of the 
Chang-ku-feng incident. Shigemitsu was, of course, a strong nationalist 
and believed that the Japanese ought to dominate China.'
Sir George Sansom to M.E. Dening 4 December 1946.1
The controversy over the career of Shigemitsu Mamoru has for the most part 
been based on the years before he was sent to London in 1938, and, in 
particular, on his time as Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs between 1933 
and 1936. To understand Shigemitsu's diplomacy in London and his 
contribution to Anglo-Japanese relations it is essential to understand the 
nature of this dispute over his reputation, and to see why he has been 
categorized variously as a virtual stooge of the military, as a moderate 
man of peace, and as a realist trying to come to terms with the fundamental 
changes affecting the identity of East Asia during these years. Without a 
knowledge of this background it is impossible to put his efforts as 
Ambassador to Britain into perspective, but in so doing one needs to look 
not only at his time as Vice-Minister, but further back to his period as 
Minister to China; it is only then that the continuity in Shigemitsu’s 
thought becomes apparent.
Shigemitsu first rose to prominence as a member of the senior rank of 
Japanese diplomats in 1930, although his sudden promotion owed as much to 
circumstance as it did to his own obvious abilities. His opportunity came 
in November 1929, when the Japanese Minister to China, Saburi Sadao, 
committed suicide. At this point Shigemitsu was still Consul-General at 
Shanghai, and while Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro decided on Saburi's 
successor, he, as the most senior Japanese diplomat in China, took on the
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temporary position of acting Minister. Almost immediately he was faced 
with a major crisis; this arose when he informed the Chinese that 
Shidehara's nominee for the vacant position of Minister to China was to be 
Obata Yukichi, the ex-Ambassador to Turkey, who had previously been in 
China at the time of the Twenty One Demands as Counsellor to the Embassy at 
Peking. To the overtly nationalist Kuomintang Government the appointment 
of a diplomat associated with this shameful incident in Chinese history was 
unacceptable, and despite urgent lobbying by Shigemitsu and Shidehara 
Nanking held firm.2
The refusal of the Kuomintang to accept Obata meant that instead 
plenipotentiary powers were conferred on Shigemitsu, who was promoted to 
the position of Charge d'Affaires. This was a position of great 
responsibility for the still relatively young diplomat, as Sino-Japanese 
relations at this time were gravely troubled by the rise of Chinese 
nationalism and the demands being made by Nanking, in the name of 
'Revolutionary Diplomacy', for the ending of all the unequal treaties. It 
is tempting to infer from this appointment that Shigemitsu was a devoted 
follower of 'Shidehara diplomacy', but any such categorization has to be 
made with some caution, for there was an important division between the two 
men. The difference can be seen in their respective outlooks on Japan's 
position in the world; for Shidehara the mainstay of Japanese policy was 
co-operation with the Western powers, whereas for Shigemitsu the chief 
concern for Japan was its relationship with China. Shigemitsu's emphasis 
on China was the result of his conviction that one of the key factors in 
East Asia in this period was the rise of Chinese nationalism, and that if 
Japan was to take its rightful position in the region then it had to come 
terms with the new China in a spirit of co-operation.3 The difference 
between the two diplomats is most clearly shown by the fact that they were 
linked to different factions within the Gaimusho, Shidehara being seen as 
close to the Ei-Bei-ha (Anglo-American group) while Shigemitsu was 
connected to the Renovationist or China faction that had been founded by 
Arita Hachiro.4
In practice this division meant that Shigemitsu far more than the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs saw Sino-Japanese relations in solely bilateral terms.
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This is confirmed in the former's post-war study of Japan's road to the 
Pacific War, Japan and Her Destiny. My Struggle For Peace (originally 
published in Japanese as Showa no Doran), where he records that, in 
contrast to his foreign colleagues in China, he resided in Nanking and 
Shanghai rather than Peking and did not attend the regular meetings of the 
Diplomatic Corps in the northern capital.5 The task facing Shigemitsu was, 
of course, by no means a simple one; there was a plethora of issues over 
which the Kuomintang expected to see substantial revisions, and many of 
them touched on the very basis of Japan's semi-imperial powers not just in 
China proper but also in Manchuria, the centre of Japanese influence in 
continental Asia. Shigemitsu's favoured policy was to make concessions 
over a wide range of these issues, and thus help to improve relations so 
that when discussion of Manchuria eventually took place it would be in a 
friendly atmosphere where mutual compromise was possible.
His first major success came in May 1930 when he negotiated an agreement 
under which Japan recognized China's tariff autonomy, a move which brought 
Japan into line with the other imperial powers.® The problem was, however, 
that these concessions from the powers only helped to stoke the fire of 
Chinese nationalism further and created a momentum where the Kuomintang, in 
order to live up to its rhetoric had to press for ever more extravagant 
demands. This culminated in the spring of 1931 with a newspaper article by 
C.T. Wang, the Chinese Foreign Minister, in which he listed his timetable 
for the recovery of China's rights, starting with complete customs autonomy 
and working through to the return of legal jurisdiction over foreigners and 
the ending of all foreign concessions and leases; the last with obvious 
implications for Manchuria. At more or less the same time Wang told the 
representatives of the powers that the next item on his agenda was 
extraterritoriality and that they would either have to negotiate away this 
right bilaterally or face the fact that China would abolish it 
unilaterally.7 In the face of this new forthright policy Shigemitsu 
considered that it was necessary to return to Tokyo to explain the 
situation to Shidehara and the Japanese Cabinet, and to urge them to 
continue to make concessions to Nanking in the hope that an outright clash 
could be avoided. His warnings, and a specific proposal he made for the 
return of two minor territorial concessions at Suchow and Hangchow, were,
15
however, dismissed, for the Minseito Government led by Wakatsuki Reijiro, 
due to the criticism of its China policy by the Army and the Seiyukai 
party, felt itself in too weak a position to envisage further compromise 
with Nanking.8
The stage was therefore set in the summer of 1931 for a steady 
deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. As expected the catalyst for 
this rise in tensions was Manchuria; by June the Wanpaoshan Incident and 
the subsequent anti-Chinese riots in Korea had led to the beginning of a 
damaging economic boycott of Japanese goods at Shanghai.9 The problem for 
Shigemitsu was how to stem this tide of mutual antagonism. He was helped 
in his endeavours by Shidehara*s decision in August to appoint him 
officially as Minister to China; a move which caused Sir Francis Lindley, 
the British Ambassador in Tokyo, to observe to the Foreign Office- 
'Although a young man he [Shigemitsu] is recognised as being a capable 
diplomat well acquainted with the difficulties of the present situation.
. . . The Opposition . . . seem on the whole to deprecate the appointment as 
foreshadowing the continuation of the present Government's weak policy 
towards China.'10
This promotion allowed Shigemitsu to negotiate with greater authority, and 
was met in Nanking with none of the resistance that had been evident over 
Obata.
The main strand in Shigemitsu's policy to forestall a major split with 
China was to hold a series of talks with T.V. Soong, the Chinese Finance 
Minister and brother— in-law of Chiang Kai-shek, about the future of 
Manchuria. This became even more necessary in August, when the apparent 
murder of a Japanese intelligence officer, Captain Nakamura Shintaro, by 
Chinese soldiers threw the region into even deeper crisis. In an effort to 
ease tensions Soong and Shigemitsu travelled to Dairen and there, in a 
meeting with Uchida Yasuya, the President of the South Manchurian Railway, 
drew up a comprehensive plan, to deal with the problems in the region, 
which Shigemitsu subsequently sent back to the Gaimusho. After receiving 
approval for this plan from Tokyo, Shigemitsu and Soong decided to make a 
further visit to the north-east so that they could discuss the proposals in 
detail with Uchida and Chang Hsueh-liang, the Chinese ruler of Manchuria.
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Four days before their planned date of departure on 20 September, their 
chances of achieving a success were given an apparent boost when the 
Chinese authorities in Manchuria arrested the man responsible for the 
murder of Nakamura, which offered the possibility that the tensions in the 
region would recede. This proved, however, to be a false dawn as the 
Kwantung Army had already decided that the time had come for action.H
Shigemitsu's first reaction to news of the confused events in Mukden on the 
night of 18 September was to meet with Soong the next day to discuss how to 
stop the fighting. Soong proposed that a six-man commission containing 
three officials from both countries should be set up to settle the incident 
as quickly as possible. Shigemitsu enthusiastically endorsed this proposal 
and, in order to facilitate a prompt end to the fighting, offered to 
continue with the planned visit to Manchuria. After this meeting
Shigemitsu communicated these proposals to Tokyo where they met with 
Shidehara's complete approval. The promise of a joint effort to restore 
peace soon, however, slipped away; on 22 September Soong told Shigemitsu 
that, in the light of the continuing expansion of the fighting by the 
Kwantung Army, the plan for a commission was dead and that China would 
instead appeal to the League of N a t i o n s . 12 The Chinese decision to turn 
away from bilateral negotiations was a great blow for Shigemitsu and in a 
telegram to Shidehara on 23 September he wrote of his disgust at the 
unilateral action taken by the Kwantung Army and lamented that- 
'. . . all the unremitting efforts to build up our position abroad are being 
destroyed in a day.'l3
The tensions between the two countries were further exacerbated following 
the start of the fighting in Manchuria by Nanking's decision to retaliate 
against the Japanese aggression in Manchuria by escalating the boycott of 
Japanese goods. In the economic climate of the early 1930s, when the 
Depression had already caused a decline in the markets available to 
Japanese exports, this was a provocative move to make. The boycott 
introduced in July had already had a severe effect, and trade figures for 
July and August revealed a drop in trade for each month of 69-70 million 
yuan compared to the same months the previous year, and a tightening of the 
economic screw could only lead to a worsening of relations.*4 The
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Kuomintang tried to evade criticism for their action by presenting the 
boycott not as government policy but as a spontaneous outburst of patriotic 
feeling on the part of the people; it was, however, obvious to the Japanese 
where the responsiblity lay. By 10 October the previously conciliatory 
Shigemitsu, under pressure from Japanese businessmen in Shanghai, 
was reduced to warning the Chinese that if the boycott did not stop Japan 
might have to send naval reinforcements to Shanghai, and that any solution 
to the Manchurian question must also include an ending of the boycott.15
If one were to take a critical view of Shigemitsu it might be held that it 
was at this point that he began to veer away from his previous policy of 
conciliation and move closer to the coercive line favoured by the Army. 
This would, however, be an exaggeration; what he was trying to do in the 
autumn of 1931, with the explicit support of Shidehara, was to protect 
Japan's economic stake in China as best he could. This had after all been 
at the centre of Shidehara's policy of conciliation ever since the Northern 
Expedition of 1926. Also his pressure on the Chinese to end the boycott 
must be seen in the context of the pressure being put on the Japanese 
Government by those companies that operated in China, and also the belief 
in government and business circles in Japan that the Chinese were using the 
dispute over Manchuria as an excuse to open an economic war with Japan. In 
fact Shigemitsu was criticized by the Japanese community in Shanghai for 
being too patient with the Chinese failure to curb the b o y c o t t . 15
To protect himself from these accusations and to influence the new Seiyukai 
government to follow a moderate policy towards Nanking, Shigemitsu returned 
to Tokyo on 3 * January 1932 without even waiting for approval for his 
movements from the Gaimusho. At first, due to his unauthorized presence in 
Tokyo, the new Foreign Minister, Yoshizawa Kenichi, refused to meet him, 
and even when they did eventually hold an interview the latter showed 
little enthusiasm for Shigemitsu*s idea for a declaration announcing a new 
policy towards China, and failed to take any notice of his warnings about 
the dangerous rise in tensions in Shanghai.17 Shigemitsu was, however, 
able to communicate his fears to other interested parties, and on 21 
January presented a lecture on the problems in China to the Emperor, who, 
when the Minister had finished, asked Shigemitsu if he thought that close
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Sino-Japanese relations were impossible at this time. Shigemitsu replied 
that as long as the Manchurian problem remained there could be no amicable 
relationship.18
Shigemitsu arrived back in Shanghai at the end of January to find that his 
warnings about the fragile peace in the city had been justified and that 
fighting had broken out between the small band of Japanese Marines in the 
city and the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army. Acting to safeguard the 
interests of Japanese residents and businesses, he felt he had no choice 
but to ask for reinforcements from Japan, and in a comment to the Japanese 
press he stated-
' . . . it is not yet the time to announce a new policy towards China. We 
must fight to protect our interests and right in China. We must protect 
ourselves against revolutionary anti-foreign movements.'*9
To some his actions at this time have appeared as a needless escalation of 
the conflict; Shigemitsu, however, defended this action in Japan and Her 
Destiny by writing-
' . . . it was out of the question that I should tamely submit to the 
annihilation of thousands of unarmed Japanese, together with their vast 
holdings, for it was only right that Japan should defend her treaty rights
at Shanghai.'20
The subsequent campaign in Shanghai and its environs raged for the next 
month until in early March, after further reinforcements had arrived, it 
was clear that the Japanese forces had emerged triumphant. At this point 
Shigemitsu, fearing the international repercussions of continued fighting 
and only too aware that the League of Nations Assembly was due to open very 
soon, persuaded'General Shirakawa Yoshinori, the Commander— in-Chief of the 
Japanese forces, to agree to a unilateral ceasefire and the opening of 
armistice talks.21
In the conference that followed Shigemitsu acted as the chief Japanese 
negotiator. This was to prove a very frustrating job, for as well as being 
faced with the intransigence of the Chinese, he also had to contend with 
the uncompromising stance of the Japanese Army. Sir Miles Lampson, the 
British Minister to China, who was also taking part in the conference, 
noted in his diary-
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’One gets an irresistible impression that Shigemitsu representing the 
civilian side is only a facade in all this and that it is the military who 
dictate what shall be done regardless of what Shigemitsu may say or
f e e l . ’22
Shigemitsu’s difficulties were also noted years later by another of the 
British officials present at the talks, Captain John Godfrey, who went on 
to become Britain's wartime Director of Naval Intelligence, and who noted 
approvingly in his memoirs-
'Even then, in 1933 [sic], he never disguised his feelings, and disagreed 
openly with the Japanese army C in C at international m e e t i n g s . ‘23 
It took almost two months of hard negotiations from the time of the 
ceasefire for a draft armistice to be drawn up on 28 April. Before the 
armistice could be signed, however, disaster struck.
On 29 April at a Japanese parade in Shanghai to honour the Emperor's 
official birthday a bomb was thrown by a Korean nationalist at the viewing 
platform containing the senior Japanese dignatories. The explosion killed 
General Shirakawa and injured many others including Shigemitsu; the latter 
was badly hit in the leg, and for a while the future of the armistice 
appeared to be in jeopardy, as it was at first believed that the outrage 
had been committed by a Chinese nationalist. Shigemitsu, however,
realizing that his work was threatened, insisted that the agreement be
signed and kept on negotiating, despite his great pain and discomfort, 
until finally the armistice was signed in his hospital room on 5 May. It 
was only after the end of the negotiations that he finally allowed the 
doctors to undertake surgery on his damaged leg which led to its amputation 
at the hip.2 4
This episode was an important event in Shigemitsu's career. In the short 
term it led to his being praised widely in Japan for his fortitude and 
becoming something of a national hero, with even the Emperor enquiring 
about his c o n d i t i o n . 2 5  in the long term the incident was also to be
important as it became a key piece of evidence in Shigemitsu's defence at
the Tokyo War Crimes Trial and a number of affidavits recalled his crucial 
role in bringing about a settlement. For example Sir Miles Lampson (or 
Lord Killearn as he had become by 1947), recorded in his affidavit that-
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'On the Japanese side Mr. Shigemitsu from the outset co-operated 
wholeheartedly and much of the credit for reaching an agreement was due to 
his persistent efforts and patient co-operation.'26
These sentiments were confirmed by the affidavits from Nelson Johnson, the 
American Minister, who also emphasized Shigemitsu's vital role in achieving 
a peaceful settlement, and from Moriya Kazuro, the First Secretary at 
Shanghai, who wrote in detail of Shigemitsu*s sick-bed d i p l o m a c y . 2 7
The injury sustained by Shigemitsu in the bombing incident was so serious 
that he did not return to work for another year. When he did reappear in 
May 1933 it was not as Minister to China, but as the successor to Arita 
Hachiro as Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, a considerable promotion for 
the forty-six year old diplomat. This was a decision which was acclaimed 
widely in Japan and the Counsellor at the British Embassy, Snow, reported 
back to London that-
'From the warmth of the welcome he received it is clear that in the popular 
estimation he ranks among the heroes of the Shanghai incident. His 
selection as Vice-Minister should accordingly, do much to enhance the 
Ministry's prestige with the p u b l i c . '28
For Shigemitsu, however, this was not to be an easy posting and his time as 
Vice-Minister has generated the greatest controversy about his career. He 
held the post for almost three years until March 1936, a period in which 
Japan pursued a continental policy of trying to force Nanking to accept 
Japanese dominance over the region and of increasing its hold over North 
China. The charge levelled against him by his critics is that during these 
years he acted as the chief ideologue within the Gaimusho for a policy of 
regional domination, and that this included a willingness to coerce China 
into accepting Japanese leadership and support for the Army's policy of 
encouraging the North Chinese autonomy m o v e m e n t . 2 9
There is an element of truth in some of these assertions, but before the 
accusation is made that Shigemitsu was an unqualified advocate of 
aggression towards China, the motives for the policy he supported as Vice- 
Minister have to be explained. It must first be understood that the 
Manchurian Crisis had left Japan diplomatically isolated and with a feeling
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that its grievances were being ignored by the international community. 
This dissatisfaction was exacerbated further by the fact that those same 
Great Powers, such as Britain and the United States, who led the public 
criticism of Japan were themselves imperialists, and that between 1930 and 
1932 they had, as a response to the economic ravages of the Depression, 
closed off their own spheres of influence to competition from foreign 
trade. Shigemitsu, like many others, felt that this was unjust, and his 
disagreement with the nature of the world order was expressed at length in 
an August 1935 memorandum. In this Shigemitsu pointed to the basic 
hypocrisy of the status quo powers and wrote-
’[The] Nations most committed to upholding the status quo are the victors 
[of the First World War], particularly those endowed with large territory 
and abundant resources, accounting in fact for the bulk of what the earth 
has to offer.... These countries have acquired all that they could and then 
speak of maintaining the status quo. Such an assertion is losing validity 
today. . . . The idea that the maintenance of the status quo equals peace is 
becoming more and more difficult to accept.'30
The economic policies of Britain and the United States particularly 
affected Japan because of its lack of raw materials and need for export 
markets. The obstacles put in the way of access to the markets controlled 
by Britain and America forced Japan to concentrate on building its economic 
future in East Asia, but here too there were problems; the setting up of 
Manchukuo had led to a wave of anti-Japanese sentiment sweeping China and 
to an apparent resurgence of Soviet interest in the region, exemplified by 
Stalin's recognition of the Nationalist Government in China in December 
1932. To safeguard its investment in China and Manchukuo, Japan had to 
exercise political and military dominance over the region, a policy which 
could be justified by pointing out that it was no different to British 
dominance over an Empire which covered a quarter of the globe, or to the 
United States control over Latin America through the Monroe Doctrine. The 
problem was, however, that this policy portended an unavoidable clash with 
the Western powers, as Japanese dominance over the region could never be 
assured while the West still held on to their privileges in China.
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It may seem at first sight that for Shigemitsu to espouse such a policy of 
regional domination goes against the diplomacy that he had carried out as 
Minister to China. Two factors need, however, to be borne in mind; first, 
that he had always viewed the bilateral Sino-Japanese relationship as the 
crucial linchpin for the region and, second, that in September 1931 it was 
the Chinese who had abandoned, on the governmental level, the policy of 
working for a mutually beneficial regional arrangement and instead opted 
for a policy of co-operation with the West in order to contain the 
Japanese. To Shigemitsu it was therefore necessary to persuade China to
give up its anti-Japanese policy and to achieve this by weakening its ties
with the West, so that eventually a Japan-China-Manchukuo bloc could be set 
up in East Asia for the economic benefit of all. Shigemitsu also advocated 
this policy because he was a staunch anti-communist and, fearing the 
effects of Soviet expansionism, desired to establish a buffer in China to 
contain Soviet influence. In essence the policy he pursued as Vice- 
Minister was only different from that he had espoused previously in the 
fact that circumstances now decreed the need for more overt political 
control and for China to be coerced into relinquishing its links with the 
West.31
The position facing Shigemitsu as he took office was that Nanking was 
continuing with its pro-Western line despite the ending of the crisis over 
Manchuria. The chief protagonist of this policy was T.V. Soong, who was 
attempting to negotiate a series of loans with the West such as a wheat and 
cotton loan with the United States and a new loan from the banks that had 
traditionally made up the China Consortium, but excluding the Japanese 
Yokohama Specie' Bank, and to build on the recommendation included in the 
Lytton Report that the League of Nations should help with the 
reconstruction of C h i n a . 33 The Chinese attempt to interest the Western
powers in the region was viewed in the Gaimusho as an effort to improve
Nanking’s ability to resist Japan and therefore as a threat to the peace 
and stability of East Asia. The Japanese reaction was to try to forestall 
the Chinese plans and assert Japan's regional dominance by warning other 
powers from interfering in East Asia. This line was first made public on 1 
April 1934 when Foreign Minister Hirota Koki told the Japanese Diet that 
Japan had sole responsibility for the stability of East Asia. This was
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followed on 17 April by the infamous and more specific Amau Statement, in 
which the head of the Gaimusho's information division, Amau. Eiji, told 
Japanese journalists that Japan not only had the responsibility for
maintaining peace in the region, but also opposed any efforts by third 
parties to provide China with financial or military aid, as such attempts 
to assist Nanking were bound to have political significance.33
The Amau statement, which caused considerable concern in Nanking and the 
capitals of the West, can be seen as having its origin in a memorandum 
drawn up by Shigemitsu in September 1933. In this important document,
which had been inspired by the need to study the link between the concept
of disarmament and the security of East Asia, he had argued that the 
problems of maintaining peace in the region were such that disarmament 
could only be viewed as 'idealistic' and that instead-
'Other nations should, explicitly or implicitly, recognize Japan’s special 
position in the Far East. Should any nation attempt to interfere with this 
position, Japan must resolutely take any measures necessary for its
defence. Japan has no aggressive intentions, territorial or political, 
toward the United States or other powers. Japan is, however, determined to 
defend at any cost its position of responsibility in the Far East.'34 
To support his argument Shigemitsu noted that this policy was justified due 
to the internal turmoil of China and the expansionist ambitions of the 
Soviet Union, two factors that made control of East Asia by the tenets of 
Wilsonian internationalism totally impossible. The motivation for the Amau 
statement can also be seen in a conversation Shigemitsu held with Baron 
Harada, the secretary to Prince Saionji, in which he declared that- 
'At the present- time the League of Nations is loaning money to China and 
giving aid. Great Britain is also giving aid to China and certain types of 
assistances become a hindrance for Japan. Therefore, Great Britain may 
withdraw from China because of the statement that was made in the papers 
and I think that the issue will quiet down.*35
The Amau statement did, however, have the desired effect on Nanking. 
Chiang Kai-shek, who was pursuing a policy of non-resistance towards Japan 
while he dealt with the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, 
quietly cancelled the various projects that Soong had been arranging and
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showed a willingness to engage in talks about re-establishing air and
postal links between Manchukuo and the rest of C h i n a . 36 The apparent
success of this policy caused the Gaimusho to study how this momentum could 
be built upon, and in a memorandum drawn up on 20 October 1934 Shigemitsu 
elaborated on his views that foreign power in China should be curbed. He 
suggested that Japan should seek the dissolution of the Chinese Maritime 
Customs Service, which was dominated by Britain, the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops and naval forces from North China through the abolition of 
the Boxer Protocol garrisons in the region, the promotion of Japan's 
diplomatic representative to China to the status of Ambassador and his 
transfer from Shanghai to Nanking, and that eventually an offer should be 
made to negotiate over extraterritoriality.37 The idea behind these 
measures was that a large number of concessions would blunt the anti- 
Japanese movement in China and therefore China's xenophobia would instead 
be directed towards the West; Japan meanwhile would retain its influence in 
the region due to its position in M a n c h u k u o . 38 Again there is here a clear 
consistency in both method and aim with the views that Shigemitsu had 
expressed to Shidehara in April 1931; which is that Japan by readjusting 
its relations with China could make the bilateral Sino-Japanese
relationship the centre of regional politics with Japan as the dominant
partner, thus forcing the Western powers to accept a considerably weakened 
position where they were only to operate in China as states with economic 
ties rather than political and military influence.
The problem for Shigemitsu was that this policy attracted the strong 
disapproval of the Army, for, although the Army shared some of the same 
beliefs, their main concern was to weaken Chiang Kai-shek so as to further 
their plans for an autonomous North China and they certainly had no 
intention of withdrawing their forces from that region. The result was 
that over the coming year Japan was to develop a dual policy towards China 
with the Army and the Gaimusho pursuing at times completely contradictory 
aims. Unfortunately the Army came out of this power struggle victorious; 
their earliest triumph was to persuade the Cabinet on 7 December 1934 to 
agree to a policy of seeking 'to reduce to a minimum degree the influence 
of the Chinese central government in North C h i n a ' . 39 Despite this Hirota 
carried on with the line proposed by Shigemitsu, and on 22 January 1935 the
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former told the Japanese Diet that Sino-Japanese relations were improving 
and called on China to end all anti-Japanese activities and to collaborate 
with Japan and Manchukuo in the economic field. This speech met with a 
favourable response in Nanking and efforts were made by the Kuomintang to 
censor anti-Japanese newspapers.40 Such was the improvement in relations 
that on 6 March Shigemitsu announced-
'The rapprochement between Japan and China was brought about as the result
of the mutual discovery that there is a perfect concurrence between the 
Greater Asia doctrine of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Oriental doctrine 
of the Japanese people. In other words, Japan and China, as two good 
neighbours, are now returning to their normal relationship.’4*
The culmination of this atmosphere of optimism came in May when Japan,
acting on Shigemitsu’s suggestion, raised the status of its Minister in
China to that of Ambassador and opened an Embassy in Nanking.
However, this period of Sino-Japanese reconciliation did not last very 
long. The major challenge to the policy espoused by Shigemitsu came as one 
would expect from the Japanese Army, which had since the winter of 193J^ - 
been steadily trying to undermine the Gaimusho's policy towards China and 
expand their own influence in North China. By May it was clear that the 
Army were stepping up their pressure in the region, and on 30 May 
Shigemitsu told Kido Koichi, the secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy 
Seal, that in his opinion-
'... this step against China is based on the idea of [Lt.-General] Itagaki 
and others who have been intending to let the military, instead of the 
diplomatic circles, take the lead in negotiations with the Chinese 
Government, just as in the case of Manchurian p o l i t i c s . ' 4 2
Shigemitsu was proved right, when, in June, disturbances in the region 
provided the Army with the chance to push the Kuomintang out of Hopei and 
Chahar provinces under the terms of the Ho-Umezu agreement of 10 June and 
the Chin-Doihara agreement of 27 June respectively.^ These events caused 
the Chinese to put pressure on Hirota to intervene with the Army, but, in a 
move that confirmed the growing powerlessness of the Gaimusho, the Kwantung 
Army refused to bow to the lacklustre pressure from the Foreign Minister.44
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The Chinese also tried circumventing the Japanese Army by stepping up the 
pressure on Hirota to conclude a political agreement, and on 17 June the 
Chinese Ambassador to Japan, Chiang Tso-pin, reiterated to the Japanese 
Foreign Minister China's desire for a treaty based on the abrogation of the 
unequal treaties and an end to the encouragement of North Chinese autonomy. 
This offer led to Shigemitsu calling a meeting at the Gaimusho on 27 June 
to discuss how Japan should respond. The subsequent conference, which was 
also attended by Counsellor Tani Masayuki, Kuwashima Kazue, the head of the 
Asian Affairs Bureau, and Morishima Goro, the chief of the first section of 
the Asian Affairs Bureau, concluded that Japan was not in a position to 
agree to a comprehensive treaty and should opt instead for the settlement 
of issues one by one, so as to avoid giving the impression that Japan was 
presenting China with another Twenty-One Demands. It was also proposed 
that the talks with China should proceed on the basis of three principles, 
the ending of anti-Japanese activities, the de facto recognition of 
Manchukuo, and co-operation against communism. The meeting also considered 
how the Gaimushd could best handle the Army. Over this issue it was agreed 
that the best policy would be to persuade the Kwantung Army to concentrate 
its efforts on expanding its influence in Inner Mongolia in order to 
counter Soviet expansionism in the region, and thus downgrade the priority 
given to the autonomy drive in North China south of the Great W a l l . 4 5  in 
putting forward this policy Shigemitsu showed his continued opposition to 
the Army, but also displayed a realization that they could not simply be 
ignored and that it was necessary to humour some of their demands.
The problem was, however, that the Army was not prepared to be fobbed off, 
and insisted that the diplomatic line towards China should continue to 
reflect their own interests. Their disagreement with the 'soft* policy put 
forward by Shigemitsu and his supporters led to three months of debate over 
the correct response to the Chinese, and in the end the Gaimusho was forced 
to make a number of compromises. The three principles which Shigemitsu had 
seen as shaping Sino-Japanese relations were now changed into preconditions 
for China to honour before any treaty could be signed, and the stress on 
mutual co-operation in the Gaimusho's original draft was severely diluted. 
In addition the Army rejected a proposal from the Navy for a declaration 
promising non-intervention in China's internal affairs. The result of
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these deliberations was the formation of what became known as Hirota’s 
Three Principles, which were approved by the Japanese Cabinet on 4 October 
1935 and passed to the Chinese Ambassador in Tokyo by Hi rota three days 
later. At first, despite the unwelcome additions and revisions made by the 
Army, the Three Principles proved acceptable to China as the basis for 
further talks, but progress was soon thwarted not only by the actions of 
the Japanese Army, but also by the intervention of B r i t a i n . 4 6
The unwelcome arrival of the British at this juncture was an indirect 
result of the policy that Japan had pursued towards Britain since the end 
of the Manchurian Crisis. On a general level the Japanese Government had 
become all too aware after its departure from the League of Nations in 
March 1933 that Japan was in danger of being thrust into isolation, and it 
was therefore thought necessary to rebuild relations with the Western 
powers and avoid, in particular, the appearance of an Anglo-Saxon anti- 
Japanese front. This was, however, in practice a difficult undertaking; 
the United States, though largely inactive in the region, insisted on 
adhering strictly to a policy of moral condemnation of Japan's actions in 
China, while relations with Britain were stalled over three vital areas of 
concern, naval disarmament, Japanese trade with the British Empire, and 
China. The first of these was largely the preserve of the Imperial 
Japanese Navy, but in the other two areas the GaimushS was dominant and 
sought to push Britain into agreements that would satisfy Japanese
ambitions.47
In regard to the British presence in China the basis of Japanese policy was 
to bring Britain around to accepting the legitimacy of Japan's claim for 
regional dominance and to get recognition of Manchukuo, thus ensuring that 
Britain's interest in the region would be predominantly an economic one. 
Shigemitsu was instrumental in this policy, and in 1934, in an effort to 
forward a rapprochement, he encouraged the idea of a visit to Japan and 
Manchukuo by the Barnby Mission, a group of British industrialists 
sponsored by the Federation of British Industry, who wished to assess the 
possibility of investment in Manchukuo by British companies.48 The 
Japanese willingness to encourage the idea of this venture appeared on the 
surface to be economic, but in fact the real motivation was political and
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designed to cultivate an awareness in Britain of the benefits that could be 
derived from co-operation in China with Japan. This was clearly 
demonstrated when the industrialists arrived in Tokyo in late September as 
Shigemitsu took advantage of their presence to hold a number of talks with 
Arthur Edwardes, who as financial adviser in London to the Manchukuo 
Government had unofficially accompanied the Mission to Japan, the topic 
being the need for greater Anglo-Japanese co-operation in China.49
Edwardes was an important figure because he provided a direct link to Sir 
Warren Fisher, the Permanent Secretary at the Treasury, who was a key 
figure in the group in Britain pushing for an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement. 
It appears that Edwardes took with him to Japan instructions from Fisher to 
sound out the chances for a non-aggression pact, and certainly on his 
return to London he briefed Fisher fully on the pro-British sentiments of 
Shigemitsu and the other senior officials he m e t . 50 Edwardes's report was 
also backed up by hints to British officials in London from Matsudaira 
Tsuneo, the Japanese Ambassador to Britain, of Japan's interest in a new 
understanding. On 14 November 1934 Shigemitsu told Baron Harada- 
' . . . the Ministry is trying to bring about a rapprochement between Japan 
and Britain. It would not come right out and make an alliance, but it was 
going to form something like a Four-Power Pact.... These plans ... were of 
the utmost secrecy and are not even discussed at Cabinet m e e t i n g s . '51 
Knowledge of Japan's apparent enthusiasm for an understanding did not, 
however, mean that Fisher was willing to co-operate with the Gaimusho's two 
main aims in its policy towards Britain of a security pact in the Pacific 
and a British political retreat from China. Instead it led him towards a 
plan for Anglo-Japanese co-operation as equals in China, and specifically 
to construct in the winter of 1934/5 an idea for the revival of control by 
the China Consortium over China's finances; a proposal that eventually 
culminated in the Leith-Ross M i s s i o n . 52
Fisher was encouraged to proceed with his plans by a growing number of 
friendly overtures from Japan that carried on into the New Year. On 7 
January 1935 Sir Robert Clive wrote of a conversation he had had with 
Shigemitsu, whom he described as an 'outspoken realist with very little 
sentiment in his make-up' , in which the latter had said that it appeared
29
that Japan and Britain were coming together after years of e s t r a n g e m e n t .53 
When informed of the plans circulating in the Treasury, however, Clive 
quickly realised that the Treasury's perception of Japanese policy was 
misplaced, and warned the Foreign Office that -
’The British initiative in proposing consultations about the financial 
situation in China runs counter to the Japanese sponsored claim to take the 
lead in matters concerning China. This claim they have so far not ventured 
officially but there is no question that the present Vice Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amau and other senior members of the Japanese Foreign 
Office consider such a claim absolutely j u s t ifi e d . ' 5 4
This accurate assessment of Shigemitsu*s policy failed, however, to have 
any effect on the Treasury, who continued to construct a grand scheme in 
which the financial reconstruction of China would be linked to a pledge by 
Nanking to give de jure recognition to Manchukuo, and thereby restore 
stability to the region.
The result of the Treasury’s policy was that in September 1935 the 
Financial Adviser to the British Government, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, 
arrived in Tokyo to explain the British proposals to the Japanese, only to 
find that his welcome was somewhat muted, in considerable contrast to the 
reception given to the Barnby Mission a year before. The Japanese reaction 
to the British plans was to view them as an ill-timed and dangerous 
intervention in the region, and an attempt to re-establish Britain's 
position in China, just as Clive had predicted. In two meetings between 
Shigemitsu and Leith-Ross on 10 and 18 September the latter found little 
enthusiasm for either the proposal over Manchukuo or a loan to China and it 
appeared that the British plan was to be s t i l l b o r n . 5 5  This did not mean 
that the Gaimusho had changed its mind on the importance of improving 
relations with Britain, for on 30 October Hirota told Baron Harada- 
' . . . it is our desire to find an opportunity to join hands with Great 
Britain through our relationship with China. Therefore, because it would 
be bad if Japan and China were opposing each other, it is our intention to 
better this relationship and then approach B r i t a i n . '56
Hirota planned to achieve the first step in this policy by developing 
economic co-operation with Japan and in October he welcomed a Chinese 
economic mission to J a p a n . 57
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Any chance of achieving such a goal was, however, destroyed by Leith-Ross's 
activities. After his setback in Japan Leith-Ross travelled on to China, 
where he held discussions about finance with the Kuomintang Government and 
proceeded to advise them on the setting up of their new currency, the fapi, 
which was launched on 3 November.58 This move constituted an even greater 
threat to the Gaimusho's policy than the original British proposals, as the 
construction of a strong Chinese currency had the potential to strengthen 
greatly Nanking's ability to resist Japan. This action therefore led to the 
Gaimusho to warn the British of the damage that was being done to the 
stability of the region. On 28 November, as rumours spread of a British 
loan being planned to support the new currency, Shigemitsu told the British 
Counsellor in Tokyo, A.F.H. Wiggin, that-
'Japanese Government recognised that he [Leith-Ross] was a well-known 
public figure in Great Britain and a technical expert of highest 
qualifications and indisputable integrity. But for these very reasons his 
political exploitation had been too good a chance for the anti-Japanese 
clique at Nanking to miss and his latest movements and utterances left no 
doubt that he was now involved in the thick of Chinese party politics.'59
As well as harming Japan's intention to increase its economic ties with 
China, the British intervention was also unfortunate in that it acted as a 
further stimulus to the aggressive designs of the Army. In November, 
partly spurred on by the currency reform, the Kwantung Army escalated its 
autonomy drive in North China, despite Shigemitsu's earlier attempt to 
divert their attentions to Inner Mongolia. On 18 November, Majoi— General 
Doihara Kenji started the process by issuing an ultimatum to the Chinese 
military leader in the region, Sung Che-yuan, either to declare Hopei 
province autonomous by 20 November or to face invasion by the Kwantung 
A r m y . 5 9  This abrupt demand was a dreadful mistake, as it staked Japanese 
prestige on the achievement of autonomy; this was a matter of some 
embarrassment in Tokyo as it was believed that if China managed to resist 
successfully the Japanese demands it would give the impression that Japan 
was weak and act as a spur to the anti-Japanese movement. This fear forced 
the GaimushS to come out in support of the Army's autonomy plans and to 
exert pressure on the Chinese to make concessions. On 19 November in a 
talk with Harada, Shigemitsu exclaimed in a state of frustration-
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'I would like to have the Army make an autonomous statement today. I would
like to send the Kwantung Army into Shanhaikuan and Hopei to put a scare
into them [the Chinese] ... I would like to have everything done the way 
the Army wants before the Emperor returns.'61
The problem was made even worse when Sung, with encouragement from Chiang
Kai-shek, unexpectedly turned down Doihara's ultimatum, which led to the 
Kwantung Army increasing the pressure by arranging on 25 November for the 
formation of the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council. This move, 
however, could not hide the fact that Doihara had failed, and to rescue the 
situation the Gaimusho put forward a policy of pushing Nanking to accept 
'mild' autonomy for North China. This plan was acceptable to Chiang Kai- 
shek and the supporters of a policy of non-resistance to Japan, and on 12 
December the Hopei-Chahar Political Council was set up in Peking led by 
S u n g . 6 2 Before this event occurred Shigemitsu expressed his hope to Harada 
that the situation could soon be settled and noted-
'After the recent serious failure of the Japanese Garrison in North China, 
I wish that the Army could be withdrawn in a way that would save its 
existing prestige.... In viewing our internal policy, a rather strong 
policy should be maintained, while gradually neutralizing the crisis so as 
not to make the Japanese Garrison in North China feel desperate on account 
of their recent failure on the one hand, and so maintain the favourable 
relationship with North China, which is to be given proper self-government 
on the other hand.*63
This comment qualified the outburst he made to Harada on 19 November and 
made clear that his apparent support for the Army on that date had been due 
to the danger that Chinese resistance to Doihara's demands would compromise 
entirely Japan's policy towards China.
The Gaimusho was therefore forced by the Army to assimilate the North China 
autonomy drive into its policy towards China; a development which was 
clearly demonstrated at a meeting of the departmental heads on 8 January
1936. In this discussion Shigemitsu put forward the view that it should be 
explained to the Chinese that Japan had vital interests in North China and 
that if this contention was challenged by Nanking the Japanese response 
should be to link the issue to Chinese recognition of Manchukuo. There was
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a recognition in the meeting that any chance for a comprehensive settlement 
based on the Three Principles had receded, but there remained hope that 
talks could carry on in the spirit of the Japanese g u i d e l i n e s . 6 4  This 
trace of optimism was soon dashed as the Japanese Army's actions, which had 
exacerbated rather than diminished anti-Japanese sentiment in China, led on 
22 January 1936 to a Chinese announcement that Hirota*s Three Principles
were too vague a base on which to begin t a l k s . 65
The pre-eminent position that the Army had established for itself in China 
policy was not only unfortunate in that it undermined the Gaimusho's policy 
towards Nanking, but also because it caused further difficulties for Japan
with the Western powers. This was particularly important in the winter of
1935/6 because Japan, under pressure from the Navy, was on the verge of 
walking out of the Naval conference in London in January 1936 and needed to 
avoid further international criticism. Fearing diplomatic isolation, 
Hirota and Shigemitsu had already in December 1935 tried to placate Britain 
and the United States with a renewed proposal for a Non-Aggression Pact, 
and after this had been rejected turned instead to the idea of reversing 
their previous negative stance towards Leith-Ross. On 19 February 
Shigemitsu told Clive that the British Financial Adviser would be very 
welcome to visit Japan before his return to Britain from China, and
stressed that pro-British sentiment in Japan had risen recently as the 
removal of the naval issue had calmed the N a v y . 66
Shigemitsu was, however, only too well aware that no improvement in Anglo- 
Japanese relations could be achieved while the Army was acting as a 
virtually free agent in North China, and he was faced with the difficult 
task of somehow reconciling their activities with the Gaimusho's policy and 
providing a legitimate defence for the establishment of autonomy in the 
region. In a meeting with Sir Robert Clive on 14 January, he attempted to 
provide an explanation which the British Ambassador described to the
Foreign Office in the following manner-
'Mr. Shigemitsu did not really attempt to defend the aggressive methods of 
the military and admitted that the latter had caused much embarrassment to 
his department. He did insist, however, that the autonomy movement was
genuine in the sense that the Northern Chinese had never liked the
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Kuomintang, that they watched the practical independence of Canton with 
envy and wished themselves to have the same sort of independence of the 
Nanking Government. Naturally the Japanese were not adverse to this. They 
were bound to be suspicious of communism and the infiltration of Soviet 
propaganda, and to encourage the autonomy of Hopei and Chahar which could 
act as a buffer against the spread of Soviet doctrines into Manchukuo was 
only sound policy.'67
This argument became the standard line for Japanese diplomats in justifying 
the North China policy and was aimed at playing on the anti-Soviet 
sentiments of the Conservative Party in Britain, and thus underlining that 
the containment of communism provided a further motive for Britain to move 
closer to Japan. The Gaimusho had begun to construct a "defence against 
communism" policy in the autumn of 1935 as a response to the build-up of 
Soviet forces in the Maritime Provinces and the Comintern's call at its 
Seventh Congress in July 1935 for a 'united front' policy to resist 
f a s c i s m . 68 The establishment of this anti-Soviet line was not only 
important in Japanese overtures to Britain but also meant that, when Hirota 
and Shigemitsu learnt in the winter of 1936 of the talks that Major— General 
Oshima Hiroshi, the Japanese Military Attache in Berlin, was holding fcal-fej 
with Hitler's adviser on foreign policy, Joachim von Ribbentrop, about co­
operation against the Soviet Union, they raised no serious objections, and 
agreed to the drafting of an anti-Comintern pact, although they hoped that 
responsibility for the talks be transferred from Oshima to the Ambassador 
to Germany, Mushakoji K i n t o m o . 6 9  Certainly Shigemitsu had a marked 
antipathy towards the Soviet Union, and on 20 March, as calls for a 'united 
front' in China-gained momentum, he told Harada about his fears of Soviet 
expansionism, stating-
'Russia has taken energetic steps to encourage the Chinese Communists to 
resist Japan. We may reasonably assume that China will rely on Russia 
increasingly as time goes by. Japan has never taken China seriously.... If 
we treat China too harshly, it will only swing China that much closer to 
Russia. There is sufficient reason to believe that 'Stir Up China' is a 
slogan that has been used by Russia to oppose Japan.*70
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The policy of "defence against communism" also had the advantage that it 
had the broad approval of the Army, but despite this tensions between 
Shigemitsu and the military were growing markedly. This was largely due to 
his continued opposition to the Army's independent policy in China. The 
bitter nature of this dispute was revealed in a conversation that 
Shigemitsu held with the British Naval Attache in Tokyo, Captain Guy Vivian 
on 13 February. In this talk the Vice-Minister talked of his dislike of 
recent events in Japan and Vivian later reported to his Ambassador that- 
'I have never known Mr. Shigemitsu so expansive or to speak with such 
conviction as he did on this occasion making no secret of his disgust at 
the part the Army and Navy is taking in trying to control national 
policy.'71
In forwarding Vivian's record of the conversation to London Clive noted in 
addition to the Naval Attache's observations that there were rumours 
circulating in Tokyo that the tensions between the Army and the Vice- 
Minister were becoming so serious that the latter might soon r e s i g n . 7 2
The Army's distrust of Shigemitsu was not long in coming into the open. 
After the failed coup of 26 February 1936 and the subsequent elevation of 
Hirota to the position of Prime Minister, the new Foreign Minister, Arita 
Hachiro, decided to replace Shigemitsu as Vice-Minister with Horinouchi 
Kensuke. The problem then was what to do with Shigemitsu; Hirota had for 
some time been considering sending him to China as Ambassador, but when 
this was suggested in April 1936 it was met with implacable opposition from 
the Army. The latter did not wish to see the independently minded 
Shigemitsu in such a position, desiring instead to have promoted to the 
post the more malleable Kawagoe Shigeru, who as Consul-General in Tientsin 
had acquiesced in the autonomy for North China policy. After this 
disappointment Hirota and Arita considered elevating Shigemitsu to the 
House of Peers, but the list of officials awaiting this honour was so long 
that this too was considered impractical. The only alternative left was to 
assign Shigemitsu to a first-class Ambassadorial post overseas; the 
favoured choice for Hirota and Arita was to send him to Moscow, but while 
this decision was pondered Shigemitsu found himself without any formal 
post.7 3
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Following the disappointments of the spring Shigemitsu took a well-earned 
rest over the summer months. His thinking during this period ranged over 
many of the issues facing Japan, and in a letter to Arthur Edwardes on 11 
July he stated that he had in particular been dwelling on the problems in 
Anglo-Japanese relations. One of his chief concerns in this area was the 
mutual antagonism that had arisen in London and Tokyo over policy towards 
China, and he warned that-
'These charges and counter-charges, however unjust and baseless, indicate 
the existence of an unwholesome atmosphere created by misunderstanding and 
mistrust.'74
Another field in which he saw the potential for trouble was in commercial 
relations, where Japan felt that its trade was being discriminated against 
by the existence of the Imperial Preference policy. Shigemitsu noted to 
Edwardes-
'The Japanese are extremely irritated under the pressure of British policy 
against the legitimate expansion of their trade, which is of vital 
necessity to their national existence and growth, and which, despite the 
alarm so loudly sounded, constitutes only 3 or 4 per cent of world trade. 
Here our grievances are justified, I believe, to a large e x t e n t . ' 7 5  
His solution to these problems was to argue that the two countries should 
start a series of general conversations so as to build up an atmosphere 
where the more intractable individual questions could be solved.
To some degree Shigemitsu in this letter was predicting the position that 
his predecessor as Ambassador to Britain, Yoshida Shigeru, was to take in 
talks in London over the next year. Shigemitsu was, however, to have 
little to do with this series of negotiations, for his next post was to be 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union. He found himself in this position because, 
in August 1936, Arita offered him a choice between going to the Soviet 
Union or Germany, and he had chosen the former on the grounds that he was 
interested in studying the Bolsheviks at close quarters.7  ^ This was, of 
course, a very challenging post to take as Russo-Japanese relations had 
continued to be strained in the summer of 1936, with a number of border 
incidents adding to the generally tense atmosphere.77 The tone of his time 
in Moscow was, indeed, set from the very day of his arrival, 25 November
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1936, which coincided inauspiciously with the signing in Berlin of the 
Anti-Comintern Pact.
During the next two years Shigemitsu was faced with an ever increasing 
number of incidents to settle; in 1937 alone there were 113 separate 
clashes on the Soviet-Manchukuo border.78 The most dangerous incident, 
occurred in 1938 due to a dispute over who held sovereignty of Changkufeng, 
a hill on the Korean-Soviet border. This once again drew Shigemitsu into a 
controversy.70 The Ambassador first heard of this incident while 
travelling in Sweden in July, and rushed immediately back to Moscow to see 
if a diplomatic solution could be found. He held his first talk with Maxim 
Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on 20 July and 
forwarded the demand he had received from his Foreign Minister, General 
Ugaki Kazushige, for immediate Russian withdrawal from the disputed hill. 
Litvinov, whose diplomatic manner was as brusque as Shigemitsu's, briskly 
dismissed the Japanese request and claimed that he had a map that proved 
that Changkufeng belonged to the Soviet Union, to which Shigemitsu 
responded by claiming, in just as forthright a manner, that the priority 
was to achieve a ceasefire and that the territorial disagreement could only 
be discussed once the fighting stopped. This led to a diplomatic impasse 
in Moscow and thus the focus of events reverted once more to Changkufeng.80
On 31 July local Japanese forces took the incident into their own hands by 
launching an offensive to retake the hill; this immediately threatened to 
escalate the conflict and underlined the necessity for a quick diplomatic 
solution. Orders were sent from Tokyo to Shigemitsu to press Litvinov 
again for a ceasefire, but the Ambassador proved tardy in putting these 
instructions into effect as he had little information about the situation 
on the ground and had hoped that Litvinov would come round to his way of 
thinking. He finally saw Litvinov on 4 August, but the Commissar insisted 
on sticking to his original position, so that what should have become 
negotiations for peace instead descended into a game of bluff.61 
Shigemitsu*s diplomatic fencing with Litvinov did not, however, gain him 
much sympathy in Tokyo and there were fears that his lack of activity was 
dictated by a fear of criticism by the Japanese Army if he should appear to 
be appeasing the Russians. On 8 August Navy Minister, Yonai Mitsumasa,
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told Baron Harada that he felt that-
‘Shigemitsu has a fear of the Army: or, if not, that he just does not
comprehend the characteristics of this incident; i.e., he does not grasp 
the fundamentals of his instructions. His method of drawing out the 
negotiations by utilizing "tactics" is not desirable.*82
As a consequence of these doubts Shigemitsu was sent on 10 August very 
specific instructions for a renewed peace effort which would lead to a 
mutual withdrawal to the front line of 29 July and the setting up of a 
buffer zone along the border claimed by the Soviets. Shigemitsu 
immediately called on Litvinov to forward these proposals, but still met 
with intransigence over the issue of a Soviet withdrawal, although not over 
the idea of a ceasefire. In the face of this opposition and in compliance 
with his orders Shigemitsu backed down reluctantly from his original 
position and agreed to a unilateral Japanese withdrawal. In the end, 
however, Japan was saved from this embarrassing situation by a Soviet 
climbdown, and in the ceasefire agreed upon at midnight of 10/11 August 
both sides were allowed to remain in the positions they held at the moment 
fighting stopped.03
Shigemitsu saw this agreement as a 'diplomatic victory' for the position he 
had taken since the outbreak of the fighting, and Foreign Minister Ugaki 
recorded in his diary that the satisfactory solution of the incident was in 
a large part due to the Ambassador's skilful handling of the negotiations 
with L i t v i n o v . 8 4  The talks were, however, to have repercussions in both 
the long and the short term. In the former Shigemitsu's role in this 
affair was to be one of the chief justifications for his indictment by the 
Soviets for war crimes in 1946.85 in the short term Soviet resentment of 
the Ambassador may have been a factor in his rapid transfer a few months 
after the incident from Moscow to the position of Ambassador to Britain . 
Whether this was an important motive for his new appointment is not 
entirely clear, and it does seem that there were other problems within the 
Gaimusho at this time that necessitated a game of diplomatic musical 
chairs, as Yoshida in London had come to retirement age, and Togo Shigenori 
had not proved to be a very successful Ambassador to B e r l i n . 86 Certainly 
at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial Ugaki dismissed the idea that t-hmh
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Shigemitsu*s transfer had been the result of displeasure at the latter's 
handling of the Soviets, and he recollected that-
'The appointment of Mr. Shigemitsu to the post of Ambassador to Great 
Britain was made shortly prior to my resignation as Foreign Minister. At 
that time relations between that country and Japan were very delicate and 
required expert handling. It was a promotion and did not indicate any 
dissatisfaction with his work in Moscow. Furthermore I had heard from no 
one in Russia nor anywhere else that the Soviet Union did not desire him as 
Ambassador nor that that country was dissatisfied with his work. I knew 
that he had done his best to carry out the policy of the Government to 
remain at peace with the Soviet Union, that he had been successful and 
therefore recommended his promotion. More important I knew from his 
skilful handling of this incident of his great ability, and I believed that 
if this ability was transferred to London it would be beneficial to both 
Japan and Great Britain.'87
Although this may have been the case as seen from Tokyo, it was undeniable 
that Shigemitsu had not made a very favourable impression on the Soviets. 
On 9 August the Soviet Ambassador to Britain, Ivan Maisky, told Sir 
Lancelot Oliphant, a Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office- 
' . . . the present Japanese Ambassador in Moscow was not the person to make 
any negotiations easier. M. Shigemitsu when in China, had been regarded as 
moderate and liberal - so far as any Japanese could be described as such. 
Now, however, and ever since his arrival in Moscow two years ago he was a 
protagonist of the Japanese military party.'88
The Soviet antipathy to Shigemitsu was certainly reciprocated by the 
latter, and it was clear from many of the comments that he made in London 
that his sojourn in Moscow had not diluted in his deep hatred of communism. 
Indeed Arthur Edwardes recorded in a letter to R.A. Butler in 1940- 
'When H.E. [Shigemitsu] came to London direct from Moscow, I used to think 
the activities of the Bear were rather a bee in his bonnet, which is a 
somewhat zoologically mixed m e t a p h o r . * 8 9
The controversy caused by Shigemitsu*s handling of the Changkufeng crisis 
was typical of this combative diplomat and makes clear that his career as 
an Ambassador can only be understood by recognising that he was first and
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foremost a Japanese patriot whose every effort in negotiations was
Vice-Minister at the Gaimusho. In making such a statement one is, of
course, open to the accusation that this is a very obvious comment to make 
and that it is indeed applicable to any diplomat of whatever nation. But 
that is the whole point; to show that in seeking what he thought was the 
best for Japan in the early to mid~1930s Shigemitsu was doing only what any 
diplomat would have done under extremely difficult circumstances.
The confrontational atmosphere in international relations in this period, 
arising from a brew of political, military and economic factors, such as 
the effects of the Depression and fear of the spread of communism,
necessarily shaped how Shigemitsu approached what he saw as the key to
Japan's destiny, which was the need to build up Japanese influence in
continental Asia. It forced him to move towards a more overtly coercive 
policy than he had supported in the period before the Manchurian Crisis, 
and to support the drive to assert Japanese dominance over the region in 
order to break China's reliance on the West and on the Soviet Union. His 
approach was also influenced by the domestic circumstances of Japan in the 
1930s where the Army was to all intents and purposes dominant in decision­
making, and where a challenge to its authority was likely to be ignored if 
too weak and risked assassination if too threatening. These then were the 
parameters within which Shigemitsu had to operate to achieve his goals and 
it is no wonder in these circumstances if the policies he espoused seemed
at times to be too harsh.
As well as shaping his policy towards China these influences also affected 
how he viewed the role of the Western powers in East Asia. In the case of 
Britain, though the interests of that country in China were a substantial
obstacle to Japanese regional dominance, he had little wish to see a break
in relations but instead strove for a new understanding between the two 
countries in which Britain would come to terms with the new system in East 
Asia and be content with holding on to its economic stake. Despite the 
trials and tribulations of Anglo-Japanese relations in the aftermath of the 
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war he still believed that this goal was
designec^to further the interests of his country. On a broader scale this 
too is the lesson that emerges from his time as Minister to China and as
attainable, and it was in this frame of mind that he approached his time as 
Ambassador in 1938. He noted later in Japan and Her Destiny- 
'I had a pleasing vision of bringing about an understanding between the two 
countries under which the China problem might be solved... *90
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CHAPTER TWO 
•A COMMITTEE SORT OF MAN'
'I forgot to tell you that the Clives have left and been replaced 
by a strange couple; he is experienced as a committee sort of man, 
but seems to have no idea what people are really like, let alone 
oriental ones.'
Katherine Sansom to her son 17 November 19371
Much of the controversy over Sir Robert Craigie’s role in Anglo-Japanese 
relations has been generated by the belief among hostile contemporaries 
that his appointment as Ambassador in 1937 had more to do with his 
political links than with his suitability for the post. To his critics, 
and in particular to those who were Far Eastern experts, he was a 
'Chamberlain man', assigned to conciliate the Japanese and keep the region 
quiet while Britain pursued a policy of active appeasement in Europe. The 
fact that Craigie had never previously served in Japan or even held a post 
in the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office only helped to heighten 
suspicions that he was no more than a Whitehall mandarin imposed on the 
Tokyo Embassy to do the Prime Minister's bidding. This image of Craigie 
is, however, misleading and reveals more about the prejudices of his 
antagonists than about the facts behind his appointment. The true position 
was that he had been near the centre of policy-making towards East Asia for 
a number of years and appeared in the spring of 1937 to be the logical 
candidate for the post.
Craigie’s chief claim to attention arose from his involvement in the naval 
talks that took place between Britain, the United States and Japan in the 
years 1921-1937. From a post-war perspective it is easy to underestimate 
the importance of this series of negotiations as they have been largely 
overshadowed by the drama of the crisis in Sino-Japanese relations and the 
drift towards the Pacific War, but during the inter-war period they were 
perceived as a vitally important issue and especially relevant to the issue 
of security in the East. Craigie’s heavy involvement in these talks made
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him conversant with the problems affecting relations in the Pacific and, in 
particular, the dilemma facing Britain of how to cope with Japan's 
revisionist ambitions. This practical experience was not only crucial in 
his being chosen as Ambassador, but also shaped his views of Japan and the 
prospects of improving relations with that country; it is therefore 
essential in any assessment of Craigie's ambassadorship to study how his 
involvement in the naval negotiations improved his status in the Foreign 
Office and how it influenced the evolution of his thinking towards the 
troubled debate in Whitehall over Britain's future role in East Asia.
cUjulJo
Craigie first became involved with naval disarmament in 1928 fey a decision
o=f the Foreign Office to hand jurisdiction of the naval limitation talks
H\€.
from the Central Department to h^s American Department. The transfer of
these talks followed from the fiasco of the Geneva naval conference of
1927, at which the British and American delegations had clashed fiercely
over the quantitative and qualitative limitation of cruisers, and which had
subsequently seriously poisoned relations between London and Washington.2
With the advantage of his naval family background Craigie, who was the head
of the American Department, quickly mastered the details of the talks and
began to be acknowledged as the chief Foreign Office expert in this field.
His first important role was in November 1928 when he acted as one of the
chief protagonists in a Foreign Office campaign to persuade the Admiralty
and the Cabinet of the need to assuage American feelings. His part in this
affair was to draw up a memorandum for the Cabinet making clear the dangers
inherent in a policy of animosity towards America.3 This brought him into
conflict for the first time with Winston Churchill, then Chancellor of the
Exchequer, who, believing that it was necessary to take a tough line with
Washington, took umbrage at Craigie’s memorandum and wrote in a
counterblast to the Cabinet that-
’...if the essay by Mr. Craigie on Anglo-American relations... has no
object other than to inculcate meekness and caution, it need not be dealt
with in detail. '4
He went on to state-
'I do not believe that ... the United States will either set about us in a
bJserk fury or markedly reduce the volume of her tourist traffic as Mr.
a
Craigie so variously s u g g e s t s . '5
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However it was Craigie's argument that eventually swayed the Cabinet and 
Churchill was left licking his wounds, having lost an argument to a civil 
servant. It is not clear how far this affair influenced Churchill's later 
treatment of Craigie, but certainly Churchill was renowned as a man who 
bore grudges and it is difficult to believe that this did not contribute to 
his eventual intolerance of Craigie's cautious line in 1940 and 1941.6
In the subsequent easing of Anglo-American tensions Craigie played an 
important part, and in April 1929 he received from the American Ambassador 
in Geneva, Hugh Gibson, the 'yardstick* proposal that helped to settle the 
dispute over cruisers. In autumn 1929 he was present at the Rapidan summit 
between the new Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and President Herbert 
Hoover, where the ground was laid for an Anglo-American deal over naval 
issues, and in 1930 he was an adviser to the British delegation at the 
London Naval Conference. This gathering saw the culmination of the new 
atmosphere of Anglo-American co-operation and led to the signing of the 
Three Power Treaty that established a 10-10-6.9 ratio in cruisers for 
Britain, the United States, and Japan respectively. By this time Craigie 
had become more or less irreplacable due to his ability to grasp every 
issue involved in the talks, and as MacDonald's right hand man he exerted a 
key influence on government naval limitation policy. In 1931 he further 
increased his prestige by taking a major part in what eventually proved to 
be an abortive naval compromise between France and Italy, and from 1932 was 
a frequent adviser to the British delegation at the Geneva Disarmament
Conference.7
The peak of Craigie’s influence came with the London Naval Conference of 
1935; an event which was also significant because it provided him with an 
opportunity to become directly involved with Anglo-Japanese relations, 
though he was only to approach the latter with the aim of facilitating a 
naval agreement.8 The new conference was convened under the terms of the 
1930 London Naval Treaty, which had laid down that, if the Disarmament 
Conference in Geneva failed to produce a new agreement on naval limitation, 
the three leading naval powers should meet to frame a new treaty in 1935. 
Preparations for the next round of talks began at the Foreign Office in 




saw in Europe grave concern about the ambitions of a resurgent Germany and 
in East Asia forebodings over the rise of Japanese militarism and the 
seizure of Manchuria. This instability in the international system meant 
that the conclusion of a new treaty was made even more desirable so as to 
avoid a general naval race which would only heighten tensions further, but 
at the same time the pervasive atmosphere of distrust argued against the 
possibility that any agreement would emerge. For Britain above all other 
states there was a great need for naval limitation to continue, as Britain 
would suffer most from an arms race which would reveal the Royal Navy's 
increasing inability to defend the far-flung Empire.9
The chances of an agreement were undermined not only by the poisonous 
atmosphere of international relations, but also by the strong likelihood 
that the positions of the United States, Japan and Britain in the 
forthcoming conversations would be mutually incompatible. The Imperial 
Japanese Navy, which in 1930 had strongly resisted the implementation of 
the London Naval Treaty, was determined to end the ratio system for both 
capital ships and cruisers, which they saw as permanently assigning them to 
an inferior position vis-a-vis the Anglo-Saxon powers.10 In turn the United 
States and Britain were determined to avoid any formula that would allow 
Japan practical parity, although Britain was willing to explore the
possibility of equality in principle. Division between Britain and the 
United States rested on the perennial problem of cruiser numbers, on which 
Washington opposed the Royal Navy's desire for more ships which the latter 
considered vital for the maintenance of Imperial security. Faced with
these gulfs of opinion it was difficult to see how an agreement could be 
brought about that would satisfy all sides.
However, in his initial memorandum in January 1934 Craigie expressed 
guarded optimism about the future talks and noted that- 
'If we can clear our minds in advance as to what precisely should be our 
objectives and what the procedure to attain them, the battle will be half 
won. I use the word " battle ” advisedly for every effort will be made in 
the next two years by other naval powers, far less dependent than we are on 
our naval defences, to diminish the relative preponderance of British sea- 
power. We shall need all our resources of skill and diplomacy if we are to
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defeat these efforts and at the same time to bring about agreement at the 
1935 conference.' 11
His proposals were first that Britain should push the United States to 
accept an increase in cruiser numbers and an end to the naval holiday on 
building capital ships so that the Royal Navy would be better able to 
perform its functions, and second that Britain should calm Japan's 
sensibilities by agreeing to a declaration on equality of status while 
still in practice limiting Japan to 70% of the British fleet. These 
suggestions were forwarded to the Admiralty and to the Cabinet Office, 
where they drew a pessimistic response from Sir Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet 
Secretary and Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, who noted in 
a letter to Craigie that- 
'... the outlook for the 1935 Conference is extremely gloomy, and I rather 
incline to the view that you are a bit optimistic in thinking that the 
Japanese will accept 70%. It is an ingenious solution, but I am afraid the 
lives of the Japanese negotiators would be at risk if they accepted it!'12
Craigie's plans were amalgamated with those of the Admiralty in a 
memorandum of 23 March 1934, which was to act as a discussion document for 
the Cabinet Naval Conference Committee that first met on 16 April. 13 
The meetings of this body did not, however, give any quick approval to the 
proposals that Craigie had helped to draft, but instead revealed that no 
consensus existed among the interested government ministries, of whom the 
Foreign Office, the Admiralty and the Treasury were the most prominent. 
The discrepancies were largely due to the relation of naval limitation to 
the issue of British rearmament. In February 1934, the Defence 
Requirements Committee (DRC), which had been set up to look into the 
question of how Britain could make good its military deficiencies and which 
of Germany and Japan should be considered to be the main threat, made its 
r e p o r t . . 14 The Committee, which consisted of Sir Maurice Hankey, Sir 
Warren Fisher, Sir Robert Vansittart (now the Permanent Under-Secretary at 
the Foreign Office), and the three Chiefs of Staff, was agreed that Germany 
constituted the greater menace, but failed to agree on a unified approach 
to the problem of how Britain should treat Japan, which in turn affected 
the formulation of a negotiating position for the naval talks.
The Admiralty and Hankey believed, despite the DRC Report, that the 
greatest and most immediate threat to British security came from Japan and 
therefore pushed for naval expansion so that British interests in the Far 
East could be safeguarded and Japan dealt with from a position of strength. 
This led the Admiralty to oppose any suggestion of parity for Japan and to 
support a push for a ceiling of seventy cruisers. In private senior naval 
officers such as the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Ernie Chatfield, 
went further and argued that quantitative limitation should cease 
altogether and that instead states should be allowed to build as many
vessels as they needed, the only limitations being in the shape of 
qualitative restrictions, a policy which would allow Britain to contain the 
Japanese menace. Allied to this the Admiralty were keen to improve 
relations with Japan on the diplomatic front as closer ties might deter the 
Japanese from pushing for naval equality by reducing tensions in East Asia, 
although such a breakthrough, if it occurred, was not seen as negating the 
argument for naval e x p a n s i o n . 15
The Treasury, as represented by Sir Warren Fisher and Neville Chamberlain, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, agreed with the need to seek a
rapprochement with Japan, but for different motives. They felt that, 
having agreed that Germany was the main threat, the strains caused by the 
Depression on Britain's financial position argued in favour of only a 
limited rearmament programme directed against the Third Reich, and that the 
Japanese threat should be neutralized by diplomatic means. This meant
that, in contrast to the Admiralty, they believed that the naval talks
should be used for the purpose of helping to pave a path to an eventual 
settlement with Japan by agreeing to parity in principle or even in
practice, which would in turn have the effect of making the Admiralty's
plans unnecessary.15 The Treasury's desire for improved relations with
Japan was underlined by their conviction that there were no real issues
dividing Britain and Japan, and that relations had deteriorated only 
because the Foreign Office had consistently, since the time of the 
Washington Conference of 1922, let an excessive concern for keeping in line 
with the United States shape its East Asian policy. In this sense they 
held that Britain had been acting in America's interests rather than its 
own, a view that Fisher expounded in an addendum to the DRC Report..
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'Good relations between ourselves and the Japanese are the last thing the 
USA desire. With the development of her commercial and other ambitions the 
United States - while shirking responsibility - regard Asia as an excellent 
object of exploitation by ourselves, and view Japan as a serious 
impediment; and what from the American point of view could be more 
satisfactory than that Britain should pick America's y^siatic chestnuts out 
of the fire and get embroiled with Japan.’*7
The Foreign Office also recognized the need to ease relations with Japan, 
but was more inclined than the Treasury and Admiralty to believe that this 
would not be an easy task due to the wide range of issues that separated 
the two countries, such as the disputes over commercial relations and the 
continued problems over China. It was, however, the problem of American
disapproval of rapprochement with Japan that provoked the iro&iz
division with other ministries. The Foreign Office's view on this issue, 
over which Craigie as head of the American Department had some influence, 
was that, while it was clear that too close a tie to Washington could 
prejudice any chances of reaching a naval agreement with Japan, it was also 
held that Britain could not afford to alienate the United States. There
were a number of reasons for this: first, one of the key restraints on
Japan would be removed if the United States were to react to such a move by
a further drift towards isolationism; second, if Washington were to refuse 
to sign a new naval agreement it would lead to just the kind of arms race 
that Britain wished to avoid; third, American alienation would be
disastrous for commercial relations; and, fourth, Britain could not afford 
to jeopardize its chances of receiving American financial and military 
support in any forthcoming conflict in Europe. The result was that, though 
the Foreign Office was wary of antagonizing Japan by forming a common front 
with the United States, it also recognized that there were limits to
Britain's freedom of action vis-a-vis Japan.*8
The battle over policy towards Japan and the drawing up of a negotiating 
position for the naval talks raged throughout the spring and summer of 
1934, with the three ministries all struggling to make their views prevail. 
This was an exasperating time for Craigie, as the disputes not only delayed 
the completion of his instructions but also involved, as part of the
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political manoeuvring, criticism of his previous efforts. In particular, 
he reacted fiercely to a waspish memorandum from Sir Warren Fisher of 19 
April 1934, that criticized the Foreign Office treatment of Japan and made 
reference to the inadequacies of the 1930 London Naval Treaty, which was 
categorized as being designed to meet American needs instead of protecting 
British interests. Craigie's response was to draft an equally forthright 
riposte, whose tone was so harsh that his superior Sir Robert Vansittart 
was forced to rewrite it. 19 Craigie's original draft vigorously defended 
the previous naval treaties, and strongly contradicted the Treasury 
assumption that Britain should turn its back on the United States by 
arguing, in one of the few passages retained by Vansittart, that- 
'...it is reasonable to suppose that Japan’s present rulers would be less 
likely to embark on any policy of aggression and adventure if they knew 
there was a good general understanding between the United Kingdom and the 
United States than if they saw Anglo-American relations deteriorating to 
the point at which they were, say in 1 9 2 0 .'20
Craigie's task of developing a policy for the new naval conference was not 
undermined only by the Treasury, but also by a series of preparatory talks 
held in June 1934 with an American delegation led by Norman Davis. These 
conversations revealed that the gulf over cruiser numbers was as wide as 
ever, and that the United States was opposed to any scheme which would give 
Japan equality whether in practice or in principle. This disappointment 
led Craigie to the conclusion that, unless President Roosevelt could be 
influenced to be more sympathetic to Britain's needs, it was very unlikely 
that agreement could be reached with Washington, and he therefore suggested 
that he should travel to Washington himself to attempt to ease relations, a 
task he had previously undertaken in spring 1928. However this proposal 
met with little support from other officials involved in the naval 
negotiations and was quickly f o r g o t t e n . 21
The setback to the Admiralty and Foreign Office position caused by the 
unsatisfactory talks with the Americans increased the Treasury's 
ammunition, and Chamberlain's case received a further boost in July with 
news of a report from the British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Clive, 
that the Japanese Foreign Minister, Hirota Koki, was toying with the idea
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of a non-aggression pact with B r i t a i n . 2 2  This not only encouraged the pro- 
Japanese lobby to redouble their efforts, but also brought the Foreign 
Secretary, Sir John Simon, closer to their camp. On 20 August Simon wrote 
to Vansittart to ask how feasible it would be to seek a non-aggression pact 
and, on the naval side, to enquire whether the problem of Japan's concern 
about equality could be side-stepped by accepting the principle of parity 
allied to a voluntary declaration of the limits to which Japan would 
build.23
Craigie was one of the officials Vansittart asked to comment on the Foreign 
Secretary's proposals, and he expressed a guarded optimism about their 
utility. In particular he was keen to develop Simon's idea of a voluntary 
declaration from its vague roots into a practical proposal, and noted in 
this context that-
'Our task, which should not pass the wit of man, is to help the more 
moderate elements in Japan to 'save face' in this matter and so overcome 
the extremist elements who want no naval treaty at a l l . '24
He proceeded to argue that this could be achieved by linking an individual 
state’s voluntary declaration to its naval needs, and to protect against 
any state building in excess of its declared intention through the use of 
an escalator clause and by making the declaration a binding treaty 
obligation. This was a careful piece of planning designed to provide a 
practical basis for the furtherance of naval limitation but still cautious 
enough to avoid compromising British security. Away from the narrow
concerns of naval policy Craigie also responded to the wider issue of a 
non-aggression pact with Japan, though he still saw this in terms of 
assisting the naval talks. His suggestion in this field was that a 
bilateral agreement reiterating the terms of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 
1928, that is renouncing the right to aggressive war, would be useful as a 
means of giving Japan a guarantee of its security, and that this in turn 
would encourage the Japanese to compromise over their fleet, although he 
also noted that-
'This would, in practice, be mere camouflage - but heavy applications of 
political camouflage may be necessary if we are to prevent naval limitation 
from going by the board next year.'25
55
i
Craigie's sympathetic response to Simon's proposals was not an attitude 
shared by either Vansittart or the head of the Far Eastern Department, 
Charles Orde, who both displayed a greater wariness of Japan and a 
recognition that any political agreement would have to deal with the thorny 
problem of Anglo-Japanese differences over C h i n a . 2 6  The disagreements 
between Craigie and his colleagues were not, however, so great as to push 
the former into the Treasury camp, even though on the surface his views 
appeared to dovetail with those of Chamberlain. This was because
Craigie’s response to Simon's enquiries was influenced by his belief that 
the signing of a new naval limitation treaty was essential to Britain's 
security and that any ideas that could break the potential deadlock in the 
talks should be pursued, whereas the Treasury viewed Simon's proposals not 
through the perspective of saving the naval talks but rather through the 
need to win over Japan at almost any price. Craigie saw the latter as a 
highly dangerous policy that would only succeed in alienating the United 
States and therefore undermine rather than strengthen the future of naval 
limitation. Craigie's opposition to the Treasury line is particularly 
interesting in the light of the accusation that he was later seen as a 
'Chamberlain man'; it is certainly clear that at this time he had not moved 
into the Treasury camp, and until the end of 1934 he continued to disagree 
with Chamberlain and F i s h e r . 27
The perceived threat the Treasury line posed to the naval talks led Craigie 
to co-operate with his Foreign Office colleagues in trying to curb 
Chamberlain’s enthusiasm. His contribution to this campaign was 
specifically concerned with raising objections in connection with the 
implications for the naval talks. In particular he was called to respond 
to the Chancellor's view of the naval declaration policy, which was that- 
'... each of us shall be free to build in future what numbers of each kind 
of ship we like, subject to such limitations of size and armament as we may 
agree upon from time to time. And for the purposes of a closer 
understanding and appreciation of each other's policy let us agree that 
each year we will communicate to each other the main outlines ... of our 
programme for the next two y e a r s . '28
At first glance this appears to be in line with Craigie’s suggestions to 
Simon, but there were crucial differences; first, Chamberlain was vague
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about American involvement, second, he did not insist on the safety net of 
linking the voluntary declaration to naval needs, and, third, he envisaged 
the declarations applying only to a two year period, whereas Craigie 
preferred them to run over six years. Craigie therefore strongly 
disapproved of Chamberlain's proposals, which he saw as dangerously 
diluting Foreign Office policy, and he wrote in a report for Simon that- 
'The Chancellor would substitute for the existing naval treaties a naval 
arrangement with Japan for the periodical exchange of naval building 
programmes. Viewed from this angle the Chancellor's proposal appears to be 
destructive of further naval limitation and to involve the taking of 
certain grave risks.'29
Craigie also expressed in this memorandum serious reservations about the 
Treasury's attitude towards a political agreement with Japan. His 
understanding was that any treaty between Britain and Japan would be 
mirrored by one between America and Japan and he saw the Treasury's policy 
of largely ignoring Washington as disastrous in terms of both the naval 
talks and the general tenor of Anglo-American relations; he noted that- 
'...the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Japan might serve a useful 
purpose if it is designed to facilitate the maintenance of the existing 
Anglo-Japanese ratio, to pave the way for a similar American-Japanese Pact 
and to promote the chance of concluding a multi-lateral naval limitation 
treaty. If, however, the conclusion of such a pact is to be the signal for 
a reduction of our relative naval strength and for the abandonment of the 
naval treaties, then the proposal is fraught with danger to our position 
and our prestige as a Great Power and ultimately to our security.'30
However,Craigie's objection to the Treasury line was not simply because he 
felt that it was misguided; he also believed that, in the face of the 
imminent arrival of the American and Japanese delegations in October for a 
further round of preliminary talks, Britain could ill-afford the delays 
caused by Chamberlain and Fisher to the finalizing of its negotiating 
position. On 7 September, at the height of the debate and with Chamberlain 
refusing to append his signature to the Naval Conference Committee's 
report, an exasperated Craigie minuted-
'... are we going to steer for ... Anglo-American cooperation ... or are we
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going to line up with Japan (in other words "throw in the sponge" in the 
Far East) and so make further Anglo-American co-operation impossible? 
Unless a much clearer policy is formulated by the Cabinet before we meet 
the Japanese and have further talks with the Americans, it seems pretty 
clear that we shall fall between two stools. This is an undignified 
position and exposes the Foreign Office to far more devastating criticism 
than would a firm seat even on the wrong stool. The fact that a faulty or 
indecisive policy may have been forced on us by interference and blustering 
of other Government Departments will unfortunately do nothing to mitigate 
the acerbity of future attacks on the Foreign 0 f f i c e . ' 3 l
This concern for the need to settle Britain’s policy led Craigie to draft 
two papers with the Admiralty for circulation to the Naval Conference 
Committee with the aim of stalling further Treasury pressure and clarifying 
British policy. The first, dated 3 October, dealt with the progress that 
had been made up to that point in talks with the other naval powers, and 
noted in particular Japanese reluctance to connect political questions with 
the naval c o n v e r s a t i o n s . 3 2 The second undated memorandum referred 
specifically to the issue of Anglo-Japanese naval talks and the likelihood 
that the Japanese proposals would be unacceptable, and came to the 
conclusion that it was extremely probable that Britain would have to put 
forward the idea of voluntary d e c l a r a t i o n s .33 These memoranda were for 
consideration at a meeting of the Cabinet’s Naval Conference Committee on 
16 October, and by this date the Foreign Office received further ammunition 
in the form of discouraging reports from Tokyo about Japan's desire for a 
political a g r e e m e n t . 34 The result was that at the meeting it was agreed to 
postpone all terlk of a political agreement with Japan until progress had 
been made in the naval talks, and that if in the latter there was deadlock 
between the Japanese and American positions, then Craigie's plan for 
voluntary declarations would be offered as a c o m p r o m i s e .35
This outcome was largely due to the stance taken by MacDonald and Simon, 
but they owed many of the arguments they used to Craigie, and this helped 
to raise Craigie's prestige even higher. Simon, in particular, was very 
impressed with his chief naval expert, whose views mirrored his to a much 
greater extent than those expressed by the Far Eastern Department, and he
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wrote to Vansittart on 23 October describing Craigie as ’the cement which
keeps the bricks together'.36 Vansittart was, in turn, very pleased to see
this tribute to one of his juniors and wrote back enthusiastically to Simon
A
lauding Craigie as-
' . . . one of the most honest-to-God workers and you can always rely on him 
to have every case at his finger— tips. I think you know that I feel your 
team would be strengthened, if promotion could be found for him in the 
office. I should greatly miss his energy + reliability if we had to let 
him go abroad. But I doubt if we can keep him much longer where he is - 
unpromoted.*37
The naval negotiations finally began in late October and soon, as expected, 
revealed deep divisions between Japan and the United States.38 The former 
had come to the talks with a proposal that there should be a common upper 
limit of total tonnage for all naval powers, and that within that limit 
states should be able to build as they wished. This was clearly designed 
as a means of allowing the Japanese to gain parity with the United States 
and Britain, and was therefore unacceptable to Washington and London. The 
American position differed little from the proposals they had made to the 
British earlier in the year and showed no willingness to compromise over 
the ratios either in practice or in principle. Once these negotiating 
stances had been clarified, the problem was to find a means of keeping the 
talks afloat and to reconcile the glaring differences of opinion between 
the delegations. Craigie noted in a memorandum on 27 Octobei—
'The United States representatives may be expected to adopt an 
uncompromising attitude ... We on the other hand will presumably say we 
believe the Japanese are not bluffing when they say they would rather 
denounce the Washington Treaty ... and that a better course is to handle 
the Japanese representatives with patience and to see whether, without 
compromising the naval security of any Power, some method cannot be found 
of meeting the Japanese on the point of prestige.'39
The problem was that to build the ground for a compromise Britain had to 
play to two disparate audiences; on one side there was the need to 
reaffirm to the Americans Britain’s opposition to parity for Japan, while 
on the other the need to try to meet Japan's demands by agreeing to 
equality in principle, putting forward the building declaration proposals,
and investigating the chances of a political pact. This was a desperate, 
ovei— complex and contradictory policy which stood little chance of success 
and was very likely to end up by pleasing nobody, but the only alternative 
was to bring the whole edifice of naval limitation crashing down, which 
Craigie and his Cabinet sponsors, MacDonald and Simon, had no intention of 
allowing.
This policy, however, met with criticism from the Treasury and the 
Admiralty; the former deemed that it was the Americans rather than the 
Japanese who had brought the talks to an impasse. Fisher, whom Chamberlain 
had insisted should be an adviser to the British delegation, believed that 
Craigie's cautious attempt to find a compromise was the result of too great 
a concern for keeping Washington in the talks, and that Britain should 
instead concentrate all its efforts on coming to terms with Japan. In one 
letter to Chamberlain, he observed- 
’Mr Craigie's activities continue the familiar proceeding of cursing in 
common (with the Americans) the wicked Japanese. Admiral Chatfield, though 
a man of exquisite restraint, allowed himself to refer to the latter part 
of that paper CNCM (35)26) "as a piece of damned impertinence" on the part 
of Mr Craigie. I told him that I had anticipated him by suggesting to you 
on Saturday that the time was near for the formal appointment of Mr Craigie 
as secretary of the American delegation.'40
His feelings on the matter ran so high that he wrote rather tastelessly to 
Craigie on 21 November that-
' I see no reason why my two sons or the scores of thousands in that 
generation should be murdered (and in vain) in a few years time. And that 
is what will happen if we allow our "policy" to be dictated by Mr. Norman 
Davis.'41
The problem as far as the Admiralty was concerned was not so much that 
Britain was sticking too close to the United States, but that as it was 
obvious that there could be no agreement over quantitative disarmament, 
Britain should not waste any more time trying to find a compromise but 
concentrate on qualitative limitation. The Vice-Chief of Naval Staff, 
Vice-Admiral Little, noted simply that Craigie's efforts were-
’...simply making a fetish of a quantitative treaty at all costs in 
opposition to common sense.*42
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The irony was that at the same time that Craigie was being accused of 
possessing too pro-American an attitude, reports were coming from the 
British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, stating that the 
State Department saw him as 'unhelpful'.43 This accusation arose from a 
particular incident where it appeared that Craigie had been deliberately 
misinforming Davis about the extent of the British talks with the Japanese, 
a suspicion which tied in with the general dissatisfaction in Washington 
with Britain's willingness to compromise rather than following the American 
preference for breaking off the talks due to Japan’s impossible demands, 
and with the American fear that Britain was still planning a political 
agreement with Japan. It transpired that Davis had misinterpreted the 
British position, but the incident remains as a symbol of the troubled 
Anglo-American relationship at this juncture and also reveals how Craigie 
was at the centre of the tortuous diplomacy undertaken to avoid the 
collapse of naval limitation.
Unfortunately, despite all the twists and turns of British policy, there 
was from the first very little chance of reaching an agreement. The Far 
Eastern Department had in fact been right all along in disparaging the 
hopes of the Treasury, and indeed of Craigie, that a deal could be made, 
because as early as September 1934 the Japanese Navy General Staff had 
forced the Okada Cabinet to agree that nothing less than the common upper 
limit plan would suffice and that if it was rejected the denunciation of 
the Washington Treaty should follow at the end of December.4 4  Inevitably, 
considering this obstacle, the talks failed to reach any settlement and on 
29 December the Japanese went ahead with abrogation.45 This move did not, 
however, mean that the mood in London was one of total pessimism for the 
future, as the head of the Japanese delegation, Reai— Admiral Yamamoto 
Isoroku, had shown some sympathy with the British proposals and had 
promised that, on his return to Japan, he would present to the naval 
authorities the proposal for voluntary declarations.46 The belief in the 
Treasury, and shared by Craigie, that this would lead to some tangible 
improvement in the Japanese position only went to show that there still 
remained a disturbing naivety about the situation.
While waiting for Yamamoto to make his report to his superiors in Japan, 
the naval talks turned away from concentration on Pacific issues to a 
consideration of the position in Europe, a development which led eventually 
to the signing of an Anglo-German Naval Agreement on 18 June 1935. Craigie 
played a major part in these negotiations, acting in the absence of the 
Foreign Secretary as the head of the British delegation in talks which gave 
him the dubious privilege of negotiating with Ribbentrop. The latter made
clear from the outset that Germany desired to build up to 35% of the
tonnage of the British fleet, and that there was no room for compromise.
The fear that a British refusal could lead to Germany's building to an even 
greater ratio, allied to concern about a possible German-Japanese
understanding, caused Craigie and the Admiralty to advise the Cabinet 
reluctantly to agree to Hitler's demand, although they recognized that to 
do so would continue the idea of ratios and therefore prejudice the chances 
of a future general agreement on the exchange of naval construction
declarations.47
Craigie's handling of these talks further boosted his reputation as a 
consummate negotiator, and helped to cement his links to the active 
appeasers within the Cabinet. These contacts were additionally fostered by 
the development of co-operation between the Treasury and Craigie in seeking 
a means of drawing closer to Japan. The coming together of the two parties 
who had sniped at each other with such venom in the autumn of 1934 was the 
result of a change of perceptions, largely on the Treasury side. By the 
end of 1934 Chamberlain and his advisers appeared to recognise that a 
return to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was simply not feasible and that the 
United States could not be ignored.48 This brought the Treasury more into 
line with Craigie's original position, and laid the basis in January 1935 
for co-operation in a further attempt to improve relations with Japan. As 
for Craigie, his enthusiasm for a further approach to Japan was influenced 
by the belief that Yamamoto's task of convincing the Imperial Japanese Navy 
would be made considerably easier if Britain made a serious effort to 
improve relations in the political and economic fields. Talks with the 
Japanese Ambassador to London, Matsudaira Tsuneo, helped to convince 
Craigie that Foreign Minister Hirota would be receptive to some kind of 
political pact, and he noted after one such conversation that-
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'As our objective is to be appeasement in the Far East, the matters which I 
would like to see covered (by a consultative pact) are those falling within 
the purview of the Nine-Power Treaty and also any other questions relating 
to the regions of the Pacific calculated to disturb the relations between 
the three countries (Britain, Japan and the United States).'49
The opportunity for a renewed diplomatic effort was, as shown 
previously.provided by the disastrous financial conditions affecting China 
at the end of 1934. Craigie sympathized with the Treasury's plans for co­
operation with Japan in aiding China, as they held the promise of improving 
the atmosphere in Anglo-Japanese relations and therefore the chances of 
concessions in the naval talks, and he played an important role in 
persuading the Foreign Office to agree to proceed with these proposals. His 
main contribution came in late January when he furthered the Treasury's 
proposals by explaining them to those he referred to as 'the pundits of the 
Far Eastern Department'.50 Craigie after some effort overcame Orde’s 
initial caution, which caused Fisher to note to Chamberlain that- 
'Craigie’s afternoon outing with this singularly unpromising material must 
have been a masterpiece of cajolery or coercion, or both, for he has 
induced the Far Eastern department to agree that . . . the present abortive 
loan should be taken as an occasion for getting together with the Japanese, 
and, of course, the Americans, and possibly others.'51
Following this he was also involved in February in the drafting of a 
Foreign Office memorandum on the need for an understanding with Japan, and 
persuaded the Far Eastern Department to recognize that-
’... the chief aim of British policy in the Far East at the present moment 
should be to endeavour to bring about a general detente because there is 
just a chance that such a detente might make it possible to reach agreement 
in the naval negotiations.'5 2
After this his involvement declined, which was, perhaps fortunate because 
once it became clear that the Leith-Ross mission had only succeeded in 
damaging relations with Japan, the whole issue became an area of bitter 
dispute between the Foreign Office and the T r e a s u r y . 53
The lack of progress in improving relations with Japan was mirrored by the 
absence of any sign from Tokyo that Yamamoto had been able to influence the
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Navy to compromise. By July 1935 Craigie and the Admiralty had begun to 
press for a naval conference to be called in the autumn on the grounds 
that, with quantitative limitation seemingly in its death-throes, it was 
necessary for qualitative limits to be set so that guidelines for the 
construction of new ships for the Royal Navy would exist. Delays were, 
however, caused by the need to hold talks with the French, and it was not 
until October that a decision to hold the conference was finally made.54 
By this time the situation in Japan had become marginally more hopeful due 
to the imminent retirement of Admiral Kato Kanji, one of the chief 
opponents of naval limitation, and reports that the Gaimusho was pushing 
the Navy very hard over the need to compromise. This led Craigie to 
propose that Japanese acceptance of quantitative limitation could be eased 
by reducing the initial declaration of building programmes to apply to a 
period of two years rather than six, and to note rather optimistically in 
a memorandum that-
'Many competent observers forecast that during the next two years 
moderating influences are likely to make themselves increasingly felt in 
the conduct of Japan's foreign policy, with the result that the Cabinet 
would be in a position to exercise better control over the extremists at 
the Japanese Ministry of M a r i n e . '55
The Second London Naval Conference finally opened on 9 December 1935 and 
soon revealed that Craigie's hopes for a more moderate Japanese negotiating 
position were not justified, as the Japanese delegation led by a Navy 
hardliner, Admiral Nagano Osami, stuck rigidly to the previous demand for a 
common upper l i m i t . 5 6  This lack of compromise was mirrored by the attitude 
of the United States, who remained as determined as ever to resist the 
Japanese claim to parity. As the talks once again sank into stalemate, it 
became clear that there were only two means of making progress; either 
through Japan's agreement to Britain's new proposals for the declaration of 
building programmes, or by a renewed attempt to secure a political 
agreement. Britain's attempt to push through the former soon floundered on 
the grounds that the Japanese delegation saw it as merely a way of 
continuing the ratio system under a different guise. The only option left 
was the well-worn path of attempting to reach a wider political 
understanding.
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The problem with this approach was that the tensions in North China in the 
autumn of 1935 had strengthened the resolve of those in the Foreign Office 
who believed that Anglo-Japanese differences were irreconcilable. This 
process was under— pinned by the arrival of Anthony Eden as the new Foreign 
Secretary halfway through the Conference. Eden, in contrast to his 
predecessors, Simon and Hoare, was not at all sympathetic to Japan but was 
very aware of the need for an improved relationship with the United 
States.57 This meant that when on 17 December, three days before the 
Conference broke for its Christmas adjournment, Clive reported from Tokyo 
that Hirota had told him, that if no naval agreement emerged, then it might 
be necessary to stabilize relations in the Pacific by arranging a political 
pact between Japan, Britain and the United States, the reaction in the 
Foreign Office was largely frosty. Even Craigie’s initial response to this 
news was unenthusiastic and he noted that-
'An agreement in the political field would lose much of its value to us if 
it did not serve to bring Japan into a naval treaty. If no agreement 
results, this can only be because of the uncompromising attitude of Japan 
and this would surely be a poor basis on which to build a political 
agreement.'58
This did not mean, however, that Craigie had given up the idea of reaching 
some kind of understanding, and his interest was stimulated by a further 
report from Clive on 27 December, which included the statement- 
'I have no doubt that the Japanese Government would welcome some political 
understanding with us and if possible Americans which would justify 
reduction in their naval expenditure.*59
This telegram spurred Craigie into writing a lengthy minute on the course 
and prospects of the naval conference which he circulated to Vansittart and 
Eden. Craigie presented a pessimistic picture of the progress made up to 
that point, but observed that-
’... we have for some time been considering whether any form of political 
understanding between the United States, Japan and ourselves would ease 
this naval difficulty. So far no very hopeful method of approach to a 
political detente has been discovered, but I am not sure that t i s o u r  
earlier examination of the political aspect has been sufficiently 
exhaustive. '50
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Craigie followed up by drafting a telegram to Clive to try to clarify 
Hirota's position and to enquire about the likelihood of a Sino-Japanese 
non-aggression pact being negotiated. This telegram was sent to Tokyo on 4 
January 1936 and led to a speedy and disheartening response from Clive, who 
stated that he felt Hirota was merely thinking out loud and that the Navy 
remained firmly opposed to the Gaimusho interfering in naval p o l i c y . 61
Craigie’s hopes were also dashed by the attitude of the United States. On 
6 January Craigie raised the idea of a tripartite agreement with Norman 
Davis, the head of the American delegation, but Davis showed little 
interest and instead concentrated on the necessity of ensuring that, if the 
Conference were to break up, then it would be Japan who would be seen to be 
at f a u l t . 62 American indifference was further evident when Craigie 
attended a meeting between Eden and the American Undei— Secretary of State, 
William Phillips, on 8. January, at which the latter made clear that even a 
simple consultative pact would not be worth p u r s u i n g . 6 3  The final nail in 
the coffin came from Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador in 
Washington, who wrote to Eden on 13 January that-
'My conclusion is that United States Government would scrutinise any 
suggestion for a political pact in the Far East with care amounting to 
suspicion especially if it tended to make any political concession to 
Japan.'64
Craigie's lone attempt to search for a political agreement was thus doomed 
to failure and did not gather any support from his superiors, as Eden was 
far more concerned to curry favour with Washington than with Tokyo.
As Craigie pushed for a political agreement the naval talks built up to 
their inevitable climax. On 6 January the conference reconvened with a 
meeting between the British and Japanese delegations, which repeated the 
same tired arguments and revealed that Japan had decided that if the common 
upper limit was not accepted then it would be forced to walk out of the 
conference. On 15 January Admiral Nagano presented the Japanese case for 
the last time, and after a short debate a vote was taken by the five naval 
Powers which led to the common upper limit being rejected by four votes to 
one. The next day Japan announced its departure from the conference. 
Despite this setback the conference did not break up but continued to meet
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to discuss a system of limitation by voluntary declarations and qualitative 
restrictions.65 These talks eventually led to an agreement on 28 March 
between Britain, the United States and France, which formalised the 
declaration of building programmes on an annual basis, and introduced a 
system of qualitative limitations that included the stipulations that 
battleships were not to exceed 35,000 tons and were not to be armed with 
guns above a calibre of 14 inches.66 The new treaty was, however, only due
to come into operation on 1 January 1937, and it was therefore hoped that
in the interim other powers, and in particular the Soviet Union, Germany 
and Japan, could be persuaded to accede either formally or informally to 
the treaty's terms.
The agreement of the last two powers was considered to be especially 
important as their refusal to abide by the terms threatened to unleash a 
new naval race which would lead to a general worsening of the tensions that 
were already undermining international peace, and help to push Germany and
Japan closer together. There was increasing evidence that the latter was
already in progress with rumours circulating in early January 1936 that a 
Pact had been signed by the two countries; a report which, though untrue, 
raised fears in Whitehall.67 This development underlined the need to 
continue discussing naval issues with Japan and to keep an interest in the 
idea of a political pact, and as early as 18 January Craigie noted that- 
'The danger of a policy of complete inactivity lies in the present tendency 
to a rapprochement between Japan and Germany - if rumour speaks true this 
is already more than a tendency. If on top of Japan’s withdrawal, we allow 
ourselves to be influenced by the present French demand that no attempt 
should be made to bring Germany into this Conference at all ... we shall be 
almost inviting those two powers to come to an understanding...'66 
This concern, added to his conviction that naval limitation was a necessary 
goal in itself, led Craigie into a determined effort to draw these two 
states into agreeing to comply with the terms of the Second London Naval 
Agreement.
Craigie’s conviction that the continuation of naval limitation could help 
to blunt the revisionism of the 'have-not' nations was not, however, shared 
by many of his colleagues within the Foreign Office, and differences were
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particularly apparent when dealing with Germany. Talks with the Germans 
over qualitative limitation began even before the signing of the eventual 
naval treaty, and an agreement had virtually been reached when on 7 March 
1936 Hitler advanced his forces into the demilitarized Rhineland. Craigie, 
despite this unilateral German abrogation of the Locarno Treaty, pushed for 
the continuation of the naval talks and was supported by the Admiralty, but 
faced vociferous opposition from other senior members of the Foreign 
Office. The head of the Central Department, Ralph Wigram, briefly minuted 
in response to Craigie's plea-
'I sincerely hope we shall suspend these negotiations. I cannot imagine 
anything more likely to add fuel to the present fire than their 
continuance.,g9
Vansittart more moderately recommended that they should be postponed at 
least until the crisis had died down, while acknowledging that this would 
be a disappointment to Craigie. The latter, however, did not agree with 
this judgement, and in typical fashion wrote a cutting reply to the 
apparent criticisms of his efforts-
'There can be no question of personal disappointment, for I am perfectly
gL
accustomed to this sort of thing! But, in view of the intendi?sg expansion 
of our naval strength, I believe the sacrifice of this (the 3 Power) naval 
treaty will have more serious consequences for this country than the 
writers of the above minutes may perhaps realise.'70
Craigie failed to persuade his colleagues, who had the support of Eden, to 
change their minds, and the result was that the talks were only re-convened 
in May, by which time it appeared that the German position had hardened as 
they were now demanding to build five A-Class cruisers rather than the 
three that they-had been prepared to agree to in March. This reopened the 
internal Foreign Office dispute, with Craigie naturally complaining that he 
had been right in the first place; this led the Parliamentary Under—  
Secretary, Lord Stanhope, to counter that-
'Had he [Craigie] kept himself . . . more closely in touch with the German 
situation he would have been able to realise there are bigger fish to be 
considered than the building or non-building of 2 Class A cruisers.'7!
This round of talks, at which Craigie was brought once again into contact 
with Ribbentrop, proved to be more difficult than those of the previous
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year due to German demands to maintain parity with the French and Soviet 
navies. An agreement was finally signed on 17 July 1937, the same day as 
the Anglo-Soviet naval treaty. To some observers these efforts to keep 
alive the spirit of naval disarmament in Europe appeared a fruitless task, 
but Craigie consistently maintained his belief in the necessity of his 
diplomacy as part of the process of ensuring peace. He noted 
optimistically in June 1936 that-
'If one detects a deterioration in the Ribbentrop attitude between June 
1935 and this June, this is, I venture to think, not a reason for giving up 
Germany in despair but for redoubling our efforts for a settlement in 
Western Europe, while it may still be a c h i e v e d . *72
This comment which conjures up the image of days spent on intricate talks 
building towards a seemingly unattainable compromise stands as a typical 
example of Craigie's attitude towards negotiations and sheds light on the 
reputation he acquired for building 'houses out of straw'.
Craigie's most difficult task, however, was not dealing with Germany, but 
rather reconciling Japan to the terms of the Second London Naval Agreement. 
He was convinced that Japan would eventually be willing to come into line 
since its refusal to abide by the Treaty's terms could lead the United 
States to increase decisively its fleet in the Pacific thereby provoking a 
naval race in the Pacific which Japan could not win. The problem for 
Craigie was to find a method of approach which would allow Japan to 
compromise without losing face, but with the failure of his last effort to 
investigate the chances of a political agreement it was not easy to see how 
this could be achieved.
The chances that such an approach would be successful were not helped by 
the continuing problem of the attitude of the United States, which remained 
consistently opposed to any compromise with Japan. The most direct 
manifestation of this was the American insistence in early 1936 that, in 
addition to the naval treaty there should be an exchange of letters 
reaffirming Anglo-American parity, a move which could only antagonize the 
Japanese. The American attitude was summed up in a conversation between 
Craigie and Norman Davis on 4 March 1936, when Davis responded to Craigie's 
concern for the effect of such a move on Japan by stating that-
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'... no amount of honeyed words would bring Japan into the treaty; the only 
argument that would have weight with their realistic statesmen was that 
England and the United States intended to work closely together in naval 
matters and to allow no misunderstandings to arise between u s . '73 
Britain was not in any position to resist such American pressure, as the 
deterioration of the European situation during 1936 made it ever more 
necessary not to jeopardize the relationship with Washington, and Britain 
was forced into the position of having to respond enthusiastically to any 
initiatives emanating from the Roosevelt administration no matter how 
bizarre. This policy was not accepted simply by Eden, who consistently 
showed a desire to co-operate with the United States, but even by the far 
more sceptical Vansittart.74 Craigie, in his capacity as supervisor of the 
American Department, was well aware of the advantages which would accrue 
from better relations, and he noted on 21 May, after the American Secretary 
Henry Morgenthau had approached Sir Ronald Lindsay about financial co­
operation, that-
'It seems to me ordinary common sense that, with the situation in Europe as 
bad as it is, we should maintain with the United States as good relations 
as are possible, having regard to present isolationist sentiment in that 
country.'75
The result of this concern for American opinion was that Britain was forced 
to continue to toe a line acceptable to Washington in East Asia.
These obstacles meant that, apart from routine soundings of the Japanese 
position, Craigie's policy for bringing Japan into line rested on 
negotiating treaties with the European nations and hoping that Japan would 
then come into line to avoid being isolated or blamed for the collapse of 
the system. The result was that it was not until October 1936 that Craigie 
made an official approach to the new Japanese Ambassador in London, Yoshida 
Shigeru, about the need for an agreement over 14 inch guns before March 
1937. By the autumn of 1936, however, the naval issue had once again, due 
to Yoshida's efforts to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive agreement, 
become an element in a possible Anglo-Japanese understanding, and in the 
Ambassador's first draft memorandum presented to Chamberlain in October, 
one of his proposals was for the reconvening of the naval c o n f e r e n c e .76 
This was not what Craigie desired but he did see some hope in Yoshida's
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proposals, and when in December Clive recommended that talk of an 
understanding be postponed, Craigie opposed this view by noting that- 
'My belief is that if we now return a reply to Mr. Yoshida on the lines 
proposed, this will just tip the balance in favour of a more reasonable 
Jap. attitude towards the naval question.'77
Yoshida's hopes for an improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations were not, 
however, shared by the Imperial Japanese Navy and the official negative 
reply to the enquiry about whether Japan would commit itself to the 14 inch 
gun eventually arrived in March 1937, while Craigie was on holiday in
A m e r i c a .  7 8
With this anticlimax Craigie’s efforts over the previous three years to 
continue to involve Japan in the naval limitation process effectively came 
to an end; all his 'resources of skill and diplomacy' had failed to bring 
about the desired conclusion and the stage was set for a new era of naval 
competition in the Pacific. He had battled in these years against 
impossible odds, and had shown the tenacity and flexibility that would 
later serve him well in his negotiations in Tokyo. As one historian has 
noted-
'Craigie handled virtually all the day-to-day communication on arms control 
matters between the two Governments..., and his presence and experience 
gave continuity and coherence to successive conferences and 
negotiations.'79
The fundamental problem that had defeated his efforts was the difficulty of 
trying to square the interests of three main naval Powers with their very 
different positions in the international system. In connection with this 
it is interesting to note that in a conversation with one of the Japanese 
delegates to the 1935 Conference following the Japanese walkout, Craigie 
stated that-
'...it was well known to both countries that, were it not for other 
countries, we could probably reach a naval understanding without much 
difficulty... .'80
Despite this sad end to his endeavours Craigie did not feel that his 
efforts had been wasted and in his memoirs 'Behind the Japanese Mask* he 
defended the 1936 London Naval Treaty stating that it 'functioned 
satisfactorily* until it was broken by the Germans in 1939. He also wrote
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that he believed that the Treaty was a good basis for future attempts at 
arms limitation as it tackled one of the key factors in naval rivalry - 
suspicion.81
Although Craigie had finally been unable to win Japan over to the 1936 
Naval Treaty, his work from 1934 had raised him to a position of 
considerable seniority in the Foreign Office, so that in January 1935 he 
had been promoted to Assistant Under— Secretary and in June 1936 had 
received a KCMG. It was, however, by no means automatic that having 
reached these heights he should be made Ambassador to Japan, one of the 
Foreign Office's senior foreign postings. The decision to appoint him to 
this post can largely be seen as a reflection of the fact that by 1936 he 
was the senior member of the Foreign Office with the greatest experience of 
negotiating with the Japanese. He had developed good contacts with a 
number of important Japanese figures of whom Matsudaira Tsuneo, who was now 
the Minister of the Imperial Household, and Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, the 
Navy Vice-Minister, were the most important. Also acting to Craigie's 
advantage was his great skill in handling tricky negotiations, a quality 
which could serve him well in Tokyo. It was therefore not entirely 
surprising when it was announced in the Times on 13 March 1937 that he was 
to replace Sir Robert Clive as Ambassador to Japan, although in doing so he 
was promoted over the heads of some of his colleagues such as Sir Lancelot
wrote to Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, the Ambassador to Nanking, stating 
that he felt that it was a shame that Sir Hughe, himself, had not been 
appointed, as 'your year in China would have been invaluable. '83 The most 
interesting reaction, however, came from Ribbentrop, Craigie's former 
opponent over the negotiating table, who wrote in a memorandum for Hitler 
in January 1938-
'The Foreign Office in the summer sent its most able official, Sir Robert 
Craigie to Japan. In order to be able to protect the heart of the British 
Empire, England will in my opinion at the proper time do everything she can 
to reestablish good relations with Italy and Japan...'84
0 1 i p h a n t . 8 2  This news did not much comment, although Clive
It is not entirely clear, however, to what extent Craigie’s appointment can 
be explained by his obvious sympathy for a policy of moderation towards
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Japan. Certainly the decision to send him to Tokyo, which was taken in 
January 1937, occurred at a time when support in government circles for a 
new attempt to come to terms with Japan was rapidly increasing and had 
spread beyond the usual coterie in the Treasury into the Services and the 
Foreign O f f i c e . 8 5  This was only partly a response to the efforts of 
Yoshida and rather more to do with, first, the conclusion of Leith-Ross's 
report on East Asia which recommended that Britain should seek to improve 
trade relations with Japan and protect British economic interests in China, 
and, second, a growing awareness in the face of the ever worsening 
relations with Germany and Italy that, if Britain did not ease its 
relations with Japan, there was the threat that Japan could take advantage 
of Britain's weak defences in East Asia, while war raged in Europe.
This strategic motive for easing relations with Japan was given an enormous 
boost in the autumn of 1936 by the news of the signing of the Anti- 
Comintern Pact by Germany and Japan on 25 November 1936.86 Although on the 
surface this was simply an agreement to exchange information about 
Comintern activities, it also included a supplementary protocol where both 
signatories agreed to remain strictly neutral should the other signatory be 
attacked by the Soviet Union and to not sign any political treaties with 
the Soviet U n i o n . 8 7  These latter clauses were intended to be kept secret 
by Germany and Japan, but, due to the successful breaking by the British 
Government Code and Cypher School of the Japanese diplomatic code, the 
Foreign Office was very quickly made aware of these t e r m s . 88 Knowledge of 
this protocol made it clear that the two revisionist states were coming 
together in a political and possibly military combination which could 
menace Britain -just as easily it could the Soviet Union. This situation 
led Vansittart to prepare in December 1936 a long memorandum entitled 'The 
World Situation and British Rearmament' in which he urged the need for 
Britain to speed up its rearmament to contain the German threat, and to buy 
time by arranging a colonial deal with Germany, an idea that had been 
turned down earlier in the year by the Committee of Imperial D e f e n c e . 8 9  He 
also noted in this paper the problems raised by Japan and wrote- 
'What the agreement clearly does ... is to introduce Japan into the orbit 
of European affairs at a particularly delicate and dangerous phase, and to 
increase the probability that, in given circumstances, Germany and Japan
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will now act together. The Japanese Ambassador in London has recently said 
that if we cannot find an alternative policy in which Japan could co­
operate with us ... those who favour an even closer relationship between 
Japan and Germany will have their way. He added that he regarded such 
tendencies as highly dangerous for his country. They are also dangerous 
for ours.'90
Vansittart's observations generated a good deal of interest and one of 
those who subsequently minuted his opinions was Craigie. Unfortunately the 
latter's comments did not include any reflections on Japan, although 
elsewhere he made his views clear by responding to Clive's lack of
enthusiasm for the Eden-Yoshida talks by noting that-
' . . . to rebuff our friends in Japan just at the moment when there is much 
searching of the Japanese heart as to the wisdom o f •the recent agreement 
with Germany would be to play the German game.'91
Craigie's reflections on Vansittart's memorandum are important, however, on 
another scale for they provide an understanding of his view of the world 
situation. His general approach was to concur with the views of his 
superior, although he made clear that he did not see a clash with Germany 
as inevitable but noted rather that-
' . . . it is the "dynamic of events" which makes the situation so intensely 
dangerous and the fact that so many of the world’s autocrats appear to be 
ill-balanced, impulsive and jumpy.'92
He went on to express specifically his agreement with Vansittart over the 
colonial question, and wrote, in a passage which throws a good deal of
light on his later insistence that the Foreign Office pursue a policy of
compromise with Japan, that-
'The recent decision of the CID Committee on this subject is one which, I 
fear, the country will have cause to rue in the years ahead of us. But a 
colonial settlement should only be part of a general political settlement 
in which Germany will declare herself satisfied once for all so far as 
territorial expansion is concerned. What puts us wrong not only with 
Germany but with the whole world is the slogan, when applied to mandates, 
of "what we have we h o l d " . ' 9 3
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Vansittart's comments on Japan hit a sympathetic chord with Admiral 
Chatfield, who in his notes on Vansittart's paper on 5 January 1937, wrote 
at length of the prospect of developing an understanding with Japan. He 
deprecated the proposal in some quarters that there could ever be a return 
to the days of the alliance, because of the dominance of the military party
in Japan, but stated that he did believe that-
’ . . . even some tacit agreement which would support the diplomatic side of 
Japan and form some curb on any aggressive action against China or against 
our own possessions would be of the greatest value, because it would give 
us greater security in the east for a time. . . An understanding with Japan 
... is therefore the first essential and, difficult as it admittedly is, 
should not be unobtainable if we make it not a weak aim but a decided 
policy. Having secured our Eastern Empire against our first commitment, we 
should be in a stronger position to sit on the fence in Europe.'94 
Following on from this Chatfield used his influence to persuade his fellow 
Chiefs of Staff to support a rapprochement, and in February 1937 their 
review of imperial defence noted that-
'From the military aspect ... we warmly support the efforts of our 
diplomacy to adjust the differences between Japan and ourselves . . . Any 
agreement with Japan would enormously strengthen the Empire but at the 
present time the probability of the conclusion of such an agreement is
remote.*95
The doubts about whether an agreement was possible were due largely to the 
impression that Japan still intended to dominate China, and that Yoshida 
did not have any approval from the Gaimusho for the soundings he was making 
and also due to the problems thrown up by the Keelung incident where two 
British sailors had been beaten up by Japanese police on Formosa.96 These 
difficulties, however, began to evaporate in the spring of 1937 when
changes within Japan appeared to promise a more moderate line towards 
China. In particular the choice of Sato Naotake, the former Ambassador to 
France, as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Hayashi cabinet augured well 
for a more conciliatory tone to.Japanese p o l i c y . 9 7  The easing of tensions 
in China was also matched by an apparently less rigid mood in Washington, 
with Roosevelt in April 1937 presenting to Eden through Davis a proposal for 
I*- the neutralization of the P a c i f i c . 9 8  By May 1937 even Eden, who had
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never been noted for his patience with Japan, reported to the Defence Plans 
(Policy) Sub-Committee that-
'The objective he had in mind . . . was an agreement which, while falling
short of an alliance, nevertheless rested on a community of interests as
regards the joint policy of England and Japan towards China. There 
appeared to be the signs of the dawn of a new era in the relations between 
China and Japan since Japan was apparently modifying her viewsL in regard to 
the right way of dealing with China.'99
Craigie was, not surprisingly, sympathetic to this drive towards an 
understanding with Japan and in the spring and summer of 1937 before his 
departure for Japan he made clear his hopes for the future on a number of 
occasions. For example in response to the Admiralty's proposal in April 
for ’A New Standard of Naval Strength* to deal with the increasing threat 
to British maritime interests, Craigie noted that the Admiralty seemed to 
be too cautious about the chances of rapprochement with Japan, and he noted 
in terms similar to Eden that-
' . . . it is possible to conceive of an agreement with Japan which, falling
short of an alliance, would nevertheless rest on a real reciprocity of
interests, based in turn on a new era in Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . '100 
In stating this view Craigie was not, however, just showing blind faith in 
Japan, for at the same time he argued the need to negotiate from a position 
of strength by stating-
’Dealing as we are with a militarist element in Japan whose worship of 
force is second only to the militant Nazis, we shall produce the maximum 
effect on the Japanese mind only if we can leave the Japanese Government in 
no doubt as to -our determination to restore our armaments to their former 
relative position in the world balance.'ioi
This was an important qualification to put on the procedure of reaching an 
understanding and demonstrates that Craigie was not approaching his new 
post with the views of a naive Japanophile, but rather that, in line with 
the views of Vansittart and Chatfield, he saw Japan in terms of the world 
situation.
Craigie also commented on the idea of an expanded Four Power Pact presented 
by Prime Minister Joseph Lyons of Australia in May 1937 at the Imperial
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Conference in London, and in this context noted his belief that, before 
proceeding with a multinational approach, it was wiser to concentrate on 
simply improving Anglo-Japanese relations and assisting the favourable 
trend in Sino-Japanese relations.102 In another episode Craigie's hopes 
were encouraged further by a meeting on 2 June with Yoshida who handed him 
a draft reply to a British proposal for negotiations that seemed to offer 
real promise for the future. 103 This atmosphere thus bred a sense of hope 
for what could be achieved in Tokyo, and when he recalled his feelings at 
this time in Behind the Japanese Mask, Craigie wrote-
'... I was not convinced that an Anglo-Japanese war was inevitable. On the 
contrary, I believed that the moderate elements, despite the ground they 
had lost in previous years, were still capable of delaying, if not 
preventing, Japan's plunge into a major war. I also believed that, with 
Germany and Italy arming to the teeth and intent on world conquest, it 
would be folly for Britain to take on Japan simultaneously...'!04
By the time Craigie departed for Japan in late July, however, the optimism 
for the future was beginning to disperse. On 7 July Chinese and Japanese 
forces clashed at Lukouchiao west of Peking and the fighting soon began to 
spread as neither side was, for reasons of prestige, willing to compromise 
in the name of peace. On 6 August Lord Chatfield wrote to the Commander in 
Chief China Fleet, Vice-Admiral Little, about his fears for the future- 
'It is very unfortunate that this China-Japanese affair has broken out at 
this time because we were all hoping here that we were going to make real 
friends with the Japanese once more and it has always been the China 
situation that has stood in the way, so I do hope that war will not come 
after all, but at present it looks very like it.'l°5
Three days later two Japanese sentries were shot at Shanghai and with the 
start of fighting in China's largest city all chances for peace were lost. 
From that moment Craigie's task in Tokyo was to change, even before he had 
arrived, from being the Ambassador to negotiate a new understanding with 
Japan to being a diplomat whose job was to try to avoid the outbreak of war 
between the two countries.
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'The one redeeming feature is that we now have a first-class ambassador in 
Tokyo in the person of Craigie and that the JCapanese] themselves ... have 
great faith in him. Poor Craigie, however, is having a trying time and is 
desperately worried as shown very clearly by what he says in his cables to 
the F.O.*
Captain Malcolm Kennedy, Diary Entry For 29 October 19371
Sir Robert Craigie arrived in Yokohama to take up his post as Ambassador to 
Japan on 3 September 1937 after a month’s journey from Britain via Canada. 
During this period the situation in China had markedly deteriorated and a 
growing rift had developed between London and Tokyo as Britain blamed Japan 
for the continuing escalation of the conflict and Japan accused Britain of 
encouraging Chinese resistance and thus hindering the Japanese war effort. 
The high tide of optimism that had been reached in the early sunmer had 
clearly ebbed away, but despite this threat to the possibility of achieving 
a rapprochement Craigie still held to his conviction that his prime task 
was to foster better Anglo-Japanese relations. He therefore arrived in 
Japan determined to achieve an understanding with Japan which would ease 
British concerns about East Asia and allow for greater flexibility in 
Britain's diplomacy with the Dictators in Europe.
In this task of neutralizing the Japanese threat it was obvious that, as a 
figure relatively inexperienced in the intricacies of Japanese politics, 
Craigie would have to rely to a considerable degree on the personnel of the 
Embassy in Tokyo, who had developed over many years an understanding of the 
Japanese system of government and had links with those in the political, 
military and commercial circles that Craigie needed to win over. The 
problem for the Ambassador was, however, that he found on his arrival that 
the majority of senior figures in the Embassy were deeply sceptical about 
the chances of a successful rapprochement as it seemed to them that there
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were too many issues over which Britain and Japan held diametrically 
opposed opinions. This group was centred around many of the leading 
characters in the Embassy, including the Naval Attache, Captain Bernard 
Rawlings, the Counsellor, James Dodds, and the Commercial Counsellor, Sir 
George Sansom.2
Sansom was the most influential in this group; he had been connected with 
Japan as a member of the Consular Service since 1904, had become renowned 
as a cultural historian of Japan, and was held in the highest esteem by the 
Foreign Office as an expert on Japanese politics, Such was his standing 
that when, in 1937, it was reported that he would shortly be retiring the 
Foreign Office debated how he could be kept on, Vansittart noted-
'My own view has been for some time that Sir G.Sansom shd be the next
ambassador. He has carried several in his day, & shd end by having his own 
day. He is one of the most distinguished men in Asia, and it wd therefore 
ill become our service that we cd do nothing more for such outstanding 
merit than a Counsellorship.'3
Since 1934 Sansom had been lamenting the change of mood in Japan, and had 
been a key influence on the Foreign Office's reservations about the 
prospects of any understanding with that country. During the debate over 
policy with the Treasury in 1934 Sansom wrote to Sir Edward Crowe, the 
Comptroller-General of the Department for Overseas Trade,-
'I feel as I have always felt for these people ... But this is not the 
Japan you know. The same people are not in charge. No doubt the pendulum 
will swing back, but until it is at rest, this is not a country to make
bargains with, unless they are very favourable, very explicit and very
easily enforced.'4
Such was the power of his argument and his prestige that the Foreign Office 
made his opinions known to the Cabinet in January 1935, in an effort to 
counter the Treasury’s demand for improved relations with Japan.5 After 
1934 his pessimism deepened with each passing year, so that by 1937 he had 
become convinced that there was no longer any moderate lobby of note in 
Japan to which Britain could appeal. These were not, however, sentiments 
shared by Craigie, with his belief that a new understanding could be 
reached with Japan. The result was that Sansom, who was used to acting as 
the principal adviser to previous Ambassadors, was to find himself frozen
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out by Craigie, a situation which was exacerbated further by a clash of 
personalities that developed between the austere Ambassador and his 
cultured Counsellor. The animosity between the two developed to such an 
extent that Sansom later recorded himself as stating to Cadogan in 1940 on 
being ordered back to Tokyo-
' I'm not going back to Japan. I hate your ambassador there. He's a 
fool.'6
Craigie found a more agreeable accomplice in the pursuit of improved 
relations away from the group that had developed around Sansom, in the 
person of the Military Attache, Major— General F.S.G. Piggott. Like Sansom, 
Piggott had originally been assigned to Japan in 1904, having been chosen 
as one of the first of the British Army’s Language Officers. He had 
already served one term of office as Military Attache between 1922 and 1926 
before being asked by the War Office in 1935 to return once again to 
Tokyo.7 His appointment for a second term was unusual; it was not standard 
practice to send such a senior officer as a Military Attache, but it was 
felt that to revive mutual trust Piggott, with his experience and extensive 
contacts, would be the best man available. The Foreign Office from the 
first expressed its reservations at this proposal, as Piggott was renowned 
as a Japanophile of the most extreme tendency who, unlike Sansom, refused 
to accept that Japan had changed. Sir Robert Clive in particular was
highly doubtful about the appointment, and reported from Tokyo- 
'My own impression confirmed by others who know General Piggott is that in 
regard to Anglo-Japanese relations his feelings outrun his sense of
realities and that his Judgement is warped. ... It might be embarrassing 
therefore to have on my staff an officer on whose judgement I could not
rely and with whom I might differ on broad questions of policy.'S
These doubts were communicated to the War Office, who, though understanding 
the misgivings of the Foreign Office, pointed out that they could think of 
no alternative.
Piggott was convinced from the time of hearing of his appointment that his 
principal mission was to lay the basis for a rapprochement with Japan, and 
this belief was underpinned by his familiarity with the desperate concern 
within the War Office in 1936 for an easing of tensions in East Asia. On
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28 July, shortly after his arrival, he wrote to the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, Field Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell-
'Of the many British officers who were sent to Japan in 1903 and 1904 ... I 
am now the last survivor still serving. For that reason . . . , in addition 
to the instructions received from Sir Archie [Field Marshall Sir A. 
Montgomery-Massingberd] and [General Sir John] Dill, I am striving to the 
utmost of my ability to restore in some measure "mutual trust and 
confidence".'9
In Japan, however, Piggott found that his efforts met with little sympathy 
from the rest of the Embassy and when, in his first major report of 17 
September, he wrote that sentiment within the Japanese Army was still 
favourable to Britain, Sansom's riposte was to observe-
'There are many people in Japan who would like to be friends with us, but 
each country wants what the other cannot give. This is not to say that we 
should abandon hope of clearing up certain outstanding issues: but a
comprehensive arrangement ... is likely to be extremely difficult, because 
our interests are, fundamentally, opposed at almost every point.'iO 
This view was heartily endorsed by the Far Eastern Department, who very 
early on began to disparage Piggott's reports and refer to his more 
effusive flights of fancy as 'Piggottry.’
Piggott was also hindered in his efforts by the War Office, who were 
concerned that the Military Attache's ardour cut across the more cautious 
policy favoured by the Foreign Office and that his unstinting search for 
better relations was pursued to the detriment of the reports on the state 
of the Japanese Army needed by M.I.2c, the military intelligence branch 
that dealt with East Asia. As early as 29 June 1936 he refused a request 
from M.I.2c that he set up a covert intelligence network in Japan by 
arguing-
’ . . . my usefulness here will largely depend ... on my being trusted by the 
Japanese military authorities. Their natural reticence and suspicion, 
coupled with some latent resentment, can only be overcome by the most 
sincere and painstaking efforts spread over many months ... the results are 
yet to seek, and I do not want to prejudice them.'11
The consequence of such thinking was that for the next year Piggott's
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reports on the Japanese Army remained inadequate for military intelligence 
purposes.
By August 1937 M.I.2c were so frustrated at the lack of information that 
they demanded that something be done to remedy the situation. This led the 
Section’s head. Colonel Dennys, to write to Major— General Haining, the 
Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, on 10 August- 
’When General Piggott took up his post ... he was convinced that his 
primary task was the promotion of better relations between the Japanese and 
British Armies, and therefore between the respective governments of these 
two countries. From the M.I.2 point of view this is a wrong appreciation 
of an MA’s duties. ... This aspect of his work is of considerable value in 
the present state of Anglo-Japanese relations . . . but it absorbs his time 
and energy to the exclusion ... of the detailed information required by 
M.I.2.’12
The Section realized that it was dangerous politically to recall Piggott, 
as this would confuse and possibly antagonize the Japanese, and suggested 
instead that he be provided with an assistant. Haining, who was not amused 
at Piggott's behaviour, and in particular the latter's habit of writing 
directly to Field Marshal Deverell, agreed with this proposal, and it was 
decided to appoint Colonel George Wards as an Assistant Military Attache. 
In relating this decision to Piggott, Haining pointedly observed- 
'... now with an assistant you will be able to devote more attention to ... 
your primary task - the collection of military intelligence.'*3
Piggott's isolation within the Embassy changed with Craigie's arrival. The 
two men had met previously at the Washington Conference of 1921 and had 
carried on a passing acquaintance in London in the years after, which meant 
that, in contrast to the relationship between Craigie and Sansom, a spark 
of friendship already existed.14 This personal link was underpinned by 
their mutual belief in the need for better Anglo-Japanese relations, and 
each saw in the other a means of achieving this common aim. For Craigie, 
Piggott provided an expertise about the psychology of the Japanese and a 
wide range of high-powered contacts in the Army; for Piggott, Craigie was 
an Ambassador willing to indulge his intrigues in the search for 'mutual 
trust and confidence'. Piggott was certainly delighted at his good fortune
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and wrote to Field Marshal Deverell on 23 October 1937 that- 
'While the situation generally as regards Anglo-Japanese relations looks so 
bad, there is still one silver lining, namely, the arrival of Sir Robert 
Craigie. I am sure you will be pleased to know that he is making a 
particular effort to get in touch with the Army. ... [Tlhere is no doubt at
all that his reputation with the Japanese as a man of wide sympathy, and
quiet wisdom and understanding, is growing r a p i d l y . '15
This was, however, a dangerous relationship for Craigie to rely upon if his 
intention was to seek a full Anglo-Japanese understanding, as Piggott's 
utility as an adviser was undermined by two crucial faults. The first was 
that he was out of touch with current trends in the Japanese Army. This 
was ably demonstrated by a minute that Piggott wrote in response to an 
assertion in 1938 by another official that the Japanese Army was anti- 
British, in which he commented-
’At present the only safe guide to the future development of the pro- and 
anti-British factions in the Army, is the undoubted fact, I repeat fact, 
that the heads of the army (Generals Sugiyama, Tada, Umezu, Homma ... Hata, 
Ikeda etc.) wish to restore and strengthen friendship with Great
Britain.'16
The problem with this judgement was that it presumed that the senior
officers named above, who were all old acquaintances of Piggott from the 
the period of the alliance and men of the same age group, were 
representative of Army opinion. The reality was that power rested with the 
younger men, such as Generals Tojo, Itagaki, Oshima, Ishiwara and Muto, who 
had risen to prominence in the 1930s and demonstrated very little concern 
for Britain’s welfare, and these were figures whom Piggott barely knew.17 
His second weakness was that he was too desperate to be conciliatory 
towards the Japanese, which led to him giving a false impression of 
Britain’s desire for an understanding, and also to his inability to 
recognize when his contacts were exaggerating the mood of the Army in a 
deliberate effort to pressurize the British into making concessions.18
These faults were certainly serious and were obvious to many of those who 
came into contact with the Military Attache; for example the Times writer 
Peter Fleming noted wickedly in July 1938 after visiting Japan-
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'Tokyo was amusing, though the only real belly-laughs were evoked by 
Piggott. He really is a preposterous and fatal man and should be removed 
at once, notwithstanding the new Japanese law which forbids the export of 
national treasures.'l9
Later on in the same year Edmund Hall-Patch, the Financial Adviser to the 
Tokyo and Shanghai embassies, noted in a more sober analysis-
he [Piggott] is ... looming too large as an interpreter of Japanese 
motives to the Ambassador, and as an exponent of our point of view to many 
Japanese who think his influence is greater than it really is. ... I do not 
place great faith in him in either capacity. Not that he is actuated by 
base motives: far from it, but he genuinely believes that the Japanese are 
people of much the same stamp as ourselves... In other times: in other
circumstances his: "get together boys" and his heartiness with the Japanese 
might be valuable. But not now.*20
The problem for Craigie was that these assessments reflected badly on him 
too, and many of his observations on Anglo-Japanese relations were 
summarily dismissed after it was deemed that they were based upon wildly
over— optimistic forecasts from his Military Attache; this was a grave
drawback on his effectiveness as an Ambassador.
Apart from the necessity of reaching sympathetic Japanese to assist in 
bringing about better relations, Craigie also realized that much would 
depend on winning over the United States. In this respect it was essential 
for him to develop a close relationship with the American Ambassador, 
Joseph Grew, who had been Washington'$ representative in Japan since 1932, 
and unlike many of the senior American ambassadorial appointees he was a 
career diplomat rather than a politician. To a noticeable degree his 
experience as Ambassador in Japan in the period 1937 to 1941 was to mirror 
that of Craigie; he was to have a number of serious clashes with the State 
Department and harboured the feeling that his perceptions of Japan's
actions and intentions were all too often ignored.21 The similarity of his 
fate to that of Craigie can be attributed to a large degree to the opinions 
they held in common, such as the belief that there was a moderate
constituency in Japan that could be appealed to, and the conviction that if 
any efforts were to be made to coerce Japan then the Anglo-Saxon powers 
should realize that they could lead to all-out war; these were views that
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were frequently not shared by their superiors. Close co-operation between 
the two Ambassadors began immediately on Craigie's arrival, and the latter 
was quick to emphasize his belief that Anglo-American friendship was an 
essential prerequisite in the task of bringing Japan back into the 
international fold.22 As early as 30 September Grew wrote to Hugh Wilson, 
the Assistant Secretary of State, who knew Craigie from the naval talks- 
'My initial impressions of him here are very favourable and so far as can 
see now he wants to cooperate to the limit.'23
However, Craigie did not have any respite on his arrival in Japan in which 
to finalize his plans for a peace offensive: instead he was thrown straight 
into a crisis. On 26 August, in an incident which further strained the 
already frayed relations between Britain and Japan, news had reached 
Whitehall from the Consulate-General in Shanghai that the Ambassador to 
China, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, had been gravely wounded in a 
Japanese air attack on his car as he travelled to the city from Nanking. 
That an attack had been made on a car clearly marked with the Union Jack 
was bad enough, but what aggravated the situation even more was that the 
Gaimusho had refused to apologize for the incident until the Japanese Navy 
had made a full investigation, and had even postulated to Dodds, who was in 
charge of the Embassy until Craigie's arrival, that the attack had been 
carried out by Chinese aircraft with false markings.24 The subsequent 
failure to find a solution to the crisis meant that, by the time of 
Craigie's arrival, ministers in London were seriously contemplating that, 
if no satisfactory apology had been given by 8 September, the date of the 
next Cabinet meeting, the new Ambassador should be withdrawn from Japan 
before he had presented his credentials to the E m p e r o r . 25
Not surprisingly Craigie was unenthusiastic about this plan, and to avert 
its implementation he was forced immediately to seek a solution to the 
crisis. He brought to the subsequent negotiations with the Japanese 
government the same tenacity that he had displayed in the naval talks 
although, as he later admitted to Grew, he was careful to tone down his 
instructions from London as he realized that too severe a line would only 
hamper any s o l u t i o n .  2 6  As a compromise he formulated the idea of an 
interim reply from the GaimushQ, and on 5 September discussed this proposal
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with the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Horinouchi Kensuke, and Navy 
Vice- Minister, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. They agreed that Japan should 
express regret that Knatchbull-Hugessen had been attacked and also state 
that Japanese air units would be instructed to act with greater discretion, 
and the next day a reply on these lines was handed o v e r . 2 7  Despite this 
solution the crisis still remained, as on one side the Foreign Office
continued to demand a full apology and on the other the Japanese Navy
quibbled over the details of the British account of the incident in an 
attempt to prove that they were not culpable. It was only on 20 September 
that the matter was finally settled, when Craigie, on receiving a note 
stressing Japan's 'deep regret’ and promising 'suitable steps' if the 
guilty parties were firmly established, informed the Foreign Office that
these were the best terms that could be expected. Reluctantly Eden gave
way, which led Malcolm Kennedy to record in his diary-
'That an amicable settlement has been reached is undoubtedly due largely to 
Craigie to whom Eden + Co. shd. feel truly grateful for rescuing them from 
the consequences of their own unfortunate mishandling of the a f f a i r . '28
The Knatchbull-Hugessen incident brought home to Craigie how difficult it 
was going to be to improve relations, and matters were not helped by 
warnings from Piggott that the Japanese were beginning to perceive Britain 
as the chief critic of their activities in China. In these circumstances 
Craigie was, not surprisingly aghast to hear in early October that the 
Archbishop of Canterbury had agreed to speak at an anti-Japanese meeting at 
the Royal Albert Hall. After a stormy interview with Horinouchi, in which 
the latter had complained vehemently about this outrage, Craigie urged the 
Foreign Office to persuade the Archbishop to cancel his appearance, and 
stated that-
’ . . . what now appears to be happening in England is ... the reverse of 
salutary and may in the long run have serious consequences for ourselves 
... United States opinion, though critical of Japan, appears from here to 
be far less vocal than in Great Britain and less inclined to advocate 
strong measures. ... Thus we bear the brunt of growing resentment 
untempered by any apprehension that words will be followed by deeds. There 
can I fear be little doubt that a continuance of this state will discourage 
moderate elements here, pushing this country further into German-Italian
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camp and tend to prolong hostilities in China.'29
In addition to his concern over the open expression in Britain of anti- 
Japanese feeling, Craigie was also disturbed by the Chinese appeal to the 
League of Nations; this he argued, because of Japan’s antipathy towards 
that organization, threatened to make a peace settlement more difficult to 
attain. He believed that Britain would do best to turn its back on the 
League and instead unilaterally make an offer of good offices to Japan. He 
was encouraged in this by an interview with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Hirota Koki, on 15 September, when the.latter assured him that 
Japan's peace terms would be very reasonable. Two days later Craigie 
learnt from a reliable source that these terms consisted of a neutral zone 
to the south of Peking and Tientsin, an assurance of a friendly regime in 
north China, economic concessions, an end to the Chinese causing problems 
with Manchukuo, and co-operation against communism, which was a remarkably 
moderate package. Even when further demands, the right to station five 
thousand troops in north China, an autonomous Inner Mongolia, the de facto 
recognition of Manchukuo, and the lowering of Chinese import duties, were 
communicated through the same channel a few days later, the terms still 
appeared reasonable considering the scale of the Japanese victory in north 
China.3° On 25 September Craigie therefore pressed the Foreign Office to 
act on these proposals, noting that-
'... good offices of a single power, carried out with the utmost secrecy in 
so far as concerns Japan is the only medium at the moment and Great Britain 
is the only power that could undertake so delicate, if ungrateful, a task 
with any hope of success. That hope lessens with every passing week.'31 
The Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, was impressed with this analysis 
of the situation, and on 27 September persuaded a rather reluctant Eden to 
forward the Japanese proposals to the Chinese. The result was that on 29 
September the Far Eastern Department instructed the British Counsellor in 
Nanking to inform the Chinese authorities of the Japanese terms, which were 
promptly dismissed by Chiang Kai-shek on 4 October as unacceptable.32
In attempting to pursue this policy of achieving peace through the 
acceptance of Japanese formulas, Craigie^was running in the face of opinion 
in the Foreign Office. The latter, as a result of Japan's previous record
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of aggression in East Asia, tended to see the renewed outbreak of war in 
China as a direct result of Japanese machinations, and consequently held 
little faith in Japan's declarations of its peaceful intentions. In 
addition there was the realization within the Foreign Office thai^. for 
Britain to pursue a line in any way favourable to Japan would harm 
relations with the United States, not only in East Asia but also in Europe. 
The similarities of the present conflict to the Manchurian Crisis raised 
the prospect of another Simon-Stimson incident if Britain took the line of 
least resistance. A strong line, however, promised the possibility of 
improving relations with Washington; a prospect which particularly appealed 
to Anthony Eden, who, as previously in the case of the Second London Naval 
Conference, had little sympathy or understanding of Japan and a noticeable 
inclination to toe the American l i n e . 33
On 6 October a move was made in the direction of an international 
settlement of the crisis when an Advisory Committee, which had been set up 
by the League to seek a settlement made its report. It decided that a 
conference of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty be convened to hear 
the Chinese and Japanese cases, and recommended in the interim that League 
members should do nothing to hinder the Chinese war effort. This move 
followed a speech by Roosevelt the day before, in which he had postulated 
the need to 'quarantine' aggressor nations. These two events encouraged 
Eden to believe that there was a possibility that the United States would 
do more than just criticize Japanese policy and consequently he ordered the 
Foreign Office to begin investigating the possibility of economic sanctions 
against Japan. On 13 October, as a result of the deliberations on 
sanctions, an inter— departmental meeting was convened which decided to call 
on the Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War (the ATB 
Committee) for a full report on the potential effect of such a c t i o n . 34
Meanwhile Craigie was given the task of trying to persuade the Japanese 
that it was in their interests to attend the conference, which was due to 
be held in Brussels, and throughout October he pushed Foreign Minister 
Hirota on this matter to no avail. He quite understood Japan's reluctance, 
and warned London that for the Japanese the convening of the Brussels 
Conference raised the image of a repeat of the League's condemnation of
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Japan ip February 1933 and of a possible move by the West to use coercion 
to make peace. He therefore advised the Foreign Office that, if the
conference were to achieve any kind of success, it ought to keep its 
judgements on the rights and wrongs of the war to a minimum and instead 
nominate a single power to mediate, and on 30 October he noted- 
'If the door is to be left open to such mediation it seems important that 
conference should adhere strictly to its mandate of attempting to promote 
peace by agreement and avoid any expression of opinion on origins of 
conflict or responsibilities involved. The greater the appearance of 
impartiality the better the chance of ultimate successful m e d i a t i o n . '35
Craigie’s opinion had little impact on Eden as he pursued the mirage of 
Anglo-American co-operation, but it did affect Chamberlain, who already had 
grave doubts about the wisdom of the anti-Japanese line being pursued by 
the Foreign Office. As early as a Cabinet meeting on 6 October he had made 
clear his complete opposition to any policy of sanctions by stating- 
'He could not imagine anything more suicidal than to pick a quarrel with 
Japan at the present moment when the European situation had become so 
serious. If this country were to become involved in the Far East the 
temptation to the Dictator States to take action in Eastern Europe or
Influenced by Craigie he took this line further in Cabinet meetings on 13 
and 20 October by arguing that the Nine Power Conference ought to see its 
primary object as ’a p p e a s e m e n t 37 jn this assessment he had the support 
of the Chiefs of Staff, who also feared the implications of a war in the 
East. In a memorandum of 23 September Admiral Chatfield poured cold water 
on a proposal from the Cabinet Committee on British Shipping in the Far 
East that two battleships should be sent to Singapore, observing that- 
’... the division of our limited force of capital ships between Eastern and 
Western hemispheres, far from acting as a deterrent to Japan might even 
present a temptation ... in offering ... at least a possibility of 
defeating the divided British forces... .'38
This was followed on 4 October by a letter from the Admiralty to the 
Foreign Office, pointing out that, even if the League as a whole were to 
take action against Japan, this in essence meant Britain would be acting 
unilaterally as it was the League’s only significant naval power. 39
Eden was not willing to let the caution of others undermine his policy, and
although he held out little hope for the Conference itself he still hoped
that it would lead to closer relations with the United States. The
Conference finally began on 3 November with Eden leading the British
delegation. At first it appeared that Eden's optimism was going to pay
off, as the chief American delegate, Norman Davis, hinted that a failure by
Japan to accept the conference's recommendations could lead the United
Ou
States to agree on the need for sanctions. Eden, tantalized by this 
prospect, tried to draw Davis out and intimatecj that Britain would be 
agreeable to sanctions if Washington concurred. In doing so Eden was going 
beyond the policy that had been agreed in Cabinet, but little harm was done 
as Davis too was considerably overstepping his brief by giving such an 
impression, and was quickly ordered to retract his vague promises by 
Washington.40 Despite this setback Eden still hoped that some good could 
come of the Conference, and at a Cabinet meeting he attended on 17 
November, during a lull in the talks at Brussels, he argued for approval of 
a tough final communique from the Conference which would uphold the policy 
of non-recognition and call for the banning of credits to Japan.4!
Eden’s recommendations were, however rejected by the Cabinet for a variety 
of reasons. The initial criticism came in the ATB Committee's report of 5 
November 1937 which concluded that the introduction of sanctions on 
Japanese exports would take between one or two years to have any serious 
effect on Japan's war e f f o r t.40 This setback was followed by a meeting of 
the Committee on British Shipping in the Far East on 9 November at which it 
was decided (in Eden's absence) to reject a scheme which he had supported 
for the assembly of military aircraft for China in Hong Kong, but to 
approve the Foreign Office's position on allowing arms to pass to China 
through the colony at their present relatively insignificant trickle.40 
These decisions showed that there was little support amongst Eden's 
colleagues for a more active policy in East Asia and that caution was to be 
the order of the day.
The reluctance to initiate a tougher policy was to a noticeable extent 
influenced by the warnings emanating from Craigie, who by early November
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was deeply agitated at the direction of British policy. On 4 November in a 
letter to Cadogan, Craigie made clear his misgivings about the Foreign 
Office's pursuit of an international solution to the war by writing that- 
'By much of what we have had to do in recent months under the stress of 
British public opinion we have been throwing away our influence here by the 
handful/. But these people would listen to us ... if they could feel that 
we were neither irretrievably opposed to every Japanese ambition nor 
determined to view in the worst possible light every Japanese activity. 
...I honestly believe we can still play a great role in this country and in 
the Far East generally by co-operation with Japan which would be at once 
friendly and restraining, but the sands are running out and I don't know 
whether I shall be able to say this in three months time.'44 
Craigie's particular fear was that a British decision to agree to the 
international pillorying of Japan would only lead to an attempt by the 
latter to overcome its diplomatic isolation by increasing its ties with the 
Axis powers; a concern which was justified on 6 November when Italy joined 
the Anti-Comintern Pact.
The drift of Japan towards the Axis was also worrying in that it raised the 
possibility that if Britain did not offer to help mediate the Sino-Japanese 
war it could find that this role was instead taken by Germany, which would 
then be able to increase its influence in East Asia. This galvanized 
Craigie into urging once again on 13 November the need for Britain to offer 
its good offices, and he noted in defence of his plea that- 
'What I fear principally is the loss of our prestige throughout the Far 
East if conclusion of Pact with Italy were to be followed by a successful 
German mediation. Moreover some concrete action on our part is necessary 
if we are to stop the present drift here towards Germany and Italy. Even 
to China we shall be of little use as a friend if our influence here sinks 
to zero.'45
Craigie's telegram found a receptive audience in Chamberlain, and 
influenced the latter to respond to Eden's calls for a tough line at the 
Cabinet meeting of 17 November by suggesting instead that Britain and the 
United States should jointly try to m e d i a t e . 4 6  This proposal was 
encouraged further by reports from Joseph Grew who told Craigie that Hirota 
had indicated to him that Japan was ready for peace. However the stumbling
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block remained the Americans, who while unwilling to co-operate with 
Britain in coercing Japan were also opposed to acting as a messenger of 
peace terms which they interpreted as infringing the Nine Power Treaty. As 
a result Washington displayed little sympathy for the proposal, and when on 
19 November Horinouchi told Craigie that Japan preferred to pursue its own 
course there was little reason to press the Japanese further.47
The recalcitrance of the Japanese began to affect Craigie at this point. 
The apparent insincerity over asking for British mediation, allied to clear 
hints that Germany instead had taken on this role,, led Craigie to shift his 
policy from purely emphasizing the positive potential of joint offices to 
exploring the prospect of coercing Japan. On 20 November he wrote to Eden- 
'Nothing . . . can be relied on to stop these people and bring the
Militarists to their senses except the imposition of sanctions (with full
American co-operation) and the unhesitating acceptance of all of the risks 
of war thereby entailed. Adoption of such a course now might save us 
infinite difficulties later.'48
In pursuit of this stricter line, Craigie went further and argued on 6 
December that Britain, in co-operation with America and France, could put 
pressure on Japan by denying the latter credits until a reasonable peace 
settlement had been reached.49 These forthright views seemed to suggest a 
sea change in Craigie's outlook, but in fact his recomnendat ions were
heavily qualified by his stipulation that any attempt to apply pressure on 
Japan could only be attempted in close co-operation with the United States 
and in the realization that such a policy could lead to war. In a letter 
to Cadogan on 2 December that is a summary of the attitude which directed 
his thinking for much of his time in Tokyo, he expanded on this
qualification-
'Above all we must get right out of our heads that these people will be 
deflected by admonitions or curses; if deeds are not possible, then let us 
try different tactics. Strangely enough, the one thing these people (with 
some notable exceptions) want is our friendship. Leave the door wide open 
to this (on the promise of good behaviour) and you will enable us to do a 
lot here. Close the door (or act so that the Japanese believe the door is 
closed) and this country will go completely to the devil, with the ready 
assistance of Mussolini & Hitler.'SO
101
Craigie's belief that Britain should not take a hard line with Japan if it 
was not prepared for war and if it did not have the direct backing of the 
United States was an important influence on his reaction to the next crisis 
that emerged in Anglo-Japanese relations. The first incident in this chain 
of events occurred on 5 December when a small group of British merchant 
ships were attacked by Japanese aircraft at Wuhu; this was followed a week 
later by artillery fire on two British gunboats, HMS Ladybird and HMS Bee, 
and the dive-bombing and sinking of an American gunboat USS Panay.51 Even 
though it seemed clear that the assaults were pot sanctioned at a high
level, these events had all the makings of a very serious crisis. Craigie
was, as George Sansom's wife Katherine recorded, 'mad as hell' over the 
attacks and promptly made official protests to the GaimushS, but he also 
remained cautious about British r e t a l i a t i o n . 52 An important reason for 
this was that the United States, on hearing of the attack on the Panay 
decided to make a unilateral protest to Hirota rather than waiting to make 
a joint demarche with Britain. This appeared to show a lack O f  inclination 
to co-operate on Washington’s part which convinced Craigie that if Britain 
attempted to use force it would be acting alone, and he subsequently wrote 
to Vansittart on 14 December that-
' In a tense situation such as the present and after long campaign of
vilification, war with Great Britain would ... not be unwelcome to the
^thinking masses and to extremist leaders, however much it would be deplored 
by wiser heads. I venture therefore to express the earnest hope that we 
shall issue no warnings that we are not prepared to make good. Everything 
seems to depend on the attitude of the United States, and judging from the 
tone of the note today, this will be compounded of righteous indignation 
rather than forceful p e r s u a s i o n . '53
Within two days, however, it became apparent that he had done the United 
States a great discourtesy by stating that they were not prepared to take 
action. On 16 December Roosevelt in a talk with Lindsay responded to a 
British proposal for a naval demonstration directed against Japan by 
suggesting that secret naval staff talks be held between an American naval 
officer and the Admiralty in London, and that they should prepare the 
ground for an Anglo-American blockade of J a p a n . 54 The Foreign Office
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recognized the latter part of the proposal to be a ’fantastic chimaera', 
but believed that the President's attitude meant that he was at least ready 
for joint action and that he could therefore be directed towards a more 
practical form of demonstrating opposition to Japan's policies.55 
Consequently Eden’s reply to Lindsay's telegram emphasized the need to 
thank Roosevelt for his suggestions and to agree to the visit of an 
American naval officer to London for talks.56
Craigie was only told of these diplomatic manoeuvrings on 3 January. His 
reaction was to register some concern at the turn of events and in a 
telegram of 5 January to Cadogan he noted-
'While I feel reasonably sure that resolute Anglo-American action would 
produce desired effect without war we can never be certain of this in 
dealing with a nation in which a compound of mysticism and nationalism is 
apt to distort reason even among responsible l e a d e r s . '57
The motive for this warning was to ensure that the Foreign Office realized 
before any action was taken that naval action could lead to war. Craigie 
was, however, aware that to express such concerns to the Americans would be 
counter-productive and only encourage their natural caution, and therefore 
when he met Grew on 7 January 1938 he tried to persuade his American 
counterpart that joint action would have a salutary effect. Grew's account 
of the conversation recorded that-
'I said this would of course mean war but Sir Robert did not agree; he
thought that we could well take a leaf out of Japan's book by taking these 
measures without a declaration of war and in any case he believed that a 
mere show of force at Singapore and Hawaii by our two countries would be 
quite sufficient to bring results without further m e a s u r e s . '58
However the optimism in London over the display of solidarity by the Anglo- 
Saxon powers soon proved to be groundless. On 7 January Cadogan, in 
response to reports from Shanghai of Japanese assaults on British 
policemen, sent a telegram to Lindsay asking him to enquire whether the 
United States would now be prepared to order naval preparations just short 
of mobilization.59 The American response was received on 10 January 1938, 
when Lindsay was told by Sumner Welles, the Under-Secretary of State, that
Roosevelt would be prepared to dry-dock the Pacific Fleet to prepare it for
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action and bring its already scheduled manoeuvres at Hawaii forward to the 
second week in February, but only if Britain announced that it was making 
preparations for the Royal Navy to be sent to S i n g a p o r e . 6 0  This came as 
something of a disappointment to the Foreign Office, as it showed that the 
United States was already lagging behind the British and helped to 
underline the need for caution; an impression which was also encouraged by 
the absence of Eden who was on holiday in the Riviera. In this mood fears 
that the movement of the fleet would lead only to problems in Europe gained 
the upper hand; as Cadogan put it on 11 January in a note for Chamberlain- 
' . . . it certainly has to be remembered that if the fleet were to sail in 
three or four weeks, that might be just at the time when we are trying to 
come to terms with Mussolini, who might choose to think that he was in a 
stronger position for dealing with us if the fleet were removed from home 
waters and the Mediterranean.'61
The British response therefore was to state that before proceeding with a 
naval demonstration the Foreign Office would attempt to gain an apology 
from the GaimushS. With this the brief possibility of joint action began 
to slip away, a process not helped by the simultaneous rejection by 
Chamberlain of Roosevelt's plan for a ’world conference*.62
Though the events of December and early January eventually failed to lead 
to the exertion of strong British pressure on Japan, they did provide a 
catalyst for examining how the Foreign Office could provide China with 
greater assistance. The logic behind this development was the belief that, 
if Japan emerged victorious from the war, this would mark the death-knell 
of British commercial interests in China and that, since Britain was not in 
a position to obstruct such a development by coercing Japan, the next best 
thing was to ensure that Chinese resistance to Japan continued. This anti- 
Japanese argument was set out in detail in a memorandum by Sir John Pratt 
on 24 January who argued, along similar lines to Sansom, that- 
'There is ... only one ground on which alliances, ententes or a common 
policy can be based and that is community of interest . . . Great Britain 
desires to see a prosperous and united China. To Japan this is as great a 
nightmare as a Europe united under one sovereignty would be to British 
statesmen.*63
The need for more open support for China was also made clear by events in
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East Asia, as December had seen the fall of Nanking and mid-January 
witnessed the decision by the Konoe government to withdraw recognition of 
the Nationalist Government in China and to cease all peace efforts. This 
kind of thinking did not, however, attract Craigie's support. He was still 
convinced that, if joint action with the United States was impossible, 
Britain should remain strictly neutral in the Sino-Japanese war, since a 
policy of backing China would only lead to tensions which Britain could ill 
afford in the light of the European situation and encourage Japan to move 
closer to the Axis powers. Even in the smaller scale context of defending 
Britain's stake in East Asia he believed that his policy was correct; he 
held that the events of December and January proved that China could not 
win the war with Japan, and felt that if Britain were to back the losing 
side a victorious Japan would inevitably seek to eliminate the British 
stake in East Asia. On 9 February Craigie made clear his views to the 
Foreign Office when he wrote-
'As I have more than once ventured to urge, British interests (strategic as 
well as economic) stand to suffer most from a prolongation of this 
struggle. ... My conclusions are that it would be most unwise from our own 
point of view to take any step calculated to encourage Chiang Kai-shek to 
prolong resistance ... and that we should watch carefully for any sign that 
nationalist Government might be prepared to make peace on terms which leave 
China temporarily weakened, it is true, but capable of ultimate 
resuscitation.
The contrasting views of the Ambassador and the Far Eastern Department 
meant that the stage was set for a year in which they were to clash 
repeatedly over policy towards East Asia. A number of arenas were to 
emerge for this contest, including disputes over the allocation of Chinese 
Customs revenues, the conduct of British authorities in China, the wisdom 
of giving loans to China, and whether anything could be gained from 
negotiations with Japan. These issues largely became excuses for each side 
to push their own East Asian policy on the Chamberlain Government with 
varying degrees of success.
One area in which Craigie did manage to persuade the Foreign Office to 
agree to a policy designed to conciliate the Japanese was over the issue of 
the future of the Chinese Maritime Customs (CMC). The question of how the
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revenue raised by the CMC was to be distributed in wartime had been a major 
problem from the start of hostilities. It was obvious that the Japanese 
had no intention of allowing money raised in ports in occupied territory to 
go to the Nationalists, who would use it to finance their war effort. The 
danger was that the Japanese would simply seize the revenue for themselves: 
this represented a threat not just to the Nationalists but also to foreign 
countries such as Britain who relied on the Customs revenue for the 
servicing of China's foreign debts.
Tensions first arose over this issue due to Japanese demands at Tientsin in 
north China in September 1937. In the subsequent negotiations, however, 
Britain's main obstacle turned out to be not the Japanese but the Chinese, 
who were vehemently against any compromise, but as this was an area which 
concerned key British interests these objections were ignored. In a 
revealing telegram of 8 October to Robert Howe, the Counsellor in Nanking, 
who was pressing for an easing of the pressure on the Chinese to 
compromise, the Foreign Office noted, ironically considering their policy 
over China in other areas, that-
'Preservation of Customs machinery is so important that I fear we must risk 
some resentment if further pressure is necessary ... It is one thing to 
stand up for a principle if it is attainable but quite another to do so if 
it is hopeless and only leads to the evils which the principle is supposed 
to prevent. The Chinese should realise that the substance is more 
important than the shadow.'65
A local agreement in which it was decided that the revenues were to be paid 
into the Yokohama Specie Bank was eventually reached on 27 October after 
Craigie had exerted pressure for moderation in Tokyo.6®
This was only to prove a short lull in the storm, as on 16 November the 
Japanese raised the even more controversial issue of the Customs revenue at 
Shanghai. The uncompromising attitude taken by the Japanese authorities at 
Shanghai, along with the many other tensions in that city caused by the 
war, threatened escalation into a major incident, and this led the Foreign 
Office to agree on 21 December to a suggestion from Howe that the talks be 
transferred to T o k y o . W h e n  the negotiations began in the New Year it 
soon became apparent that the major obstacle was the United States, which
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although opposed to the Japanese plan to deposit all CMC revenues in the 
Yokohama Specie Bank, was not prepared to agree to the British alternative 
of placing them with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. To Craigie this was 
further evidence of Washington's vacillating policy in East Asia, and in 
advising the Foreign Office to continue talks unilaterally, he noted-
if Japanese authorities find that they can virtually dictate a
settlement, with the interested Powers reduced to lodging a vain protest,
. . . they will be encouraged to treat our rights and interests with even 
scantier respect in other fields.'68
This did not, however, mean that Craigie was proposing to take ar\
unequivocal line over this issue, but rather that he was attempting to 
assert and protect Britain's interest in this matter, so as to preclude ag* 
unilateral Japanese solution. This meant that he did not restrict himself 
only to backing the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank proposal but was willing to 
agree to deposition in the Japanese bank if certain conditions were met, 
mainly that the revenue would still be used to service China's foreign
debts. The latter proposition in the end became the basis for the
agreement signed by Craigie on 3 May 1938 after three months of tortuous 
negotiations in Tokyo.68 The eventual settlement was greeted with little 
enthusiasm in the United States or China as the British action, although a 
reaction to a real problem, hinted at acceptance of the principle that 
Japan had the right to police China's affairs. To some observers it has 
appeared as the first act of appeasement by Britain in East Asia; Craigie 
however, considered it to be a demonstration of how British interests in 
China could be protected by the skilful use of compromise.78
As indicated above, another issue that aggravated Anglo-Japanese relations 
was the rising tension in the International Concession at Shanghai between 
the Japanese Army and the British authorities. Ever since the initial 
outbreak of hostilities in the city in August 1937 there had been tensions 
between the two sides, the British complaining that the Japanese were using 
the conflict to discriminate against their commercial interests, the 
Japanese accusing the British of hindering their war effort. The climate 
of crisis was further exacerbated by a number of incidents, such as the 
aforementioned beating of the two policemen in December 1937 and the
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frequent Japanese infringements of the British sector of the Settlement. 
As early as December 1937 Major— General Piggott had commented on the 
deteriorating conditions in the city, and in particular the tension between 
the British garrison led by Major— General A. Telfer-Smollett and the 
Japanese forces led by General Hata Shunroku, and suggested that a liaison 
officer conversant in Japanese should be appointed to ease the situation. 
This proposal was, however, summarily dismissed by Major-General Haining in 
the War Office who reported to Field Marshall Deverell that- 
'You will remember that our Military Attache in Tokyo is so intensely 
Japanese as to be quite impervious to any suggestion that the Japanese have 
done anything either to start this trouble or make it worse.'7!
The result was that no brake was applied to the growing mutual antagonism 
at Shanghai, which continued to gain momentum in 1938.72 Craigie, who 
believed that the tensions were largely the result of the British 
authorities’ failure to act in a strictly neutral manner, became so alarmed 
by the late spring that he, with the concurrence of Sir Archibald Clark 
Kerr, the new Ambassador to China, proposed on 18 May 1938 that Piggott be 
sent to the city to see what could be done to improve relations. The War 
Office now acquiesced, and the Foreign Office also concurred with little 
confidence that anything substantial would be achieved.73
Piggott arrived in Shanghai on 30 May and promptly set to work by holding a 
number of talks with General Hata and arranging for him to meet Telfer- 
Smollett and Clark Kerr. In addition he set up social gatherings where it 
was possible for officials from the two sides to meet their counterparts in 
a convivial atmosphere, to such a degree that one MP complained in the 
House of Commons of the 'fraternization' between the two sides.74 The 
effect was, however, that Piggott's visit did lead to the lowering of 
tensions in the city. Despite this apparent success the Far Eastern 
Department continued to mock Piggott's efforts, and noted in their minutes 
that they still believed that any respite would be merely temporary and 
that little had been achieved. When Piggott returned to Japan and tried in 
a conversation with the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, General Ugaki 
Kazushige, to argue that the battle-weary division stationed at Shanghai 
should be relieved, Nigel Ronald of the Department noted caustically- 
'General Ugaki no doubt had a good giggle when this meeting was over.'75
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It was therefore with some chagrin that they learnt in early August that 
the division at Shanghai had indeed been sent back to Japan and 
demobi1i zed.7 6
This visit was as much a triumph for Craigie as for Piggott, as it seemed 
to justify the former's opinion that Britain could gain much by avoiding 
tensions with Japan and pursuing a strictly neutral policy towards the 
Sino-Japanese war. The same argument was to shape Craigie*s response to 
another issue which was to occupy much thought in Whitehall during 1938, 
which was the debate over whether Britain should grant or guarantee a loan 
to China. The issue of a loan to China was first raised by the Chinese 
Minister of Finance, H.H. Kung, in a visit to Europe in the late spring of 
1937, when he proposed that Britain provide a £20 million loan to support 
the stability of the Chinese currency, an idea which initially met with a 
favourable British response. The situation changed, however, when the 
Sino-Japanese war broke out, as the Foreign Office then decided in the face 
of Treasury objections that a loan would be too controversial.77 The 
proposal for some degree of financial support re-emerged in January 1938, 
when Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, the economic adviser to the Cabinet, 
suggested, in line with the League of Nations recomnendation that members 
should assist China and after prompting by Kung, that a loan should be 
given. The Foreign Office now reversed its previous policy and supported 
the principle of a loan as a useful means of fulfilling its aim of 
encouraging Chinese resistance.78
The problem then was to decide who should provide the money for China; 
should the Government itself be the lending body, or should the Treasury 
merely provide security for a loan to Chiang Kai-shek's regime to be raised 
in the City by a consortium led by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank? The 
Chinese themselves eventually offered a solution by suggesting that a 
Government loan be secured by linking it to Chinese exports of wolfram and 
antimony, two metals which were crucial to the manufacture of munitions. 
On hearing of this plan many ministers, including Chamberlain, Lord Halifax 
(Eden's successor as Foreign Secretary) and Sir John Simon, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, expressed an interest, as this appeared to be a scheme 
that would, while supporting China, also play the useful role of barring
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German access to these vital c o m m o d i t i e s . E v e n t s  began to move in 
earnest in late April, when Chiang Kai-shek pressed Clark Kerr to appeal 
for greater aid from Britain, and on 9 May Halifax wrote to Simon that- 
'We are embarking on an expenditure of two milliards of pounds in 
preparations for war. Here, for an infinitesimal fraction of that sum, we 
may be able, at no risk to ourselves, to preserve our vital interests in 
the Far East.'80
The view that no risk was involved was not, however, accepted by Craigie in 
Tokyo. His major complaint was that, in the absence of any American 
support for the idea, the loan was of a blatantly political nature and 
would compromise Britain's neutrality in the China war, with the obvious 
corollary that it would further worsen Anglo-Japanese relations. In 
addition, he felt that the loan would, in any case, be a waste of useful 
assets because China was doomed to defeat. On 6 May he made his first 
objection to the loan proposal by telling the Foreign Office that- 
'I am not in a position to estimate whether the gains to be anticipated 
from such a policy would outweigh its dangers but it would be unwise to 
under— estimate the risks of serious complications ensuing with this country 
were a "political" loan of this character to be granted to China.*81 
Four days later he took a more extreme position, warning that there could 
be an 'overwhelming outburst of fury against Great Britain' if the loan was 
made, and arguing that the decision to agree to a loan had to be seen on 
more than an East Asian scale-
’... whereas in a World War the attitude of China would not be a 
determining factor, the reverse is true of Japan. Any breach in our
relationship with Japan which is of such a character as to bring her
irrevocably under German domination is bound sooner or later to act upon
our defensive position in Europe.'82
Craigie's fears had little impact on the Foreign Office or on Leith-Ross, 
and the latter casually dismissed Craigie*s arguments in a letter of 12 May 
to N.E. Young of the Treasury by noting that-
'The Japanese themselves are constantly angling for loans and though they 
would be annoyed that we should give credits to China, the hope that 
something of the kind could be done for them would . . . counterbalance this
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indignation that we should do it for C h i n a . '83
The Treasury, however, were impressed by Craigie*s warnings, and began to 
move away from their earlier enthusiasm for the loan project to opposition 
to the proposals. Therefore at a meeting of the Cabinet Foreign Policy 
Committee on 1 June Craigie's 10 May telegram became the centrepiece of an 
argument between the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
with Halifax, on the advice of the Far Eastern Department, dismissing the 
Ambassador's contentions that China would lose the war and that Japan would 
be provoked to war by the loan, while Simon reported that he and his 
advisers were in full agreement with Craigie. The meeting ended without 
any definite conclusion, although it appeared that the policy of caution 
was in the a s c e n d a n t . 8 4
Just as it appeared that the Foreign Office was on a losing wicket, a new 
proposal arrived from Cyril Rogers, a Treasury official on loan to the 
Chinese Government, who suggested a reversion to Kung’s idea of a £20 
million currency l o a n . 85 This idea, unsurprisingly, met with support from 
the Foreign Office and Leith Ross, and the former proceeded to enquire into 
Craigie's views on the new suggestion. His opposition this time was less 
rigid than before, for although he affirmed that a currency loan would be 
seen by Japan as an 'unfriendly act', he calculated that opinion would not 
be as outraged as it might have been over a directly political loan. One 
reason for this judgement was that he had received information from some 
sources that indicated that Japan itself was opposed to a collapse of 
China's currency; he therefore concluded that, if it could be assured that 
the money given to China would not be used for military funding, the loan 
could go forward as Japanese objections would not be too v o c i f e r o u s .86 The 
Treasury carefully noted the proviso to Craigie's qualified support, and in 
a letter in late June Simon noted to Halifax that-
’In the view of the Treasury and the Bank of England it is quite impossible 
to devise any such safeguards as Sir R. Craigie suggests for it is 
perfectly clear that China must actually in practice use any money she gets 
to prosecute the w a r . '87
The divide between the Treasury and the Foreign Office was therefore still 
considerable, and at an informal meeting on 28 June between Chamberlain,
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Halifax and Simon it was decided to put the issue before a full Cabinet 
meeting on 1 July. 8 8 The Treasury memorandum for this next meeting 
continued to reflect strongly Craigie's arguments, and again quoted heavily 
from his 10 May telegram. In contrast, the Foreign Office, in an effort to 
refute the Ambassador's case, argued that Britain's global strategic 
position would in fact be weakened if a loan were not given- 
' . . . if China is not able to maintain an organized resistance, we may soon 
find ourselves face to face with a Japan flushed with success, allied with 
the "Have-not" Powers in Europe and with her hands free to pursue her 
expansionist ambitions in the South Seas and throughout A s i a . ' 8 9  
In the subsequent discussion at the Cabinet meeting a final decision was 
postponed until the American Ambassador and Craigie were consulted. It was 
clear, however, that the Foreign Office was losing ground largely due to 
the growing international tensions, for as Chamberlain stressed- 
'If we were to become embroiled in the Far East, Germany might seize the 
opportunity to do something in Czechoslovakia or Italy in Libya.'90 
The issue was next discussed at the Cabinet meeting on 13 July, by which 
time it had been established that no parallel American action could be 
expected and that Craigie still felt that caution was the best option, and 
as a result Halifax acquiesced in a decision not to go forward with any 
loan.91
The dropping of the loan proposal was a notable triumph for Craigie, as it 
had been his opinions which were consistently cited by the Treasury and 
others to defeat the Foreign Office initiative. It seems likely that he 
was helped in his case against the loan by the fact that both Chamberlain 
and Simon were already well acquainted with him and had come to place trust 
in his judgement. For example, Chamberlain as recently as late April had 
referred to Craigie in a letter to H.A. Gwynne as 'a very valuable servant 
in one of our key posit ions'.92 Another factor in his favour was that the 
senior politicians, to a greater extent than the Far Eastern Department, 
were sympathetic to the need, which Craigie emphasized, to see the issue of 
a loan in a global context, and in particular to calculate its potential 
repercussions on relations between the Axis powers and Japan. Craigie's 
objections to the loan were not, however, completely based on grand 
strategic calculations; they were also rooted in his belief in the summer
112
of 1938 that he was on the verge of opening a valuable round of talks with 
the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, General Ugaki.
Elements within the Japanese Government had begun to look favourably on the 
idea of improving relations with Britain from February 1938, when it was 
realized that reconciliation could result in pressure from London on the 
Chinese to agree to a peace settlement. These sentiments were further 
encouraged by reports from Yoshida Shigeru to the Gaimushd that the 
Chamberlain Cabinet was keen to see the end of the war in China.93 In May 
Konoe made changes to his Cabinet which opened the way for improvements in 
relations with Britain and for new attempts to achieve peace with China by 
appointing Ikeda Seihin as Finance Minister and General Ugaki Kazushige as 
Foreign Minister. Ugaki, a former Army Minister, had since October 1937 
been a Cabinet Councillor, and had opposed the decision in January 1938 to 
refuse to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek and argued for closer ties with 
Britain. He was therefore well suited to the task set before him, and on 8 
July, under his guidance, a formal decision was made at a Five Minister 
Conference to improve Anglo-Japanese relations, and thus began the Craigie- 
Ugaki talks that were to run from July through to September.94
Craigie from the first saw Ugaki's appointment as an asset, an attitude
which was certainly encouraged by Piggott, and on 7 June he wrote to Robert 
Howe, who had recently returned from China to take up the post of head of 
the Far Eastern Department, that-
'The great point about Ugaki is that he is a strong and fearless 
personality and that, _if we can succeed in making him understand our point
of view, he is likely to stand up to the extreme military elements in a way
his predecessor never dared to do.'
Craigie’s foremost concern was to use Ugaki's appointment to ensure greater 
respect for British interests in China and to persuade the Gaimusho to be 
more receptive to British claims for compensation arising from the war. He 
believed that this was an area of policy where it would be wise to tread 
carefully and not, as the Foreign Office wished, to rest all of Britain's 
complaints on the grounds that Japan was failing to honour the Nine Power 
Treaty. On 18 June he noted to the Foreign Office that if their policy was 
adopted-
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’... our representations in connection with British rights and interest ... 
will gradually lose their effect and the possibility of successful 
negotiation on non-Chinese issues will progressively diminish. The main 
result would be to strengthen the totalitarian triangle and to add to the 
sum of our embarrassments not only in China but elsewhere.'96 
Instead he pushed for a policy of compromise, particularly in north China 
where the British position was at its weakest.
Within a month this policy changed to become a broader appeal for the need 
to seek a more substantial improvement of Anglo-Japanese relations. In a 
long telegram on 14 July, which was a response to a Foreign Office
Craigie expanded on this idea by noting that-
'... the prospect of a re-established friendship ... would afford the best 
hope visible today of weaning Japan from her foolish policy of armed 
imperialism. Of the cynic who denies that any such hope exists, I would 
enquire whether the alternative of constant bickering and impotent 
condemnation is not likely to leave China for years in a state of unrest 
and economic distress. I maintain that such a hope in fact exists; that a 
test of its strength involves no risks; and that, given encouragement from 
our side Japan’s recent experiences in China may tend to hasten rather than 
to retard its fruition.'97
Underlying these ideas was his frustration at the role he had hitherto been 
forced to pursue as Ambassador, which was little more than to act as a post 
office for complaints to the Japanese Government from British firms in
China. It needs to be recognized in this context that Craigie had a great
desire to make a success of his mission in Tokyo and to achieve his
original aim of bringing about an Anglo-Japanese understanding. The depth 
of his rancour against the Foreign Office's ignoring of his opinions can be 
seen in a letter to Cadogan in which he reported that his wife had heard 
from a source that an attempt was being made to curb extremist influence; 
he concluded-
'You will if you are in a cynical mood no doubt be disposed to regard the 
above as so much additional chloroform. If so, presumably nothing I can 
say will shift you from that position, I merely suggest that we on the spot 
must be presumed to have at least some capacity to judge character -
rejection of his case for negotiating the Japanese,
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otherwise we should presumably not be here - and that our facilities for 
judging whether this or that move is a genuine one are greater than are 
yours in London.’98
Craigie and Ugaki were therefore, at least on the surface moving towards 
the same goal of improved Anglo-Japanese relations, but intended to use
such an achievement for different purposes; Ugaki wished Britain to
persuade China to make peace while Craigie desired to guarantee Britain's 
position in China and to ease the strategic position. This meant that the 
crucial issue for the talks was whether Britain was prepared to achieve its 
aims at the price of ending completely its support for China’s war effort, 
which in essence doomed the talks from the start as this was a condition 
which was unacceptable not only to the Foreign Office but also to the 
Cabinet itself. Lord Halifax made clear to the Cabinet on 13 July his 
pessimism about the whole basis of the talks when he noted- 
’He himself was not much impressed by Sir R. Craigie's recent telegrams as 
to the improved attitude of the Japanese Government towards this country, 
which was not likely to affect the long-range policy of Japan.'"
These doubts were echoed in China where there was concern that Craigie was 
becoming too conciliatory towards Japan. One example of this was a letter 
Peter Fleming wrote to Clark Kerr, in which he observed-
'I wish you could get him over to Shanghai; I don't think he has the 
slightest/of what China is like or what the Japanese are like in China. 
His line seems to be to drift in a dignified way into a position where, in 
a haze of benevolence, we shall be presented by the Japanese with the 
jackal's share in China (which the poor sap believes will be worth having)
. . . [Tihough he may be following what is nowadays often called by the 
English a 'realistic' policy, he almost entirely fails to apprehend the
realities in Eastern Asia, however alive he may be to the realities in
Europe.'100
There was also concern that Craigie was unaware of the real sentiments 
driving Japan. This was the feeling of Christopher Chancellor, the head of 
the Reuters bureau at Shanghai, who in writing to R.A. Butler, the 
Parliamentary Undei— Secretary at the Foreign Office, in November 1938 about 
the growing militancy of Japan, noted-
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’By virtue of my work I come into contact with many Japanese who are 
perhaps more representative of Japanese opinion than the Foreign Office 
officials and the retired generals of the old pro-British clique to whom 
British Embassy contacts seem to be largely confined.'l0l
Although this letter was written late in the year after the talks with 
Ugaki had collapsed it touches on an important point and hints again at 
what was seen as the damaging impact of Piggott. Both of these criticisms 
were shared by the Far Eastern Department, who had little time for 
Craigie's grand visions and instead concerned themselves with the issue of 
how to counteract Japan's infringement of Britain's rights. Therefore 
while Craigie hoped that the talks would act as a spur to a new diplomatic 
alignment, the Foreign Office and Clark Kerr saw them merely as a means of 
settling some of the myriad claims from British companies in China.
The first official conversation of the Craigie-Ugaki talks took place on 26 
July. It dealt with two main issues, the first of which was the need for 
Japan to deal more promptly with British grievances. In this context 
Craigie presented five specific demands for Ugaki to consider, which 
included renewed access to northern Shanghai, the reopening of the Yangtse 
river for trade, the removal of restrictions on British-owned concerns such 
as cotton mills, the protection of British interests in British-owned 
railways, and access to Whangpoo Conservancy. Ugaki's immediate reaction 
was to state that the reopening of the Yangtse was not possible until 
Hankow had been captured, but that he would get the GaimushS to investigate 
these points.!02 The second major issue was the prospect of peace talks 
with China; Ugaki proposed that Britain should act as a mediator and 
explained that he had as yet made little progress in talks, for which he 
blamed the obstinacy of Chiang Kai-shek. Craigie for his part stuck firmly 
to his instructions from the Foreign Office, saying that he would forward 
Ugaki's request to London but expressing the opinions that the real problem 
was that Japan's peace terms were too harsh, and that any British help 
would have to be linked to the Japanese response to the five demands.!0 3
This talk did not augur well for any substantial improvement in Anglo- 
Japanese relations, indeed it only succeeded in clarifying the deep divide 
between the two powers. On 27 July Ugaki noted in his diary that-
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'Our people cannot accept the position of the British Government as just 
and unbiased and that of a neutral nation. Ambassador Craigie praises 
Chiang Kai-shek excessively and blurs the picture of where responsibility 
lies for the China Incid e n t 104
His pessimism was further exacerbated by the grave suspicions about the 
talks in the Army and within the Gaimusho itself, which meant that he was 
under great pressure not to compromise but to use the talks solely to 
persuade the British to withdraw support from Chiang Kai-shek and co­
operate with Japan in the occupied areas.105 On the British side too there 
was little hope of any conclusive agreement, and on 27 July Chamberlain 
stated in a speech to the House of Commons that the British Government had 
no intention of sacrificing its interests in China to Japan.106 This still 
left the problem of how Britain should react to the Japanese request for 
mediation, an issue which was made all the more difficult by a simultaneous 
request from the Chinese for Britain and the United States to use their 
joint good offices. 107 This Chinese initiative meant that the idea that 
Britain could act alone as a go-between was now obsolete; Britain would 
have to co-operate with Washington. Craigie was not enamoured with this 
prospect, as he believed that any offer of good offices from two or more 
powers would be seen by Japan as a repeat of the Triple Intervention of 
1895, an opinion which also had the backing of the American Ambassador in 
Tokyo, Joseph Grew.108
There was little movement by either side before the second conversation 
took place on 17 August, and it was therefore not surprising that this talk 
became bogged down in mutual recrimination. Ugaki complained in particular 
about Chamberlain's speech, which led Craigie to respond by stating that- 
’... our stock of patience had been great, but ... it was not 
inexhaustible. It seemed to me that Japanese authorities in China were 
using statements in Parliament as a pretext for continuing for a further 
spell of unfair and ungenerous treatment of our interests of which we have 
just complained.'109
The lack of progress discouraged Craigie, and following the meeting he told 
Grew of his growing pessimism and wrote to the Foreign Office that- 
'I am afraid moment is fast approaching when we must conclude that method 
of friendly negotiations has failed and that such other methods of pressure
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as are available must be tried... 'HO
In the Foreign Office Ugaki's recalcitrance was seen as the result of the 
uncertainty over the future course of affairs in Europe, where the Sudeten 
crisis was reaching its climax, and it was believed that Japan would 
neither commit itself to an agreement with Britain nor come out in open 
opposition until the European situation was clearer.111
However, Craigie had not given up hope, and on 20 August held a further 
talk with Ugaki which seemed to offer progress over Britain's five demands. 
The most important development though was that. Ugaki now openly asked 
Craigie for British co-operation with the Japanese Army in the occupied 
areas of China. This approach held some appeal to Craigie who, while
recognizing that Japan's definition of the word 'co-operation' was likely
to be different to that of Britain, still believed that British interests 
could only be protected by talking out problems with the Japanese. As a 
result of this conversation Craigie proposed to the Foreign Office on 22 
August that Britain should prepare to 'co-operate' with Japan in C h i n a . 113 
The reaction in London to this suggestion was, not surprisingly, entirely 
negative, and Craigie was ordered not to refer to the word 'co-operation' 
in his talks with Ugaki, to proceed very cautiously and to avoid making any
concessions that would compromise relations with the United States.113
Meanwhile Clark Kerr went even further and proposed that the talks should 
be completely suspended. Craigie was disappointed at this limitation on 
his freedom of action and wrote to the Foreign Office that- 
'Absence of collaboration has been at root of many of our difficulties in 
the past and if it is to be officially encouraged will end by being fatal 
to our whole position in occupied China.'114
Craigie's renewed optimism was in any case soon belied by his next meeting 
with Ugaki on 8 September, after a string of cancellations, when the 
Foreign Minister returned to the theme that Britain should end all support 
for Chiang Kai-shek and again failed to meet Britain's five demands.115 
Craigie reported shortly after to the Foreign Office-
'Up to the interview of 27th July I was hopeful of results, but ever since 
that date the atmosphere has changed and General Ugaki's attitude has 
become that of a courteous and imperturbable, but nevertheless thoroughly
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stubborn council for the d e f e n c e . 'H®
On 22 September a further meeting was held in a more convivial atmosphere, 
but once again no real progress was made.l^7 Despite the failure to 
achieve anything substantive in these talks Craigie still believed that it 
was necessary for them to continue and that to break them off could be 
dangerous, particularly as the European situation was so uncertain. The 
Foreign Office, despite the objections of Clark Kerr, agreed to this, but 
in fact the conversation of 22 September turned out to be the last in the 
series. On 29 September, in protest against the plan to establish a China 
Board which would take responsibility for China . away from the Gaimusho, 
Ugaki tendered his resignation.l18 Craigie saw the passing of Ugaki from 
the scene as a great tragedy, and wrote later in his memoirs that, although 
he had found Ugaki a 'hard bargainer' and that their conversations had 
entailed 'some pretty plain speaking', he also felt that some progress was 
being made, and in relating the story of the General's resignation noted- 
'So ended the last determined attempt to curb the activities and policies 
of the Japanese military in China.'119
Thus ended the first year of Craigie’s stay in Japan; it had on the whole 
been a frustrating period for him, for British policy was still 
precariously poised between assisting China and not alienating Japan and it 
appeared that the aims of achieving a rapprochement had been largely 
forgotten. Craigie could see that the British policy of refusing to
observe the strictest neutrality in the occupied areas of China was storing
up problems for the future, but his observations on this were routinely
ignored by the Far Eastern Department and therefore the tensions between 
the Japanese Army and the British authorities in China continued to rise. 
Craigie could also sense the growing interest in Japan in Anglo-German 
antagonism and felt that Britain had to act to try to contain the threat of 
a further Japanese drift towards the Axis; in this too he was frustrated by 
the Foreign Office, and as the year progressed Britain and Japan had
drifted further and further apart and the only attempt at reconciliation 
had come to nought.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
*A SURRENDER OF VITAL PRINCIPLES'
'While every effort will be made to avoid a breakdown of the Tokyo 
negotiations, there is a point beyond which it is not advisable to 
go, and it may well be argued the danger of a surrender of vital 
principles is greater than that of a breakdown of the conversations. 
The respite to be won by concessions would be of a temporary and 
precarious nature and the conflict of principle would inevitably rise 
again almost immediately.'
Lord Halifax Memorandum 21 August 1939*
The collapse of the Craigie-Ugaki talks at the end of September 1938 was 
followed by a period of markedly worsening relations between Britain and 
Japan in East Asia. This was largely the consequence of Japan's continuing 
inability to defeat China. The problem for the Japanese was that, despite 
their series of military victories, which in October 1938 had included the 
capture of both Hankow and Canton, Chiang Kai-shek's regime still refused 
to surrender. This led the Japanese to believe that the survival of the 
Kuomintang government rested on foreign support, and that if this lifeline 
could be cut by forcing the Western powers out of the region the Chinese 
could be forced to make peace. This policy manifested itself in two ways. 
First, it led to a number of diplomatic initiatives such as Konoe's 'New 
Order in East Asia' statement of 3 November 1938, the formal repudiation of 
the Nine Power Treaty on 18 November in response to an American protest 
about that statement, and the publication of new peace terms on 22 
December; all these initiatives were designed to assert Japan's regional 
hegemony and to nullify the last remnants of the Washington System. 
Second, it precipitated a campaign to pressurize the Western concessions in 
the occupied areas to end all forms of co-operation with the Nationalists, 
Shanghai and Tientsin being the main areas of contention.2
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This new hardline attitude, which obviously held the danger that it could 
lead to a direct confrontation with Britain, was not constructed in a 
vacuum, but was also affected deeply by events in Europe, and in particular 
by the Munich settlement over Czechoslovakia which revealed to Japan the 
extent of British weakness in Europe and the apparent lack of will for war. 
This impression naturally encouraged Japan to believe that it could pursue 
its ends in East Asia without too great a risk of incurring a reaction, and 
that it need not be restrained in its methods. In addition to this the 
Japanese Army hoped that the new talks between Germany, Italy and Japan to 
turn the Anti-Comintern Pact into a military alliance would further 
restrict Britain's freedom of action by threatening her with a war in 
Europe should a firm stand be taken in East Asia.3
The British were therefore faced with an increasingly dangerous position 
and in the autumn much time was spent discussing how the Foreign Office 
should react. Initially this debate revealed a continuing divide between 
London and Tokyo, which was not helped by Craigie’s misguided belief that 
Munich would have a salutary effect on the Japanese. He expressed this 
conviction in a memorandum for the embassy staff on 5 October 1938, which 
is worth quoting from at length-
'I think it would be a fair deduction to say that Herr Hitler has for the 
first time met with a diplomatic check and has been obliged to agree to 
certain things which must have been distinctly unpalatable.
The Japanese are busy trying to convey the impression that the Munich 
conference was a diplomatic defeat for the democratic powers. The more I 
study the matter the more I am convinced that the exact contrary is the 
case. The two dictators have been forced to realise - what they have 
hitherto refused to believe - that France and Britain were prepared to
fight on this issue if Germany resorted to force... It is permissible to
feel great sympathy for Czechoslovakia in her hour of difficulty and we may 
thoroughly dislike the sabre-rattling of the dictators. But when this has 
been said we must recognise that discontented minorities cannot and should 
not remain indefinitely under a ruthless oppression... Furthermore it is 
permissible to hope that Czechoslovakia, freed of these alien and hostile 
elements and enjoying the guarantee of the four most powerful nations of
Europe, will be able to look forward to a more peaceful and no less
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prosperous future.
I have put forward these points at some length because I think it is 
important that we should each of us, when opportunity offers, try to
correct the mistaken impression which is being sedulously fostered here 
that France and Great Britain have suffered a serious setback. Even if
this were true it is something we should seek to combat in this country so
prone at present to underestimate the might of the British Empire; as
however it happens to be untrue we can resist such aspersions with all the 
greatest vigour.'4
Craigie*s reaction seems now to be inexcusably naive and even callous, but 
it must be read, unburdened by hindsight, as a contemporary defence and 
seen as an opinion that was by no means unique at the time. It did indeed 
appear to many observers that Chamberlain had pulled off a remarkable coup 
and that Hitler had been thwarted from his intended war, and it should be 
remembered that Munich was seen as necessary not only by those later 
castigated as the ’Guilty Men* but also by Cadogan and the Chiefs of 
Staff.5 There is, however, in Craigie's outlook an unrealistic sense of 
optimism, a belief that a corner had been turned, which was also frequently 
present in his dealings with Japan. This was all too evident when he 
reported to the Foreign Office on 21 October that his interpretation of 
Munich had been accepted in Japan, noting that-
'There is widest commendation of achievement of Prime Minister and 
definitely more friendly trend towards us is now noticeable among public as 
a whole and more responsible elements in particular.'6
It is probable that the evidence for this apparent appreciation of 
Chamberlain came from Piggott's sources, but what is disturbing is that the 
Ambassador should have believed it was true.
In contrast to these pronouncements Clark Kerr noted on 13 October that the 
Chinese saw the settlement as another example of 'perfidious Albion’, and- 
'The Japanese reaction ... is that we are prepared to put up with any 
indignity rather than fight.
The result is that all in all our prestige is at a low ebb in the east and 
anything which could be construed as a sign of weakness or of a lack of 
serious determination to maintain our position in the east may have
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consequences far beyond Shanghai.'7
Unsurprisingly considering their jaundiced views on the nebulous Japanese 
’moderates', the Far Eastern Department took Clark Kerr's side over the 
effect of Munich on Japan, and saw Britain’s display of weakness as 
encouraging the Japanese move into South China in October 1938.8 This new 
advance by the Japanese army, which constituted a clear threat to the 
security of Hong Kong, led to renewed discussion of how Britain could aid 
China and whether sanctions should be introduced against Japan.9 Craigie’s. 
response to these proposals was hostile, and in this he was heavily 
influenced by the rumours of new talks between the signatories of the Anti- 
Comintern Pact. These negotiations prompted him to stress again the need 
to see events in East Asia as part of a world picture, and therefore 
British actions had to be judged on the basis of whether they would 
encourage or hinder Japan's conversations with the Axis powers. He 
concluded that British attempts at coercion would most likely antagonize 
Japan, and even opposed a denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial 
Treaty on the grounds that-
'Such action would be indistinguishable from sanctions and ... would 
definitely rule out our prospects, such as they are, of improving Anglo- 
Japanese relations, weakening the "axis” and asserting a salutary influence 
on the ultimate peace settlement.'10
Such was his concern over the prospects for Anglo-Japanese relations that 
in November he proposed that he should be allowed home for consultations, 
and even at one point suggested, post-Munich, that a settlement for East
Asia might be attainable if there was Anglo-German co-operation in pursuing
that end. 11 On 2 December 1938 he took his fears one step further by
conjuring up the image of Japan as not just using a European war as an 
opportunity to make mischief but acting as a co-belligerent with the Axis 
powers. This led him to pose a fundamental question-
'If "co-operation" with Japan would be sufficient to prevent the 
consummation of this alliance, would not that render desirable a
reconsideration of the earlier decision not to pursue this line of enquiry?
I have never believed that "co-operation" need necessarily involve a 
complete surrender to the wishes of the Japanese extremists or the 
abandonment of the cause of China - quite the contrary. It would however
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definitely mean the abandonment of any further scheme to support, or give 
material assistance to, the regime of General Chiang Kai-shek. It would 
mean recognition of the actual fact of Japan’s military and economic 
predominance in China today, and an effort to win back ultimate Chinese 
independence through co-operation, both with China and Japan, in 
establishing that assured market and that source of raw materials which 
represents Japan's primary needs in the economic field. Not an attractive 
policy at first sight but one which should not perhaps be rejected out of 
hand if the need to separate Japan from the totalitarian countries is real 
and urgent.'12
Craigie's attempt to place events in East Asia on a world scale met with 
some sympathy within the Foreign Office; Sir John Brenan noted on 11 
January 1939 that-
'In this despatch Sir Robert Craigie tries to lift the Far Eastern question 
out of the plane on which it has hitherto been treated by His Majesty's 
Government: the ineffectual attempt to maintain British trading interests 
in China by means of impotent protests and recriminations: and to place it 
where it belongs as an important factor in the general world situation.'*3 
Despite this approval of the scale of his thinking, there was, however, no 
agreement with his conclusion: the problem remained as it had done since
the time of the naval talks; to appease Japan meant alienating the United 
States and the maintenance of good relations with Washington was considered 
to be a greater priority than the hypothetical possibility of hindering the 
formation of a Tripartite alliance.14
Craigie's effort to counter the calls from London for a more pro-Chinese 
policy was, however, short-lived. The apparent triumph of the hardliners 
in Japan, as witnessed in the events of November and in particular the 
challenge to the Nine Power Treaty, soon caused him to reverse his 
opposition to putting pressure on Japan. He summed up the reasons for his 
change in thinking in a letter to Cadogan in January 1939 where he wrote- 
'... I advocated a policy of conciliation here as long as I felt there was 
any hope of the Japanese people playing fair with us; but the prolongation 
of this trouble, the military successes and the eclipse (temporarily I 
hope) of more reasonable elements from Japanese political life have
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necessitated a change of method on our part until such time as the
situation here changes for the better.'16
Craigie's new approach was not simply a result of Japan's strident tone 
over China; it was also influenced by another change in the international 
climate. In the late autumn of 1938 the United States indulged itself in 
one of its periodic forays into world affairs, condemning Nazi Germany for 
the outrages of Kristallnacht and confronting Japan's challenge to the
sanctity of treaties in East Asia.16 The former led Craigie to recognize 
that any chance of Anglo-German mediation had died, and he noted on 29 
December to the Foreign Office-
'If we appear to be sacrificing our ideals to our interests by co-operating 
with the Germans to effect a compromise in the Far East, at a time when the 
Americans are engaged in an ideological dispute with the Germans, we risk
losing their sympathy and being accused of similar behaviour to that
attributed to us by Mr. Stimson over the Manchurian affair.'17
The most important change, however, was in the American attitude towards 
Japan. As has been noted at the time of the Panay Incident, Craigie 
believed that a policy of coercion towards Japan could only be attempted if 
the United States was willing to take action; he was therefore much 
encouraged in his change of heart by an enquiry on 1 December 1938 from 
Sumner Welles, then acting American Secretary of State, asking what Britain 
thought of economic reprisals against Japan.16 This appeared to him to 
offer real possibilities, and when his opinion was asked for by London he 
wrote on 1 January 1939 that, as Japanese aims were now clear and as it 
appeared that American attitudes were hardening, the time was right for 
action to be taken, and he proposed that Britain, France and the United 
States should start by refusing to purchase Japanese gold. He supported 
his case by pointing to the increasing vulnerabilty of the Japanese economy 
due to the war effort.19 The Far Eastern Department was greatly pleased by 
this change of heart, with Ronald minuting-
'Sir R. Craigie seems to have radically altered his opinions during the 
last few months. His views now coincide with those held by the Department 
eight or nine months ago.'20
Craigie's support was welcome not only in the sense that it was agreeable 
to have a common front, but also because it provided the Foreign Office
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with a useful weapon in persuading the Treasury and the Board of Trade to 
agree to a positive response to Washington's e n q u i r y * 21 The fact that even 
Craigie, who had been so circumspect about reprisals in 1938, was now 
willing to support tough action was a persuasive argument. The Board of 
Trade was, however, less impressed with Craigie's new stance and responded 
to his bellicosity by advising the Foreign Office, ironically considering 
Craigie's previous stance, that-
'We should like it plainly put to him . . . that in our view, based on 
experience, it is useless to contemplate economic reprisals if we do not 
also contemplate war.'22
The result of the debate within Whitehall, in which Craigie's conversion 
played a significant role, was that on 23 January a telegram was sent to 
Washington asking for the American view of Britain's denouncing its 
Commercial Treaty but making it clear that Britain could not make any firm 
plans until it was known what the Roosevelt administration was p l a n n i n g . 2 3 
The British motive for this careful reply was made clear in a note from 
Halifax to Chamberlain on 9 January in which he wrote-
'I rather doubt whether in fact it is likely to be found very feasible to 
do anything very effective... but it is of very great political 
importance... that the Americans should not again have the fun of saying
what they would have done if only we had not stood in the way.'24
The American reply came on 3 February when Welles told the British 
Counsellor in Washington, Mallet, that the United States preferred to offer
aid to China rather than to take direct action against J a p a n . 25 This did
not come as a surprise to Whitehall, and though it ended for a while talk 
of sanctions it also acted as a stimulus to increased assitance for China.
The issue of loans to China had been under reconsideration since November, 
when Chiang Kai-shek had told Clark Kerr that China desperately needed 
financial a i d . 2 6  Here too, Craigie saw fit to modify his views from 
initial opposition to approval once the United States had agreed to aid 
Chiang Kai-shek. His support was also facilitated by a change of emphasis 
in the nature of the proposed loan from one direct to the Chinese 
government to a currency loan, which had the advantage that it could not be 
used • for the purchase of munitions. On 17 January, in response to a
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request from the Prime Minister for his view, Craigie noted that- 
' . . . I think there will be a storm but that we shall weather it without 
great difficulty. Essential requirement is to keep in step with United 
States...'27
This telegram was, as in the case of sanctions, essential in confirming 
that it was safe for Britain to move forward in this field and at a Cabinet 
meeting on 18 January his views were one of the factors that led to 
approval of the currency loan proposal, which was finally announced in 
Parliament on 8  M a r c h . 28
The increasing tensions in East Asia also caused Craigie to work for the 
improvement of the British position in another field. On 14 December 1938 
he added his voice to that of Sir Josiah Crosby, the British Minister to 
Thailand, in calling for naval reinforcements for the Far East to stem the 
advance of Japanese influence in the region, by arguing-
'Japan is at the present time ruled by men who are influenced in the main 
by the prevalent German ideas of "power politics" and to such minds as 
these the moving of a few capital ships represents a far more convincing 
argument than any number of protests or the most passionate advocacy of the 
sanctity of t r e a t i e s . ' 2 9
He also emphasized the advantages that would be gained in the United States 
which would be more convinced that Britain was willing to defend its own 
interests. Craigie's entry into this area led the Far Eastern Department 
quickly to put pressure on the Admiralty to consider these views and to 
push for the issue to be put before the Chiefs of Staff Committee.3°
This pressure from the Foreign Office coincided with what Dr. Pritchard has 
referred to as a ’palace revolution' within the Admiralty, in terms of both 
staff and strategy. In the latter the increasing threat of war in Europe 
had led to a reassessment of the assumption that, in the case of a crisis 
in East Asia, the main fleet would automatically be sent to Singapore 
without reference to the situation in Europe. Instead the Admiralty was 
developing the idea that, if a conflict with the Axis powers were already 
in progress in Europe, then it would be better to delay the sending of the 
fleet at least until Italy had been defeated and the Mediterranean 
secured.31 With such proposals mooted the Admiralty had little time for
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Foreign Office plans for a squadron to be permanently stationed in the 
East, and the reply to the Foreign Office of 29 March recorded that- 
'Neither as it exists now, nor as it will be when the present contemplated 
expansion is completed, can the British Fleet be regarded as adequate to 
meet with success, alone and simultaneously, the navies of Germany, Italy 
and Japan ... My Lords fully appreciate the political arguments which have 
been advanced for the stationing of capital ships in the Far East: but it 
will be appreciated ... that at the moment, with our restricted number of 
capital ships and with heavy commitments in the Mediterranean, it is 
impossible to do so. They hope however that by 1942 we shall be able to 
station a capital ship in the Far E a s t . ' 3 2
This moderately worded reply disguised the true feelings of the Admiralty 
about the Foreign Office proposal and a more accurate assessment can be 
found in a minute by Admiral Backhouse, the new First Sea Lord, who noted 
on 1 March that-
*The moral to be drawn from the situation we now find ourselves in is that 
our foreign policy should be largely governed by the strength of the Navy. 
This principle was completely rejected by the Government in 1930 and it was 
not until 1936 or 1937 that it was fully realised again. (Our Ambassador 
at Tokyo was one of the F.O. officials who was most energetic in connection 
with drawing up the London Naval Treaty, and the Foreign Office of the day 
gave the Admiralty no support whatever.)*33
In other words as far as Backhouse was concerned Craigie's past was now 
coming back to haunt his present; due to the disarmament process Britain 
had too small a fleet to defend all its interests, and was forced to 
identify its priorities; on this scale East Asia was never to be as 
important as Europe.
It was during these months of escalating tensions in the autumn and winter 
of 1938/9 that Shigemitsu Mamoru took up his post of Ambassador to the 
Court of St. James. The news of his appointment to London was first 
received in September 1938 and was greeted with some enthusiasm in British 
circles with Craigie, as one example, noting to Lord Halifax- 
'I am informed by my staff that Mr Shigemitsu is a man of outstanding 
ability and has probably the highest reputation of any serving Japanese 
Ambassador ... he is pleasant to deal with and is believed to be well
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disposed towards Great Britain, where he has long wanted to serve as 
Ambassador.’34
Partly the satisfaction in Britain at Shigemitsu's appointment must be seen 
as a result of the relief generated by the confirmation of Yoshida's 
departure, and that the new Ambassador appeared in such sharp contrast to 
his predecessor. This was the view expressed by Cadogan on 4 November when 
he wrote to Sir Horace Wilson, the Chief Economic Adviser to the Cabinet- 
' . . . he [Shigemitsu] is probably a good representative of his Government 
and if the latter have any good intentions, it might be possible to make 
better progress with him than with Y o s h i d a . ' 3 5
Ironically, considering his previous efforts to persuade Britain to retreat 
from China, Shigemitsu's arrival in November coincided with the virtual 
Japanese abrogation of the Nine Power Treaty. This was, of course, a move 
that came as a logical progression from the policies he had espoused as 
Vice-Minister, and in a talk with Carl Sandberg, a Swedish-born 
entrepreneur on 29 January 1939, he made clear that he still believed that 
the West should retreat from East Asia by remarking-
' . . . in view of America and our Dominions refusing to admit Japanese into 
their territories, there was a double necessity for Japan to find an outlet 
in China.... The main gist was that other nations must realise Japan's 
special claim and her necessities, that Japan particularly realised Great 
Britain's interest in China ... but that Japan felt very strongly that the 
assistance which England and America were giving to China by supplying her 
with both finance and materials was an unfriendly form of neutrality.'36
The confrontational approach adopted by the New Order statement did not, 
however, make it easy for Shigemitsu to find a receptive audience for his 
views as Konoe’s pronouncement seemed to presage Britain being vanquished 
from the region entirely. This meant that, though on arrival he set to 
work by meeting in rapid succession many of the major figures who held sway 
over British policy towards East Asia such as Lord Halifax, R.A. Butler, 
Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, and Sir Horace Wilson, he failed to make much 
progress. On 22 November this impression was underlined in a talk with 
Chamberlain which appears to have been a rather ill-tempered affair, with 
the Prime Minister complaining about Japan's deliberate ignoring of
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Britain's legitimate rights in China while the Ambassador responded by 
pointing to the British infringement of neutrality in its support for the 
Chinese at Geneva and during the Brussels C o n f e r e n c e .37
It was obvious to Shigemitsu from these first meetings that somehow Britain
had to be placated, and on 19 December he approached the MP Sir John
Wardlaw-Milne, who was the Chairman of the House of Commons China 
Committee, to suggest a scheme that would break the deadlock in Anglo- 
Japanese relations. His proposal incorporated a recognition by Britain of 
'Japan's unique position in China’, an agreement that all problems that 
arose in China between Britain and Japan should be settled by 'frank and 
friendly conversations’, and for a committee to be set up to deal 
specifically with outstanding matters from Shanghai.38 To the Foreign 
Office, however, this idea hardly broke new ground, and it was seen as
merely a rehash of the plan that Ugaki had put forward in the summer. It 
was agreed within the Department that the only way in which it could be 
made acceptable was for it to include a clause which reiterated both
parties’ commitment to the Nine Power Treaty and the Open Door, and it was 
planned that Lord Halifax would present this idea to Shigemitsu at an 
interview on 21 December. At the last moment, however, the Ambassador
cancelled this appointment, and in the wake of the following day's 
announcement of new Japanese peace terms the initiative was forgotten.39
Shigemitsu was not discouraged by this setback, but rather continued in his 
enthusiastic efforts to start meaningful talks in London. On 9 January, in 
a meeting with Lord Halifax, he offered in a purely private capacity to
have a series of talks with the Foreign Secretary to discuss outstanding
problems.40 This idea did not find much welcome in either the Department 
or the British Embassy in Tokyo. Craigie, in a reply to a request for his 
views on the subject, stated that he thought that the start of serious 
talks in London might make the Japanese assume that Britain was willing to 
negotiate a compromise over China, and reminded the Foreign Office that 
British policy was to see any talks in London as only complementary to 
those in Tokyo.41 He also argued-
'Apart from above reasons for caution I doubt whether the Ambassador is 
sufficiently in touch with recent developments here to be able to convey a
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very accurate impression of Japanese Government's p o l i c y . '42 
Although Craigie*s opinion was influenced by his own hardline attitude at 
this point and the personal motive of wanting to keep all important talks 
with Japan within his own orbit, his comment raised an Vnportant question. 
Shigemitsu had last been in Japan in 1936, a year before the outbreak of 
the Sino-Japanese war; since then he had only known at second hand the 
complex twists and turns of policy-making. The result was that in the 
Foreign Office it became a common assumption that, no matter how well- 
intentioned the Ambassador appeared to be, his opinions were of 
questionable value as he was no longer in a position fully to comprehend 
and communicate the mood of Japan, and that it was therefore better to rely 
on the British Embassy in Tokyo to carry out negotiations on the spot. 
This was to be a continual restriction on Shigemitsu's utility in London 
during his two and a half years in office.
There were also other factors that led the Foreign Office to treat 
Shigemitsu's request for talks with caution. There were doubts about his 
grasp of English which led to the fear that he could accidently mislead 
Tokyo about Britain's position; to this was added the more serious concern 
that, like Yoshida before him, he might deliberately misrepresent the 
opinions of the Foreign Secretary in an effort to convince the Gaimusho 
that talks in London had a reasonable chance of success. This impression 
was generated by the belief that the Japanese Ambassador had reported to 
the Gaimusho that it was Halifax rather than himself who had first proposed 
private talks. Sir John Brenan wrote caustically on 17 January- 
'It is becoming obvious that Mr.Shigemitsu is a careerist who is anxious to 
secure a personal success during his stay in London. There is reason to 
believe that he has been discouraged by Tokyo from initiating discussions 
on policy with the Secretary of State, and that in order, to get over this 
difficulty he has falsely reported to his government that it is Lord 
Halifax who is pressing for conversations... .
In dealing with a diplomatist of this character I suggest respectfully 
that the Secretary of State will have to be doubly careful that he does not 
give the Ambassador any ground for claiming to have secured damaging 
concessions of principle, especially with regard to a recognition of the 
"new situation in East Asia" or "Japan's special position in China"-43
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The result of the doubts about Shigemitsu in the Foreign Office meant that
his proposal for talks was turned down and it was not until the start of
C
the war in Europe that he would one more find himself at centre-stage.
A
Another important issue that affecting Shigemitsu in this period was the
talks between Japan and the Axis powers over a Tripartite Alliance. The
position reached by the beginning of January 1939 was that the Italians had 
agreed to a proposal from the Germans for a tripartite defensive alliance, 
but that the Japanese had not committed themselves, as the general terms 
put forward by Ribbentrop for an alliance against Britain and France as 
well as the Soviet Union had led to heated debate in Japan.44 Support for
the German draft came largely from the Japanese Army, but met with
resistance in the Cabinet from Arita and the Navy Minister, Admiral Yonai 
Mitsumasa who, when Konoe resigned as Prime Minister in early January, 
managed to persuade his successor, the veteran nationalist Hiranuma 
Kiichiro, to remain firm. The obstinacy of Tokyo in agreeing to the 
alliance particularly infuriated the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin General 
Oshima Hiroshi, and in an effort to put further pressure on Arita he tried 
to garner support from his fellow ambassadors in E u r o p e . 4 5
This was an easy enough task with Shiratori Toshio, the pro-Axis Ambassador 
to Italy, but less simple with Shigemitsu. In January a conference of 
Ambassadors was held in Paris where Shigemitsu opposed the idea of a Pact; 
subsequently in February Oshima travelled to London to persuade the 
Ambassador to change his attitude but to no avail, a fact to which Oshima 
later testified when cross-examined at the Tokyo War Crimes T r i a l . 4 6  
Shigemitsu's opposition rested on his belief that to alienate the British 
and the French would only hinder a settlement of the China problem and that 
to ally with Germany and Italy at a time of rising tensions in Europe was 
foolhardy in the extreme.47 Oshima's efforts did not end there, and his 
clear unwillingness to adhere to the Cabinet's policy led to a decision to 
send out a special mission from Japan headed by Ito Nobufumi, a former 
Ambassador to Poland, with a new draft for ^ an alliance. Oshima responded 
to this move in early March by trying to convene a meeting of all the 
European heads of mission with Ito in Berlin in a further attempt to force 
through his own line, but again his plan ^ loe failed as Arita refused to
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give permission for the conference, with the result that it was poorly 
attended, with Shigemitsu as one of the absentees.48
The ebbs and flows of this debate were to a large extent followed by the 
Foreign Office in London through the ability of the Government Code and 
Cypher School to read the Japanese diplomatic code, although this gold-mine 
appears to have been lost in late February due to the introduction of the 
new 97-Shiki O-bun Injiki cypher machine on the Berlin, Rome and London to 
Tokyo circuits.49 The British were therefore aware that the issue of an 
alliance was causing great division owing to the reluctance of Japan to 
enter into an anti-British agreement, and this impression was supported by 
information that Craigie had been able to gather in Japan from various 
sources which included Yoshida Shigeru, ex-Finence Minister Ikeda Seihin, 
General Koiso Kuniaki and General Araki S a d a o . 5 0  The Department took heart 
from the apparent deadlock in the talks, but realised that there was little 
Britain could do to influence events. Craigie, however, began to feel 
differently as the obvious difficulties the army was having in convincing 
the government to sign a military alliance convinced him that the moderate 
cause was not lost. Therefore by the beginning of April he was returning 
to the view that Britain still had something to gain from a policy of
conciliation towards Japan and began to stray from the tough line he had
espoused at the start of the year.51
TENSIONS AT TIENTSIN
In the background, as these large issues were grappled with, what started 
as a routine dispute in north China began slowly to encroach on the path of 
Anglo-Japanese relations. The crisis concerned the position of the British 
and French Concessions at Tientsin which stood as two small surviving
enclaves of Western rule in north China. Their existence posed two
problems for the Japanese, who otherwise had almost complete political and 
military control of the region: first, the Concessions were used by Chinese 
nationalists as a safe haven from which to launch terrorist attacks against 
the Japanese; second, and perhaps more importantly, they acted as an 
economic challenge to the Chinese puppet government at Peking due to the
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continued use of the official Chinese currency, the fapi, within their
perimeters, which weakened the Peking government's attempt to dominate the
economy of north China by setting up its own currency. Added to this was 
the presence in the British Concession of a substantial amount of silver 
belonging to the Kuomintang government, which the Japanese wished to see 
transferred to the reserves of the puppet government to strengthen its 
financial position.52
Tensions in Tientsin first manifested themselves in the summer of 1938 when 
the Japanese authorities raised the silver issue .and banned the export of 
animal skins from north China in an attempt to put pressure on British 
business interests. However, it was the issue of terrorism, where clearly 
there was a greater legal justification for action by the Japanese Army, 
which provoked the initial atmosphere of crisis. This came in October 1938 
when the Japanese Government protested to Craigie about the refusal of the 
British authorities at Tientsin to hand over a man called Ssu Ching-wu who, 
they alleged, was the head of a 25,000 strong band of guerrillas. This
complaint sparked off a debate in British circles over how to react which
followed lines similar to the previous disputes over Shanghai. Craigie and 
Edgar Jamieson, the British Consul-General at Tientsin, held that if Ssu 
was guilty he should be handed over, and Craigie also took the opportunity 
to reiterate to the Foreign Office that his task of getting the Japanese to 
respect British interests in China would only be made harder if the British 
concessions in China did not follow a policy of strict neutrality. Clark 
Kerr's response was to argue that as Ssu had commixed no crime within the 
Concession there was no legal basis for handing him over, and to state that 
the concessions were already doing their utmost to ensure law and order and 
that nothing more should be done to satisfy the Japanese.52
Sympathy in the Foreign Office lay with Clark Kerr in this dispute, not 
simply due to the legal position, but also because the Foreign Office 
believed that the protests over terrorism were merely a front for Japan's 
real motive of forcing Britain and France to relinquish their rights 
altogether. On receiving news in November that Japan was ordering its 
nationals to leave the Concession, Lord Halifax speculated in a telegram 
addressed to both Ambassadors that-
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'This I suspect will be the first step in a carefully prepared programme 
for the destruction of our political position in China, first in the North 
and then probably in other parts of the occupied areas. Mere diplomatic 
representations are not likely to produce any effect and I am for the 
moment frankly at a loss to think of any preventative action open to us, 
except economic retaliation...'54
The result of such thinking was that, typically, the Foreign Office could 
decide neither on a policy of retaliation nor one of appeasement, such as 
the handing over of Ssu, and consequently during the autumn pressure on the 
British authorities in Tientsin continued to increase.
On 14 December Jamieson reported that every road leading into the British 
and French Concessions had been barricaded in an attempt by the Japanese 
army to capture Chinese illegally entering and leaving, and that residents 
who failed to produce identity cards or passports were being turned away. 
Added to this was the extension of the export ban to wool, another vital 
commodity for Britsh business.55 Apart from ordering Craigie to issue a 
protest in Tokyo, and to explain that the Concession authorities were doing 
all they could to deter terrorists from using the Concession as a base, 
there was little Britain could do to resist these encroachments. In late 
January 1939, however, there came some cause for optimism when it was 
announced that the Japanese Army General Staff had decided to send the 
Anglophile General Homma to command the forces at Tientsin. This optimism 
was briefly justified on 8 February when Jamieson reported that the 
barriers had been raised at Tientsin and the searching of Concession 
residents stopped, but this proved to be only a lull in the storm.55
Despite Homma's presence there remained a wide range of issues separating 
the two sides; in addition to the dispute over Ssu, there was the Japanese 
claim that the deputy chief of the British Municipal Council Police Li Han- 
yuan was an agent of Chungking, and also the growing economic pressure. On 
10 March the Chinese puppet government at Peking declared the fapi to be an 
illegal currency, and as a result export restrictions were extended so that 
they now covered 70% of Britain's trade.5? Under this intense pressure 
Jamieson's patience began to snap and on 15 March, when it was announced 
that searches for fapi were to be reintroduced, he wrote back to London-
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’I wish to make it perfectly clear that I do not wish to make any 
concessions to the Japanese. My position is that I have done everything to 
ensure that the British Concession is being kept neutral. No anti-Japanese 
incidents have occurred in the concession since commencement of 
hostilities. I have made and am continuing to make a diligent search for 
persons using concession as a base for non-neutral acts.'58 
Jamieson's sudden intransigence was soon faced with a new challenge when 
two days later, the chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce at 
Tientsin, a Mr H. Dyott, was kidnapped by Chinese bandits in the pay of the 
Japanese. Although this was bad enough the situation was made even worse 
when the Japanese authorities put the most blatant obstacles in the way of 
British attempts to search for him.59
At this point Craigie, who until then had had little to do except to 
communicate the occasional protest, decided that the situation in Tientsin 
was becoming potentially explosive and wrote to London on 22 March- 
'I do not like the way the situation is developing at Tientsin and while I 
am most anxious to help I feel only locally will it be possible to bring 
about any real improvement. One way in which this could be done would be 
for Major General Piggott to visit Tientsin and to use his influence with 
the Japanese military authorities in the same way as he did in Shanghai in 
June 1938.'60
In particular Craigie emphasized that Piggott had the advantage of being on 
friendly terms not only with Homma but also with General Sugiyama Gen, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the North China Area Army. Not surprisingly such a 
suggestion did not win unanimous approval with the Far Eastern Department, 
the strongest objections coming from A.L. Scott who noted in a minute- 
'I think the root of the trouble at Tientsin is too deep for even General 
Piggott to pull up. It is the Japse [sic] in North China who are 
responsible for the present situation . . . and no amount of friendly talk 
washed down with draughts of sake will make any difference. ... I am a 
little apprehensive however that a visit by General Piggott may lead the 
Japse to expect a weakening of the present firm attitude of our local auths 
[sic] and that in particular he may try to persuade our military auths 
[sic] at Tientsin of the need to compromise "in the interests of friendly 
relations".'61
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Scott was, however, overruled by his superiors and Craigie*s proposal was 
approved, as Sir John Brenan observed, on the grounds that- 
*The Military Attache's friendly relationship with high Japanese military 
officers is a useful asset which can be used to advantage in a case of this 
sort. At the worst I do not think he can do any harm...'62
By the time Piggott's visit had been approved the situation in Tientsin had 
deteriorated considerably due to the Dyott affair. Jamieson, exasperated 
by the blatant obstructionism of the Japanese addressed an aide-memoire to 
Homma on 25 March using the most unguarded language-
'I desire to warn you in most solemn terms that unless Mr. Dyott is 
returned immediately, safe and sound, the effect on reputation not only of 
yourself but of the Japanese army as a whole will be most deplorable.'63 
Whether Jamieson realised how insulting this phrasing was to a Japanese 
officer, let alone to the Japanese nation, is not made clear from the 
documents, but the note certainly caused a volcanic uproar both in Tientsin 
and Tokyo. Craigie reported to the Foreign Office that- 
'Military Attache during thirty-five years experience cannot recall any 
occasion when the feelings of the military authorities have been so 
aroused. The sending of such a communication to General Homma the leading 
pro-British General in the Japanese army has had an effect which, unless 
remedied at the earliest possible moment, may be incalculable.'64 
The result was that Jamieson on 29 March withdrew the aide-memoire, 
although he subsequently claimed that it helped to save Dyott's l i f e . 65
Dyott was finally released on 3 April after a ransom of 70,000 dollars had 
been paid; on the same day Piggott arrived in Tientsin and in a visit 
lasting six days transformed the situation.66 Again Piggott began his
mission by calling on the local Japanese commander. Homma made it clear to 
him that the situation at Tientsin was far more severe than it had been at 
Shanghai in the previous year. In particular he stressed the problem of 
guerrilla activities, and highlighted this by allowing Piggott the rare 
privilege of seeing Japanese intelligence maps which pinpointed the 
hideouts of terrorists within the British Concession.6? On receipt of this 
information Piggott appeared before the Associated British Committee in the 
Concession, told them of Japanese grievances, and advised that co-operation
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was needed, and as a result it was decided that a Japanese liaison officer 
should be attached to the British Municipal P o l i c e . 68 This move, allied to 
yet another whirlwind of Piggott-inspired social gatherings where Japanese 
and British could meet in informal surroundings, led to a vastly improved 
atmosphere in the city. Craigie was delighted with the apparent success of 
the mission seeing it not only as justifying his proposal to send Piggott, 
but also as underlining the progress that could be made if Britain was 
prepared to co-operate with the Japanese.69 Even the Foreign Office at 
first had to agree reluctantly that the situation had been transformed and 
that Piggott had achieved more than they felt p o s s i b l e .  Brenan minuted on 
14 April in response to some typically overblown 'Piggottry* that- 
'In spite of the fulsome style of these reports the Military Attache may 
have succeeded in easing the tension in Tientsin, in which case his visit 
and methods are justified.'70
On 9 April, however, the day that Piggott left Tientsin, this new
atmosphere of co-operation received its first challenge, when the newly
appointed pro-Japanese Inspector of Customs in Tientsin, Dr. Cheng Hsi- 
keng, was murdered while watching the film Gunga Din at the Grand Theatre 
in the British Concession.7! Within just over two months this incident and 
its ramifications were to lead Japan to instigate a new, even harsher 
blockade of the British Concession and to bring the two countries to the 
brink of war. The crisis developed over the Japanese conviction that four 
men being held in British custody were responsible for Cheng's death, and 
the British refusal to hand over these men for trial by the local Chinese 
court on the grounds that the only evidence against them were confessions 
obtained by the Japanese under t o r t u r e . 79 Britain's diplomatic record in 
dealing with this stage of the Tientsin crisis was hardly a picture of 
expertise and produced the unedifying spectacle of a major squabble over
policy between Jamieson and his superiors.
Jamieson's view of events, influenced by Piggott*s visit, was that the men 
should be handed over whether guilty of the specific crime or not, as they 
were members of a terrorist gang and therefore their presence prejudiced 
the neutrality of the concession.73 His opinion was also influenced by his 
recognition that Japanese patience with the British over Tientsin was
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wearing thin and that to take too legalistic a stance might lead to a 
dangerous escalation of tensions. In his telegram of 13 May which informed 
the Foreign Office of the detention of the four men he noted- 
'... the Japanese believe that we are deliberately assisting the Chinese by 
our attitude [and] will, I am convinced take some positive action unless 
our policy is altered.'74
He received support for his stand from Craigie, who, owing to his alarm at 
the growing bellicosity of the Japanese authorities, urged the Foreign 
Office to give Jamieson full discretion in deciding how to proceed.
In this they were opposed by both Clark Kerr and the Far Eastern 
Department, who were determined to act strictly within the bounds of legal 
propriety. For Clark Kerr this conviction of the need to adhere to 
principles was underlined by his faith in Chiang Kai-shek's cause and his 
belief that the guerrillas in the concession were fighting for it.75 In 
the Foreign Office, as well as sympathy for China, there was also the view 
that Britain would win no concessions from the Japanese by compromising. 
In addition, underpinning the Foreign Office attitude was a severe 
underestimation of the serious nature of the tensions at Tientsin. The 
minutes written by Foreign Office staff in this period consistently showed 
their belief that the Japanese were bluffing in their threats to seize the 
concession; in one letter of 30 May to Clark Kerr, Howe wrote simply- 
'I have a feeling that the danger threatening the Concession at Tientsin is 
not so grave or immediate as the Consul-General makes out in his recent 
telegrams. '76
This led the Department to view Jamieson and Craigie as being needlessly 
alarmist in the face of Japanese bluff; in particular Craigie's warnings 
were not heeded because as Brenan remarked-
' . . . these alarming reports are received through General Piggott who 
swallows without discrimination every threat and every assurance that the 
Japanese make to him.’77
Indeed, to a large extent the Department increasingly saw the developing 
crisis as a result of Piggott's baleful influence on Jamieson. Scott noted 
on 2 June-
’It is quite evident that General Piggott's visit has been responsible for 
a radical change of attitude on the part of our Consular auths [sicl at
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Tientsin ... Mr. Jamieson who in mid-March did not wish to make any 
concession to the Japse fsic] now thinks it necessary to concede everything 
the Japse [sic] want in order to avert an attack on the Concession ... In 
fact the fears I expressed in my minute of 23 March seem to have been 
largely realised.'78
The result of this tortuous debate over policy amongst the concerned 
parties was that, in the face of Japanese pressure, British policy 
continued to drift, Homma being neither appeased nor convinced that Britain 
was in a position to resist. The situation was not helped by the fact that 
Jamieson’s and Clark Kerr’s individual handling of the crisis left much to 
be desired. Though Piggott was clearly guilty of encouraging Jamieson to 
be over-conciliatory raising Japanese expectations and thus contributing to 
the crisis, the unsuitability of Jamieson for his post was a more important 
factor. In this context it is worth noting an assessment of the Consul- 
General sent in February 1939 to the War Office from Lt.-General E.
Grasett, the General Officer Commanding at Hong Kong-
'Our Consul-General is not a very powerful personality, and it is only 
necessary to talk rather firmly but loudly to him to obtain his agreement, 
which of course may only be temporary.'79
This analysis is certainly relevant to Jamieson's behaviour during 
Piggott's visit when he was influenced to change his attitude completely. 
This weakness of character was also demonstrated by Jamieson's tendency to 
over-react at times of crisis as is evident with both the Dyott affair and 
the events of May and June 1939, and it is easy to sympathize with the 
exasperation shown by Scott in one minute when he wrote-
'... I don't know why Mr. Jamieson does not try to do a little 
negotiating.'80
The problem with Jamieson did not lie only with his weak personality, but 
also with the practical problem that he failed to provide Clark Kerr and 
the Foreign Office with detailed accurate information. For example it was 
only on 27 May that Jamieson revealed that two of the prisoners had been 
carrying bombs when they were arrested, and on 14 June, the day the 
blockade started, that he referred to their confessing their crime to Major 
Guy Herbert, the British Consul at Tientsin, while they had been in
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Japanese custody.81 Finally on 22 June he admitted that Herbert had
implied to the Japanese that the men would be handed o v e r . 82 The Far
Eastern Department was not impressed that Jamieson had withheld this 
information, and Brenan noted on 16 June that, had they been in possession 
of such material a month before, they might well have acted d i f f e r e n t l y .83
In addition to this Jamieson was guilty of delaying the implementation of 
instructions which did not accord with his own views. This fault also 
applied to Clark Kerr; even when Jamieson had revealed incriminating 
evidence rather than mere conjecture, Clark Kerr.continued to prevaricate 
due to the moral issues concerned and his belief, shared with the Foreign 
Office, that the Japanese were b l u f f i n g . 8 4  His attitude throughout the 
crisis was summed up by a telegram he sent to London on 17 May when first
called by Jamieson to take a lead-
'This imposes upon me a decision from which I confess I flinch. This 
problem reduces itself to a repugnant simplicity to sacrifice the four ... 
scapegoats in the hope that by this sacrifice Japanese may be persuaded to 
hold their hand for a time at any rate and give concession a breathing 
space.'85
The behaviour of the diplomats in China does not, however, excuse the Far 
Eastern Department from the charge of blatant complacency in the face of 
numerous reports of Japanese bellicosity, not only from Jamieson and 
Craigie, but also from Lt.-General Grasett at Hong Kong. This failure to 
register how serious the crisis was becoming was a result of their long 
ingrained belief that Japan was not as formidable as was often held, and 
that Britain merely had to make clear its willingness to resist in order to 
force the Japanese to back down. This was a dangerous presumption on which 
to base a policy when the Admiralty had made clear in the winter their 
opposition to a 'main fleet to Singapore' policy, and when the Treasury and 
Board of Trade had still not agreed to economic retaliation against Japan. 
Another problem was that the Department dealt with the developing crisis 
without drawing the situation to the attention of the higher echelons of 
the Foreign Office. During most of May and June the senior official who 
saw most of the material was Sir George Mounsey, who supervised the 
Department, and it was only on 7 June that the issue was brought before the
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Cabinet and even then Lord Halifax, on the advice of the Department, tended 
to play the dangers down.86 On 20 June Cadogan noted in his diary- 
’As regards Tientsin, we have bungled the thing sadly. F.E. Department and 
Mounsey have been working their little groove and never referred a paper to 
me. That puts me in the awkward position that I can’t explain or shift the 
blame. I saw copies of the telegrams ... and did not ask what it was 
about. I ought to have.’87
This failure to consult also applied to relations with other Ministries and 
was particularly important in relation to the War Office, who were directly 
responsible for the defence of the Concession.. At no point did the 
Department ask the Army how they planned to respond to military action at 
Tientsin by Japan. Instead the War Office was kept on the sidelines and 
only occasionally made its concern known, although its feelings were hinted 
at in a minute by one member of M.I.2c who wrote succinctly- 
'What a mess has been made out of this business.*88
Chamberlain too, added his voice to criticism of the Foreign Office, and 
wrote to his sister Hilda on 17 June-
' . . . the F.O. did not consult me and though I was very uncomfortable about 
the way things were going I can't always be interfering in their job so I 
left it alone.'89
The only figure on the British side to emerge respectably from the build-up 
of the crisis was Sir Robert Craigie. He clearly recognized that the 
Japanese were not bluffing and, more important, saw that the events at 
Tientsin were turning into a symbol of Anglo-Japanese antagonism, but his 
influence was limited because Jamieson reported not to him but to Clark 
Kerr. As a result his opinions were ignored until the crisis reached its 
peak on 14 June, when Homma, faced with a lack of compromise by Britain 
over any of the issues raised, reintroduced the barrier system and ordered 
his troops to search all Concession residents, both men and women, who 
passed through the barriers.90 This great insult to British prestige, 
allied to the ever tighter commercial blockade of the Concession, forced 
the British government to consider how to react to the high-handed policy 
of the Japanese Army, whether to retaliate through economic or military 
measures or seek to conciliate Japan, and this meant that Craigie had to be 
consulted.
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Craigie was not, however, in the frame of mind to tell the Department what 
they wanted to hear; by mid-June his patience with London had been 
stretched to endurance, largely due to events at Tientsin but also because 
of the appearance of another crisis in north China. The latter had its 
roots in the spring of 1939, when Clark Kerr had given permission for his 
Military Attache, Lt.-Colonel Ronald Spear, to travel in the company of 
troops of the Chinese Eighth Route Army from Chungking to Peking, which 
meant that he had to pass through Japanese lines. On 31 May news reached 
the Consulate-General at Peking that Spear had been arrested by the 
Japanese at Hsia Hua Yuan, seventy miles north .west of Peking, for not 
having a pass, and was being held in custody in the town of K a l g a n . 9 l  
Efforts at the local level to secure his release failed and by 7 June it 
was clear that representations would have to be made in Tokyo. Craigie 
raised the case with the Gaimusho but felt that Spear should never have 
attempted such a mission, and he told the Foreign Office on 10 June- 
' . . . my fear is that the Japanese local authorities inflamed by the 
situation in Tientsin will regard this as a heaven sent chance to make 
difficulties for us and early release will be correspondingly more 
difficult.’92
The need for Craigie to be consulted therefore allowed him the opportunity 
to express at length his dissatisfaction with British policy towards 
Tientsin. On 14 June he sounded his first major warning by writing- 
’It seems to me that we are risking our whole position in N. China 
involving ourselves at an inappropriate moment in serious trouble with 
Japan on account of legal niceties which I frankly find myself unable to 
appreciate.’93
On 18 June he went a stage further and composed a long and damning critique 
of Foreign Office policy, not merely directed at events in Tientsin but at 
the line taken by London since the start of the Sino-Japanese war- 
'Relations with this country have now become so strained and the feeling 
against us has been aroused to such a pitch that unless some fundamental 
change in policy - or at least in tactics - can be envisaged there is a 
serious danger of two countries drifting into a long conflict.
Tientsin is but symptomatic. The major cause of our trouble is of course a 
vast • clash of interests in China, especially acute during the present
152
hostilities, but bound to continue with varying intensity for many years, 
but such clashes of interest between powerful states in relation to the 
fate of a weaker state are nothing new in history and have by no means 
always led to war: nor need the present clash lead to war if the Japanese 
policy can be rendered less intransigent and British policy be pursued with 
more regard for realities.
There has been an open partisanship about our policy which in the 
circumstances of today does more credit to our heart than to our head. No 
doubt if we were in Sir A. Clark Kerr’s place I should be tempted to adopt 
the same vigorous championship of a valiant cause. But from this post I 
feel bound to emphasise deadly dangers to which we are heading if we cannot 
get back to a position of stricter neutrality such as the Americans have 
been clever enough to maintain.’®4
In relation to events specifically at Tientsin, Craigie disclaimed any 
blame for himself noting-
'My advice on these points and others has been neglected because it would 
have compromised not so much the strictness of our neutrality as its often 
excessive benevolence towards China.'95
He ended by suggesting that, as a means of settling the present crisis,
talks should be opened in Tokyo to examine the whole range of problems
thrown up by the Tientsin crisis.
These arguments were in marked contrast to the position that Craigie had 
taken in the winter of 1938/39, and instead appeared to be a reversion to 
the position he had held in the previous summer during the talks with 
Ugaki. The change can be explained in a number of ways. The vital point 
was that Craigie's bellicosity in December 1938 had relied on two factors,
that the Americans appeared to be pushing for a tougher line and that the
Admiralty could be persuaded to station a permanent force at Singapore. By
the summer of 1939 both of these hopes had been shown to be misplaced; the
United States after its brief outburst over the threat to the Nine Power 
Treaty had returned to its usual passivity, and in Britain the Admiralty 
had pushed through the Committee of Imperial Defence its plan to make Italy 
the first object of attack in any European war undermining the 'Main Fleet 
to Singapore* policy by stating that in the case of an emergency in East
Asia,- neither the size of squadron or the time-lapse before it reached
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Singapore could be predicted. In such circumstances, Craigie believed, 
taking a tough stance with Japan was tantamount to suicide. In addition 
Craigie had in his mind the disturbing rise of tensions in Europe in the 
spring of 1939 with the German occupation of Prague, Italy's seizure of 
Albania and the raising of the Danzig issue; at such a time Britain could 
ill-afford distractions e l s e w h e r e . 96
Craigie's attitude also changed because he believed that the situation in 
Japan by the early summer of 1939 differed from that at the start of the
t
year, when it had appeared that moderate opinion, had been dissipated and * 
that Japan was on the verge of signing an alliance with the Axis Powers. 
The fact that no alliance had emerged, and that Germany and Italy had been 
forced to sign the Pact of Steel on 22 May without Japan present, showed 
that the influence of the moderates had not died and that there was still a 
pro-Anglo-Saxon lobby to which an appeals# could be a d d r e s s e d . 9 7  Craigie 
did not, however, believe that the moderates had vanquished the pro-Axis 
clique completely but recognized that they were merely holding their ground 
against strong pressure, although he was optimistic that-
'If they [the moderates] win and if a military coup d'etat can be avoided a 
new era in Anglo-Japanese relations will slowly dawn.'98
In such a position he felt it disastrous for Britain to pick a quarrel with 
Japan as this would play straight into the hands of the hardliners; he 
rather held that Britain needed to show what could be gained from pursuing 
a more conciliatory policy. Connected to this was Craigie's insistence in 
the spring of 1939 that Britain should not risk pushing Japan towards the 
Axis by allowing the talks with the Soviet Union on an alliance in Europe 
to be extended to East Asia. In a telegram of 15 June he noted- 
'Question of an alliance with Russia must of course be determined on basis 
of considerations other than our relations with Japan but at least let us 
be clear that conclusion of an alliance will reduce to vanishing point the 
chance of a friendly settlement of outstanding differences with Japan and 
impose upon us the responsibility of assuming a firmer attitude in our 
dealings with this country.'99
Craigie was not simply espousing a policy in which the only concern was to 
seek ’ conciliation, he also continued to recognize the need to convince
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Japan that Britain could only be pushed so far. He did this in the belief 
that by showing the Japanese the consequences of confrontation alongside 
the fruits of co-operation, his negotiating position would be strengthened, 
and wrote to the Foreign Office on 15 June that-
'So serious ... is the threat to our whole position and prestige in the Far 
East that, even failing the support of America, I feel that some sort of 
counter— action on our part is essential.'100
The easiest way for Britain to do this was to flex its economic muscles, 
and on 16 June Craigie pressed the Foreign Office to draw together a series 
of reprisals split into two categories; the first to be introduced 
gradually, prior to a denunciation of the 1911 Commercial Treaty, and a 
second harsher group to follow on from such an event, although in a further 
communication of 19 June he made it clear that talks should be the first 
priority.*0*
In the bellicose atmosphere within the Far Eastern Department it was the 
call for retaliation that appealed rather than the proposal for talks, but 
the Department, due to the gravity of the crisis, was no longer responsible 
for policy-making, which was now in the hands of the Cabinet and the Chiefs 
of Staff. The crucial meeting for deciding the British response to the 
crisis was a gathering of the Cabinet Foreign Policy Committee on 19 
J u n e . 102 Memoranda produced for the meeting differed in their approach. 
One from the Foreign Office argued strongly for economic sanctions, 
preferably in parallel with the United States, on the political grounds 
that to compromise would-
'... lead to the downfall of China, it would put Japan in a better position 
to undermine the British Empire in the East, and it would alienate America, 
whose goodwill is essential to us in the West as well as in the East.'103 
Another memorandum jointly presented by the Foreign Office and the Board of 
Trade, considered the prospects of economic retaliation in more detail and, 
showing the influence of the latter ministry, argued that the most 
effective measure Britain could take was to restrict Japanese exports, thus 
striking not only at Japanese industry but also at Japan's poor foreign 
exchange reserves. It concluded, however, on the cautious note that- 
'There are disadvantages in making the Tientsin incident the occasion for
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taking action, in that the Americans are not at present directly involved 
and that an influential section of our own commercial community are out of 
sympathy with our action in refusing to hand over the four Chinese. 
Consequently there are strong arguments for seeking to keep the incident 
localised if possible and searching for a solution by negotiation.'*03 
The report from the Chiefs of Staff on the strategic situation went a stage 
further and made it clear that to initiate the 'main fleet to Singapore* 
policy at this juncture would-
' . . . endanger our position in Europe to an extent which, from a military 
point of view, would be quite unjustifiable.'*05
With the British guarantees to Romania and Greece and the pact with Turkey, 
the Royal Navy was in a position where very few capital ships could be 
spared, and it was calculated that only two could be sent to Singapore. 
This reiterated the conclusion that action could only be taken if Britain 
had the active support of the United States.106
The decision facing the Committee was therefore a complicated one, and made 
more complex by a lack, at this point, of any response from Washington. 
From the start it was apparent that Chamberlain was not impressed with the 
Foreign Office line of introducing sanctions, but was rather drawn to the 
proposal from Craigie for talks, which seemed to offer the only way out of 
the crisis, and the minutes record Chamberlain as stating that- 
'He himself would have thought that our best course would have been to 
endeavour to reach some settlement with the Japanese on the most favourable 
terms obtainable, though, no doubt in so doing we should open ourselves to 
considerable humiliation and criticism.’107
Halifax and Cadogan were, however, able to restrain the Prime Minister from 
ordering talks to begin immediately by stating that it was necessary first 
to hear from the United States and to consult more with Craigie, but this 
only put matters on hold as pressure from other members of the Cabinet for 
a diplomatic solution continued to grow.
On 19 June Chamberlain received a letter from Lord Runciman, the Lord 
President of the Council, which urged him to take the line recommended by 
Craigie and warned that-
'If ultimately we are to be effective in our use of the Fleet it will be
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wiser of us to look after the European position first of all, and when we 
are secure in this theatre we can later on deal with the Japanese Navy. 
That I submit is the correct order ... to go to war with our present 
divided forces without the active cooperation of the U.S.A. would in my 
judgement be disastrous, and I could not accept any responsibility for this 
course. ' 1 0 8
The need for caution was further confirmed by a meeting the following day 
between Chamberlain and Admiral Chatfield, by then Minister for the Co­
ordination of Defence, where the latter made clear his concurrence with the 
Chiefs of Staff that Britain could not afford to contemplate a war in the 
East which might lead Hitler and Mussolini to take advantage of a British 
preoccupation with J a p a n . 1 0 9
On 20 June a second meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee was convened at 
which Chatfield expanded on Britain's naval dilemma and stated that the 
Chiefs of Staff had indicated that, if necessary, the Royal Navy could send 
seven battleships to Singapore by late August, but that they could not 
recommend this course of action due to the dangers elsewhere. The Prime 
Minister's response to this was to conclude that-
* . . . we could only send an effective Fleet to the Far East at the cost of
abandoning our naval position in the Mediterranean. This was conclusive in 
favour of making every endeavour to reach an early settlement of the 
dispute at Tientsin. It was clear that we should only be prepared to run 
the risks involved in sending a Fleet to the Far East if Japan made our 
position there quite intolerable.'110
The Foreign Office line was thus defeated by the practical objection that 
Britain simply could not afford to run the risk of war through a policy of 
retaliation. This was not a policy chosen out of any real choice, but was
rather one of necessity. Chamberlain noted to his sister Ida-
'It is maddening to hold our hands in the face of such humiliations but we 
cannot ignore the terrible risks of putting such temptation in Hitler's 
way .'in
The stage was therefore set for Craigie to try to achieve some kind of 
settlement in Tokyo.
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Another factor in favour of an attempt at talks was the position of 
Shigemitsu. As early as 9 May he had indicated to R.A. Butler his growing 
concern about the direction of Anglo-Japanese relations and, in particular, 
the effect of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations, which he saw as adding 
ammunition to those in Japan who were still pushing for a Tripartite 
A l l i a n c e .  112 He followed this with a meeting with Halifax on 19 May in 
which he bemoaned Britain’s continuing lack of collaboration with the 
Japanese and pressed for concessions over Tientsin, and lamented that- 
'... in the atmosphere which prevailed in China there appeared to be a lack 
of collaboration on the part of the British and very little endeavour to 
understand Japanese difficulties.... Neither his country nor the Japanese 
Government had ever expressed any hostile feeling towards Great Britain. 
Ministers and public men always hoped for a better understanding, but he 
really wondered whether this feeling was reciprocated by English official 
circles.'ll3
He did not have another opportunity to express his alarm until he was 
called to the Foreign Office on 19 June to receive a stern warning from 
Halifax about the situation at Tientsin. Shigemitsu managed to deflate 
what could have been a stormy conversation by concurring in the Foreign 
Secretary's assertion that the behaviour of the Japanese Army had been 
shocking, and conveyed to Halifax the important point that it was not the 
policy of the Japanese Government to escalate the incident but rather to 
reach an agreement over the status of the Concession. This was a vital 
signal to give to the British when the situation was so confused and 
reinforced Craigie's case for the opening of talks.!14 it was recognized 
by Halifax that Shigemitsu would be of little use as an intermediary in the 
talks with Japan, and when it was suggested at the Foreign Policy Committee 
meeting on 19 June that he should approach the Ambassador he replied- 
'The Japanese Ambassador in London had in this matter little influence 
either with the local Japanese authorities in Tientsin or with the Japanese 
Government in Tokyo.'115
This was also the feeling of Craigie and when asked on 3 July by Halifax 
whether it was worth presenting further protests to Shigemitsu, he replied 
a day latei—
'I doubt if any useful purpose would be served by making further
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representations to the Japanese Ambassador at the moment.'116
The result was that Shigemitsu was to take a very low key role in the
Tientsin Crisis at least until the end of August.
Even before approval of his plans for talks were received from London, 
Craigie had on 18 June sounded out Foreign Minister Arita on the subject, 
stressing how important it was for talks to be held in Tokyo rather than 
injthe heated atmosphere of Tientsin, and had met with a favourable 
resp0nse.il7 Over the next week the situation remained fluid due to the 
Japanese Army's dislike of negotiations and Its insistence that all 
problems should be settled in Tientsin. The belligerent attitude of the 
Army meant that Arita and Prime Minister Hiranuma, who also supported the 
idea of talks, realised that success could only be achieved through a fait 
accompli. The result was that the proposals for talks could only be passed 
between Craigie and Hiranuma through the use of Piggott and a Japanese man 
referred to as 'M' acting as unofficial go-betweens.ll8 Eventually on 28 
June a communique appeared stating that talks were to be held about 
Tientsin, and with that there was a slight easing of tensions in the city 
and a drop in the number of body-searches of British subjects.l19 To some 
in London the mere fact that Craigie had managed to get this far was 
success enough, and Chamberlain noted hopefully in a letter of 2 July to 
his sister Hilda that-
'The Tientsin incident shows some prospects of relief now that Craigie has
very skilfully managed to get the venue removed to T o k y o . . . ' 120
Despite Craigie's success in relaxing tensions and arranging for talks to 
begin, this approach still found little favour in the Department, who 
continued to push for retaliatory measures against Japan and raged against 
the timidity of the Services and of the Board of Trade. On 23 June Dening 
noted in response to the Chiefs of Staff report of 18 June that- 
'... (it) is based on the assumption ... that economic retaliatory measures 
are considered likely ... to lead to war. But are they? The burden of our 
contention is that they are not, and further than that it is an opinion
that all that is required is some degree of firmness in order to make the
Japanese desist.'121
The Department therefore continued to develop plans for sanctions in the
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expectation that the talks would fail, despite a decision at the Committee 
of Imperial Defence that no retaliatory measures should be introduced for 
the interim lest they damage the Tokyo t a l k s . 122 On 30 June they proposed 
to Craigie that legislation should speedily be passed through Parliament to 
lay the foundations for economic retaliation and thus impress the Japanese 
with British resolve. Craigie's reply on 3 July was to argue that it was 
first necessary to see how the talks developed, but that it would do no 
harm for a bill to be drawn up . 123
Although they disliked the idea of talks it was. still necessary for the 
Department to set guidelines for Craigie, and the instructions they sent 
only clarified the growing divergence of opinion between them and the 
Embassy in Tokyo. One of the areas of disagreement was the issue of how 
wide was to be the agenda of the talks. From the time of Craigie's first 
approach Arita had made it clear that the negotiations could not be 
concentrated only on the legal problems but must also include discussion of 
currency and silver.124 Negotiation over the latter two issues was 
anathema to the Foreign Office as these were areas where any concession 
would be seen as the British government betraying the Chinese; on 4 July 
Craigie was told that compromise over currency was inadmissible. To 
Craigie this attitude was unrealistic and on 6 July he warned- 
’Question at issue is not whether any action can affect maintenance of the 
Federal Reserve Bank currency since it is already well established and 
Japanese are determined to maintain it at all costs; question is rather 
whether a solution can be found in agreement with interested Powers or 
whether one is to be imposed by methods which will be highly inconvenient 
to our prestige unless we are prepared and in a position to oppose force by 
force.*125
As suggested by Craigie's response the question of the agenda was linked to 
the problem of how far Britain could resist Japanese pressure, and whether 
the Japanese were only bluffing. To Craigie's mind it was clear that 
Britain was in no position to stand and fight and that Japan was serious; 
an impression heightened by the wave of anti-British protests whipped up by 
the Japanese army in Tokyo in the first fortnight in July. On 14 July he 
answered a request for his views on the chances of war by noting that-
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’I do not anticipate that Japan would "go to war" in the sense of
despatching ultimatum or delivering sudden attack on British territory. I
do however consider that the first act of pressure on our part will be
answered by counter action ... with the result that we should quickly drift
into a state of things scarcely distinguishable from open hostilities. ... 
My advice therefore is that . . . pressure by Great Britain alone should be 
avoided ... unless difficulties ... about "fleet movements" can be overcome 
so that we may not only show ourselves ready but in fact be ready to take 
naval and military measures for defence of our territory and interests in 
the Far E a s t . ' 126
This warning was backed up by a similar telegram sent collectively by the 
Service Attaches to their respective overseers on 15 J u l y . 127 This was not 
a view shared by the Far Eastern Department, who continued to believe that 
Craigie and the Chiefs of Staff were unnecessarily despondent failing to 
take into account that Japan’s military machine and economy was already 
overstretched by the war in China. Their belief that Japan was not in a 
position to go to war meant that they held in practice as well as in 
principle that Britain did not have to concede over the economic i s s u e s . 1 2 8
In the background to this disagreement over the details of what should be 
discussed there were signs of a growing clash of personalities between the 
Department and the Embassy. There had, of course, been previous episodes 
when relations had become strained due to Craigie's eagerness to negotiate 
and the Foreign Office's innate caution, but Tientsin raised the mutual 
recriminations to a new level. One of the main reasons for this was the 
continuing presence of Piggott in Tokyo. The Department believed that he 
was a malign influence, that it was probable that he was the source of the 
scare stories about the likelihood of war, and that he had given Craigie 
the fallacious impression that the talks would mark a turning point in 
Anglo-Japanese relations. The distrust of Piggott had obviously been 
heightened by his visit to Tientsin and its debatable effect on Jamieson, 
but was also affected by other incidents. First, a telegram he had sent to 
the War Office on 2 June criticising Clark Kerr had caused consternation, 
and second there were also renewed doubts about his discretion in 
discussions of British policy with his Japanese c o u n t e r p a r t s .1 29  One 
particular incident that infuriated the Foreign Office was when, in March
161
1939, he was reported as stating to a group of Japanese officers that a 
pro-Chinese statement made by R.A. Butler to the House of Commons had only 
been for the sake of appeasing public opinion.130 This led Robert Howe to 
tell Craigie on 25 May-
’We do not wish to make heavy weather of the incident and ask the War 
Office to reprimand him, but I think you should call his attention to the 
grave impropriety of what he said and point out to him that, if these 
unofficial conversations are to do any good, neither side ought to give 
utterance to misleading, still less to false, statements.'131
Craigie's reply to this letter on 30 June strongly defended Piggott, 
pointing out that the letter's words had been misinterpreted by the British 
official who had reported them, stating tersely that-
' . . . I may tell you in confidence that one argument which the Japanese 
Prime Minister used in order to prevail over the reluctance of the Japanese 
Army to hold the Tientsin conversations in Tokyo was precisely that General 
Piggott and I were sufficiently well known in Army circles to enable the 
military representatives to feel that they would not be dealing with total 
strangers impervious to reasonable a r g u m e n t . ' 133
The Ambassador then went on to write a passage that summarized his growing 
exasperation with the Far Eastern Department and the role which he felt 
that he was being forced to play out in Tokyo-
'I am left here with the feeling that such efforts as we are able to make 
here to prevent the state of our relations with Japan from going from bad 
to worse are viewed with suspicion and misgiving by the Far Eastern 
Department and that only when we are engaged in our normal duty of 
protesting and recriminating can you really sleep comfortably in your 
beds.'133
This passage, however, revealed more than Craigie's impatience; it also 
made clear his continuing personal ambition to make a success of his time 
in Tokyo.
Craigie was not, however, as isolated as he imagined; his efforts had the 
constant backing of Chamberlain, who wrote to his sister Hilda on 15 July- 
'Thanks to the ineptitude of our Foreign Office we have been manoeuvred 
into a false position where we are single-handed and yet are being attacked
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over a policy as essential for America, France and Germany as ourselves... 
The only thing that gives me any confidence is Craigie's attitude. He 
always seems to preserve his calm and never seems to get rattled.... But 
the anti-Japanese bias of the FO in the past has never given him a chance. 
If he gets us through this mess I shall insist on his having an honour to 
mark our gratitude.'*34
Importantly there was also an understanding on the part of Halifax and 
Butler that Piggott had a useful role to play, particularly in providing 
the Ambassador with an entree to the Army, and in this context it is 
interesting to note that in January 1940 Butler wrote to Oliver Stanley, 
the Secretary of State for War stating-
' General Piggott's sympathies are well known to be 100% Japanese. In 
Halifax's view there is no doubt that he has considerably contributed to 
the easing of tension in Anglo-Japanese relations, even though some of his 
critics feel that his views are too much one way.'135
On 15 July the talks between Craigie and Arita finally began with the 
Foreign Minister presenting the Japanese agenda for the negotiations, which 
consisted of discussion of general Anglo-Japanese relations in China, of 
the legal problems arising from Tientsin, and finally of the economic 
p r o b l e m s . 136 in furtherance of the first item Arita presented Craigie with 
a formula for Britain to accept, which stated that-
'The British Government fully recognise the actual situation in China,
where hostilities on a large scale are in progress and note that, as long 
as that state of affairs continues to exist, the Japanese forces in China 
have special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own
security and maintaining public order in the regions under their control, 
and they have to take the necessary steps in order to suppress or remove
any such acts or causes as will obstruct them or benefit their enemy. The
British Government, therefore, will refrain from all acts and measures 
which will interfere with the Japanese forces in attaining their above 
mentioned objects.'137
This wording was, of course, quite unacceptable to Craigie, as it would 
have forced Britain to become virtually a benevolent neutral, and because 
it did not just apply to the Tientsin area but to the whole of occupied 
China. Since he realised, however, that for Britain simply to reject the
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idea of a formula would be extremely dangerous as it would very likely 
precipitate the end of the talks, he proposed that the best policy was to 
dilute the Japanese wording to make it as innocuous as possible.138
Clark Kerr objected strongly to this line, but in the Foreign Office, 
despite clear antipathy towards such an agreement, work was started on an 
alternative formula which accepted the Japanese line as far as possible 
while at the same time reserving Britain’s legitimate rights in the 
region.139 On 19 July Craigie duly presented this document to Arita, who 
immediately rejected it, while Craigie still refused to accept the original 
Japanese draft. That evening the talks recommenced with the presentation 
of a new Japanese formula and after two days of negotiation this eventually 
emerged as a mutually acceptable document.140 The final text, which was 
officially signed on 24 July and became known as the ■Arita-Craigie 
Agreement, was a subtly worded and vague work, which was, in the tradition 
of agreements with Japan^open to various interpretations. It differed from 
the original Japanese formula only in the last sentence where it stated- 
'His Majesty’s Government have no intention of countenancing any act or 
measures prejudicial to attainment of the above mentioned objects by 
Japanese forces and that they will take this opportunity to confirm their 
policy in this respect by making it plain to British authorities and 
British nationals in China that they should refrain from^ acts and 
measures.'i4i
The crucial change of wording was in the last half of the sentence, in that 
it implied that the onus of the agreement rested on the British Concessions 
in China, and committed the latter to uphold a policy of neutrality without 
restricting the British Government itself from assisting the Chinese.
The reaction in China and the United States to the publication of the 
Agreement suggested that these subtleties were lost on the wider audience 
and the general opinion was that this was an example of ’perfidious Albion’ 
at its worst. i42 in the British press too there was displeasure at the 
apparent appeasement of Japan and letters of complaint were sent both to 
the editors of newspapers and to the Foreign Office, one of the most 
memorable of the latter being a rather brief note from a Reverand R.G. 
Milburn to Lord Halifax which simply stated-
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'Permit me as a clergyman to protest against this wicked agreement with 
Japan. One feels so strongly that one does not like to say m o r e . '1 43 
In Whitehall, however, news of the Agreement was generally met with great 
relief and with admiration for Craigie's negotiating skills. Chamberlain 
noted to his sister Ida-
'Craigie has with great skill got an agreement with the Japs about the 
preliminary formula and if only a little restraint can be exercised on our 
side the inflammation should gradually s u b s i d e . '1 4 4
In a Cabinet meeting of 26 July Halifax defended the formula by noting that 
its most important achievement had been to lessen tensions and to gain 
time; he described the British policy as being one of holding on and doing 
anything necessary 'to extricate ourselves from a difficult position.'1*5
Craigie too was pleased with his achievement which convinced him that the 
talks could lead to a real improvement of relations with Japan. With such 
hopes he reversed his previous support for the introduction of legislation 
to allow the imposition of sanctions, which had anyway been delayed due to 
difficulties over wording and the opposition of the Board of T r a d e . 1 4 6  He 
also raised objections to news from London that the Government was on the 
verge of announcing an export guarantee loan to China, and wrote- 
'If by announcing this credit we cause the downfall of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs who has risked much to avert trouble between the two 
nations I doubt whether we shall have a friend left in this country. ... My 
own position would be so shaken as greatly to impair my utility.'147  
In both cases his objections had the necessary effect as, with the European 
situation still so uncertain, there was no wish to risk antagonizing the 
Japanese at such a critical juncture.
With the Agreement signed it was possible for the talks on Tientsin proper 
to open. These began on 24 July with Craigie chiefly assisted by Piggott, 
Major Herbert, and P. Gore-Booth, the Second Secretary in Tokyo. On the 
Japanese side the chief figure was KatS Sotomatsu, a former Counsellor at 
the Japanese Embassy in London, who had a reputation as a moderate: he was, 
however, assisted by Major-General Muto Akira, the Vice-Chief of Staff of 
the North China Army and a noted fi r e b r a n d .1 4 8  The talks began once again 
with the Japanese setting an agenda of issues that they wished to discuss,
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which consisted of twelve points taking in the position of the four 
suspects, general problems of public order, and the economic problems. By 
31 July a provisional agreement had been thrashed out over the first two 
areas, with a decision that the four men should be handed over to the 
Japanese for interrogation and a compromise where it was agreed that the 
Japanese should be able to observe the work of the police in the 
Concession.149
Over the economic issues, however, no such easy progress was made, and as 
early as 27 July Craigie reported that deadlock had been reached over both 
the currency and the silver q u e s t i o n s . 150 The result of this was that on 1 
August Craigie asked the Foreign Office to moderate its position over the 
silver, which he saw as the more important of the economic problems. His 
proposal was that to meet the Japanese demand the silver ought to be handed 
over to the Federal Reserve Bank or the Yokohama Specie Bank, but that it 
ought to remain sealed. He supported his case by arguing that- 
'Above represents the only way out of the present difficulty which I can 
see and is to my mind preferable to serious consequences which would attend 
the breakdown. I am quite satisfied that it would be impossible for the 
Japanese to leave the Conference Table empty-handed on both q u e s t i o n s .'15 l 
In London it was realised that the deadlock over the economic issues was 
very threatening, and that any compromise would affect the rights of other 
powers such as France, the United States and, obviously, China. In a 
Cabinet meeting of 2 August Halifax summed up his fears by confessing- 
'... the position in the Far East was now causing him more anxiety than the 
position in any other part of the w o r l d . ' l 5 2
The position of the British Government was further complicated by the 
American announcement on 26 July that they would abrogate their 1911 
Commercial Treaty with Japan in six months time. This momentous decision 
was made without any prior consultation with London and came as a complete 
s h o c k . 1 5 3  To those in the Foreign Office who deprecated Craigie's efforts 
the American action came as a demonstration that Britain no longer had to 
appease Japan but could begin to stand its ground and even move to abrogate 
its own Commercial Treaty.154 To these voices was added the opinion of Sir 
George Sansom, freshly returned from Japan and convinced that his former
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chief's assessments of the situation were fundamentally wrong. The 
resurgent opposition within the Foreign Office to a policy of compromise 
influenced Halifax, who at the Cabinet meeting of 2 August proposed that 
Britain should use the continued anti-British demonstrations in both Japan 
and occupied China as an excuse to break off the talks, and that if it was 
decided that retaliation was necessary then Britain should denounce its 
Commercial Treaty with Japan.155 This view did not find much support with 
Chamberlain, who told the Cabinet that in his opinion-
' . . . the utmost consideration should be given to Sir Robert Craigie. Our 
Ambassador in Tokyo was working under most di/icul.t conditions and had very
A
few cards in his hand, but he had shown great skill and coolness. It was 
clear, therefore, that before any decision was taken which might have the 
effect of breaking or suspending the negotiations, Sir Robert’s views 
should be ascertained and due weight given to them.'156
Chamberlain’s recommendation received the general support of the Cabinet 
and it was subsequently decided that before a position over the economic 
issues was settled it was necessary to consult Craigie further and also to 
sound out France and the United States. In terms of the talks in Tokyo the 
result was that on 2 August Craigie was informed that there would have to 
be a delay while the economic problems were mulled over, and to ease the 
blow an effusive tribute was made to his diplomatic efforts so f a r . *57
Craigie was far from happy with this enforced lull in the talks, and he 
supported his case for a compromise with a number of arguments that
illustrate his hopes and concerns at the time. As early as 1 August he had 
urged restraint in assessing the impact of the apparent toughening of 
American policy. With his long experience of American affairs he 
considered himself well qualified to pass judgement, and noted caustically- 
'I have seen the present United States Administration run away so often 
from their own initiatives that I hesitate to regard the action very 
seriously and believe the new American treaty will be negotiated well
before expiration of six months limit. We must be sure it is not just
another flash in the American pan before putting any reliance on this new
development.’158
Having dismissed the possibility of co-operation with the United States,
I
Craigie saw the position as little different from that in June, apart from
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the fact that he was now even more convinced that British concessions could 
strengthen the position of the Japanese 'moderates’. On 5 August in a long 
telegram to the Foreign Office he wrote-
'Rapprochement with Democrats ... would definitely smash such reliance as 
Germany may have on Japan's active assistance whether on the outbreak or 
during the course of a world war and correspondingly reduce the chance of 
Herr Hitler risking the gamble.’1 5 9
Craigie*s arguments were not, however, accepted within the Department. The 
most influential criticism of the Ambassador's views came from Sansom, who 
produced a minute on 3 August disagreeing deeply with the former's 
assessment of the Japanese 'moderates'. Sansom held that the 'moderates' 
if they did exist only differed in terms of method rather than aim from the 
'radicals' and that they were anyway small in number and not very 
influential. Bearing this in mind, he also addressed the issue of what it 
would actually take to come to an understanding with Japan, a topic which 
Craigie largely had skirted over, and came to the conclusion that it would 
involve at the least giving up British privileges in China and might also 
require compromising over colonial q u o t a s . 160 Such opinions tallied with 
that of the Department, but carried considerably more weight from the pen 
of the man who was deemed the doyen of Japanese experts.
Another aspect to the Department's refusal to accept Craigie's arguments 
was that the atmosphere of crisis had further heightened the personal 
animosities that had already been witnessed in the first part of the 
crisis. The clearest example of this came in a brief correspondence 
between Nigel Ronald, the First Secretary in the Department, and Craigie. 
Ronald wrote to Tokyo on 5 August to try to explain the reason for the 
delay in sending on instructions, and noted in passing-
'What with three Far Eastern debates and about 40 questions in four days, 
Howe away and Brenan on leave work of department has got rather behindhand. 
Incidentally to us here it would seem of doubtful wisdom to show too much 
haste as implying that we can be hustled. But thfri^iR awful damp heat with 
a lot of savages howling round your garden, dark hints whispered in your 
ear by all and sundry in season and out, and constant pressure from here to 
go on making bricks without straw naturally the picture presents itself to
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you in a rather different light.'161
The underlying impatience with Craigie's barrage of telegrams displayed in 
this explanation was not lost on the Ambassador. Craigie, who was 
suffering from neuritis and had had to give up his sunnier break at Chuzenji 
to stay in the stultifying heat of Tokyo for the talks, was not in the best 
of temper and replied with an acidic note on 9 August-
'I fully appreciate your difficulties and hope Mr. Howe is now recovered. 
At the same time I am sorry you should think my plea for earliest possible 
settlement is dictated either by motives of personal convenience or blind 
acceptance of Japanese pressure. We are all of us ready to stay here 
through the summer if that would help to extricate us from present mess. 
If sometimes I wonder whether our perspiring efforts are of any avail it is
fas £^«vc.-v\ i.
because of the^Bourbon-1ike inability to learn anything from past events. 
Perhaps however this picture is as much distorted by distance as is your 
picture of our attitude here.'162
Such language did little to endear Craigie to the Foreign Office and 
Cadogan noted in his diary on 10 August that Sir George Mounsey seemed 
'rather anti-Craigie.’163
Away from this direct confrontation Craigie's position was further 
undermined due to his continued reliance on Piggott for advice. Grave 
doubts had been expressed already in the Department about the wisdom of the 
latter's participation in the Tientsin talks, but this was as nothing 
compared to the consternation when on 29 July Craigie asked the Foreign 
Office if Piggott's tour of duty, which was due to end in October, could be 
extended, as his presence was needed in the negotiations over Tientsin.164 
Nigel Ronald minuted in response to this that he along with Sansom believed 
Piggott to be a 'public danger', and noted-
'If I might say so without altogether outstripping the bounds of propriety, 
I consider that General Piggott has been the ame damnee of the whole sorry 
story of our recent Tientsin troubles. I realise that this is a serious 
charge, but I cannot refrain from recording my opinion, so strongly do I 
feel on the subject.'165
The general annoyance with Piggott's behaviour and his faith in his 
Japanese friends led the Foreign Office to goad the Military Attache over 
the failure of his military acquaintances to arrange for the release of
169
Colonel Spear from custody, and on 3 August a sarcastically worded telegram 
drafted within the Department was sent by Halifax to Craigie- 
'I must confess that I am keenly disappointed at the absence of any 
concrete results from Military Attache's efforts. ... Surely his intimate 
contacts with the Japanese Army should enable [him] to secure if not 
release, at least more generous treatment for an officer of the status of 
Military A t t a c h e . '* 66
The atmosphere was thus not one in which Craigie's views were likely to 
receive a very favourable hearing, and it is clear from the minutes made in 
the Department that there was little enthusiasm for a continuation of the 
Tientsin talks. This position was underpinned by the views received from 
France and the United States about the economic issues. The French 
reported on 11 August that as the silver deposited in their Concession was 
in the hands of a private bank they would find it very difficult to order 
it to be handed over to the Japanese.I67 The United States meanwhile 
indicated their opposition to any agreement that would restrict the use of 
the fapi in north China.168 To the Department this proved that Britain 
could not comply with the Japanese terms and, as neutralization of the 
silver was not likely to find favour with Tokyo, it was decided that no 
British counter— proposal should be made. The justification for this view 
was summed up by Mounsey in a memorandum of 12 August in which he wrote- 
'... we now have an opportunity of taking a firm stand vis-a-vis the 
Japanese on ground which will give us international s u p p o r t  and in regard 
to which the Japanese must find it difficult, if not impossible, to drive 
us into war.'169
The arguments of the Department convinced both Halifax and Cadogan that 
this was the right course of action, that to continue making concessions 
was too dangerous and that there seemed little likelihood of Japan choosing 
to go to war over the silver. On 16 August Halifax wrote to Chamberlain to 
explain the Foreign Office’s rejection of Craigie’s call for a compromise. 
In his letter he noted-
'I feel pretty clear ... that we cannot do what Craigie wants by way of 
compromise over silver, and I feel that if we did we should be very likely 
to get very little positive result in exchange for the great worsening of
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our present position vis-a-vis the United States and Japan.'*7*)
In reply Chamberlain with a heavy heart gave his assent to Halifax's 
proposals-
'I find myself in full agreement with your conclusions though I fear they 
may lead to fresh anxieties. I am particularly impressed with the 
memorandum initialled G.M. [George Mounsey] which admirably summarises 
considerations already in my mind. I wish I could believe that by a 
"compromise" on silver we could begin a new era of Anglo-Jap [sic] 
agreement. But I can't bring myself to any such belief. I see no 
practical alternative to that proposal & we must learn to live with the 
consequences.'171
The result of Chamberlain's assent was that on 17 August the Foreign 
Office's terms were communicated to Craigie who passed them on to Kato the 
next day. He tried to soften the impact by stating that Britain had still 
not finished consulting the interested third parties and therefore asked 
for a mere adjournment of the talks. This, however, failed to mollify Kato 
and when the Foreign Office, against Craigie*s advice, published a 
statement clarifying their position on 20 August, it led to an announcement 
the following day from the Gaimushb that the talks had broken down. 
Craigie was naturally resentful that his advice had been rejected and his 
telegrams over the next few days clearly revealed his b i t t e r n e s s . * 7 2 This 
was not simply because he believed that the talks could have succeeded but 
also due to his belief that tensions at Tientsin could once again bring 
Britain and Japan to a crisis point. These fears proved in the end to be 
unsubstantiated owing to two events in the last days of August.
On 20 August severe flooding at Tientsin left most of the British 
Concession under water in conditions so atrocious that it would have been 
impossible for the local Japanese forces to increase their pressure.173 
The other, and much more important, event was that on 23 August the Nazi- 
Soviet Pact was signed in Moscow. The effect in Tokyo was bewilderment and 
anger at the German betrayal. Japanese policy, which had since 1936 been 
based on a alignment with Germany, was thrown into turmoil with the Army, 
which had renewed pressure for an alliance earlier in the month, unsure 
how to react and the moderates convinced that the time had come to return
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to the fray by pushing for closer relations with Britain and America. The 
Hiranuma Government was caught in the middle of this furore and on 28
August announced its resignation. It was replaced by a new Cabinet led by
General Abe Nobuyuki, and rumours soon circulated that Shigemitsu was to be 
selected as Foreign Minister, although in the end this was not to be the 
case.l74 In such an uncertain atmosphere there was little likelihood the
Japanese would risk the alienation of Britain by raising the stakes at
Tientsin, and therefore the end of the talks passed without any serious 
recriminations. Whether this would have happened had the above events not 
occurred is a moot point, and the question of how justified Craigie*s fears 
were must remain unanswered.
Craigie quickly recognized that the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact raised 
the possibility of a backlash in Japan against Germany which Britain would 
be wise to exploit, and on 24 August recommended to Halifax the renewing of 
the Tientsin talks and on a broader scale an attempt to push for a Sino- 
Japanese peace settlement. He justified these proposals by arguing- 
' In making these recommendations I do not mean that I renounce abhorrence 
of the original Japanese aggression or recent anti-British campaign. But 
the present moment is too critical for us to look at anything but the 
future and I am convinced that there is possibility if we act quickly 
enough of turning the present situation to our advantage.'176 
These suggestions met with some approval in the Foreign Office and Craigie 
was told that he could make soundings about Tientsin but that peace talks 
were still too controversial.
An interest in reopening the Tientsin talks was also displayed by the 
Japanese Embassy in London. In late August Shigemitsu, realizing that the 
signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact could have a salutary effect on Anglo- 
Japanese relations, began to make diplomatic manoeuvres of his own, and on 
26 August sent Arthur Edwardes to ask R.A. Butler if it would be worth 
starting new talks based around the sealing of the silver, and whethei—
*... if he were to explore the possibilities of improving Anglo-Japanese 
relations and made approaches to us, he would be snubbed...'176 
This was followed by a talk between Shigemitsu and Lord Halifax on 28 
August in which the former expressed his approval of the Abe Cabinet, and
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noted optimistically, according to Halifax's record of the talk, that- 
'... the doublecrossing of Japan by Germany and of ourselves by Russia must 
cause both the Japanese and the British Governments to reconsider the 
positions in which they find themselves, and to consider a possible 
improvement in their mutual conditions.'
However, before anything could come of Shigemitsu's soundings they were 
overtaken by events. On 1 September Germany invaded Poland and two days 
later Britain was at war.
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CHAPTER FIVE
•AN EFFORT OF APPEASEMENT*
'Hornbeck showed some anxiety lest in the stress of war the Allied 
Governments might embark upon an effort of "appeasement" with Japan 
which he thought would stultify our own interests and lead to 
misunderstandings with the United States.'
Memorandum by F. Ashton Gwatkin 21 May 19401
The outbreak of the European War had grave repercussions in East Asia. It 
meant that Britain and France now were even less able to protect their 
interests in the region, leading to an ever increasing power vacuum. Such 
a process naturally led to an instability which was only worsened by the 
refusal of the United States to take up the mantle of the Western European 
powers, and the German determination to inveigle the Japanese into 
supporting their cause.
Japan therefore found itself in an advantageous position, and the obvious 
temptation was to use the new situation to bring the conflict in China to a 
favourable conclusion. The question was, however, how this could best be 
achieved; should Japan lean towards the Democracies in the hope of using 
their influence to solve the China Incident, or favour Germany and the 
latter's new-found Soviet partner in order to force a full retreat of the 
West from the region? The discrediting of the pro-German lobby in Japan 
due to the Nazi-Soviet Pact meant that the 'moderates' were initially able 
to secure an influential position in the Abe and Yonai Governments; in 
particular the two Foreign Ministers in this period, Admiral Nomura 
Kichisaburo and Arita Hachiro, argued for a rapprochement with the Western 
powers. Thus on the surface Japan appeared to be tentatively moving 
towards the West, but in Army circles sentiment was increasingly focussed 
on the revival of a pro~Axis policy, a settlement of Japan's differences 
with Moscow thus cutting off Soviet support for the Kuomintang, and the use 
of the war in Europe as an opportunity to prise the French and British out
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of East Asia. The clash between these two views was to hinder the growth 
of the Government's pro-Western policy until the events of the early summer 
in 1940 provided an irresistible answer to the debate.2
For Britain the main effect of the outbreak of war on East Asian policy was
that it made the 'strategic nightmare' of a three-front war a greater and
even more frightening prospect. Almost as soon as the war began in Europe
there was a reassessment among the higher echelons of the British
Government to see if the Japanese threat could be neutralized. The problem
was to discover how this goal could be achieved; one possibility was that,
in the interests of power politics and the primacy of the need to defeat
Germany, China might be sacrificed to the higher strategic goal of winning
over Japan by whatever means necessary. A policy of complete appeasement,
however, carried with it many problems; the most important of these was
that any such move would irrevocably alienate Washington, and that this
would have a detrimental effect not only in East Asia but also on the level 
r-c
of^assistance given by Washington to the Allied war effort in Europe. In 
fact now more than ever before Britain was forced to negotiate with Japan 
with one eye kept firmly on Washington to ensure that the State Department 
and American public opinion did not disapprove. As Halifax remarked to the 
War Cabinet on 4 September—
'Any suggestion of the revival of our Alliance with Japan, even as a long 
term object, would need to be very carefully considered from the point of 
view of the effect upon the United States.'3
Another aspect of the argument against any immediate attempt at a 
rapprochement with Japan was that Britain had little reason to trust Japan 
even if an understanding could be reached; all that Britain might be doing 
by agreeing to recognise the 'New Order in East Asia' could be signing away 
its own position in the region. In addition to this there was the danger 
that any policy of making abject concessions to an Asian power might have 
grave consequences in the British colonies of South and South East Asia, as 
the imperial hold over these areas relied not on actual power but on 
prestige and the myth of European invincibility. The arguments against an 
all-out policy of appeasement were therefore very strong and found little 
support in Government circles, and this line was explicitly rejected by
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Chamberlain when he noted to the War Cabinet on 28 September 1939- 
' ...it was to our interest to steer a middle course and to avoid giving 
offence either to the Chinese or the Japanese Governments. It was
important to encourage those elements in Japan who were friendly to us. At 
the same time we must be careful not to prejudice Chiang Kai-shek's 
position in any way.'4
An alternative to the policy of easing tensions in East Asia by making
concessions to the Japanese was to try instead to solve the problem of
Anglo-Japanese antagonism by negotiating a peace agreement between Japan 
and China. A proposal on these lines first originated from the French on 3 
September, but was initially dismissed in the Foreign Office as too
dangerous because it might antagonize the Americans.5 The suggestion was, 
however, revived later in the month when Craigie reported optimistic signs 
in this direction from Tokyo. The apparent Japanese willingness to discuss 
peace with China was communicated to Craigie by General Koiso Kuniaki, who 
had been in fairly regular contact with the Ambassador through Major- 
General Piggott since the previous February. Already in mid-June Koiso had 
told Craigie of his own plan for Prime Minister Hiranuma to meet Chiang 
Kai-shek on neutral ground to discuss peace, and it was this plan which 
resurfaced in a conversation they had on 22 September when Koiso claimed 
that his project had the support of General Abe and of the new Army 
Minister General Hata Shunroku. Craigie, who had been led to believe by 
Piggott that Koiso had strong pro-British leanings, enthusiastically 
informed London, suggesting that Britain could assist this plan by allowing 
the proposed meeting to take place at Hong Kong.6
The Foreign Office naturally saw this as an interesting proposition, for 
though there were obvious arguments against Britain and France pushing for 
a peace settlement themselves, the situation was far more promising and 
more likely to be acceptable to Washington if it were a Japanese 
initiative. On 25 September Lord Halifax reported to the War Cabinet about 
the proposed talks, and a decision was taken the next day that Britain 
should offer its good offices in arranging for them to go ahead, but that 
Britain should not attempt to mediate directly.7 Plans were then made to 
inform Chiang Kai-shek what was afoot, but before Clark Kerr could see the
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Generalissimo the situation had changed. On 30 September Craigie paid a 
call on the new Foreign Minister, Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo, who, much to 
the Ambassador’s surprise, denied any knowledge of the Koiso proposal, and 
reported that he would have to investigate it.8 This led to a further 
delay until 11 October when Craigie met Nomura again, only to find that the 
Foreign Minister's stance was to declare that-
’ . . . in view of the well known determination of successive Japanese 
Governments not to enter into direct discussions with Chiang Kai-shek, any 
meeting at Hong Kong between prominent Chinese and Japanese personalities 
would certainly be regarded as a volte-face on the part of the present 
Government and would be disapproved by Japanese public opinion.'9 
Craigie was flabbergasted by this turn of events which left him 
considerably embarrassed, while the Foreign Office pretended that they had 
never held out strong hopes anyway.10
These events therefore blocked off another possible avenue of progress for 
Britain in trying to improve relations with Japan, but there was by no 
means a consensus within British circles that a solution to the Sino- 
Japanese conflict would necessarily ease Britain's position. The Chiefs of 
Staff, for example, had written in an influential memorandum for the War 
Cabinet on 28 September—
'We have always recognised the danger of becoming embroiled with a first 
class power in the Far East when we are at war with Germany. Moreover so 
long as the neutrality of Italy is not definitely assured, a possible 
extension of the war to the Far East must be prevented by any means in our 
power.
The fact remains however that so long as Japan has this commitment in 
China, she is unable to concentrate on us, and the continued drain on her 
economic resources must react on her capacity to wage war in the future 
against a major power.'ll
To this mode of thinking an end of the Sino-Japanese conflict was the last 
thing that Britain should desire or strive for, as this would only free 
Japanese forces for an offensive against the British position in the East.
This still left the question open of how far could Britain afford to go 
along the path of conciliation, for, although this course could not be
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pursued at the cost of hindering the war effort against Germany or of 
alienating the United States, it was undeniable that the fragile relations 
between Berlin and Tokyo following the 'betrayal' of the Nazi-Soviet Pact 
provided Britain with a window of opportunity. The answer to this dilemma 
was that Britain should pursue a policy of limited appeasement towards 
Japan in relation to a small number of issues of mutual interest such as 
the settlement of the Tientsin problem, a partial withdrawal of British 
troops from China, and various concessions to Japan in the economic field, 
with the hope that this would create an atmosphere in which relations could 
begin to improve.12 An important statement of intent to this end was made 
on 22 September by R.A. Butler, who had been given the ministerial brief 
of overseeing the day to day running of British policy towards East Asia. 
He wrote that it was dangerous for Britain to have poor relations with both 
Japan and the Soviet Union and proposed that steps should be taken to draw 
closer to the former, and went on-
'If she [Russia] is to become the inveterate enemy of the British Empire, 
it is essential that we should harness Japan to ourselves. It is therefore 
wise to take precautionary steps now. Russia and Japan are bound to remain 
enemies, and with our position in India and the East it would pay us to 
make a return to the Anglo-Japanese alliance p o s s i b l e . '13
A
This was naturally a policy that appealed to Sir Robert Craigie, and during 
the period between September 1939 and June 1940 he worked hard to further
this cause and pushed the Foreign Office to make the most of the available
opportunities.
In Japan too there was a recognition of the opportunities raised by the new 
circumstances in Europe, and in a Cabinet meeting on 21 September it was 
decided that efforts should be made to persuade Britain to recognize the 
'New Order in East Asia', to end its tacit support for Chiang Kai-shek's
regime and to transfer its allegiance to the government being constructed
in collusion with Japan by Wang Ching-wei.l* As a result of this policy 
Shigemitsu was called upon to lobby in London for an improvement in Anglo- 
Japanese relations. This role forced him to become more active than had 
been the case over the previous ten months and he began to hold a series of 
weekly meetings with R.A. Butler in which they discussed any problems that 
had arisen and sought to find areas of common interest. The result was
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that during these months tentative steps were made by both Britain and 
Japan towards some kind of understanding, and divisive issues were dealt 
with in a conscious spirit of compromise.
The first major issue raised in East Asia by the European war was one that 
threatened to increase divisions rather than heal them^ TShis was the matter 
of the future of the British garrisons in China. On 5 September Craigie 
was handed an aide-memoire by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Sawada 
Renzo calling for the withdrawal of all British forces from China on the 
grounds that their presence might lead to incidents arising out of the 
European conflict.15 It was obvious that the justification for this 
request was without foundation as there were no German forces in China, and 
that the real reason was a wish to further weaken the position of the 
Western Concessions and to humiliate the British in the eyes of the Chinese 
and thus damage the letter's morale. The Japanese request put Britain in a 
very difficult position, as even before the former had raised the issue the 
British authorities had been considering the withdrawal of the garrisons. 
In August, when it was clear that war was imminent in Europe, Vansittart 
had suggested their removal, a proposal which had won the approval of 
General Grasett but the opposition of Craigie and Clark K e r r . 15
The Japanese intervention made the situation substantially more complex as 
any decision to withdraw, even if militarily necessary, would not now be 
seen as such, but rather as giving way to Japanese pressure. Another 
complication was that the United States made clear their utter disapproval 
of the Japanese demand and put pressure on Britain to resist. The initial 
sentiment in the Foreign Office was to stand firm and this was strongly 
supported by Craigie, who argued that Britain should only withdraw when the 
decision could be made to look u n i  l a t e r a l .17 The pleas of Craigie and the 
Far Eastern Department, however, came to nothing and instead a decision to 
stage a withdrawal, although only of troops from north China, was soon 
taken by the War C a b i n e t . 15 This was a symptom of the way that things were 
to change in East Asian policy from September 1939; increasingly decisions 
were to be taken at the highest level. The days of independence which had 
after all led to the Tientsin Crisis were over; now that Britain was at war 
the foibles of the East Asian experts could no longer be indulged.
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The most vital issue between Britain and Japan remained the future of the 
Tientsin negotiations. Craigie, despite his drive for the continuation of 
the talks in late August, showed a measure of caution once the war began in 
Europe and recommended on 4 September that Britain should only proceed 
slowly over this matter.19 Tensions were lifted to a small degree by the 
handing over of the four Chinese terrorists to the District Court at 
Tientsin on 6 September and the release from custody of Colonel Spear on 8 
September after a visit by Major-General Piggott to Peking, but it was not 
until 18 September that Craigie finally felt that the situation was stable 
enough to recommend to the Foreign Office that the talks be reopened.20 
His argument for the revival of the negotiations rested on his strong 
conviction that, now that war had begun in Europe, it was too dangerous for 
Britain to endanger its relations with Japan over as small an issue as the 
future of the Tientsin silver. He was also encouraged in his desire to 
restart the talks by a suggestion from Jamieson that the silver problem 
could be overcome by selling some of the deposits to raise money for flood 
relief at Tientsin. The issue was of such importance that the subsequent 
recommendation by the Foreign Office that the talks be renewed was 
considered by the War Cabinet on 23 September. At this meeting the 
Ministers approved a new attempt to sound the Japanese out, but kept to the 
cautious line espoused by the Foreign Office of first trying to get the 
silver sealed in a neutral bank and, only if this proved impossible, 
allowing it to be used for flood relief.21
Craigie raised the matter of the talks with Admiral Nomura at his meetings 
with the Foreign Minister on 30 September and 11 October, and both times 
pressed strongly for their renewal but to little effect, as Nomura argued 
that Britain was still too far from the Japanese position for the talks to 
succeed.22 In the background to this stalemate was the fact that Nomura as 
the new Foreign Minister and a non-diplomat was in too weak a position to 
press the Gaimusho in this direction and also that his chief interest lay 
not in an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement but in relations with America. 
Nomura's attitude naturally stalled the momentum of the British initiative, 
but it was not the only factor. In mid-October Grew, who had been in the 
United States for the summer, returned to Japan and informed Craigie that
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the American attitude towards Japanese aggression against China was 
becoming noticeably harsher. This was followed on 19 October by Grew's 
famous Horse’s Mouth speech to the America-Japan Society in Tokyo in which 
he warned his Japanese audience of the impatience of the American people 
with Japanese aggression.23 This naturally caused some hesitation on the 
British side, but proved to be only momentary as soon there were positive 
indications of renewed Japanese interest in a Tientsin settlement. In 
talks with both Lord Halifax and Sir George Sansom in late October 
Shigemitsu stressed the chances for success, while on 25 October Craigie 
received from Kato an offer of international control of the silver, 
agreement to its use for flood relief, and a proposal for the removal of 
restrictions within the Concession on the use of the FRB currency.2*
The situation now looked more promising but the road towards a formal 
reopening of the talks was not easy. One problem was that once again 
Shigemitsu appeared to be misinterpreting British policy in his dispatches 
to Tokyo, which threatened to hinder their progress by generating false 
impressions. This became apparent in a meeting on 11 November between 
Craigie and Tani Masayuki, the new Vice-Minister at the Gaimusho, when the 
latter noted that, according to Shigemitsu, the chances of success had 
increased due to Lord Halifax's statement that the British Government had- 
'... no intention of pursuing political designs in China, their interests 
being limited to commercial and financial considerations.'26 
Craigie was forced to disabuse Tani of this false interpretation of 
Halifax's words, but this did not stop the Vice Minister from taking 
advantage of Britain’s apparent retreat by ignoring the terms recently put 
forward by Kato and instead proposing a new plan where the silver was to be 
given to the Provisional Government at Peking for them to spend on flood 
relief. Craigie made it clear that this was unacceptable, which led three 
days later to Tani proposing that the silver be deposited in the Yokohama 
Specie Bank and used for flood relief.26 Contrary to previous practice, 
where all proposals were made solely in Tokyo, this plan was also 
communicated in London by Shigemitsu to R.A. Butler. This caused concern 
in the Foreign Office that the Japanese Ambassador was attempting to take 
over the talks which, in the light of his latest faux pas, led Robert Howe 
to minute on 17 November-
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'We should be well advised to let these negotiations continue to be centred
in Tokyo and I do not much like the idea of the Japanese Ambassador's being
brought into them. Mr. Shigemitsu would have no latitude in the
negotiations and his efforts would be concentrated on endeavouring to get 
us to yield from our point of view, and he is an obstinate person with whom 
it is difficult to reason.'27
Howe's doubts about Shigemitsu's suitability were given further ammunition 
when, on 25 November, Craigie reported that it appeared that Tani was under 
the impression, due to Shigemitsu’s report on his 20 October talk with Lord 
Halifax, that the British Ambassador had been given a free hand in the
silver talks. This was followed by a newspaper article, apparently based 
on Shigemitsu's report, criticizing Craigie for being inflexible in the 
talks in contrast to London, which desired an early agreement.28
Despite Shigemitsu's clumsy intervention in the negotiations, progress was 
made in November towards a solution, and by the end of the month Lord 
Halifax was in the position where he could ask the War Cabinet to agree 
formally to reopen the talks. Within the Far Eastern Department there were 
still doubts whether Craigie's efforts would actually lead to an agreement, 
a view which was shared by Cadogan who noted in his diary on 27 November- 
'... why he [Craigie] should think there is any chance of success, I simply 
can't think.’29
Halifax and Butler were, however, keen to let Craigie go ahead, not just 
because an agreement was possible but also because the need to conciliate 
Japan was becoming ever more pressing. One reason for this was that it 
seemed increasingly evident that Japan was teetering on the brink of a 
momentous decision. Lord Halifax warned the War Cabinet on 27 November—
'A struggle was going on in Japan between those who favoured a 
rapprochement with Germany through the Soviets, and those who desired Japan 
to draw nearer to the Democracies. Everything pointed to the near approach 
of a turning point in Japanese policy, and it would be wrong to miss any 
chance of drawing Japan closer to our side.'30
The fear that Japan would turn towards the totalitarian bloc had been 
present since the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and had increased after 
the Nomonhan armistice had been signed on 16 September. In November the 
possibility of this diplomatic revolution seemed to gather in momentum due
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to the opening of fisheries talks between Japan and Russia. Craigie, who 
had little sympathy for the Russians, played up this threat, and sent a 
number of worrying telegrams reporting rumours of closer Japanese-Soviet
relations. In particular, he noted in a telegram of 22 November—
'In the Japanese Army opinion, although of course normally anti-Russian, is 
becoming more and more interested in the plan of an agreement with the USSR 
as offering, superficially, the quickest method of liquidating the China 
incident without undue detriment to Japan's immediate political and 
economic ambitions.'3*
The pressures driving Britain towards an agreement over Tientsin need also 
to be seen in the light of economic relations between Britain and Japan and 
how these had been complicated by the war with Germany. As early as 19 
September the Far East Combined Bureau [FECB] at Singapore had decrypted a 
telegram revealing Japan's concern over restrictions on its supply of raw 
materials from the British Empire now that war had started.32 This was 
followed on 23 September by a proposal from the Japanese Commercial 
Counsellor in London, Shudo Yasuto, that Britain and Japan negotiate a
modus operandi over trade to allow Britain to buy Japanese foodstuffs and 
silk in return for continued Japanese access to British machinery and
Imperial raw materials.33 In the Foreign Office such a proposal fell on 
fertile ground as only the day before R.A. Butler had asked Sir George 
Sansom to enquire into the possibility of making a friendly gesture to 
Japan in the economic field.34
However, the problem was that this was not solely a Foreign Office matter, 
as the Treasury, the Board of Trade and other lesser ministries also had a 
say in commercial policy and therefore all decisions had to be reached at 
inter-departmental meetings. The first of these on 26 September agreed 
that no binding trade agreement should be signed and that Britain should 
aim at concessions over commodity exports to Japan rather than agree to a 
commitment to increase imports from Japan. Following this another meeting 
was held on 5 October, which, after discussing a new more detailed proposal 
from Shudo, decided that the new Japanese outline could act as a basis for 
negotiation, but with the proviso that there was also a need to endeavour 
to link any concessions to a relaxation of the restrictions on British
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trade in China.35 It was agreed that the decision to start talks should be 
communicated to Shigemitsu through Sansom. The latter was, considering his 
attitude during the summer and his previous utterings on economic 
concessions to Japan, surprisingly keen on the idea of attempting to reach 
a compromise with Japan, and, in words that would not have out of place
A
coming from Sir Robert Craigie, had already minuted on 3 October—
' . . . I am, and have since the lapse of the alliance always been, most 
anxious to see an understanding between Gt. Britain and Japan; and it is 
because I think there is a prospect of reaching such an understanding that 
I feel the method of approach to be of first importance. ... I can see 
danger in making piecemeal concessions without at a very early stage 
bringing them into relation with a general scheme of friendship.'36
The meeting between Shigemitsu and Sansom subsequently took place on 6 
October, and marked the initial entry of the Japanese Ambassador into a 
series of negotiations which were to take up a considerable amount of his 
time and his hopes for the next eighteen months. His extensive involvement 
in these talks was due to a conscious decision by the British to keep them 
in London rather than Tokyo, partly because their very nature, as indicated 
above, required extensive consultation between the many concerned 
mini sties, but also because it was believed that by holding the talks in 
Britain the economic problems could be treated on a separate plain to those 
arising from the war in China. The meeting on 6 October was held in a 
friendly atmosphere and the only difficulty arose over the attempted 
linkage between trade with Britain and trade in China. Shigemitsu 
responded to this by arguing-
'... it would be dangerous to link in any open or official way the two 
separate questions of Anglo-Japanese political differences in China and 
commercial relations in general. It would produce a hostile reaction in 
Japan.'37
Despite this difficulty there was still general agreement on the need to 
work for some kind of trade arrangement and consequently a reason for some 
optimism.
At this stage the prospective agreement, though useful, was still of 
relatively minor importance, and it is noticeable that the Ministry of
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Economic Warfare at first showed little interest in the talks. Indeed Sir 
Victor Wellesley, who advised the Ministry about East Asian affairs, 
minuted on 28 September-
’I can see no reason for a War Trade Agreement with Japan as yet. Japan is 
not contiguous with Germany. No trade with Germany is therefore likely to 
pass through J a p a n . ’38
Such complacency was to be rudely shattered on 20 October by the arrival of 
a vitally important telegram from Craigie which changed the whole basis of 
Britain's economic relations with Japan. Craigie wrote-
'... there is another matter in addition to improvement of Anglo-Japanese 
relations and better treatment for British interests in China that we 
should keep in mind in connexion with any arrangements that we make to 
facilitate supplies to Japan, namely the danger of supplies reaching 
Germany via Japan and S i b e r i a . ' 3 9
He then went on to report rumours obtained from what he referred to as 
'good sources' in Tokyo that the Germans were trying to arrange for the 
delivery of Manchurian soya beans via the Trans-Siberian Railway. The 
seriousness of this turn of events led him to propose that there was a need 
for a formal General Trade Agreement with Japan, but that Britain should- 
*... indicate to the Japanese that they can hardly expect us to facilitate 
supplies unless they on their side undertake not to export Japanese, 
Manchurian or Chinese produce to our enemies by any route and unless they 
undertake also to prevent the transit to our enemies of goods from third 
countries either through their territories or by their v e s s e l s . '40 
Craigie did not, however, go as far as proposing a War Trade Agreement 
which would formally link the Siberian issue to Anglo-Japanese trade, as he 
realized that any attempt to do this would only increase the agitation of 
the radicals against the weak Abe Government.
At first the Ministry of Economic Warfare appeared too shocked to take in 
the gravity of Craigie's news, but within days further reports from Japan 
made it clear that a major circumvention of the British blockade on Germany 
was beginning to emerge, granting the Reich continued access to the 
commodity- rich countries of South East Asia. This was a major threat to 
the Allied war effort as it allowed Germany continued supplies of rubber, 
nickel and tin from the Dutch East Indies, wolfram and antimony from China,
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copper from the United States and Japan, and vegetable oils from Manchukuo.
gL
At once the Ministry of Economic Warfare was galvanized into co-operating 
with the Foreign Office to push for some kind of General Trade Agreement 
along the lines suggested by Craigie, which would indirectly link 
favourable terms for Anglo-Japanese trade to a commitment by Japan not to 
supply Germany with raw materials. In November both ministries began to 
prepare memoranda for the War Cabinet arguing in favour of such an 
agreement and noting Craigie's approval for such a line, but they soon 
found themselves facing strong opposition from the Treasury and the Board 
of Trade.41 The Treasury's objections rested on their concern that too 
generous an agreement with Japan would allow the latter to accrue large 
stocks of sterling which would very likely be sold on the open market at 
Shanghai for dollars with the effect of lowering the value of sterling.42 
The Board of Trade meanwhile claimed that no trade agreement was possible 
until enough time had passed to see what trade Britain would need in 
wartime and that for Britain to enter into an agreement with Japan and thus
would be very unwise.43 The result was that at an inter— departmental
meeting on 24 November to discuss the two draft memoranda it was decided
that it was impossible to continue along these lines and the idea of a
Trade Agreement was dropped.44
The problems faced over the Trade Agreement were not the only obstacle to 
an improvement in commercial relations. It was hoped by Chamberlain and 
others that effective economic warfare could in a relatively short space of 
time bring the German economy close to collapse, and in an attempt to 
increase the pressure it was decided in November to introduce Orders in 
Council to restrict German exports severely. The motive for this move was 
to reduce drastically German acquisition of foreign exchange, but it was 
officially justified as retaliation for Germany's indiscriminate use of 
mines off Britain.45 The initiation of such a policy may have been
necessary for the pursuit of the war against Germany, but it portended a 
series of clashes with the latter's trading partners, which obviously 
included Japan. The seriousness with which Japan viewed this British move 
was made evident when on 27 November, the day that the Orders in Council 
came into operation, Shigemitsu handed a vigorous note of protest to Lord
commit itself to the purchase of goods that
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Halifax which declared that there was no justification for Britain's act 
under international law. In addition to this he also protested over other 
issues arising from Britain's war effort, such as the problem over goods 
which Japan had ordered from British factories before the war which
werefrequisitioned once the conflict broke out, and the question of the 
future of £1,200,000 worth of goods from Japan for Germany which had been 
seized at British ports.46
The need to make a decision over Tientsin therefore came at a point when 
Anglo-Japanese relations were on the verge of becoming increasingly
strained, and just as Britain had discovered that there was less room for 
manoeuvre in its attempts to conciliate Japan than had been originally 
thought. Another important influence on Lord Halifax's support for a 
concerted attempt to end the Tientsin dispute was the advice of Craigie. 
On 16 November he had sent a lengthy analysis of Anglo-Japanese relations 
to the Foreign Office in which he had noted-
’ . . . commercial interest as a means of improving relations . . . certainly
has possibilities, and would have valuable psychological effect on both 
pro- and anti- British elements here ... But in any event, Japanese 
Government and public consider (however unreasonably) a Tientsin settlement 
to be a pre-requisite of any discussion on wider issues. ... I assume it to 
be of vital importance that Japan should not become an adversary in the 
present conflict and, however improbable this may appear at the moment, we 
must try to arrest at the start any trend in policy leading in that 
direction.'4?
Even while the War Cabinet considered whether to go ahead with the Tientsin 
negotiations Craigie kept up the pressure, reiterating his arguments about 
what he referred to as the 'titanic struggle' in Japan between the 
advocates of a pro-Western and pro-German policy.48 He was also assisted 
by two other developments; first, that Grew had begun talks with Nomura 
about renegotiating the American-Japanese Commercial Treaty, which lessened 
the possibility of an American backlash against renewed Tientsin talks, and 
second that the Japanese came up with a new more reasonable compromise over 
silver which proposed the deposit of the silver in a neutral bank but under 
the joint control of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and the Yokohama 
Specie Bank and the use of a sum of £100,000 for flood relief.49
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Despite all of these motives for using the Tientsin talks as a means of 
conciliating Japan at a crucial juncture there was still some opposition 
within the War Cabinet, notably from Winston Churchill, the First Lord of 
the Admiralty, who was already showing signs of a dangerous underestimation 
of Japan's martial capabilities and the importance of East A s i a . 50 On 4 
December, however, after a week of discussion in the War Cabinet, Craigie 
was finally given permission to reach a settlement.51 He immediately set 
to work, and on the day he received his instructions from London he and 
Tani drew up a first draft of a formula over silver and followed this the 
next day by transmitting to the Foreign Office another draft to cover the 
currency i s s u e . 5 2  The Foreign Office took fright at this rapid diplomacy 
and urged Craigie to be more cautious. This was not an attitude which 
appealed to the latter, who realized that the potential tensions in Anglo- 
Japanese relations and within Japan itself were so great that there was no 
time to lose, and he defended his stance on 10 December by arguing- 
'The time is surely one for broad and far sighted decisions - not for 
bargaining on sums which are small in relation to issues involved and on 
points which involve no possible question of principle. The present 
friendly Government may fall before the year is out, and if it does so 
before Tientsin is settled I am convinced that we shall find the settlement 
of our problems increasingly diffi c u l t . ' 5 3
Despite the obvious differences in approach between London and Tokyo, the 
real obstacle to the talks in fact proved to be neither the timidity of the 
Foreign Office nor the excessive demands of the Japanese, though these were 
both important, but rather the opposition of the Chinese Government in 
Chungking. On 13 December Clark Kerr reported that the Chinese Foreign 
Minister was against any sale of silver to raise funds for flood relief, an 
announcement that threw the Foreign Office into a state of utter d i s m a y . 54 
In response a telegram was sent to Clark Kerr for him to forward directly 
to Chiang Kai-shek; it vociferously defended the silver formula negotiated 
by Craigie and noted-
'His Majesty's Government are not prepared to allow this situation to 
continue indefinitely and they, especially in view of the moral and 
material support which they have given to the Chinese Government, feel that 
they are entitled to expect the latter to afford such help as may be
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possible or at any rate not to adopt too rigid an attitude. ... It is in 
the interests of the Chinese Government not to place obstacles in the way 
of our relations with Japan which hamper our war effort, since the victory 
of the Allies in Europe is in the best interests of an independent 
China.'55
The note could not, however, be delivered immediately. First Clark Kerr, 
who was in Shanghai, had to get to Chungking, only to find when he got 
there in late December that Chiang Kai-shek had gone to the front. This 
caused a considerable delay in the Tientsin talks, but in some respects 
this was fortunate as the negotiations in Tokyo had moved into a new 
minefield. This had arisen due to the Japanese indicating on 20 December 
that the figure of £100,000 was too low for flood relief, and the Foreign 
Office's opposition to Craigie's subsequent proposal to raise the sum to 
£300,000.56
As the Tientsin talks stagnated, Japan kept up its pressure on Britain to 
relax its restrictions on trade with Germany. On 5 December Shigemitsu
handed to Robert Howe an aide-memoire asking for special treatment for
Japan over machinery that had been already been ordered from Germany, for 
Japan to be allowed to order further vital goods in the future, and for the 
Orders in Council not to be applied before 1 January 1940.57 This was 
followed on 10 December by a request from Shigemitsu to Lord Halifax that 
the Sanyo Maru, a Japanese ship, which was just about to leave Rotterdam, 
be exempted from British contraband control. This posed a very difficult 
problem for Britain because the Ministry of Economic Warfare had received 
information that the ship was carrying a cargo of 'secret naval goods’ from 
Germany for the Imperial Japanese N a v y . 58 Any decision over searching of 
the ship therefore had to be made at the highest level as it raised 
important policy questions. In the War Cabinet Churchill with his usual 
bellicose attitude towards Japan argued for a strict search of the ship, 
but this was countered by Halifax who argued that any search would cause
political difficulties with Japan. The eventual decision made on 14
December was that the ship would only be given a cursory search if there 
was an assurance from the Japanese that the whole cargo was for the 
Japanese Government and that none of it would pass into German hands in 
East Asia. Subsequently on 15 December Shigemitsu made such an assurance
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to Halifax and within two days the ship, which had left Rotterdam on 14 
December, was searched and released without incident.59 This was then 
followed later in the month by the free passage of another ship, the Mi to 
Maru, due to a British agreement to meet the demands of Japan and of other 
powers and postpone the Orders in Council until 1 January 1940.
The other problem that Britain faced in December 1939 was how to promote 
better commercial relations with Japan now that the idea of a Trade 
Agreement had been scotched. Craigie, again reflecting his anxiety that 
Britain was losing an opportunity to establish better relations with Japan, 
continued to forward complaints about various British practices which led 
him to believe that the economic warfare policies were leading to the 
needless antagonism of Japan. On 11 December he sent a number of 
observations to the Foreign Office, noting in passing that- 
'... we have a good opportunity of retaining Japan's friendship during the 
present hostilities and ... we should meet her wishes as far as we can 
without seriously impeding our economic measures against Germany.'60 
This telegram encouraged Sansom to continue to look at new ways in which 
Britain could conciliate Japan in the economic field, and he eventually 
fixed on a plan to communicate to the Japanese a message stressing 
Britain's belief that in the future a beneficial agreement could be 
reached. Before this optimistic missive could be sent to Tokyo it had, 
however, to be approved by the other Ministries, and it came under 
withering fire from S.D. Waley of the Treasury, who wrote to Robert Howe 
that such a move would be unwise at the present because the Americans were 
due to end their Commercial Agreement with Japan in January. This view was 
shared by Leith-Ross, now the Director-General of the Ministry of Economic 
Warfare, who also noted that too conciliatory a line would be unwise, not 
only for the reason raised by Waley but also because-
'We are at present discussing a USA proposal to restrict supplies of metals 
to Russia and Japan (esp.Csic] molybdenum and nickel) & the USA would 
certainly take it amiss if we chose this time to assure Japan with other 
raw materials.'61
By the end of 1939 therefore the British and Japanese Governments were as 
far away from agreement as ever before. Despite the warnings from Craigie
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that there was much to lose if the opportunity was wasted, Britain still 
held back from making any substantial advance to Japan, due to the 
obstacles of concern for American public opinion and the need not to aid 
Germany by making concessions to the Japanese. Just as the British were 
trapped so were the Japanese; the Nomura-Grew talks failed to alleviate 
American pressure, which only added to the calls to solve Japan's problems 
by aligning with Germany, and it was increasingly obvious that despite the 
British desire for improved relations the latter was not prepared to meet 
Japan’s paramount demand, assistance to end the war in China.62 In London 
Shigemitsu, despite attempts to force the pace, was largely reduced to 
forwarding complaints arising from Britain's economic warfare, mirroring 
Craigie's role as the postman for British claims from China. Meanwhile the 
war with Germany served only to raise more and more seemingly intractable 
differences.
In January 1940 one incident related to the pursuit of the war with Germany 
led to the most serious crisis in Anglo-Japanese relations since the 
previous summer. On 30 December 1939 the Admiralty received information 
that a number of German sailors who were stranded in the United States were 
planning to return to the Reich via Japan and the Trans-Siberian Railway. 
The first part of this journey entailed travelling from San Francisco to 
Yokohama on the Japanese merchant ship, the Asama Maru.63 The Admiralty 
therefore decided that it was necessary to intercept this ship and detain 
the German sailors. This plan was discussed with the Foreign Office and 
the Ministry of Economic Warfare, who raised no objections, and on 9 
January the relevant orders were sent out to the Commander-in-Chief China 
Station with the explicit instruction-
'Vessel is not I repeat not to be stopped within sight of Japanese 
coast.'64
Craigie was not personally informed of this proposed action and only learnt 
about it from his Naval Attache, Captain D.N.C. Tufnell, on 12 January; he 
immediately told the Foreign Office that he hoped that they realized what 
impact such a move would have on Anglo-Japanese relations and that if the 
interception were to take place it had best be at a distance of over sixty 
miles from the Japanese coast. A complacent Foreign Office replied the 
next day assuring him that there was nothing to worry about as the Japanese
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had already been warned of the intended act ion.65
On 21 January the Asama Maru was intercepted by HMS Liverpool, and twenty- 
one Germans comprising thirteen officers and eight technical ratings were 
taken into British custody. The problem was, however, that the ship had 
been intercepted not sixty miles away from Japan but at a distance of 
thirty-five miles or what the Japanese termed as 'within sight of Mount 
Fuji'. The high-handed nature of the British action allied to its 
proximity to the Japanese coast led to a feeling of outrage within Japan, 
and Craigie found himself immersed again in an unwanted and avoidable 
crisis which it would take all of his diplomatic skills to solve. On 22 
January Craigie was called to see Vice-Minister Tani who protested strongly 
about the British action and demanded the return of the detained Germans.66 
Craigie was therefore forced to defend the interception by stating that 
Britain had acted within international law, but when he returned to the 
Embassy he composed one of his severe and self-righteous rejoinders to the 
Foreign Office, noting-
'The depth of latent anti-British feeling in this country is probably not 
fully realised at home, despite my efforts to assess it accurately, but it 
is against this background that the effect of any action such as the 
interception of the Asama Maru must be judged.'6?
His mood was little improved the next day when he learnt that the Admiralty 
were now planning to intercept another ship, the La Plata Maru, which led 
him to send another telegram warning in no uncertain terms that another 
incident could lead to war.68
In the Foreign Office too there was a sense of bewilderment at the sudden 
appearance of this crisis out of nowhere and a desire to try to placate the 
Japanese. This led to the Admiralty being restrained from further 
interceptions and a promise by the Foreign Office to Shigemitsu that the 
boarding by a Japanese trawler, the Yo Bai Maru, of a British launch, the 
Kuong Hing, within Hong Kong territorial waters and the beating up of the 
latter*s crew would not be publicized.69 Luckily for the British the 
Japanese Government was also at this stage anxious to avoid a break in 
relations. On 14 January the Abe Cabinet had resigned and been replaced by 
a new Government led by Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa with Arita Hachiro once
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again as Foreign Minister. At the time Craigie was much pleased at the 
reappointment of Arita and had noted to the Foreign Office-
when he first entered the Konoye Cabinet I found him reserved and not 
particularly well disposed towards Great Britain, a steady evolution was 
noticeable during his period of office and at the end he was more
understanding of our point of view and more generally desirous of improving 
Anglo-Japanese relations.'70
His optimism was justified during the crisis, for despite virulent anti- 
British sentiments in the Japanese press and large demonstrations, Arita 
kept his head and worked steadily for an agreement.
The first result of this was that Shigemitsu saw Lord Halifax on 24 January 
and informed him that he was under orders from Arita to ease the situation 
in whatever way he could, and the next day Arita improved matters further
by ordering the two main Japanese shipping companies, ny)(k and OSK, not to
take any more German passengers of military age.71 On 27 January Craigie 
met with Arita to present the British plan for a solution of the crisis. 
In keeping with the concern in the Foreign Office he offered a very
moderate proposal; a Japanese promise not to carry anyone valuable to the 
German war effort in exchange for a British commitment not to stop and 
search Japanese ships for German passengers, and if necessary the return of 
those removed from the Asama Maru who were not of use to the German Navy.72 
Though this should have led to an agreement, Arita was in fact disappointed 
with the British terms as he had been led to believe by Shigemitsu that 
Lord Halifax had already promised three days earlier to release all the 
detainees, and he therefore pushed Craigie to retreat to what he thought 
was the original British position. It appears that the Japanese Ambassador 
in London had made one of his habitual misinterpretations of the Foreign 
Secretary's words, but the damage was not permanent and by 1 February Arita 
had been convinced by Craigie's adept and persuasive diplomacy to accept 
the proposed British settlement.73 The problem then was to decide how many 
men were to be returned to the Japanese, this caused some difficulty as the 
Japanese demanded the return of eleven, but eventually a compromise of nine 
was agreed to on 5 February and with that the crisis was solved.
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The settlement of this potentially explosive incident was a matter of 
satisfaction for both sides; in the Foreign Office it was recognized that 
Craigie and his Embassy staff had played a vital role in its containment, 
and a telegram of thanks from Lord Halifax was sent to Tokyo which stated- 
'I wish to congratulate you on behalf of my colleagues and myself on the 
successful conclusion to which, by your skill, patience and resource, you 
have brought this difficult negotiation. It was, I feel sure, your 
consistent readiness to recommend a common sense settlement and your timely 
show of firmness that brought the Japanese to accept the equitable terms 
they were offered.'7*
The sense of relief that Craigie's astute diplomacy had once again saved 
Britain from an unnecessary crisis was also reflected in a comment made in 
a letter by Lord Hankey, who now held the I -^ f ministerial post of 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, to Admiral Sir R. Drax on 3 February- 
'We have not had a bad deal over this Asama Maru business... . Craigie has 
handled it extremely firmly and tactfully, and the ruling Japanese, as 
distinct from the jingoes, are most anxious for a fair settlement.'75 
This assessment of Craigie's worth was also reflected in Japan, and in the 
spring R.A. Butler received a letter from Viscount Kano, the head of the 
Yokohama Specie Bank in London, that observed-
'Everyone deeply sympathises with him [Craigie] in his difficult task, and 
highly appreciates his great and untiring efforts.... This in fact is the 
first time that Japan has had a real hardworking Ambassador.... You really 
have an excellent representative and I wish to impress this upon you most 
emphatically.'75
The sense of optimism pervading the air after the crisis was also reflected 
by Shigemitsu who, when he met R.A. Butler to express his gratitude at the 
settling of the incident, declared that he believed it would give new life 
to negotiations to solve the other outstanding issues between Britain and 
Japan, and even expressed the belief that the climate in Japanese politics 
had so improved that there was a possiblity of a return to party 
government.77 Such views did not, however, impress the Far Eastern 
Department, who saw it as further evidence of just how cut off the Japanese 
Ambassador was from his native country; Esler Dening noted in response to 
the Ambassador's last point-
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'Mr. Shigemitsu is, I think, quite genuinely working for an improvement in 
Anglo-Japanese relations. But he has not been in Japan for several years, 
and he either underestimates or ignores the strength of opposition to 
democratic government in his country.'78
One of Shigemitsu's keenest ambitions at this time was to lay the 
foundation for an Anglo-Japanese understanding by basing co-operation on a 
common front against Bolshevism. As noted previously he was a virulent 
anti-communist, an attitude which he had ably displayed in his warnings 
against a British understanding with the Soviet Union in the summer of
1939. In many of his talks with R.A. Butler he therefore emphasized his 
distrust of the Soviets in the hope that it would touch a raw nerve in the 
British. This tendency had caused Butler to note perceptively in October 
1939, after one of the Ambassador’s anti-Russian tirades, that- 
'Mr. Shigemitsu has always believed in looking at Anglo-Japanese relations 
against the larger issues which confront our two countries rather than in 
the atmosphere of the smaller and more detailed questions upon which we are 
likely to find ourselves in disagreement.'79
The most blatant example of Shigemitsu's lobbying over this matter came on 
18 March 1940, after the Finnish surrender to the Soviet Union, when Butler 
recorded the Ambassador's view as being that-
'... we and Japan have a common enemy in Russia and that, although an 
opportunity had been lost for striking against her, the determination of 
Japan to keep on terms with us against Russia was undiminished.' 80 
Shigemitsu was matched in his anti-communist passion by Craigie, who also 
saw a common bond of opposition to the Soviet Union as a possible aid in 
constructing closer Anglo-Japanese relations. In terms similar to
Shigemitsu's, Craigie noted on 26 March-
'Since July 1937 there has been one focal point of disturbance in Anglo- 
Japanese relations; namely China, nothing would tend to re-establish those 
relations more quickly than to discover that the two countries now had a 
point of common interest, namely resistance to the aggressive tendencies 
and subversive doctrines of Soviet Russia.'81
The late winter and early spring of 1940 was the high point in the 
circulation of these ideas. By the end of February it appeared that Japan
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was seriously thinking about an anti-Soviet front in East Asia with Britain 
and France, and on 29 February Craigie offered to do preparatory work in 
case anything came of these rumours. Such talk met with some sympathy 
within the Foreign Office, although not always due to a sense of common 
interest with Japan, and Dening minuted on receiving Craigie’s telegram- 
'If Japan were to resort to war with the Soviet Union, all danger of a 
southward movement would be eliminated for the time being, and whatever 
successes Japan might achieve in her campaign, her economy would be so 
exhausted by the end of it, that we too could hope for a prolonged 
breathing space in the Far East.'82
The concept of a common front was carried a stage further when at the end 
of March a Japanese journalist, named Hashimoto, suggested to Craigie that 
Japan and Britain should exchange information about the activities of the 
Comintern. Despite the obvious similarity of this idea to the Anti- 
Comintern Pact it was met with some enthusiasm in the highest echelons of 
the Foreign Office, with Halifax indicating some interest, and R.A. Butler 
minuting-
'Such an exchange could do nothing but good to anybody and would have a 
slight diplomatic flavour of a piquant character.'83
However, nothing came of this idea, due to opposition from Cadogan within 
the Foreign Office and criticisms from other departments, such as M.I.2c in 
the War Office who noted that any link with Japan would mean that British 
support for China would have to be curtailed and-
’If we jettisoned China ... in favour of an alliance with Japan, favourable 
application of the US neutrality legislation now afforded to us might quite 
probably be revised: the disastrous effect of this on US material supplies 
to this country, especially aircraft needs no amplification ... America is 
almost a potential Ally.'64
Here too, the United States stood as the greatest obstacle to an Anglo- 
Japanese rapprochement.
Despite the obstacles to this diplomatic realignment Craigie still sensed 
that with the settlement of the Asama Maru case an opportunity to win over 
Japan had arisen. The high point of his efforts to take advantage of this 
tide of opinion came with a speech he made to the Japan-British Society in 
Tokyo on 28 March 1940. The speech was made without first clearing its
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contents with the Foreign Office; this was not unusual but it was rather 
unfortunate as the contents of his address were to cause some controversy. 
In his speech Craigie observed that there were many problems in Anglo- 
Japanese relations, but expressed the hope that these would be overcome in 
the near future because Britain and Japan, despite their superficial 
differences, in reality had so much in common. The passage which caused 
the most adverse comment was when he stated-
'Methods in some cases differ but both countries are ultimately striving 
for the same objective namely lasting peace and preservation of our 
institutions from extraneous subversive influences. It is surely not
beyond the powers of constructive statesmanship to bring the aims of their 
national policies into full harmony.'85
Apart from the sentiments expressed by Craigie which appeared to suggest 
approval of Japan's ambitions the speech also became the object of
criticism, particularly in the United States, because it contrasted very 
poorly with Grew's Horse's Mouth address to the Japan-America Society the 
previous October, and in addition because it came only three days before 
the setting up of the puppet Wang Ching-wei Government at Nanking on 1 
Apr i1.
In London the speech led to Herschel Johnson, the Counsellor at the 
American Embassy, calling on R.A. Butler to clarify whether the views 
expressed were those of the Foreign Office, to which Butler replied that 
the speech was of little significance and the problems had arisen due to 
one or two double; entendres.8 6 Such, however, was the furore in the United 
States that the Foreign Office decided that it was necessary for a 
statement to be made to Parliament on 3 April, which read-
'His Majesty's Government do not ... regard their policy ... as being in 
any way inconsistent with the endeavour to place our relations with Japan 
on a more friendly footing. Sir Robert Craigie has rendered very valuable 
service in this direction, and it was this purpose which he was concerned 
to promote in his speech.'87
Craigie, not surprisingly, was embarrassed at the uproar he had caused and
told the Foreign Office on 1 April that he had been forced to make a
conciliatory speech due to the presence in the audience of Arita and the 
Emperor's brother, Prince Chichibu.88 On 5 April he went further and sent
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back a formal apology to Lord Halifax-
'I greatly regret that my speech at Japan's British Society should have 
provoked so much discussion and that you should have to explain the 
position in Parliament. In my effort to meet the strong German drive 
against us here I used certain phrases which, when taken out of context, 
gave ammunition to those who wish to make difficulties for His Majesty's 
Government and I shall bear this possibility carefully in mind on any 
future occasion.'89
The irony of this situation was that Craigie only a month previously had 
felt it necessary formally to dissociate himself from a speech that Major—  
General Piggott had made at Chatham House on 13 February. Piggott, who had 
left Japan in November 1939 after ending his term as Military Attache, had 
now retired from the Army and was therefore free to make speeches espousing 
Anglo-Japanese friendship. In this particular lecture he had argued that 
the defeat of the Nationalists in China was inevitable due to the 
superiority of the Japanese Army, and though the address was supposedly 
private its contents were soon widely reported in the Japanese media.90 
This led Craigie, who had so recently praised Piggott in a telegram to the 
Foreign Office for 'his patient and untiring efforts', to write- 
'... it would be unfortunate if General Piggott's reported statements were 
to be considered in England as representing the views of this Embassy.'91 
However, Craigie did not apparently learn the lesson from Piggott's speech, 
which was that all such declarations were subject to microscopic study and 
misrepresentation, and therefore failed to make his speech in March precise 
enough to avoid misinterpretation.
Despite all this talk of collaboration against the Soviets and the 
sentiments raised by the Asama Maru crisis, there were in reality only two 
issues that really mattered in Anglo-Japanese relations at this juncture, 
Tientsin and commercial policy, and there could be no rapprochement without 
progress in both. In the field of the economic problems the difficulties 
in the first half of 1940 remained substantially as they had done in 1939, 
namely that Japan resented the restrictions on German exports and that the 
British were disturbed by the Japanese role in the trade with Germany along 
the Trans-Siberian Railway. There were, however, other complicating
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factors, in particular the American decisions to go ahead with the 
abrogation of its Commercial Treaty with Japan and to restrict the export 
of strategically vital ferro-alloys to Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan, 
provided Britain with a great dilemma.92 Although obviously it was in 
Britain's interests to see American exports to Germany limited, the 
difficulty lay in how to react to the new hard line being pursued by the 
United States towards Japan.
To Craigie this coercive tendency in American policy was misplaced as he 
believed, in line with his American colleague, Joseph Grew, that Japan was 
beginning to seek an escape from the China Incident and that if the West 
was able to offer a feasible alternative to autarky then it might make all 
the difference. In particular Craigie reacted fiercely to reports from the 
United States that disparaged the existence of a moderate element in Japan. 
One incident that irritated him and stands as a example of his views, was 
when on 9 December 1939 the State Department's Adviser on Far Eastern 
Affairs, Stanley Hornbeck, told Lord Lothian, the new British Ambassador in 
Washington, that he entirely discounted the influence of the 'moderates'.92 
This led Craigie to write back to London on 1 January-
'Though every Japanese naturally desires the advancement of his country's 
fortunes, distinction must be made between moderates who favour gradual 
economic expansion through the control of vital raw materials and the 
development of overseas markets as the solution for Japan's organic 
economic ills and extremists who, impelled by mystical fanaticism, aspire 
to world domination. . . . Danger here is that too severe pressure from the 
United States ... might have more immmediate effect of bringing the 
extremist government into power to carry out re-orientation of Japan's 
foreign policy.'9*
Instead Craigie believed that it was necessary to continue trying to come 
to terms with Japan, and in another telegram on the same day he proposed 
that Britain should make a firm offer over raw materials to conciliate 
Japan, a suggestion which interested Chamberlain until the Foreign Office 
told him of the various complications inherent in such a policy.95
The views expressed by Craigie were not accepted by the majority of the 
members of the Far Eastern Department such as Dening and Sansom who felt
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that his faith in the moderates was misguided and that British policy 
should be to encourage Washington to pursue its new hard line towards Japan 
as the best means of containing Japanese aggression, an opinion which also 
had the support of Clark Kerr.96 The War Cabinet, however, in making a 
decision about how to respond to the United States initiative over ferro­
alloys had to view the consequences through a wider perspective than either
Craigie or his detractors. A key element in the eventual decision to co­
operate with Washington, despite the necessity of easing relations with 
Japan, was a joint Foreign Office~Ministry of Economic Warfare memorandum 
for the War Cabinet on 19 January which noted simply-
'When the course of war cannot be foreseen, and when all that is certain is 
that we are fighting for our lives, it is clear that the Allies cannot
afford to reject any friendly approach by the President of the United
States...'97
This was enough to persuade the War Cabinet, although even Eden, anti- 
Japanese as he was, noted sadly-
'It was ... unfortunate that the United States should wish to take a firm 
line with Japan, just when we were trying to improve our relations with 
that country.'98
The result was that Britain agreed to restrict the sale of these ferro­
alloys to Japan, of which the most important was Canadian nickel. This was 
in addition to goods which Britain had already restricted in order to meet 
the requirements of the British war effort and to hinder the possibility of 
certain materials, such as rubber and tin, from being re-exported to 
Germany." The obstacles to a solution of the trade problems were 
therefore becoming larger rather than smaller.
Despite this setback to their policy of reaching an understanding with 
Japan, Halifax and Butler were still determined to try placating the 
Japanese in the economic field wherever possible, and in the face of this 
ministerial consensus the Far Eastern Department, which had serious doubts 
about the efficacy of this policy, had no choice but to do their bidding. 
The problem in making progress in this field was that Japan kept on 
forwarding new requests which were very difficult to satisfy, as to comply 
with them threatened to undermine the blockade and generate similar demands 
from other neutrals. On the Japanese side there was little patience with
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such arguments as the shortages caused by the European War were now 
beginning to bite causing commodity prices to rise drastically thus 
straining an economy already stretched to the limits by the need to support 
the war effort in China.100
The first major problem to arise in 1940 was once again over the issue of 
German exports; the Japanese had two ships, the Tajima Maru at Rotterdam 
and the Muroran Maru at Genoa, ready to sail for Japan in February carrying 
goods bought from Germany for defence purposes. As early as 11 January the 
Japanese asked for these two ships to be allowed through British contraband 
control, but in doing so they were contravening the agreement that had been 
reached with the Ministry of Economic Warfare in December that had laid 
down that from, 1 January 1940, the Orders in Council would apply to all 
cargoes.101 Nevertheless Shigemitsu was still hopeful that in the improved 
atmosphere of early February 1940, the British would be more amenable and 
in a talk with Lord Drogheda of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, Okamoto 
Suemasa, the Counsellor at the Japanese Embassy noted-
' . . . his Ambassador had expressed to him the opinion that it would be
"intolerable" that enemy exports should embitter Anglo-Japanese relations 
now that the 'Asama Maru' incident might happily be regarded as practically 
over.'1° 2
Halifax, realizing the importance of promoting a momentum in Anglo-Japanese 
relations, was keen to meet this Japanese demand and therefore put pressure 
on the Ministry in early February to compromise over these two ships, using 
the argument that to make concessions over this issue could lead to Japan 
becoming more amenable over exports to Germany.100 This argument was 
supported by Craigie who in a telegram of 14 February urged the Foreign 
Office to meet the Japanese over the two ships-
'To refuse to pass these cargoes . . . would not only create a further
serious disturbance in Anglo-Japanese relations just when we are recovering 
from the Asama Maru case, but will in no way assist our war effort. ... I
would point out that we are hopeful of being able to establish friendly co­
operation with the Japanese to prevent such vital raw materials as rubber, 
tin and tungsten etc. ... being carried in Japanese ships for dispatch to 
Germany via Siberian Railway. Unless however His Majesty's Government are
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prepared to meet Japanese to some extent on this matter of vital imports, 
we cannot expect proposed arrangements to materialise.'104
The Foreign Secretary and Craigie were thus very close in outlook, and
their combined pressure was enough to persuade the Ministry of Economic
Warfare to seek a compromise. A deal was finally struck in a meeting
between Halifax and Shigemitsu on 20 February, when the latter said that in
future the Japanese would provide all the necessary documentation over
payment and descriptions of goods. Nigel Ronald, now head of the Foreign
Office's General Department, who also present at the meeting, hinted inA
return that if Japan curtailed its exports to Germany then Britain would be 
willing to compromise with Japan over the latter's wish to import vital 
goods from the Reich. Shigemitsu displayed a distinct interest in this 
proposal, and observed that it could act as the basis for an agreement.105 
The momentum was therefore building on both sides for new talks to start 
that would touch on all aspects of economic relations.
This was not only a matter of interest for the Foreign Office; the Ministry 
of Economic Warfare was also keen to begin negotiations. The latter had 
been encouraged to move in this direction by the rapidly expanding use of 
the Trans-Siberian Railway by the Germans and evidence from intelligence 
sources that Germany was building an extensive network in East Asia to 
arrange for the purchase and transport of vital commodities.105 Their view 
on how to deal with this menace did not, however, dovetail easily with that 
of Craigie or the Foreign Office as it contained a much greater coercive 
element. The basis of their policy rested on the need to block the gap in 
the British blockade not on a desire to improve relations with Japan, and 
therefore their proposal was to deal broadly with the problem by extending 
contraband control to goods travelling to the Soviet Union, and to use the 
threat of British economic sanctions to force Japan into talks in which 
they would promise to comply with this embargo: their memorandum on this
subject for the War Cabinet noted-
'The obvious bargaining counter exists in Japan's great need for raw 
materials for which she is largely dependent on the British Empire and the 
U.S.A. We might well make it a condition of the supply to Japan of her 
normal domestic requirements that she should cease to facilitate shipments
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to Vladivostock or Dairen for Russia or Germany.'107
Another element of the extension of contraband control to the USSR which 
affected Japan was that it would necessitate the start of an intensive
campaign of intercepting ships heading towards the Soviet Union, which 
would require the Royal Navy to increase its patrols in waters off Japan. 
Taken as a whole the Ministry's plan seemed the very antithesis of what 
Craigie had been suggesting.
On 14 March the War Cabinet agreed to this policy of coercing the Japanese 
into talks and a week later a telegram was sent to Craigie informing him 
that interceptions would soon begin in the Pacific, the only restriction 
being that they were not to take place within sight of Japan. This flew in 
the face of a Japanese proposal that had been made on 4 March by Tani to 
institute an informal one hundred mile zone around Japan which would be 
free of interceptions.108 Craigie, with the memory of the Asama Maru
incident fresh in his mind, not surprisingly thought the Ministry of
Economic Warfare's plan to be insensitive and potentially damaging, and
protested to the Foreign Office on 26 March that if the aim was to stop 
cargo from reaching the USSR-
'... most effective method is to make earliest possible arrangements under 
which Japanese ships ... will abstain from carrying those vital contraband 
goods the transit of which via Siberian Railway is possible. But if 
insufficient account is to be taken of Japanese sensitiveness in the matter 
of interception close to territorial waters, negotiation for friendly 
arrangement will become infinitely more difficult.'100
He proceeded to suggest that at the very minimum ships should not be
Craigie’s proposal arrived just as the Foreign Office's General Department 
was drafting a telegram to him to explain the decision to start economic 
talks with Japan and to describe how Japan was to be persuaded to agree to 
the British terms. This draft fleshed out the plans suggested by the War 
Cabinet and in places changed drastically the ideas contained in the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare's original memorandum. One such amendment was 
to expand on Craigie's proposal and to suggest that no Japanese ships 
should be intercepted. Elsewhere the draft also caused controversy by
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proposing that there was no need to consult the United States before 
approaching Japan, and, in contradiction to the conciliatory line over 
shipping, that Japan should be persuaded to submit to the British demands 
over trade with Germany through a policy of introducing restrictions on 
sales of commodities to Japan before talks had even began.110 The Ministry 
of Economic Warfare, not surprisingly, reacted unfavourably to the first 
two proposals as they were utterly opposed to any concessions over 
interception, and were quite convinced that the United States approval must 
be won before talks could start; as Sir Frederick Leith-Ross wrote to Nigel 
Ronald-
'If we have to choose between an agreement with Japan and keeping even this 
degree of support from the United States, we feel that we would have to 
choose the United States. And certainly we do not want to risk losing 
American support without getting a really watertight agreement with the 
Japanese.'111
Meanwhile in the Foreign Office Lord Halifax and R.A. Butler were disturbed 
at the prospect of coercing Japan into talks, which led the latter on 5 
April to write to Ronald Cross, the Minister for Economic Warfare- 
'We accept the main line of reasoning, but do not see why a severe strain
need be imposed on our relations with Japan. We have evidence of a
predisposition on the part of that country to reach an agreement with us 
which will be satisfactory. ... the Far Eastern situation cannot be 
divorced from the world situation, and we would not be happy were our
relations with Japan to take a wrong turning as a result of our handling of
the Japanese over this question.'112
In part this reaction was the result of intimations by Shigemitsu of just 
how important an economic agreement would be in improving Anglo-Japanese 
relations. He communicated this impression not only directly through his 
meetings with Halifax and Butler but also through the use of Arthur 
Edwardes as an informal channel. On 27 March, for example, Edwardes wrote 
to Butler stating that Shigemitsu was very keen on negotiating a War Trade 
Agreement, but could not say so openly as Shudo’s proposals had been 
rejected by the British.113 This use of Edwardes as an intermediary was 
deprecated by the Far Eastern Department, who saw him as little more than a 
traitor to his country, but Butler recognized that he had an important role
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to play, and later in the year when the use of Edwardes as a source of 
information was criticized, the Minister noted in response-
'I find this information, as does the S/S, really quite valuable. I am 
taking the utmost care with this contact, but I refuse to be turned into a 
robot of our Gestapo.'114
The result of the various criticisms of the General Department's draft was 
that the original Foreign Office draft was merged with a new one from the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare and it was agreed to tone down the coercive 
elements, to reinstate the proposal to intercept Japanese ships, and to 
introduce a commitment to consult the Americans. This was, however, not 
all, as in early April another issue forced itself on to the agenda. On 3 
April Shigemitsu called on Halifax to forward a note asking Britain to 
allow another eight ships which were, in the main, loading at Italian 
ports, to carry further consignments of German exports to Japan. He 
claimed that all of the goods concerned had been ordered and paid for 
before the Orders in Council had been introduced and were necessary for 
military defence.115 This proposal naturally threw both the Foreign Office 
and the Ministry into a state of confusion and at a joint meeting on 9 
April it was decided that the best solution would be to link approval for 
their release to the success of the contraband talks and thus add another 
bargaining chip to the British position.115 Shigemitsu had hinted that 
such a linkage would be acceptable in his meeting with Halifax, and on 11 
April this was made more explicit when Arthur Edwardes delivered a note to 
Captain J. Knox, the head of the Ministry’s Enemy Exports Section, stating 
Japan's willingness to cease exporting to Germany by ship in return for 
agreement over the eight ships.117
This meant that the issue of enemy exports was also added to the text of 
the long telegram on the economic talks which was finally sent to Craigie 
on 14 April. In Tokyo Craigie was glad to hear that the negotiations were 
finally to start, agreed with the general aims, and had no objection to the 
talks taking place in London rather than Tokyo, but he did express a number 
of reservations about the methods suggested and in particular objected to a 
passage which read-
'With a view to acquiring the maximum bargaining power in negotiations for
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such an understanding with Japan it is proposed that the Allied Government 
fsicl should temporarily place drastic restrictions on the export to Japan 
of certain key commodities of which she stands most in need . . . excusing 
their action to her on the grounds of military necessity and domestic 
needs. ' 118
Craigie in his reply to the Foreign Office on 16 April warned in the 
strongest possible terms that any attempt to apply such restrictions on 
Japan would have a disastrous effect-
' . . . it would be an error of tact to endeavour to screw the Japanese down 
too tightly in the matter of rationing. . . . Negotiations should take place 
against the background that we still have a host of enemies in this country 
who are only waiting for some pretext to stem the current running in our 
favour and nothing would assist their campaign more than some drastic step 
calculated to divert to us the present ill-feeling against the United 
States. ... Drastic action of this kind may well create such a storm here 
as to render impossible future negotiations along the lines you 
contemplate.'119
Apart from that complaint Craigie also stressed that he still believed it 
would be a mistake to intercept any Japanese ships, and noted, in addition, 
that he did not believe Britain ought to give up the chance of reaching a 
successful agreement should the United States object, as the latter could 
always be brought round.
Craigie's views had a considerable impact in London, where they mirrored 
concerns expressed by the Australian Government to the Dominions Office on 
the same day. The combined weight of these arguments had the effect of 
forcing the Ministry of Economic Warfare to back down over the interception 
of Japanese ships and of once again provoking the Foreign Office into 
making known its doubts about the wisdom of restricting the sale of 
commodities to Japan during the talks, with the result that at an inter­
departmental meeting on 24 April it was decided to introduce only a very 
limited curtailment of exports to Japan. 120 Craigie's influence was thus 
important in toning down the British negotiating position and making it 
more palatable for the Japanese, even though he was to have little say once 
the talks began. Despite his approval there were still further delays in 
starting the talks, mainly due to the need to consult the Americans and it
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was only on 4 May that Lothian finally reported Washington’s approval of
the British scheme.121
The delay caused by the need to reassure the Americans that Britain was not
on the verge of an East Asian Munich caused irritation in the Foreign
Office and with the Japanese. For the latter there was an urgent need to 
/
begin the talks because of the link to the enemy exports issue. Their
concern was growing because it was apparent in the spring of 1940 that 
Italy was /the verge of entering the war and that if this happened the 
Japanese ships at Italian ports would be caught in a war zone. Shigemitsu 
took up the cause in London and exerted great pressure on the Foreign 
Office for the free passage of the ships. In a meeting with Butler on 26 
April he expressed his grave displeasure at the delay and said that a 
request he had received from the Ministry of Economic Warfare for a 
breakdown of the cargoes of the eight ships was against 'the spirit in 
which his offer had been put forward’.122 a few days later he further 
demonstrated the gravity of the matter for Japan by getting Edwardes to 
tell Butler that Japan refused to supply details of the cargo and that if 
Britain did not allow the ships to pass unhindered then Japan might be 
forced to send out warships to escort these vessels on their journey
home.123 Disturbed by this series of events C. Steel of the General
Department of the Foreign Office wrote to Lord Drogheda-
1 . . . we have obviously got to try and reach some settlement more quickly 
than we previously contemplated and I am inclined to think that to do so 
over enemy exports would not necessarily prejudice our general negotiations 
on contraband control, provided we beat them down enough to save face.'124
A joint Foreign Office-Ministry of Economic Warfare meeting on 2 May agreed 
on a compromise under which Britain would not ask for comprehensive 
documentation on the cargoes and would allow some dyestuffs that Japan 
admitted ordering after 27 November 1939 to pass. This slight climb-down 
was communicated to Shigemitsu by Butler on 7 May at a meeting in which the 
latter, following the news from Washington, finally announced that Britain 
was now ready to begin the contraband negotiations. Shigemitsu, in typical 
fashion, tried at this late stage to propose that the talks should be 
broadened further by bringing in relations in China, but this manoeuvre was
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quickly dismissed by B u t l e r . 1 2 5  The interview was followed three days 
later by a further talk between Shigemitsu, Cross and Leith-Ross at which 
an aide memoire setting out Britain's intentions in the contraband talks 
was handed to the Japanese Ambassador. 126 After six months delay the 
negotiations had finally started.
The subsequent detailed conversations arising from the talks were not 
carried out at the most senior level but in meetings between Leith-Ross and 
Counsellor Okamoto. The first of these took place on 14 May when Leith 
Ross handed over the list of goods that Britain wished to see considered as 
contraband and Okamoto responded by making known the raw materials which 
Japan wished to import from the British Empire. 127 The talk was held in a 
friendly atmosphere, and seemed to fulfil^ the hopes that Shigemitsu had 
displayed the day before in a meeting with Butler when he had declared- 
'... we taire beginning to turn a dangerous corner in Anglo-Japanese 
relations in a satisfactory m a n n e r . ' l 2 8
This sense of optimism was assisted further by yet another British 
concession over the eight ships, as on 15 May Shigemitsu was informed by 
Butler that Britain would agree to the sailing of two ships, the Noto Maru 
and Najima Maru, which were ready to leave from Genoa, and to consider 
another, the Nagaru Maru, sympathetically when it was ready to depart.129
The talks therefore started in a potentially fruitful atmosphere, but soon 
began to lose their momentum; the problem being that the Japanese 
considered the British list of contraband goods to be too extensive and the 
ban on any re-export of goods too wide, and that it should only apply to 
items imported from the British Empire. The British were equally
determined to compromise as little as possible over these vital issues and, 
in addition, the Ministry of Economic Warfare found themselves unable to 
agree to the Japanese list of desired commodities, in particular because 
they clashed with the commitment to the American moral, embargo. By the 
beginning of June after another two meetings between Leith Ross and Okamoto 
it had become obvious that the talks were approaching stalemate.130 This
deadlock could not have come at a worse moment, for by this time events in
Europe were beginning to cast a disturbing shadow over Anglo-Japanese
relations.
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The war in Europe and the deteriorating fortunes of the Allied powers had 
an impact on the position in East Asia as early as April when there was a 
diplomatic exchange between the United States and Japan over the neutral 
status of the Dutch East Indies.131 This was followed on 10 May 1940 by 
the unleashing of the German blitzkrieg in Western Europe which brought 
Holland into the European conflict. The Japanese took advantage of Dutch 
weakness to press the latter into economic talks with a view to increasing 
Japan's quotas of raw materials from the East Indies, thus reducing the 
need to rely on trade with the United States and the British Empire. Such 
a move was, however, by no means enough to satisfy the clamour in Japan, in 
the wake of the German victories, for a concerted effort to take advantage 
of the power vacuum appearing in South East Asia. It was apparent to all 
foreign observers that the Yonai Cabinet was under immense pressure to take 
a more radical stance with the Western powers and to assert Japanese 
dominance in the region. At first Shigemitsu typically tried to keep an 
optimistic attitude in his meetings with Butler and to play down the 
gravity of the debate in Tokyo. On 12 June he told Butler in relation to 
the economic talks-
'The spirit in which the Japanese Counsellor had been instructed to 
negotiate was good, and he hoped that no difficult demands would be put to 
the Japanese, since he wished the negotiations to reach a successful 
result.'132
A more realistic assessment of the situation, however, was given the next 
day when John Keswick of the Ministry of Economic Warfare reported Okamoto 
as telling him that-
'... news from Tokyo is not good. As the Germans advance in France so does 
the anti-British party gain strength in Japan. Arita is having a hard time 
nevertheless Shigemitsu is pressing vigorously. ... [I] see no hope at all 
of the full MEW demands being even discussed, they are far too wide.'133 
In this increasingly chilled atmosphere the contraband talks had no chance 
of success, and after a last meeting on 28 June between Leith-Ross and 
Okamoto they were abandoned and it was decided in the interim to limit 
negotiations to arriving at a Payments A g r e e m e n t .1 34
Despite the failure to attain a deal over contraband and Anglo-Japanese 
trade there was progress in another area. The Tientsin talks, as stated
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earlier, had stalled in December 1939 due to Chinese opposition to the 
concessions that had been made over the silver issue. This reluctance on 
the part of Chiang Kai-shek to agree to the terms negotiated by Craigie 
continued into the New Year, and the talks had remained in abeyance until
late February when the Chinese finally came up with proposals of their own
which included the exclusion of the Yokohama Specie Bank from any agreement 
and an absolute ceiling of £100,000 for flood r e l i e f . 1 3 5  Craigie 
reluctantly communicated these ideas to Vice-Minister Tani on 8 March, and 
the latter predictably expressed his complete disapproval, stating that he 
could see no good reason why further withdrawals should not be made beyond 
the £100,000 ceiling to finance flood relief. Craigie, realizing that the 
talks were perilously close to collapse, had urged the Foreign Office to 
compromise over the withdrawals issue, while Clark Kerr proposed a solution 
to the problem of the Chinese objection to the Yokohama Specie Bank, which 
was to exclude banks altogether from the deal and instead have the British 
and Japanese Consul-Generals at Tientsin seal the s i l v e r . 1 3 6  On this basis 
by the middle of April a new consensus was formed and it was agreed that,
though there would be an initial sum of £100,000 for flood relief, the
Japanese authorities were entitled to request further sums in the future 
and that these applications would be reviewed by the British 'in the spirit 
which had led to conclusion of previous agreement.'137
The apparent settlement of these problems meant that work could begin on 
drawing up final formulas over the silver, currency and police issues 
concerning Tientsin. The last two were completed without much difficulty, 
as the policing arrangements had been agreed, more or less, during the 
negotiations in August 1939 and the currency question had been settled, on 
the basis of free circulation of the FRB currency within the Concession, in 
January. Problems, however, remained over the silver, where once again the 
Chinese raised c o m p l i c a t i o n s .1 3 8  Craigie, sensing how close he was to 
settling this crisis which had dominated his life for over a year, was not 
sympathetic to the new Chinese intervention, and this sentiment was 
exacerbated by the news from Europe of the German attack in Western Europe. 
On 10 May Craigie told the Foreign Office that now more than ever the 
situation demanded a rapid agreement over T i e n t s i n . 1 3 9  The Far Eastern 
Department did not accept this view and Esler Dening minuted, in a passage
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which ably summed up the Department's concerns, that-
'To conclude the Tientsin agreement immediately after the latest German 
assault would be interpreted by the majority of Japanese as a sign of 
weakness. ... Far more dangerous would be the effect on American opinion, 
which so far has been moving rapidly in our favour. We may shortly find 
ourselves in a tight corner in the Far East. ... We are virtually incapable 
of defending ourselves by force of arms should the Japanese decide to move, 
and our salvation therefore depends solely on America.'140
This was not an attitude that appealed to Craigie, who felt that, now Japan 
was tempted once more to flirt with the Axis, Britain should redouble its 
efforts to conciliate Japan and also try to persuade the United States to 
forego its present hard line towards Japan. In this latter aim Craigie was 
encouraged by Grew, who ever since the abrogation of the Commercial Treaty 
in January had felt that the United States policy was threatening to waste 
the opportunities offered by a moderate Japanese Government. As late as 20 
May Grew wrote to Craigie-
'There is evidence in hand, I think, to warrant the conclusion that serious 
thought is being given to a reorientation of Japanese policy in a 
constructive direction.'141
Following on from this the two Ambassadors met on 31 May to co-ordinate 
their opinions, and Grew's record of the conversation reported Craigie as 
stating that-
'The time is ... becoming increasingly ripe to take the ball away from the 
Germans who are playing it for all it is worth here and to give the 
Japanese some hope of solving their economic problems through friendship 
with the United States and Great B r i t a i n . ' 1 4 2
Craigie therefore kept up the pressure over the Tientsin question, feeling 
that it remained as a key issue in which Britain could persuade the 
Japanese that it was willing to listen to their grievances. The Foreign 
Office still disliked the idea of a rapid agreement,’ but their delaying 
tactics held less conviction after 16 May when the Chinese indicated their 
reluctant acceptance of the final formula over silver. 143 On 19 June the 
Tientsin Agreement was finally signed in Tokyo and the problems that had 
brought Britain and Japan to the brink of war in 1939 were finally settled.
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Craigie felt that this was a great achievement and on 24 June he wrote to 
the Foreign Office saying-
it is undoubtedly a cause for satisfaction that in spite of Allied 
reverses the Japanese Government should have seen fit to carry the 
negotiations to their conclusion and the fact that they did so is good 
evidence that the present Government at any rate are not anxious to be 
stampeded by the press and by extremist opinion into a completely pro-Axis 
and anti-British attitude.'144
If this was a genuine outburst of optimism from Craigie it could not have 
been more greatly misplaced; the signature of the Tientsin Agreement was 
the last conciliatory gesture to emerge from the now desperately fragile 
Yonai Government. On 24 June 1940 the Burma Road crisis broke and with 
that Anglo-Japanese relations were never to be the same again.
A period was thus ending in which Britain and Japan had come closer to 
agreement than at any time since the summer of 1937. Finally, however, the 
two sides had found it impossible to bridge the gap between them. The 
problem was that both countries had negotiated solely out of self-interest; 
Arita and Shigemitsu had striven to push Britain towards compromising its 
position in China and alleviating the effects of the economic blockade, 
while the British had in turn pressed the Japanese to cut voluntarily a 
link with a vital trading partner.145 The common desire for improved 
relations was therefore buried under the mutual incompatibility of their 
respective positions. This, however, was not all, for looming in the 
background throughout these months was the disapproving countenance of the 
United States. And all of Craigie's warnings that an opportunity was being 
lost could not change the fact that Britain needed America more than it 
needed Japan.
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CHAPTER SIX
'OUR PRESENT HUMILIATING POSITION'
'For our present humiliating position we have to thank our own 
fatuous FCar] ECastern] policy of the past 20 years and those 
who refused to listen to the advice and warnings of those who 
knew and understood Japan.'
Captain Malcolm Kennedy diary entry 24 June 1940*
The direct origins of the tumultuous crisis in Anglo-Japanese relations, 
which swept away the limited achievements of Britain's policy of 
conciliation in the summer of 1940, lay in the events in Europe. By June 
Germany had emerged victorious, with France, Holland and Belgium all 
defeated, and Britain apparently as the next target. The capitulation of 
the Dutch and the French and the seemingly inevitable surrender of Britain, 
whose position was further worsened by the Italian entry into the war, 
radically changed the balance of power in South East Asia, where their 
colonies lay virtually unprotected. The Yonai Cabinet, which already faced 
heavy domestic pressures due to Konoe’s reemergence as a potential Prime 
Minister, was now faced with even more vociferous braying from the Army and 
the press that Japan should not ‘miss the bus' in the Far East, and should 
seek closer relations with the Axis powers. Arita was therefore forced to 
adapt his foreign policy to the new conditions, and to strive to achieve 
his goals of ending the war in China and keeping South East Asia neutral in 
a more strident fashion than b e f o r e . 2
The change in Japanese policies manifested itself even before the signing 
of the Tientsin Agreement, when on 11 June 1940 Craigie was summoned to the 
Gaimusho to be told by the Vice-Minister Tani that, due to the Italian 
entry into the war, Japan recommended that Britain should withdraw its 
remaining gunboats and troops from China in order to avoid any clashes with 
the Italians.3 However, before talks could begin over this issue, the 
Japanese Army, with a total disregard for diplomatic channels, increased 
the stakes by unilaterally pushing forward another series of demands. On
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19 June Major-General Tsuchihashi Yuichi, the Director of Military 
Intelligence, told Colonel Bernard Mullaly, Piggott's replacement as 
Military Attache, in an abrasive interview-
'Situation is critical and there is now nothing to stop Japan from seizing 
either French Indo-China, Netherlands East Indies or Hong Kong or all of 
them ... United States are in no condition to prevent Japan from taking 
whatever action she likes in Western Pacific. Great Britain now has her 
last chance and if she takes it positive action by Japan may be averted. 
Japan's demands are:
(1) Immediate closing of Burmese frontier with China;
(2) Immediate closing of Hong Kong frontier;
(3) Immediate withdrawal of British troops from Shanghai.
Instant and decisive compliance with these demands is the only thing 
that may yet avert a declaration of war by Japan against Britain.'4 
These demands had been agreed to by Arita at a Four Minister Conference the 
previous day, but the Gaimusho plan had been to present them to the British 
by stressing that if Britain desired improved relations with Japan then it
was necessary for the former to cut its links with China rather than using
the directly confrontational bluster favoured by the Army. However, once
the precedent had been set all the Gaimusho could do was reiterate the
demands to Craigie on 24 June.5
The Army’s actions left Shigemitsu in London in the awkward position of 
having to clarify the situation to the British. It appears from both the 
contemporary records and his memoirs that he genuinely deprecated the 
brutally frank threats of the Army; Halifax certainly took away this 
impression from the 21 July talk when he noted-
'His Excellency, who was evidently taken aback by the situation with which 
he was confronted, endeavoured to minimise its importance... [and] went on 
to say that the extremists in Japan felt they had a fundamental cause of 
complaint in our attitude towards China. They were simple minded people, 
and felt they that as they were neutral to us as well as to Germany in the 
European war, we should equally be neutral towards their war.'6 
In further conversations that the Ambassador held with Butler over the next 
few days he reinforced this impression, and at one point the latter 
recorded Shigemitsu as going so far as to say-
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'"I cannot speak for my sovereign, but I think you are underestimating the 
power of the Emperor. I feel that he would never give consent to the 
military coming to a direct collision with the British; whatever we may do, 
I do not think we will attack you at Hong Kong." He then said that Japanese 
military spokesmen had spoken unwisely and wrongly in putting forward the 
Japanese proposal originally.'7
This disapproval of the manner of the Army's delivery did not, however, 
mean that Shigemitsu looked unfavourably upon the demand to close the Burma 
Road itself. Such a policy suited his conviction that Britain should be 
discouraged from taking a political role in China but rather be limited to 
an economic stake. In this light a close study of Shigemitsu's talks with 
the Foreign Office reveals a different picture, illuminating not his 
protestations of disapproval towards the Army's actions, but the subtle 
pressure he put on the British to agree to the Japanese demands. In talk 
after talk, under orders from Tokyo, Shigemitsu concentrated on stressing 
the advantages that could be gained from meeting Japan over the Burma Road 
in terms of a general improvement in relations. On 4 July he stated to 
Butler reassuringly-
' . . . Sir Robert Craigie with all his diplomatic skill and ability could 
discuss the question of the Burma Road and possible solutions with 
considerable likelihood of success.'8
As well as emphasising the advantages he also used the weapon of warning 
that a refusal could weaken the Yonai government and play into the hands of 
the hotheads who desired a war. This was a familiar Japanese tactic: to 
pressure a state into making concessions by implying that not to do so
could lead to the Army attempting its own unilateral solution, a device
which Shigemitsu had previously used during the Manchurian crisis.9
Shigemitsu's hope that Britain could be persuaded to readjust its policy 
towards China was not, however, the only advantage that he saw as arising 
from the decline of European power in the East, he was also convinced that 
Japan should benefit from the power vacuum that had opened up in South East 
Asia by increasing its political and economic influence in the region. On 
19 June, in a telegram to Arita, the Ambassador noted-
' . . . it is most important for our foreign policy to state that Japan is
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gravely concerned with the stability of East Asia (including South Seas), 
and is resolved that the spread of European war must be prevented, and is 
taking policy to exclude the conditions destructive to the said stability 
and also to prevent those who may be destructive, especially to make clear 
that Japan will not tolerate to leave Orientals (sic) and East Asian 
districts as the plantation and object of trade to be exploited by 
capitalism of Europe and I think it is our best chance to elucidate our 
fundamental policy relating to East Asia and Orientals today. ... If the 
districts of East Asia and South Sea, which is so-called living area 
('Lebensraum') should be owned by a certain great power, Japan would be
driven to take the risk of war with that country and the stability of East 
Asia would be deteriorated. Therefore I think it is of necessity to take 
courage to prevent it today. I believe that Germany and Italy will fully 
understand this matter. ... As it is evident that the influence of Europe 
to Orient will be remarkable (sic) reduced after the war, Japan had better, 
I presume, take advantage of this opportunity to establish our position in 
East Asia firmly.'10
Shigemitsu's espousal of the need for Japanese dominance over the Greater 
East Asian region was very close to the sentiments expressed by Arita in 
his 'Monroe Doctrine for East Asia' speech of 29 June. In the latter the 
Foreign Minister declared that Japan was responsible for the security of 
East Asia and the South West Pacific and sought stability and co-existence 
with these regions; a declaration which at the very least showed Japan's
interest in 'indirect empire’.11 Shigemitsu's support of this policy is
interesting in that it challenges two key aspects of the self-image that he
was later to develop in 'Japan and Her Destiny’. First, it clashes with 
the impression that Shigemitsu was consistently Anglophile, as the policy 
he proposed was clearly one designed to undermine Britain's role in the 
region and one that would never be acceptable to the Foreign Office. 
Second, it jars with his claim that he was a Pan-Asianist. For example, 
Shigemitsu stated in his memoirs-
'...if Japan were to become a true leader, it was not right that she should 
follow in the footsteps of imperialism. Leadership was not to be acquired 
by antagonizing the Asians. Only if she became their trusted friend would 
they accept Japan as a guide.'i2
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There is, however, in the telegram more than a hint of an imposed Japanese 
leadership for the region rather than leadership by request.
Japan's growing interest in the future of South East Asia was not just 
displayed in Arita's 29 June speech, but was also evident in the growing 
Japanese pressure on the Netherlands East Indies to make economic 
concessions and in the demands on the new French regime at Vichy to close 
the Indochina/Yunnan border and allow it to be patrolled by Japanese Army 
units. It was in this increasingly threatening environment that Britain
had to decide whether or not to accede to Japanese demands and close the 
Burma Road. In Tokyo, Craigie was aware of and frightened by Japan's 
renewed belligerency and the signs of a renewed interest in alignment with 
the Axis and in a long telegram on 22 June, which recalled his previous 
tirade of 18 June 1939, he implored the Foreign Office to undertake a 
fundamental change in its East Asian policy in order to parry this 
challenge-
'I take it for granted that, short of any dishonourable yielding on 
principle, it is the policy of His Majesty's Government that everything 
possible should be done to prevent Japan from being drawn into the war on
the side of her former Axis partners, but I am doubtful whether this can be
achieved without the adoption of some more positive methods than have been 
adopted hitherto. In wider aspects of policy we have been content to rely 
on the United States which has favoured a purely negative policy designed 
so as to wear down Japanese resistance that the army in Japan would be 
deposed from its paramount position. Whatever merit there may have been in 
this policy before the French collapse it is now certainly ineffective; 
long before it could produce results the whole face of things in the Far 
East may be changed by that very army at which the United States seeks to 
strike with such puny weapons.'13
Craigie proceeded then to espouse his plan to win over Japan, which
consisted of the presentation to the Japanese government by Britain and 
America of a draft understanding, which he envisaged as including- 
'(a) joint assistance to Japan in bringing about a settlement with the 
Chinese Government on the basis of Japan's restoration of China's 
independence and integrity.
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(b) Japan formally to undertake to remain neutral in the European War and 
to respect full territorial integrity not only of the Netherlands East 
Indies but also of British and French and American possessions in the 
Pacific so long as the status quo of these territories is preserved.
(c) United States and members of British Commonwealth to give Japan all 
financial and economic assistance and facilities in their power both 
now and during post-war reconstruction period.
(d) Allied Governments to receive full guarantees against re-export to 
enemy countries.
(e) Question of future settlements and concessions in China to be left in 
abeyance until the restoration of peace in Europe and China.'14
This was certainly a radical and wide-ranging series of propositions 
designed as an effort to lay the foundations for a complete post-war 
settlement rather than an attempt to buy a temporary understanding. 
Craigie was, of course, not unaware of the problems arising from such a 
policy; he stated that he realized that any such proposals as the above 
would have to be seen as originating from Japan rather than the West, in 
order to avoid the accusation of appeasement, and recognised that this was 
not a policy which Britain could pursue alone, allowing the Americans to 
remain on the sidelines raining down criticism. Craigie felt, however, 
that the only alternative, if the United States was not willing to co­
operate, was for Britain to put up a rearguard action in the Far East and 
hope that war could somehow be avoided. He concluded-
'To become involved in a war with Japan without the fullest assurance of 
active American assistance would be suicidal and I am assuming that His 
Majesty's Government are not prepared to take even the slightest risk of 
this in the present circumstances.'15
On 25 June, following a formal request from Tani that the Japanese demands 
be met so as to avoid an 'unforeseen dispute' occurring, Craigie dealt more 
specifically with the issue of the Burma Road and concluded that, as there 
was only 'one chance in ten' of American support, Britain should accede to 
the Japanese demand.16 He did not predict any immediate declaration of 
war, but postulated that the Japanese response to a negative reply from 
Britain might be to blockade Hong Kong and/or to bomb the Burma Road from 
air-bases in South China, a process which could gain its own momentum and
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spiral into open conflict. He also felt that for Britain to comply with 
the Japanese request would help the position of the moderates, for it would 
show that Britain was willing to come to terms with Japan, while to keep 
the Burma Road open would favour the pro-Axis extremists who were looking 
for an excuse to plunge Japan into war with Britain; thus mirroring the 
arguments used by Shigemitsu. Craigie admitted that to give way might only 
lead to further demands being made, but deflected this criticism of his 
views by stating that to pursue a more positive policy as he had outlined 
on 22 June would make any new demands unnecessary. He thus ended his 
recommendations with the conclusion-
'I therefore have no doubt in my own mind that we should agree to this 
Japanese request and do so promptly i.e. before some incident occurs which 
renders acceptance more difficult.'17
For the Foreign Office a new crisis in East Asia could not have come at a 
worse time as Britain was at its lowest ebb in the war with Germany. The 
first priority before any decision could be made about how to react to the 
Japanese demands was to discover what support could be elicited from the 
United States. On 25 June a telegram was sent to Lord Lothian asking him 
to see Cordell Hull and to enquire as to what action Washington was willing 
to take, and to also raise the issue of a general settlement on the lines 
that Craigie had already suggested, and to ask if the Americans would be 
willing to participate in such an effort.18 On 28 June Lothian sent back 
his record of his subsequent conversation with Hull, where the latter 
stated that Britain should only give way over the Burma Road under force 
majeure and that there could be no guarantee of support from the United 
States. Over the peace issue Hull was equally non-committal, stating that 
though he did not object to the idea, Britain should not expect a joint or 
parallel effort by the United States.19 The implication was clear, and 
Craigie was proved to be right, yet again Britain was to be left to fend 
for itself in East Asia. Lothian himself, however, noted his belief that 
Craigie's ideas were worth looking into, particularly as he believed that 
the United States would not go to war in the Pacific on behalf of Britain 
or in fact for anything West of H a w a i i . 2 0
One might expect from the above that the Foreign Office faced with the
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threat of war in East Asia with no chance of American support and a 
desperate position in Europe would agree to Craigie's pleadings for a 
settlement. This however was not to be the case; influenced by the views 
of Clark Kerr and Dr Quo, the Chinese Ambassador in London, the Foreign 
Office strongly opposed any closure of the Burma Road on the grounds that 
it would irreparably damage Chinese m o r a l e . 21 This was an important 
consideration, as the consequence of such an effect could be either to 
drive Chiang Kai-shek into the hands of the Soviet Union or force him to 
make peace with the Japanese on unfavourable terms, thus freeing the 
Japanese Army to pursue a policy of southern expansion. The Far Eastern 
Department also argued that there was a danger that, despite the United 
States' unwillingness to help Britain, the sacrifice of principle involved 
in closing the Burma Road would alienate the Americans, which would have 
repercussions not only in the Pacific but also in Europe. Another factor 
that influenced the Department in their eventual decision was their opinion 
of Craigie. As previously in the Tientsin crisis, and to an extent over 
the Asama Maru, the Department felt that Craigie had failed to look below 
the surface of Japanese blustering, a view summed up by Sir John Brenan 
when he wrote-
' . . . our Ambassador in Tokyo has been greatly influenced in his political 
judgement by Japanese threats and promises, and has shown very little 
disposition to assess them dispassionately as part of an obvious technique 
for securing political results at the least possible c o s t . '22 
In other words Craigie had failed to realize that the Japanese, with their 
forces too ovei— stretched by the war in China to contemplate risking a war 
with Britain, were bluffing.
The opinions of the Department were put together in a memorandum for Lord 
Halifax to present to the War Cabinet on 29 J u n e . 23 The paper concluded 
that Britain should not close the Burma Road, but make the small concession 
of offering to keep trade to the 1939 level of 21,965 tons per annum, and 
that over Hong Kong, it should be pointed out to the Japanese that, as the 
border was already closed due to the Japanese occupation of Kwangtung 
province, the demand for an end to supplies for China was irrelevant. The 
danger of a completely negative reply to Japanese claims was, however, 
recognised and it was therefore suggested that as a conciliatory measure
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the two brigades of troops stationed in Shanghai should be withdrawn and 
sent to Singapore. Finally, in line with Craigie's suggestion, it was
decided that a comprehensive peace settlement in the Far East should be 
sought. On 1 July the War Cabinet approved the Foreign Office's 
recommendations, although New Zealand and Australia had to be consulted 
before the Japanese could officially be told of the British decision.24
On 2 July Craigie was told of the War Cabinet's decision which, not 
surprisingly, provoked an immediate reply. The tone of his response on 3 
July was couched in apocalyptic terms-
'... the general argument for refusal appears to rest on the assumption
that Japan is incapable of carrying out to the full her desires in East 
Asia so long as Chiang Kai-shek continues to resist, any such assumption I 
believe to be entirely mistaken.'25
Craigie went on to state that he believed that the chances of war if the
Japanese request was refused were over 50%, that if war did take place
Britain would in essence not be fighting for her own interests but for 
China's, and also that he feared Germany was going to use the crisis to 
influence Japan to enter the war against Britain. Craigie ended the 
telegram by admitting how distressing the situation was for him- 
'It is most repugnant for me to have to urge compliance with this Japanese 
request, but I do so in the hope and belief that when we have defeated 
Germany we and the United States will be able to teach Japan a lesson which 
she will never forget. To precipitate the crisis unnecessarily at this 
moment will in my opinion mean jeopardizing the prospect of that ultimate 
re-establishment of a strong British position in the Far East on which I 
pin all my hopes.'26
On the next day four more telegrams arrived from Craigie, all warning that 
the threat of an inexorable slide into war was very real.27 In these 
tirades he used various arguments; he stated in one telegram, in contrast 
to the view he expressed on 3 July that Japan could be punished in the 
future, that he still believed a Sino-Japanese settlement was possible, and 
that in the wake of such an agreement Anglo-Japanese relations would 
improve, but that failure to close the Burma Road would endanger any such 
p r o g r e s s . 26 The Foreign Office was not impressed by this diplomatic
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barrage, and when on 6 July Craigie himself noted that for him to propose 
at one stage future war against Japan and at another to suggest a future 
improvement in relations may appear inconsistent, Dening minuted- 
'It is at least interesting that the "apparent inconsistencies" have been 
noted by Sir R. Craigie himself. The fact is that he employs any argument 
which occurs to him at the moment to prove his case.'29
In addition to the telegrams from Craigie, the Foreign Office was also 
subjected to pressure for acceptance of the Japanese demands from reports 
sent by Colonel Mullaly to the War Office, which were at Craigie’s request 
subsequently forwarded to the Department. This form of persuasion was seen 
as 'distinctly improper’, as the Military Attache was supposed to desist 
from interfering in political matters, and Mullaly's efforts only earned 
him the type of comments that had previously been reserved for Piggott.30
Although not impressing the Foreign Office, Craigie and Mullaly's 
telegrams did have an effect on the Chiefs of Staff and the service 
departments who were decidedly uneasy about the way the Far Eastern 
situation was developing. The attention of the Services was naturally at 
this stage centred on the situation in western Europe and, in particular, 
on Britain's prospects of survival without France as an ally, and they were 
obviously loathe to see a crisis emerging in the East. As early as 25 
June, Admiral Godfrey, the Director of Naval Intelligence, noted- 
'It is vital for us not to add the Japanese to our list of enemies. > We 
have got to win this war in Europe and it seems obvious that all we can do
in the East is to save what we can of our possessions and prestige and, if
it is in any way possible, improve our relations with Japan.'31 
The Chiefs of Staff, however, only decided to intervene directly in the 
debate on 3 July, when there arose the very real fear, after the Royal 
Navy's bombardment of the French fleet at Mers~el-Kebir on that day, that 
the Vichy regime might side with Germany. As Dill stated at the Chiefs of 
Staff meeting on the morning of 4 July-
'... the arguments against taking any action which would involve us in war 
with Japan had become more cogent in the light of the events of the past
twenty-four hours, which pointed to the possibility that we might find
ourselves at war with France.'32
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Against this strategic background the Foreign Office’s arguments and their 
dedication to principles and insistence that Britain could not afford to 
alienate the United States seemed irrelevant and dangerous. On 4 July 
Vice-Admiral Tom Phillips, the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, minuted- 
'The Foreign Office are again throwing their weight about in the Far East, 
like they did last year before the Tientsin incident, but this time we have 
even less to throw about than we had then. ... We know quite well that we 
cannot take on Japan in addition to the rest of the world at the present 
time, and every sign goes to show that the United States will not back a 
strong policy in the Far East by force.*33
In contrast to the Foreign Office line Craigie's proposals seemed to be the 
voice of common sense, not only because he warned of the potential crisis 
that could ensue from British intransigence, but also because he appeared 
to offer in his peace plan a long term solution to the East Asian problem. 
To the over— stretched British military such suggestions were very welcome, 
as it was obvious that the neutralization of East Asia would allow more of 
Britain's military power to be directed against Germany and Italy. The 
feeling of the Services was aptly summed up in a memorandum for the Chiefs 
of Staff by the Joint Planning Committee on 29 June which noted- 
‘We should make it clear to Chiang Kai-shek that, in our present situation, 
the best help we can give him would be to act as an intermediary in 
arranging peace terms between him and the Japanese Government. We think 
that he would appreciate the honesty of our p urpose.'34
Influenced by these views on 4 July the Chiefs of Staff prepared a 
memorandum for the War Cabinet in which they outlined their fears. It 
stated plainly that there was no way that Britain could risk a war in the 
Far East at the present time, that there was no fleet available to be sent 
to Singapore, and that war would mean the diversion of Australian and New
were urgently needed to bolster Egypt against Italian attack. The Chiefs 
of Staff concluded by saying they considered a peace settlement in the Far 
East must be reached as soon as possible. 35 This memorandum was not 
greeted with much enthusiasm in the Foreign Office, where Dening, seemingly 
oblivious to the effect that the severity of Britain's military position 
had on the Chiefs of Staff, blamed their cautious line on Craigie's
Zealand troops to South-East the Middle East, where they
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unsubstantiated warnings-
' . . . the alarming tone of his telegrams, and the forceful manner in which 
he has expounded his views, appear to have convinced the Chiefs of Staff as 
well as many others that we are in very grave danger of total war.'36
In the War Cabinet meeting of 5 July Halifax, influenced by the 
Department’s and Cadogan's opposition to caving in to the Japanese demands, 
clung to the idea that Britain should refuse to close the Burma Road and 
only agree to set a ceiling on the amount of goods.37 This plan for a 
limited compromise was, however, undermined when Leo Amery, the Secretary 
of State for India and Burma, dismissed the idea which had been raised at 
the previous meeting of a strict rationing of supplies as hopelessly 
impracticable. This left Halifax, with Amery's backing, supporting a line 
of no concessions at all over the Burma Road, which contrasted sharply with 
the warnings from Craigie and the Chiefs of Staff. The deadlock was broken 
by Churchill who stressed that he felt the United States ought to take more 
of the strain in the Far East, but as it was obvious that this was not 
possible, Britain would have to make a unilateral decision. The minutes of 
the meeting then record Churchill as stating simply that-
' In the present state of affairs he did not think that we ought to incur 
Japanese hostility for reasons mainly of prestige.'38
The War Cabinet decided in the light of these remarks that the best policy 
was to let Craigie try to find a compromise over the Burma Road issue, 
while gaining time and giving away as little as possible. In the last 
resort it was agreed, however, that he was not to surrender any British 
rights, but only to give way under force majeure. The limitations on 
Craigie's freedom of action demonstrated that this was a decision, which, 
although heavily influenced by Craigie's warnings of war, was not designed 
as an acceptance of the 'New Order in East Asia' or as a means of 
bolstering the position of the Japanese moderates. It was almost wholly 
the result of the singularly dire strategic position of Britain in July 
1940 and was seen only as a temporary measure to allow Britain a breathing 
space in East Asia.
The War Cabinet's orders for Craigie to find a compromise reached him on 7 
July and he immediately proceeded to engage in talks with Arita, who showed
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interest in the British offer of good offices to seek a peace settlement 
with China but was displeased that Britain still refused to close the Burma 
Road.39 On 9 July Craigie reported to the Foreign Office that Arita felt 
talks could only last a week and that after that time the situation would 
again become menacing. Craigie was not encouraged by Arita's attitude, but 
he did make his own suggestion for a new negotiating position- 
'Would you be prepared to consider following compromise: Agreement on our 
part to suspend transit of war material through Burma Road for a period of 
three months (i.e. during rainy season) on the understanding that during 
this time special efforts will be made to bring about . . . "just and 
equitable peace" in Far East ... Should these efforts fail, His Majesty’s 
Government to remain free to permit transit trade to be resumed at the end 
of three months period.'40
Craigie saw many advantages in this suggestion: it allowed Britain and the 
United States to push for a Sino-Japanese settlement; the actual loss of 
material to China would be negligible, as the Burma Road was largely 
impassable during the rainy season; and lastly Britain could very well be 
in a better international position by October and therefore better able to 
resist Japanese demands to extend the agreement.
On 10 July Halifax presented Craigie's proposal to the War Cabinet, who, 
with the added incentive of Australian pressure for a more realistic policy 
to be pursued in the Far East, decided to approve negotiations on these 
lines.4! On 12 July Craigie presented the British terms to Arita who 
agreed to them in principle. The task then was to tackle details such as 
which goods were to be stopped, the rights of inspection of the Japanese 
Consul-General at Rangoon to ensure that Britain was complying fully, and 
Arita's initial desire to keep the promise to pursue a peace settlement 
separate from the actual Burma Road Agreement. Over the next few days 
progress was made on the minutiae of the Agreement, but Craigie's work was 
threatened on 16 July when the Yonai Cabinet fell from power due to the 
resignation of the Army Minister General Hata Shunroku. It had been clear 
for some time that the Government had been losing its grip on power and 
that the next Cabinet would be considerably more extreme with Prince Konoe 
Fumimaro once again as Prime Minister and possibly the fiercely pro-Axis 
Shiratori replacing Arita as Foreign Minister.43 In such a situation
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Craigie decided to press for the signing of the Agreement as soon as 
possible in order to avoid the reopening of the issues with a new 
government. With War Cabinet permission, on 17 July Craigie and Arita
signed the Burma Road Agreement, which banned the transport of war 
materials including petrol to China until 18 October.43
News of the Agreement was greeted at home and abroad with cries of dismay 
that the British Government had appeased Japan and in particular there was 
strong criticism in the United States and China. In the former the closure 
of the Road led Hull to declare that the British action constituted 
'unwarranted interpositions of obstacles to world trade', although he 
later declared that the criticism had been directed against Japan for 
pressuring Britain into closure.44 This comment was not well received in 
British official circles, who knew that an important motive behind the 
agreement with Japan had been the lack of American support.45 This 
resentment seems to have amused Craigie who in a letter to Viscount Simon, 
the Lord Chancellor, noted-
'... the Americans are for ever inciting us to assume an attitude of utmost 
firmness towards Japan, only to tell us, when the inevitable crisis comes, 
that they are of course not in a position to use force. I have been aware 
of this tendency from the start but the Far Eastern Department of the 
Foreign Office have been less wary - or perhaps less well-acquainted with 
American methods - than I have been.'46
In China criticism of the agreement was chiefly levelled at the peace 
initiative and it was believed that the Burma Road had been closed as a 
direct means of pressuring the Kuomintang to make peace. In Britain too, 
much of the alarm expressed/Parliament and in the press was directed at the 
idea of a peace settlement, which was ironic because as Sterndale Bennett, 
the head of the Far Eastern Department, noted this part of the agreement 
had only been put in to justify the closure, which otherwise appeared as a 
completely unprincipled action.4?
The fact that the War Cabinet and the Foreign Office viewed the issue of 
peace proposals as a cover showed clearly that the decision to appease 
Japan had not been taken with the intention of leading to a permanent 
readjustment of Britain's position in the Far East. Churchill himself,
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wrote to Lord Halifax on 17 July-
'I have never liked the idea of our trying to make a peace between Japan
and China. I am sure that all this talk of a "just and equitable peace" is
moonshine and known to be so. I think it is a great pity to use it. It
might act as some palliation for the action which has been forced upon us 
by the plight in which we lie. I have yielded to it but it is certainly 
not in our interests that China and Japan should end their quarrel, and I 
am delighted that Chiang Kai-shek should rest his objections to our conduct 
so largely upon our references to peace.'48
The majority of Foreign Office opinion concurred with this view and felt 
that Britain's priority for the next three months was to build up the 
defences in the Far East so that Britain could resist Japanese pressure for 
an extension in October.
The idea of investigating the possibilities of a peace settlement did, 
however, still have supporters in the shape of the Chiefs of Staff, R.A. 
Butler, Lord Lothian, and, of course, Sir Robert Craigie. On 14 July the 
latter expanded on his original proposals of 24 June and began by stating- 
'In general I agree with the underlying ideas; Powers having possessions in 
East Asia should be prepared to make concessions to Japan as a means of 
purchasing a generous peace for China.*49
He then outlined what he saw as the grievances which Japan would raise in 
any general talks on East Asia which included the rejection of the racial 
equality clause in the League of Nations Covenant, the United States' 
Immigration Act of 1924, the Imperial Preference policy decided at the 
Ottawa Conference of 1932, and the general refusal of credits to Japan. He 
proceeded to declare that the most important measure the West could take 
was to make trade concessions, particularly in the area of access to raw 
materials, which he held to be more vital to Japan than territorial 
aggrandizement. Again Craigie stressed that if there was to be any 
meaningful progress over these issues then it was vitally necessary for 
the Foreign Office to get in touch directly with the Americans so that 
joint proposals could be drawn up.
The Far Eastern Department's reaction to these proposals was to treat them 
with great caution as they believed that discussion of peace terms would
only inflame American indignation at Britain's lack of principles. This 
inactivity and unwllingness to approach Washington soon came to the notice 
of Butler who in exasperation minuted on 25 July his conviction that-
a much more frank exchange of views must be held with the U.S.A. We 
cannot go on with this drawing room diplomacy.... We may well go to the 
grave chanting that we must be polite to the Americans, but we shan't save 
our civilization like t h i s . '5 0
Under this pressure the Department finally put its views on paper, and on 
10 August sent a letter and memorandum based on Craigie's views to related 
government departments in order to elicit/ their attitudes to a peace 
settlement.5l The answers to the Department's paper and Craigie's
suggestions were not enthusiastic. The Dominions Office explained that 
Australia and New Zealand would never agree to make concessions over 
immigration, and the Colonial Office stated that an influx of cheap exports 
from Japan would only succeed in damaging the fragile economies of the 
c o l o n i e s . 5 2  More important, the Board of Trade and the Ministry of 
Economic Warfare pointed out, as they had done on previous occasions, that 
to make any trade concessions to Japan would only result in the diversion 
of resources away from Britain, which would damage the war effort against 
Germany with no guarantee that Japan would be p a c i f i e d . 5 3  Craigie's peace 
initiative was, however, not hindered only by opposition within Whitehall, 
it was also compromised by the continuing crisis in Anglo-Japanese 
relations.
The chances of Japan collaborating in a general peace for East Asia had 
been fairly slim even under the Yonai administration but the appearance of 
the Konoe Cabinet on 22 July with General Tojo Hideki as Army Minister and 
Matsuoka Yosuke as Foreign Minister, made any co-operation even less 
likely. The only comfort that Britain could take was that at least 
Shiratori had not been appointed as this would have been a clear signal 
that Japan was preparing to enter closer relations with the Axis powers. 
The choice of Matsuoka was more ambiguous. The latter, who, since leading 
the walkout of the Japanese delegation from the League of Nations Assembly 
in February 1933 had gone on to become the chairman of the South Manchurian 
Railway, was an ardent nationalist, who it could be assumed would pursue 
only policies that reflected Japan's self-interest.54
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Shigemitsu, who was a close acquaintance of Matsuoka, was encouraged by his 
appointment, and in a conversation with Butler on 19 July the latter 
reported the Ambassador as stating that-
'M. Matsuoka would be a very good Minister for Foreign Affairs. He,
Shigemitsu, was closer to M. Matsuoka than any other member of the Japanese 
Foreign Office, and had worked with him in the past. Japan's new Minister 
for Foreign Affairs had the advantage of appreciating the economic
importance of the United States of America and Great Britain to Japan.'55 
Craigie was initially more cautious about welcoming the appointment and 
noted on 22 July-
'New Foreign Minister is said to desire revenge for Japan's treatment at 
the hands of the League of Nations and for this reason, though anti- 
foreign, generally is more likely to be favourably disposed towards 
Germany than towards us as mainly responsible for the League's policy.'55 
On 26 July Craigie had his first interview with the new Foreign Minister, 
who said he felt that the British position in the Far East was 
diametrically opposed to the Japanese ’New Order in East Asia', but that he 
was for peaceful change. Craigie responded by informing Matsuoka that he 
felt that there were no insuperable problems in Anglo-Japanese relations, 
and stressed that Japan should base its policies on the assumption that
Britain was going to win the war in Europe. It was predominantly a
friendly meeting, and Craigie felt afterwards that Matsuoka's view that no 
agreement could be reached with Britain might have been shaken.5?
However, the hopes of Craigie and Shigemitsu were soon shown to be 
misplaced by a series of Japanese actions in late July and August which 
clearly demonstrated the new administration's desire to increase the 
pressure on the Western European colonial powers. Within days of taking 
power, the Konoe government went a considerable step further than even 
Yonai had envisaged in his 29 June speech, by declaring on 1 August in a 
press release, its intention to set up a Greater East Asian Co-prosperity 
Sphere which would include the Netherlands East Indies and French 
Indochina.55 At the same time rumours abounded that the Japanese were 
planning an economic mission to go to Batavia to press the Dutch into 
further concessions over commodity quotas for Japan. In Indo-China the 
pressure was even more palpable; already the French Governor-General,
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G/vo oi
•Admirol-Jean Socqux r had agreed on 20 June to close the border with China, 
but in early August the stakes were raised when Japan demanded free passage 
for her troops through Tonkin province and the use of air-bases around 
Hanoi.59
This expansion of Japanese influence into South East Asia was a matter of 
concern for Shigemitsu. It might seem logical to conclude, considering the 
position that Shigemitsu had taken in his 19 June telegram, that he would 
support Matsuoka's efforts in early August; this, however, ignores the fact 
that, just as Japanese circumstances had changed, so had the situation in 
the West. During June and July 1940 when it was unclear whether Britain 
would or could continue the fight against Germany the United States held 
back from offering support to the Churchill government, and it had made 
sense in such a situation for Japan to pressure Britain into concessions in 
the East. By late July, however, Washington's sympathies towards London 
became more pronounced largely as a result of Britain’s clear determination 
to fight on in Europe. As part of this tendency Morgenthau, the Secretary 
of the Treasury, and other hawkish colleagues in the Cabinet persuaded 
Roosevelt on 25 July of the need to restrain Japan from applying further 
pressure on Britain by banning the export of high quality scrap iron and 
high octane aviation fuel.60 To Shigemitsu this was an important change 
and a symptom that eventually America would openly side with Britain 
against Germany and that this combination would eventually lead to the 
latter's defeat.
Such an assessment had important implications for Japan's policy in East 
Asia and in particular was relevant to the debate between the Army and Navy 
about whether or not Britain and the United States should be treated as 
inseparable. Shigemitsu's view on this subject was that it depended on the 
circumstances, and in a long telegram to Matsuoka on 5 August he observed- 
, 'The policies of Britain and the US are not joint but parallel. So far 
these parallel policies have not necessarily been in accord in aim or 
conduct. That depends upon our attitude. If we carry out our Greater East 
I Asian policy with a responsible, fair and square attitude, we may properly 
expect Anglo-American obstacles to be removed in the natural course of 
events. As to our attitude toward Britain and America, we need to consider
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fully the actual benefits, while considering at the same time our 
principles and position.'6!
From this standpoint he went on to warn that there were those in the West,
and in particular on the left, who were keen to draw Japan into a
confrontation with Britain and the United States, and that this too showed 
the need for caution. He concluded-
'In short, though the main object of our policy is to establish a powerful 
political and economic position in Greater East Asia, I believe that to 
show a liberal-minded attitude towards settling the China problem 
expresses, not weakness, but strength on our part. In view of our present 
high international position, it would be improper for us to be victimized
by other countries... I believe it to be the cardinal principle of
diplomacy to assert what our country requires and believes and at the same 
time to prevent untoward losses in complicated diplomatic relations and to 
devise all available means towards every country alike within the limits of 
their personal utility. Needless to say, it is necessary to sweeten our 
relations with the Soviet Union and also to proceed with scrupulous 
consideration and prudence in our relations with Britain.'62
These views did not mean that Shigemitsu had abandoned his hope that Japan 
could build up its influence in South East Asia, but it did indicate that 
he was concerned about how this aim should be achieved. The basis of his 
policy was that if Japan proceeded slowly in its expansion and concentrated 
its pressure on the smaller powers such as France and Holland then the West 
would be willing to acquiesce, but that to advance on all fronts and to
directly threaten Anglo-American interests would lead to confrontation.
This was a cautious policy that was out of step with thinking in Japan in 
the late summer of 1940, and contrasted sharply with the decision made at 
a Liaison Conference on 27 July to pursue expansion in South East Asia even 
at the cost of war with Britain.63
The first crisis caused by the new administration came on 27 July when a
British subject was arrested in Japan, followed the next day by the
detention of seven others. By 1 August fourteen Britons were in custody, 
all well respected members of the British community, some even holding the 
position of Honorary Consul for other countries such as Sweden and Greece.
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The orders for these arrests originated with the Military Police, the 
Kempeitai, and may have been directed at curtailing the activities of the 
British Secret Intelligence Service’s (SIS) harbour— watchers who reported 
on the movements of Japanese and German shipping.64 The situation was made 
worse on 29 July with the news that the first man to be arrested, Melville 
Cox, the man who had replaced Captain Malcolm Kennedy as Reuters 
correspondent in Tokyo, had fallen to his death from a third floor window 
while in custody.65 The first reaction was to suspect foul play, but it 
soon became clear that Cox had committed suicide, although it was certain 
that this had been brought about by the terrible conditions in which he 
been kept and the incessant questioning to which he had been subjected. 
The situation caused Kennedy, who.by this stage^working at Bletchley Park, 
to note in his diary on 29 July t^ iat he was very lucky not to have been in 
Japan himself and to reflect that-
'Whether or not he (Cox) and the others are guilty, the fact 10 have been 
arrested and other arrests are threatened wd. seem to indicate that Japan 
is either making, or considering, plans for action against this country and 
is therefore taking precautionary measures to prevent well-informed 
Englishmen from passing on information.'66
The outrage felt in Britain at the arrests was even more intense than that 
over the Burma Road issue. The reason for this was that, as in the case of 
the Tientsin crisis, the incident involved the welfare of British nationals 
overseas, which was always a sensitive subject for the British public. 
Also calls for a tough British response were influenced by the fact that 
this crisis followed so shortly after Britain had appeased Japan in the 
hope of achieving an easing of tensions, and that now those concessions had 
been shown to be worthless. The result was that the arrests rather than 
the Burma Road issue can be seen as the point where Britain decided that 
the policy of conciliation towards Japan had run its course. The 
prevailing sentiment was summed up by Sir Alexander Cadogan when he noted 
in his diary-
'Those Jap savages have arrested 11 Britishers. One has committed 
suicide, we can't stand this ... we really must stand against them now. 
Surely even Winston will realise that we can't "appease" any further.*67
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The crucial effect of the arrests can be seen in that they did not simply 
influence opinion in London, but also deeply affected Sir Robert Craigie. 
He was outraged by these events and interpreted this move, which appeared 
at the same time as a series of anti-British tirades in the Japanese press, 
as a deliberate attempt to intimidate Britain. This impression was 
reinforced by information from a secret source that the order for the 
arrests had come directly from General Tojo.68 Craigie*s initial reaction 
was to tell the Foreign Office on 30 July that there should be no attempt 
to settle the dispute by negotiation but instead to recommend that Britain 
should prepare to take reprisals against Japan; such as the progressive 
detention of Japanese in Britain, India and the South East Asian colonies, 
the ending of all negotiations in progress, economic reprisals, and a 
demand that a Colonel Suzuki, who everyone knew to be a Japanese 
intelligence officer, be asked to leave Hong K o n g . 8 9 This change of 
attitude on Craigie's part came as a welcome sign to the Foreign Office and 
directly influenced the War Cabinet's decision on 1 August to arrest ten 
Japanese subjects who were already under suspicion of spying in 
retaliation.70
Craigie's telegram, however, obviously raised the prospect of greater 
retaliation than simply tit-for-tat arrests, as he had basically called for 
the suspension of all efforts to conciliate Japan. This led in Whitehall 
to a reassessment of British policy which affected many areas of policy. 
The first important issue raised was that of the remaining British 
garrisons in China, who, like the British nationals in Japan, were a 
hostage to fortune should Anglo-Japanese relations deteriorate even 
further. This matter had been left in abeyance during the latter half of 
the debate over the Burma Road as there was no desire for Britain to be 
seen as too appeasing. The Far Eastern Department had felt all along that, 
as the number of troops concerned was so small a Japanese attack on the 
British garrisons could not be effectively resisted, they should be 
withdrawn no matter what the effect on Britain's prestige in China. The 
arrests caused the issue to be reopened, and the War Cabinet asked for 
Craigie’s views on the matter to be ascertained. On 5 August Craigie wrote 
to London-
*As long as the late Government remained in power I had reason to hope
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that they would not press this question of withdrawal of troops from 
Shanghai. The new Government will, however, press it and seek to make our 
ultimate compliance as humiliating as possible. From this point of view, 
the more quickly the withdrawal is effected the better.'71
This view, as in Craigie's response to the arrests, showed that his initial 
caution towards the new administration in Japan was very rapidly turning 
into deep pessimism. The War Cabinet concurred with Craigie's view, and 
the decision to withdraw the British troops was finally announced on 9 
August.7 2
The most important issue to be discussed, however, was Craigie's proposal 
that economic reprisals should be taken against Japan. On 14 August an 
inter-departmental meeting was held at the Foreign Office to discuss the 
introduction of unobtrusive measures and subsequently a letter was sent to 
each department asking them to draw up their own suggestions.73 It was 
also deemed necessary to consult Craigie further about this issue and on 14 
August a telegram was sent to Tokyo which asked for the Ambassador’s 
judgement on the following scenario-
'If ... Japan is now determined to embark upon her programme of southward 
expansion ... then it seems that we are faced with two alternatives: either 
to stand idly by and watch the situation deteriorate until we ourselves are 
in serious danger, or to adopt some sort of reprisals short of war which 
would retard the pace of Japan's advance and so gain valuable time. In the 
latter event our object would be to try to convince Japan by example that 
aggression does not pay, and that, though she may gain control of 
territories, the resultant loss of goodwill ... will, on balance, only 
increase her economic difficulties even if it improves her strategic 
position.'74
Craigie's response to this enquiry was very carefully balanced. The 
position he held, once the initial furore over the arrests had died down, 
was that Britain had to discontinue the policy of conciliation but at the 
same time not move into a position of outright hostility. This meant that 
he approved of a tough stand over current negotiations and agreements, and 
in this context he wrote to the Foreign Office on 18 August- 
’...we should be entirely unhelpful in regard to any Japanese requests on
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any subject now under consideration; also in regard to any request made.’75 
A practical example of this was that Craigie advised the Foreign Office to 
take a harsh line over the case of the Japanese ship the Nagara Maru, which 
it was revealed on 15 August was intending to leave Italy for Japan 
carrying goods which had not been cleared by the Ministry of Economic 
Warf are.76
At the same time he realised that there were still strict limits to 
Britain's freedom of action so that in his answer on 26 August to the 
Foreign Office's telegram of 14 August he took a more cautious stance- 
'... the type of demonstration of pressure mentioned in your telegram would 
merely convince extremists here that there is no time to lose in reinsuring 
themselves in the South against loss of resources in the West.'77 
He then went on to explain-
'I have always ventured to recommend the prosecution of a dual policy, by 
which is meant formulation of two alternatives, one disagreeable and the 
other potentially agreeable to Japan. But for such a policy to be 
successful we require at least the full co-operation of the Dominions and 
preferably also parallel action by the United States. Neither
unfortunately seems assured to us and I regret that I can hold out no hope 
of success in the Far East along any other lines, until the war in Europe 
has turned definitely in our favour.'78
Craigie's opposition to a purely coercive policy was influenced not merely 
by his conviction that Japan would react violently to economic sanctions, 
but also yjtafs by his belief that the wave of extreme nationalism sweeping 
Japan was due only to the momentarily enthralling prospects offered by the 
power vacuum in South East Asia, and that this phase would pass once 
Britain had shown that it could stand up to Germany, and the moderates 
would then be able to reassert their influence.79
Craigie's advice was heeded during August and no moves were made to put 
pressure on Japan apart from the retaliatory arrests and the refusal to 
allow the Nagara Maru to carry a consignment of Italian mercury to Japan. 
There was, however, an issue that by the end of the month required 
immediate attention and that was to decide whether or not Britain should 
continue with the Burma Road Agreement. There was from the first a general
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consensus in London that, as Japan had not honoured their part of the deal, 
Britain should reopen the Burma Road on 18 October, but that this should be 
done without any fanfares so that Japan would not have any grounds for 
taking retaliatory action. It was also agreed that in the interim British 
defences should be improved and that efforts should be made to ensure 
American support so that a reasonable deterrent to Japanese retaliation 
existed.80 In Tokyo Craigie had come to more or less the same conclusion 
and on 30 August he reported that-
'It is devoutly to be hoped by that date [18 October] the situation will be 
such that we can refuse to renew our Agreement without incurring the risk 
of war or precipitating that southward advance by Japan which it is our 
purpose to avoid.'81
Craigie's approval for the re-opening of the Burma Road was greeted with 
satisfaction in the Department and was subsequently referred to in a 
Foreign Office memorandum to the War Cabinet on 2 September, which outlined 
the case for re-opening and influenced that body to agree to the 
preparation of a climate in East Asia favourable to an easy abrogation of 
the Burma Road Agreement.82
Craigie was still very cautious about how Britain should go about 
terminating the Agreement and, though he recognised that the threat of 
Japanese military action had diminished, he held on to the view that it 
would be beneficial not to act until Japan had actually rejected the still 
awaited British peace proposals.83 This was not a view that was accepted 
by the Foreign Office as it had become obvious to them on receiving the 
views of the other concerned departments that there was little desire to 
proceed with the drawing up of a peace package. This opposition to 
Craigie's soft line was also influenced by the appearance of a tougher 
American stance towards the 'aggressor' nations. Already on 3 September 
the Destroyer for Bases agreement had been signed and by mid-September 
Cordell Hull, in conversations with Lord Lothian, had begun to talk of 
further sanctions against Japan and a possible joint declaration with 
Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Holland to uphold the status quo south 
of the equator.84 This new drive towards co-operation on Washington's part 
reversed one of the key factors that had forced Britain to sign the Burma
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Road Agreement in the first place and suggested that a decision to re-open 
could be taken without too great a concern about Japanese retaliation.
Craigie was not enthusiastic about encouraging America to pursue this path 
and in a telegram of 19 September he raised important doubts about the 
wisdom of allowing a Japanese-American confrontation to develop, and 
warned-
'I [am] ... impressed by need to work out some concrete Anglo-American 
alternative to negative policy of a return to status quo which leaves Japan 
no hope of solving her economic problems or redressing her political 
grievances except through recourse to force. ... However gratifying may be 
increasing American disposition to collaborate with us in Far East, it 
remains as true as ever that actual American involvement in hostilities 
with Japan would in present circumstances mean a serious weakening of 
America's power to assist us in Europe.'85
Over this issue Craigie came up against heavy opposition, not just from the 
Foreign Office, but also from Churchill himself and when in a further 
telegram he stated that it was only 'likely' that Britain would enter an 
American-Japanese war, it led to a sharp minute being sent to Lord Halifax 
from the Prime Minister—
'This shows the very serious misconception which has grown in Sir R. 
Craigie's mind about the consequences of the United States entering the 
war. He should surely be told forthwith that the entry of the United 
States into war either with Germany and Italy or with Japan is fully 
compatible with British interests.
That nothing in the munitions sphere can compare with the importance of 
the British Empire and the United States being co-belligerent, that if 
Japan attacked the United States without declaring war on us we should at 
once range ourselves at the side of the United States and declare war upon 
Japan.'86
Here lay the germ of the argument that led to the eventual clash over 
Craigie’s Final Report.
Craigie’s belief in the need to avoid a hard line with Japan was, however, 
severely challenged in September by a series of events that showed that 
Japan was still seeking to expand its influence in South East Asia and that
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it was veering ever closer to the Axis powers. The first cause of concern 
was on 11 September when it was officially announced by Japan that an 
economic mission led by Kobayashi Ichizo, the Minister for Commerce and 
Industry, had been sent to Batavia to discuss closer economic relations 
with the Dutch.87 This was followed by even more serious developments in 
Indo-China, where Admiral Decoux's intransigence in the face of the ever 
growing Japanese demands led on 19 September to a virtual ultimatum from 
his opposite number, General Nishihara. On 22 September Decoux finally 
capitulated and signed an agreement in which 25,000 troops were to be 
allowed free passage into Tonkin province and four air-bases were allocated 
for use by the Japanese.88 These two acts of intimidation towards European 
powers in South East Asia were followed on 27 September by the news of the 
signing in Berlin of a Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan. 
The Pact, which pledged that each signatory would go to war if either of 
the others was involved in a conflict with a third power, was obviously 
aimed at the United States and designed to deter Washington from entering 
either the European or East Asian conflicts by threatening America with a 
war on two fronts.89
These developments naturally outraged Western opinion and led to 
consideration of possible means of retaliation. On 26 September as a 
response to the occupation of north Indo-China the United States expanded 
its embargo of goods to Japan by banning the export of all scrap metal and 
of all petroleum that could be processed into aviation f u e l . 9 0  Craigie 
meanwhile recommended to the Foreign Office-
'Repudiation of the Burma agreement is most tempting immediate means of 
hitting back at Japanese for their Indo-China aggression. I presume 
however that before His Majesty’s Government take any action in this 
sense they will make sure that it would suit book of the United States 
government to precipitate a crisis now rather than to await expiration in 
three weeks time.*91
The signing of the Tripartite Pact reinforced the view that Britain ought 
to repudiate the agreement and Craigie stressed that inaction on Britain's 
part would only help to create the impression that Britain had been 
frightened by the signing of the P a c t . 92
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In the Foreign Office Craigie’s suggestion of repudiation won immediate 
support, but raised the problem of whether this might be too provocative. 
A solution was drawn up by R.A. Butler, who suggested that instead of 
repudiation Britain should announce an early decision not to renew the 
Burma Road Agreement. Halifax duly presented this plan to the War Cabinet 
on 3 October, where it was unanimously endorsed. The minutes of the 
meeting also noted-
'It was significant that Sir Robert Craigie, who three months ago had 
thought that Japan would declare war on us, if we did not close the Road, 
was now in favour of the termination of the agreement.'93
The decision of the War Cabinet was communicated to Craigie, who on 8 
October informed Matsuoka that the Burma Road would be reopened on 18 
October.9*
The British were not the only people to be exasperated by Japan’s 
aggression in the late summer of 1940", in the Japanese Embassy in London 
there was also consternation at Matsuoka*s diplomacy. The first shock for 
Shigemitsu had been the arrests, which had occurred within a few days of 
his assurance to Butler that the new Foreign Minister would help to improve 
Anglo-Japanese relations. On 31 July he was called to the Foreign Office 
to explain Japan’s actions to Lord Halifax, which he attempted to do as 
convincingly as possible, while hiding his own embarrassment. Shigemitsu's 
real feelings were, however, recorded in a letter from Arthur Edwardes to 
Butler on the same day, which recorded that in contrast to the official 
posture taken by the Ambassador-
'The inner atmosphere of the Embassy is very different and the word 
resignation has passed several lips. H.E. [Shigemitsu], however, refuses 
to accept defeat and he is determined to fight on and make everybody else 
fight on. His bitter comments to me on his Government are not such as he 
could make to the S. of S. [Halifax].'95
This impression was supported the next day when Shigemitsu held an informal 
talk with Butler, in which the Ambassador was recorded as stating that- 
'He was himself more embarrassed about them [the arrests] than he had liked 
to confess to you [Lord Halifax] officially.'96
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Despite the crisis over the arrests, Shigemitsu still felt that a general 
improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations was possible. His thinking about 
this subject was still naturally based on the idea of mutual concessions 
and in a talk with Butler on 9 August he declared-
he had always looked forward to a new order in the Far East in which 
the aims of America, Japan and ourselves coincided as far as possible but 
that just as we disliked Japan being in collusion with the enemies of 
Britain, so the Japanese objected to the British helping the enemy of 
Japan.'97
To this end, while pressing Butler to cut aid to China, he also encouraged 
Matsuoka in the latter's intention to make a general review of relations 
with Britain." Unfortunately this exercise resulted only in a further 
setback, and led Arthur Edwardes to note in one of his 'secret' letters to 
Butler that-
'H.E. has been somewhat disappointed last week by the receipt of a message 
summing up the result of Matsuoka's studies. The message states that the 
friendliness of our intentions has never been made clear or expressed on 
any occasion at the Foreign Office in Tokyo.'99
This outcome seemed to block any official approach to the British 
Government and therefore Shigemitsu decided instead to work for an 
understanding unofficially through two members of Churchill’s Government 
who were sympathetic towards the Japanese moderates. On 11 September at a 
private lunch at the Savoy, Shigemitsu held discussions with Lord Lloyd, 
the Secretary of State for the Dominions, and Lord Hankey, the Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster. The intermediary in this liaison was Major- 
General Piggott who was still doing his best to work for an Ariglo-Japanese 
rapprochement. At this first meeting, which had the approval of Lord 
Halifax, there was only the most general of conversations, but at a second 
meeting on 25 September Shigemitsu put forward a concrete plan. His 
proposal was one that the Japanophile group in London had been espousing 
ever since April which was that a British Cabinet Minister should go to 
Japan as the head of a British Government Mission with the aim of improving 
relations and of countering the growing German influence in Tokyo. The two 
Cabinet ministers found the idea appealing and Lord Lloyd promised to 
consult Lord Halifax.!"
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The events of the preceding days did not, however, promise a favourable 
response. On the same day as the second meeting Shigemitsu was called to 
the Foreign Office to explain the Japanese occupation of north Indo-China. 
Shigemitsu defended this action by stating that it did not portend any move 
towards British territory, but was a purely anti-Chinese manoeuvre.101 
Also at this meeting the issue of Japanese-German relations was discussed 
and Shigemitsu was recorded as saying that-
' . . . he doubted whether the Japanese Government would at this stage take 
any final step in company with Germany, although they might have 
conversations defining their respective interests.'102
This comment, as well as other evidence, suggests that the Ambassador knew
nothing of the negotiations that led two days later to the signing of the
Tripartite Pact in Berlin. Kase Toshikazu, the Second Secretary at the
Japanese Embassy in London, noted later in his memoirs that-
'... it was but one day before the publication of the pact that our embassy
was informed from Tokyo about the impending announcement. That was the
first official information we received about the alliance. From London we
had been persistently warning the home government against a hasty
£ /commitment to the Axis, stressing the need to cultivating cordial relations 
with the democratic powers. Such warnings were regarded by the Army as 
pure nuisances. That was perhaps why news of the alliance was kept from us 
until the last moment.'1Q3
The fact that news of the Pact was kept from Shigemitsu for so long is 
important for a number of reasons. First, it clearly shows the chaotic 
nature of Japanese diplomacy in this period that such a senior figure could 
be left in the dark about information that so seriously affected his post. 
Second, it implies that Shigemitsu's opinions on this subject were of 
little concern to Matsuoka, and that the Ambassador's previous comments on 
the warmth of his relationship with the Foreign Minister held little 
conviction. Third it sheds some light on the curious fact that Shigemitsu 
was one of the few ambassadors to escape the purge of the Gaimusho 
instigated by Matsuoka in August 1940. The reason why Shigemitsu survived 
is by no means clear and is made even more puzzling by the fact that his 
Counsellor Okamoto was a victim.104 To some the Ambassador's continued 
presence in London can be explained by the fact that he was and always had
been a confirmed expansionist and was thus acceptable to Matsuoka and the 
Army. To others his survival was due to his being recognised by the 
Gaimusho as a very capable Ambassador and the realization that his removal 
would antagonise and perhaps frighten the British. This would certainly 
have been an accurate assessment of British sentiment as on 2 September, 
when news of the purge reached London, M.E. Dening of the Far Eastern 
Department noted-
'It would be a pity if Mr. Shigemitsu were to leave us because he is an 
able Ambassador. And we have quite enough evidence to show that he has 
served his country very well. ... the Ambassador, the Counsellor and Kase 
are the best type of Japanese.'105
The lack of information that the Ambassador received from the Gaimusho over 
the Tripartite Pact, a clearly anti-British move, would tend to favour the 
idea that he was kept on largely because of his acceptability to London.
Although in his official capacity he had to defend and justify the signing 
of the Pact, it is clear from a number of sources that Shigemitsu deeply 
deplored the decision. In a number of private conversations with Western 
acquaintances he talked of his personal response to the Alliance. At the 
Tokyo War Crimes Trial the American Ambassador in London in 1940, Joseph 
Kennedy, in an affidavit for Shigemitsu's defence, testified that that he 
had heard from William Hillman, head of the International News Bureau in 
Europe, that-
’Shigemitsu ... told him that it [the Tripartite Pact] was one of the worst 
blows he had suffered in his career as it threatened to kill the object of 
his mission in London which was Anglo-Japanese reconciliation ... that he 
had been tempted to resign on the first impulse, but then on second 
thoughts decided to remain in London as long as it was possible to mitigate 
the effects of the conclusion of the pact and by diplomacy to prevent its 
being implemented.'105
As well as this Shigemitsu in Japan and Her Destiny recorded that- 
'To those like myself who had consistently opposed the Alliance it passed 
human understanding. ...that the Alliance had placed Japan in a position 
from which she could never recover and I was plunged into the depths of 
despair.'107
He thus saw the Pact at the time and in hindsight as a turning point in
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Anglo-Japanese relations. The reason for his despondency was that the 
fears that he had begun to harbour in August about the growing co-operation 
between Britain and the United States were becoming more justified with 
every day, and that in addition the RAF's victory in the Battle of Britain 
had shown that there was no guarantee that Germany would triumph in the war 
in Europe. The danger had therefore arisen that Japan had backed the loser 
and that in the long run the Anglo-Saxon powers would make Japan pay for 
this mistake. Shigemitsu's desire to build better Anglo-Japanese relations 
therefore became more urgent than ever.
For Craigie too, the events of the summer of 1940 were to be a turning 
point in his mission as Ambassador. He had ever since the start of the 
European War felt that if Britain was willing to make sensible compromises 
then the problem of having to divert vital forces from Europe and the 
Mediterranean to defend Britain's East Asian interests could be solved. 
This had been the basis of his support for a War Trade Agreement, the 
Tientsin talks, his speech of 28 March 1940, and for attaching the idea of 
a general peace to the Burma Road Agreement. In August and September, 
however, the policies of Konoe and Matsuoka forced him to re-evaluate this 
policy and he came to the conclusion that this was a Government with which 
it was impossible to negotiate. He noted in a telegram to the Foreign 
Office on 11 October that-
'The pro-British faction has been driven still further to ground by the 
recent espionage campaign against the British community and is now 
powerless to exert any influence whatsoever. Japanese foreign policy 
will continue to be dominated by the extremists until such a time as the 
Axis powers meet with a decisive reverse in Europe or until the peril of 
an unwanted war with the United States becomes so great that a decisive 
change in popular opinion begins to make itself felt.’108
Craigie therefore had to reluctantly admit that his favoured policy of 
trying to improve relations was dead and until Matsuoka's removal as 
Foreign Minister in July 1941 he was to take a bellicose attitude towards 
Japan.
The crisis was also important for Craigie in terms of his relationship with 
the Foreign Office. The latter in reviewing the Burma Road Agreement
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continued to maintain the idea that Britain had been duped into 
compromising by Japanese bluff and that it was Craigie who was chiefly 
responsible for this, as he had grossly overstated the risk of war and that 
only through his pressure had the decision to close the Road been finally 
taken. Much of this criticism is unfair to the Ambassador: while
recognizing that he perhaps exaggerated the risks, it is only right to 
acknowledge the fact that had Britain tried to call Japan’s bluff and found 
that Japan was truly ready to attack it would have been a disaster of the 
greatest magnitude, occurring simultaneously with the lowest ebb of British 
fortunes in the West. It is also necessary to \j0& point out that Craigie's 
observations were only a contributory factor to the final decision, of much 
greater importance was Britain's dire strategic position in Europe. One 
must also acknowledge what Cadogan wrote in his diary of 13 July- 
‘Craigie has given away 110%. I was against it. We've been bluffed. But 
it was Winston who resolutely refused to call it.'*°9
The decision to close the Burma Road can thus not solely be blamed on Sir 
Robert Craigie; it was finally a decision that was made by the War Cabinet, 
who also had the opinions of Lothian, Clark Kerr, the Far Eastern 
Department and the Chiefs of Staff on which to base their judgments. In 
hindsight it was obviously a decision that did not bring much honour to the 
British government at the time of its signing or in relation to Japanese
behaviour over the next three months, but it was the correct choice * the
alternative was too awful to contemplate.
Nevertheless the result of the Burma Road Crisis and the subsequent events 
were to discredit Craigie’s pleas for conciliation and when he returned to 
this policy in autumn 1941 it was the example of the Burma Road that was 
used to belittle his opinions. The Foreign Office convinced itself in the 
wake of the crisis of the summer of 1940 that appeasement of Japan was no
longer acceptable in any form. A policy of conciliation had been
acceptable when Japan had been undecided about its course, but now that 
Japan had decided to align itself openly with the Axis and had begun a 
campaign to dominate the affairs of South East Asia, the only avenue left 
to Britain was to forge a policy of deterrence^hopefully in league with the 
United States. From this point onwards the influence of both Craigie and
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Shigemitsu was on the wane and there was little that they could do to stop 
the drift towards war.
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'News from Japan reaching the F.O. increasingly disconcerting the last 
few days and, unless someting unexpected comes along to ease the 
situation in the present rapidly increasing tensions between our two 
countries, it looks as though we shall be at war with Japan very shortly.
Captain Malcolm Kennedy diary entry 12 February 19411
It is tempting to portray the fourteen months from the re-opening of the 
Burma Road to the start of hostilities in the Pacific as a period which saw 
close co-operation between Britain and the United States to contain the 
threat of Japanese expansionism. Any such impression would, however, be 
largely false; it was in reality not until July 1941 that the Anglo-Saxon 
partners forged a truly joint policy, although even then the British until 
early December had no guarantee that America would come to their aid should 
war break out. This meant that the period between October 1940 and June 
1941, instead of being one in which Britain could concentrate on the war in 
Europe, was one of acute concern in Whitehall about East Asia as, while 
Britain turned its back on conciliation and started to construct a policy 
of deterrence, Washington continued to lag far behind. This was a 
dangerous position for Britain to be in, but the Burma Road Crisis and the 
signing of the Tripartite Pact had shown that there was very little choice. 
If war with Japan was to be avoided this could only be achieved by a 
tightrope policy of deterring Tokyo from a further southern advance while 
at the same time not acting so harshly as simply to provoke a new Japanese 
offensive.
The remarkable fact about the development of this policy was that for 
virtually the first time since Craigie had gone to Tokyo there was a 
consensus about which approach to take. Even Craigie himself, who had long 
championed a policy of moderation, now agreed that deterrence was 
necessary. The appearance of this consensus was a reflection of a number
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of convictions that were held in common by Craigie and the Foreign Office.
First it was deemed obvious, after the events of the summer of 1940, that 
Japan needed to be resisted in order to thwart its desire to expand its 
influence into South East Asia and to counter its close links with Germany 
and Italy, which threatened to increase the level of trade along the Trans- 
Siberian Railway. Second, it was believed that the United States was 
beginning to take a more active role in the Pacific and that this afforded 
the opportunity for Britain to take a firmer line and also a chance to 
impress the Americans and appear as a worthy potential ally. Third, it was 
held that after the victory in the Battle of Britain had been won, and V0l\€,4\
the position in the Middle East somewhat eased, Britain could afford to
be more stalwart in East Asia.
There were, however, two other motives for a policy of deterrence that were 
not held in common. The first of these was that in London and Singapore 
there were elements, of whom Churchill was the most important, who were 
convinced that the Japanese would never attack, and that, even if they did, 
it would pose a nuisance rather than a direct threat to the future of the 
Empire. To this group deterrence was largely a matter of being severe with 
Japan but not backing up this harsh policy with the deployment of military 
forces. Craigie felt strongly that this line represented a gross 
underestimation of Japan’s intentions and abilities. He himself had 
another reason for supporting a tough policy; believing that it would serve 
the purpose of proving to the Japanese people that the extremists who 
controlled their foreign policy were only exposing the country to danger, 
and that this would encourage the moderates to attempt to return to power 
before it was too late; a motive that garnered little support in the 
Foreign Office. The consensus was therefore not built on the most solid of 
foundations and in the heightened atmosphere of the summer of 1941 the 
contradictions between Craigie and London would begin to tear it apart.
The toughening of British policy manifested itself just as the Burma Road 
crisis came to its conclusion. To a large extent much of the impetus for 
this change came from the hardening in late summer of America's stance 
towards the Japanese with the introduction of the scrap iron embargo and 
their apparent desire to increase co-operation with the British as
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demonstrated by the offer from Hull to Lothian on 30 September for staff 
talks.2 These two initiatives galvanized Britain into action and the 
former led to a study of how the still very limited economic restrictions 
on Japan could be increased. Already in early September 1940 the Ministry 
of Economic Warfare had responded to the call made by the Foreign Office on 
14 August for reprisals against Japan by declaring that they had always 
disliked the Foreign Office’s leniency towards the Japanese, and that- 
'... it would do little harm to adopt a stiffer attitude towards Japanese 
requests wherever the merits of the case justify it. We would suggest that 
henceforward we should treat each case on its own merits, and not attempt 
to give the Japanese unduly favourable treatment for political reasons.'3 
With the American example on 26 September it now appeared that it would be 
possible to apply such a policy.
The development of a programme of harsher economic restrictions took place 
in a new co-ordinating body set up in early October, the War Cabinet Far 
Eastern Committee which was chaired by R.A. Butler.4 In proposing the 
establishment of this Committee to the War Cabinet, Lord Halifax noted that 
its policy should based on the line that-
' ... in the near future there might be several ways in which we should be 
able to cause inconvenience to the Japanese without ceasing to be p o l i t e . '5 
This clearly set down the parameters of British policy; that the aim was to 
deter so that a war in the East could be avoided. The result of this was 
that the discussion of economic sanctions rested not on the need to bring 
Japan to its knees, but rather, as R.A. Butler put it in a report for the 
War Cabinet, to have-
' . . . the double object of preventing the Japanese from assisting our 
present enemies and from building up stocks t h e m s e l v e s .'6
To achieve this end it was decided to widen the range of commodities put 
under export licence and to restrict exports to Japan to normal trade 
levels, which it was deemed consisted of 75% of the 1939 figures. The 
actual implementation of this policy was, however, slow as it involved 
complex co-ordination with the Dominions, India, and the C o l o n i e s . 7
As Britain began to develop this fairly comprehensive list of restrictions, 
the United States in turn started to retreat from its forward policy. The
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first indication of this came on 9 October when, in a talk with Lothian, 
Hull indicated that staff talks could not be held until after the 
Presidential election in November, and that for the present all Washington 
could do was to send Admiral Ghormley to Britain to liaise with the 
Admiralty.8 American reticence was further demonstrated by the State 
Department's refusal to agree to conversations in the immediate future 
about co-operation in economic restrictions against Japan.9 The result of 
this was that in the autumn of 1940 there was only limited evidence of
Anglo-American co-operation rather than the broad sweep which Britain had
hoped for, although it is worth noting that a U.S. observer did secretly 
attend the Anglo-Australian Conference at Singapore in October, and in 
November Commander T. Wisden, the deputy commander at the FECB, was sent to
Manila to meet his counter— parts in the U.S. Asiatic Fleet.10 News of the
American retreat did not lead to the cancellation of Britain's new policy 
but it did lead to an air of caution.
The need for a guarded approach was underlined by reports from Craigie,
who, though recognising that his policy of conciliation was no longer 
valid, was aware that the mood in Tokyo was fraught and that it would not 
take much to provoke Japan. This led him to emphasize in a telegram on 14 
October the great necessity for Britain not to go beyond the measures
taken by the United States, on the grounds that-
'As long as responsible Japanese quarters continue to think that the United 
States will in no circumstances go to war to resist attack on any non-
American territory in the Pacific, danger remains that Japan will make some
tragic mistake as Germany did in 1914 when she counted on British
abstention.’11
On 16 October he went further by observing that, though his personal
preference for co-operation with Washington was in the military field
rather than in the area of economic restrictions, any joint action should 
be considered very carefully, and be judged in the light of the fact that- 
' . . . we should at present avoid measures which would only be to our 
advantage if war with Japan is absolutely imminent, until we are convinced 
that war iji imminent. Otherwise we and America may find ourselves, as a 
cumulative result of our actions and the provocations of those of the 
Japanese, in a position where war is imminent whether we are ready for it
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or not. '12
These views were broadly in agreement with those being expressed within 
Whitehall, and British policy was therefore composed in the knowledge that 
it could not afford to be too provocative.
Despite these pleas for caution, Craigie was far from advocating a return 
to a policy of conciliation. The major factor that influenced his shift to 
supporting a hard line was the character and policies of Matsuoka. 
Although Craigie had initially displayed some enthusiasm for the 
appointment of a politician renowned for his straightforward style and 
forthright views, this had soon evaporated. The succession of events since 
Matsuoka took the helm obviously indictated a dramatic expansion of Japan's 
ambitions and Craigie felt particular concern over the Foreign Minister’s 
clear desire to draw ever nearer to Germany and the Soviet Union, which 
threatened to lead to the formation of an anti-democratic camp to rival the 
West. Apart from his obviously anti-British policies, Matsuoka also 
contributed to the worsening of relations through his personal style, 
unlike his predecessors he did not try to cajole listeners into agreement 
with his views, his tactic was to harangue and bluster at great length. 
The poor relationship between the two men was clearly displayed in one 
particularly interminable meeting on 9 November which left Craigie so 
greatly dispirited that he noted to the Foreign Office-
'Like all interviews with the Minister of Foreign Affairs this one 
consisted of a long monologue in the course of which I found it difficult 
to get in my word.'13
It was not just Matsuoka's long-windedness that Craigie found 
objectionable, even though that habit made a mockery of the purpose of such 
interviews, but that within a short space of time the Foreign Minister 
proffered his 'honest' hopes for peace and then proceeded to take another 
tack by declaring-
'... he had no intention of offering assurances he could not keep, and it 
was from this point of view that he asked us to regard the expression of 
his fervent desire to avoid war with either Great Britain or the United 
States. Nothing would provoke this except American entry into the European 
war or some serious provocation such as the visit of a powerful American 
squadron to Singapore.'l*
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Craigie*s doubts about Matsuoka*s intentions were intensified in December 
due to an accumulation of evidence that suggested German-Japanese relations 
were becoming much closer, such as the announcements that naval and 
military missions were travelling to Europe and that General Oshima was to 
be re-appointed as Ambassador to Germany. In addition there were also 
reports clearly suggesting that Japan was giving assistance to German 
commerce raiders in the Pacific which had been attacking Allied s h i p p i n g . 15 
Craigie responded to this news by warning the Foreign Office- 
' . . . I do not think we can be too impartial about such an accumulation of 
evidence, particularly in view of the Minister of Foreign Affairs recent 
remark to me that we must be prepared for further action by Japan that 
might appear to us as un-neutral.'15
These events and insinuations were not worrying merely because they implied 
that Japan was ready to enter the European War should tensions in the 
Atlantic leiad to a clash between Germany and the United States, but also 
because they coincided with a further rise of tensions in South East Asia.
By the autumn of 1940 the situation in South East Asia was increasingly 
complex, for not only had the fall of France inspired Japanese pressure on 
Indo-China, it also led to Thailand making territorial claims on the French 
colony. This irredentism provided Japan with the opportunity not only to 
put its New Order principles into action by claiming its right to intervene 
in the dispute, but also to use its intervention to expand its influence 
over the two countries and thus gain a firm foothold in the region without 
having to resort to war.17 To the Foreign Office the prospect of Japan 
being poised to strike at Singapore, and at the same time having free 
access to the vital raw materials produced in Thailand and Indo-China, such 
as rubber and tin, was too awful to contemplate. However, Britain's 
dilemma in this situation was that to support either side in the Thai- 
French dispute had its disadvantages: to back France would certainly drive 
the Thais into Japan's sphere, while support for Thailand would only help 
to weaken French resistance to further Japanese encroachments into Indo- 
China and open up the colony's rubber to re-export to Germany. The 
difficulty in deciding on a firm policy was made all the harder by the 
unwillingness of the United States to take any sort of lead over the 
dispute apart from stating that to satisfy Thailand’s claims would be
280
tantamount to appeasement. Britain was therefore put in a very difficult 
position, hindered by Washington from making a diplomatic intervention and 
too weak unilaterally to use military pressure to dampen down the growing 
tensions.18
As had been the case so often before, the result of British weakness was 
that policy was left to drift and no concerted effort was made to contain 
the crisis. Finally on 28 November war broke out, and almost immediately 
the two combatants were subject to intense pressure from Japan and Germany 
to mediate. This seemed, especially in the light of the other evidence of 
their increased co-operation, to indicate a concerted effort by the 
Tripartite powers to establish Japanese dominance over the region and 
raised the possibility that Japan might synchronise the unleashing of its 
forces against the British colonies to coincide with a German offensive in 
Europe. In December Craigie raised this fear by writing-
’ It seems possible that Japan is taking no further action in a southerly 
direction until she sees what is the outcome of her negotiations with the 
French regarding Indo-China, but that meanwhile she is taking steps with 
her German ally to ensure full co-operation when, and if time comes, for 
further developments in the south.1.9
The situation facing Britain was thus steadily growing more desperate and 
the question of how it could be eased became ever more pressing.
In the Foreign Office, R.A. Butler saw the only solution to be the
strengthening of British defences in the region and he prompted Lord 
Halifax to write to A.V. Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty, in 
late November urging him to send a naval squadron to Singapore by arguing 
that-
’There is an urgent need to strengthen our defences in the Far East, not 
only with the object of offering successful resistance to any attack which 
may be made, but even more for the purpose of showing Japan by our
preparedness that she would be unwise to make the attempt, and also of
strengthening the courage and stiffening the resistance of the territories 
which Japan seeks to penetrate.'20
This plea was, however, dismissed by Alexander who pointed out, that 
despite the British success at Taranto, the Royal Navy was so over­
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stretched that it could not afford to send out any forces to the East, and 
noted-
'Surely the real deterrent to Japanese aggression in the Far East can only 
be found in the willing and open co-operation of the United States.21 
This was a stance which had the full support of Churchill who consistently 
believed that the diversion of any forces to defend against a potential 
enemy, Japan, rather than using them against actual enemies, Germany and 
Italy, was a dangerous indulgence.22
The need for a greater American presence in East Asia was a view also 
shared by Craigie, who noted in a long telegram to London on 4 Decembei—
'... given no deterioration in the situation in Europe, Japan would make no 
further advance southwards if her leaders could once be convinced that the 
United States would accept the challenge as well as ourselves. This is the 
crux of the question.'23
In particular Craigie was very keen on the idea that had been pursued by 
the Foreign Office in early October of Anglo-American co-operation being 
visibly displayed to Japan through the visit of an American naval squadron 
to Singapore. In early December when the Foreign Office ordered Lord 
Lothian to renew the pressure over this issue, Craigie immediately 
indicated his approval and noted his hope that some of the ships that 
Washington was sending to reinforce the Philippines would visit the British 
base.24 However, any hope of decisive action by the United States was 
misplaced; the State Department was not willing to see American ships visit 
Singapore and believed that the small-scale reinforcement of the 
Philippines would be enough to deter Japan from any further move into South 
East Asia.25
The effect of American inaction and British military weakness was to force 
the Foreign Office to rest its containment of Japan almost entirely on the 
policy of economic restrictions in order to wear down Japan's ability to 
wage war and reduce the supplies available for aiding the German war 
effort. Even here it was recognised that Britain's freedom of action was 
restrained by the passivity of the State Department. Despite efforts in 
Washington to persuade the Americans to expand their licensing system the 
sanctions introduced by the Roosevelt administration were still very
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l i m i t e d . 26 in a Far Eastern Committee report to the War Cabinet on 17 
December, which described the American policy as an 'improvisation', R.A. 
Butler was reduced to noting on the subject of British sanctions- 
'The screw will have to be applied, more or less firmly, in proportion as 
the Japanese control their wayward tendencies, or as our hand grows 
stronger in Europe and the Middle East, or as the United States 
Administration interests itself more in the Far E a s t . ' 2 7
However, this did not mean that the British economic restrictions were 
completely innocuous. In particular Britain was now less concerned than 
before about the consequences of taking strong action against Japanese 
merchant ships carrying merchandise and commodities destined for the Axis 
powers. In comparison to the first half of 1940, when such a policy had 
largely been avoided in order not to antagonize Japan, Japanese ships were 
now subject to frequent searches and a increasing number of cargoes were 
s e i z e d . 2 8  Craigie raised no objections to this policy, and even showed 
great disappointment in November 1940 when the Canadians refused to 
intercept the Kozui Maru, which was carrying a cargo of copper for the 
Italians, and was prompted to note to the Foreign Office-
'Particularly if action were taken by the Canadian Navy, the Japanese 
Government would be reluctant to encourage public outcry here and might 
well decide on their own to discontinue traffic, thus helping to plug this 
hole in our contraband control system.'29
The contrast with the concerns that he had expressed earlier in the year 
could hardly be greater.
Nevertheless, despite the general toughening of British policy and the 
desire to avoid any compromises with Japan, diplomatic negotiations between 
the two sides had not ceased entirely. Though the discussions over a Trade 
Agreement had long since lapsed, talks had continued over the possibility 
of a Payments Agreement between the two countries, even during the Burma 
Road Crisis. The idea of such an Agreement had been mooted as early as 
November 1939 by the Foreign Office as a means of regulating Anglo-Japanese 
trade and of hindering the Japanese from selling sterling for dollars on 
the free market.30 The Japanese had at first been somewhat wary of this 
proposal seeing it as very limited in scope and not aiding them in their
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main aim which was to gain greater access to British controlled raw 
materials. Consequently when the idea was mentioned by Butler to 
Shigemitsu on 4 April 1940, the latter showed some unwillingness to proceed 
on these lines believing that the wider trade negotiations about to start 
were more firmly in line with Japan’s interests.3! Nevertheless talks on 
this matter did begin in spring 1940 and the Treasury offered Japan a more 
advantageous deal than had been offered to other neutrals, which included a 
commitment by Britain to convert monthly 20% of the Japanese sterling 
account in London into gold.32
With the collapse of the Okamoto/Leith-Ross negotiations, the Payments 
Agreement remained as the only economic negotiations in progress and 
therefore became more significant as a barometer of Anglo-Japanese 
relations. The British position over the summer of 1940 was slowly to 
reduce the benefits to Japan which been offered at first, as a response to 
the increasingly bellicose attitude of Japan. In August a new draft was 
handed by S.D. Waley of the Treasury to Okamoto, which still promised that 
10% of the Japanese sterling account in Britain would be converted into 
gold, but the lack of any reply to this proposal soon convinced the 
Treasury to toughen their position further.33 From Tokyo Craigie warned 
that this was dangerous and that it was still necessary to be flexible in 
this field as to become too harsh risked alienating the Bank of Japan and 
the Ministry of Finance, two organizations still opposed to the 
Government's pro-Axis policy.3* In December a Japanese response to the 
Treasury draft of August finally arrived expressing general agreement with 
the British terms but including a number of amendments of which the most 
important was a proviso that-
' . . . no unreasonable prohibitions or restrictions shall be imposed on 
exports from the British Empire to Japan, in other words, that the export 
of commodities from the British Empire to Japan shall be facilitated to the 
utmost possible.'35
This made it clear that the new Japanese enthusiasm for these talks was not 
because they felt that a Payments Agreement had an intrinsic value of its 
own, but rather that they saw an agreement as a means to overturn Britain’s 
economic restrictions. This was clearly unacceptable to the Treasury and
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the Foreign Office and there was an increasing danger that these 
negotiations like their predecessors were doomed to deadlock.
These talks were, however, seen by Shigemitsu as one of the last hopes for 
improving Anglo-Japanese relations. In the autumn of 1940 the Japanese 
Ambassador was becoming increasingly despondent about the direction of 
Japanese policy and tried his utmost to overcome the dire impression left 
by the Tripartite Pact and show that Japan had not decided to come out into 
open opposition to Britain. In pursuit of this he tried in his weekly 
talks with Butler to argue, yet again, that Japan's relations with Germany 
only mirrored the support that the Western powers had given to China and 
therefore hinted that the withdrawal of British support for Chiang Kai-shek 
could lead to Japan drawing away from the Axis. On 2 December he told 
Butler in one of their meetings that-
’He appreciated the unfortunate effect of the Tripartite Pact on the work 
which we had been doing together. But two months study of the situation 
since had only confirmed in his mind ... that it was not designed to bring 
Japan into war. So far as Japan was concerned, it was designed to
facilitate her task in China.'36
He then went on, in response to a remark by Butler that both sides must be 
careful not to take actions which were likely to provoke the other, to 
state despondently that-
'To him it seemed that we should go further and try and work out, as we
should have done ten years ago, the fundamental points on which we had
interests in common. ... If however we were simply to put the Chinese 
question at one side and at the same time allow public feeling in our two 
countries to become irritated ... he feared that our collaboration would 
not go very far.'37
The problem was that Shigemitsu’s sentiments seemed to have very little 
relation to the threats emanating from Matsuoka or to Japan’s actions in 
South East Asia, and this only confirmed to the British that he was
becoming ever more isolated from his own Government. This suspicion was 
underlined when it became apparent in late November, after a series of 
talks in which the Ambassador had tried to persuade Butler to change 
British policy on the China issue, that Shigemitsu had not even been
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informed by Tokyo of the terms of the Nanking Agreement between Japan and 
the Wang Ching-wei Government.38
The Ambassador’s assurances of Japan’s pacific intentions therefore had 
very little impact on the Foreign Office, and he was left only with the 
alternative of improving Anglo-Japanese relations by continuing the 
informal talks he had started in September with Lord Lloyd and Lord Hankey. 
In this direction he still had the enthusiastic support of Piggott, who, 
despite the signing of the Tripartite Pact, was as keen as ever to work for 
a rapprochement; indeed only three days after the signing of the Pact, 
Piggott had pressed Hankey to act on Shigemitsu's proposal of 26 September 
for a cabinet minister to visit Japan by writing-
'I am more than ever convinced that if you and I went to Japan in the very 
near future we could do much to prevent some disasters happening to 
humanity. . . . Our presence, especially yours, would be of the greatest 
encouragement to Craigie, and the British community; and my innumerable 
friends in all circles, Government and private, would undoubtedly tell me 
many things which Craigie and,his staff could never hear.’39 
Hankey who was, of course, aware of the change in British policy could only 
respond to this by replying that such a plan would be unacceptable to the 
Foreign Office and that the idea should be put on ice until a more 
favourable climate a p p e a r e d . 4 0
Shigemitsu was, however, still keen to pursue this line and he arranged for 
a further meeting to be held with the two ministers on 20 November. At 
this lunch Lloyd suggested that, instead of an official government mission 
to Japan, it might be possible to improve relations through the sending of 
a group led by Hankey under the auspices of the British C o u n c i  1 . 4 1  The 
Ambassador responded by expressing considerable enthusiasm for this idea 
saying that he thought that it could be very beneficial, and it was decided 
that Lloyd would make enquiries at the Foreign Office to see if this was 
a c c e p t a b l e . 4 2  The Colonial Secretary subsequently wrote to Halifax on 4 
December laying out his plan. The reply, as one might have expected, was 
not favourable and noted bleakly-
'It might be welcomed by those whose views are suppressed and unheard and 
who may indeed be on our side, but, merging as it would into the political
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field, it would risk being misunderstood as a gesture designed to 
conciliate those who every day take steps to prejudice ourselves and our 
interests. ... I am convinced that it is only by showing a combined 
American and British firm front that we shall restrain the extremist 
elements from taking extreme m e a s u r e s . ' 4 3  
Shigemitsu's hopes had thus reached another dead end.
There were then insurmountable obstacles to any attempt at improving Anglo- 
Japanese relations; the mood of the times rather leant towards a steady 
escalation of tensions. Events in South East Asia were the chief catalyst 
in this process and in the early winter of 1941 they began to approach a 
climax. During January the tide of events swung further away from Britain, 
for while the Foreign Office tried forlornly to persuade the State 
Department that the situation could only be saved by joint Anglo-American 
mediation, the Japanese pressure on the combatants to make peace under 
Japan’s auspices markedly increased. The lack of any notable military 
success on land, allied to the French victory at sea in the battle of Ko 
Chang island, drove the Thais further towards the Japanese. With Thailand 
now favouring mediation, the Japanese began to hint to the French of the 
serious consequences that would arise if they continued fighting, llfot 
surprisingly, considering the lack of support from the United States, Vichy 
quickly acquiesced, and on 29 January armistice talks began in S a i g o n . 4 4
Simultaneously with the exertion of diplomatic pressure came an escalation 
of the Japanese military and naval presence in the region. This policy was 
approved in Japan at a Liaison Conference on 19 January and was designed to 
intimidate the Thais and French into making peace, and to force them to 
agree to the Japanese conditions for mediation which were that both 
countries should agree to closer political, military and economic ties with 
J a p a n . 4 5 The Army and Navy, however, had rather different plans from those 
of the Gaimusho; they wished to use the military build-up as an opportunity 
to seize bases in the region as a preliminary to a southward advance into 
the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. This led to disagreements with Matsuoka, 
who believed that only military exercises were necessary and that the use 
of military force could drag the British and Americans into the crisis and 
that this could lead to war. As a consequence of this division over aims
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the signals from Japan about its intentions became confused and even at 
times contradictory and it was this uncertainty that greatly contributed to 
the crisis in Anglo-Japanese relations that surfaced in F e b r u a r y . 4 6
The British were well aware of the build-up of Japanese diplomatic and 
military pressure in the region. Through the use of radio direction 
finding equipment at Singapore the FECB was able to follow the deployment 
of Japanese naval forces into the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam, 
which included indications that Japan was beginning to operate in the 
vicinity of Cam Ranh Bay, the best anchorage in I n d o - C h i n a .47 To this ya 
added disturbing decrypts of telegrams sent from Tokyo to the Japanese 
Consul-General in Singapore which included one intercepted on 20 January 
that was summarised as stating that-
' . . . future intelligence and propaganda policy will be "mainly directed 
southwards in order to secure supplies of war commodities". Promotion of 
agitation, political plots, propaganda and intelligence (particularly naval 
and military) must be expedited and intensified so that new order in
greater East Asia may be expedited.'48
This evidence was also supported by decrypts of telegrams passing between 
the Japanese Minister in Bangkok and Tokyo which clearly indicated the
Japanese interest in bases as a quid pro quo for assistance in mediation, 
and by information from the Dutch intelligence community in Bandung, with
whom co-operation over Japanese cyphers and the activities of local
Japanese agents had begun only r e c e n t l y .49
by
The indications of impending crisis were reinforced ^ a number of bellicose 
speeches and interviews by Matsuoka in January, which included the 
assertions that the Tripartite Pact was the central pillar of Japan's 
foreign policy and that Japan counted the European colonial empires of 
South East Asia as falling within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. In addition to this Craigie was reporting back the details of the 
rumours sweeping Tokyo about coming events, and identified a general tense 
air of expectation. On 27 January he observed-
'There is a general feeling amongst the Japanese that the crisis in the Far 
East will come within the next few w e e k s . *50
He followed this a week later with an even more alarming telegram in which
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he pointed to the grave dangers that would arise if the Japanese were able 
to establish themselves in Thailand, and again urged the Foreign Office to 
renew the pressure for an American commitment to Singapore. He concluded 
by observing ominously-
' . . . unless Thailand, Indo China and the Netherlands East Indies can be 
made to feel now that full strength of British Empire and United States 
will be behind them in resisting further aggression, the pass will be sold 
and. our recent gains in the Mediterranean will be offset by steady 
undermining of our whole strategic position in the Far East and Indian 
Ocean.'51
This warning and the accumulation of evidence hinting at some imminent 
advance by the Japanese, meant that Britain obviously had to make some sort 
of response. However, the problem was deciding what sort of threat Britain 
was faced with, what exactly Japan's intentions were and when any strike 
would be likely to take place? On 5 February the Joint Intelligence Sub- 
Committee synthesised the evidence from all available sources and 
concluded-
' . . . Japan will take advantage of her role as mediator in the dispute
between Thailand and French Indo-China so as to gain naval, military and
air bases which would enable her to threaten Malaya, the Netherlands East 
Indies, North Borneo, and possibly Burma. Of these objectives we believe 
that she will probably select, in the first instance, the Netherlands East 
Indies, and that she intends to move against this territory in the near
future.'52
The situation therefore at this point did not suggest to London any 
imminent attack on British territory, but there was some concern that Japan 
was planning an attack which could take place over the next few months, and 
that it would be timed to coincide with a new German offensive in Europe or 
even an invasion of Britain. Overnight, however, the British assessment of 
Japan's timetable changed and a report drawn up the next day by the Chiefs 
of Staff noted-
'The gravity of the situation in the Far East, to which the Joint
Intelligence Sub-Committee have drawn our attention in their report, is now 
reinforced by a most secret intelligence report.
Briefly it appears that the Japanese have decided upon a policy which
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they realise may involve them in war with the British Empire in the near 
future.'53
The obvious question is what information inspired this drastic 
reassessment? What could have made them believe that Britain was now the 
intended target of Japanese aggression? The answer is almost certainly 
that the source alluded to in the Chiefs of Staff report was the operation 
for bugging the telephones at the Japanese Embassy in London. On 5 
February the operator responsible for translating the telephone 
conversations within the Embassy reported that staff had been ordered to 
cut off all fraternization with British officials and to be prepared to 
leave Britain at short notice, this was followed the next day by news that 
some kind of action was expected shortly.54 These reports suggested, and 
were interpreted by Whitehall as indicating, that a Japanese offensive was 
far more imminent than originally thought, and that the target of Japanese 
aggression was not simply going to be the Dutch but could also be Britain 
itself. On 6 February Sir Alexander Cadogan noted in his diary- 
'Some more very bad-looking Jap telephone conversations, from which it 
appears that they have decided to attack us.'55
In one sense this was obviously deeply disturbing news as the Services were 
clearly too weak to defend Britain's East Asian possessions, and 
furthermore these reports had arrived simultaneously with indications that 
Germany was preparing to launch a new offensive into South East Europe.56 
At the same time, however, the ’war scare* was seen as somewhat fortuitous, 
because, despite the obvious dangers, it also provided an opportunity for 
Britain to increase its security in the region. The thinking behind this 
strategy was that if propaganda could be used to build up an atmosphere of 
crisis and to stress Britain's apparent readiness to resist any advance, 
Japan, with America still as an unknown quantity, might be deterred not 
only from war with Britain, but also from pressing on Thailand and Indo- 
China its claims for military bases. As well as this the crisis also 
offered the chance to bring to America's attention the increasingly tense 
climate in South East Asia, and pave the way for a more forward American
policy.5 7
290
One crucial aspect of the propaganda campaign was to use the media to print 
and broadcast reports that war with Japan was thought to be imminent; an 
activity which was co-ordinated by a sub-committee of the Far Eastern 
Committee.58 However, there was also a diplomatic element comprising 
two aims; first to persuade the United States to exert diplomatic pressure 
on Japan, and second to present Japan with the image of a country prepared 
for any eventuality. An approach to the Americans was first made on 6 
February by Butler to Roosevelt's close confidant, Harry Hopkins, who was 
at this time in London on a mission to report on British morale. In this 
talk Butler made clear the British position and told Hopkins that- 
'... we now felt that the Americans were lagging behind in their 
understanding of Japanese ambitions in the South Seas...'59
Hopkins responded by noting unofficially that he was convinced that the 
United States would 'react immediately' to any further Japanese advance in 
the region; a reaction which naturally encouraged the Foreign Office to 
press their case even harder in Washington.60
The initial move in relation to Japan came on 7 February when Eden called 
Shigemitsu to the Foreign Office to protest at the deterioration of Anglo- 
Japanese relations. A meeting had, in fact, already been scheduled before 
the telephone intercepts had appeared. The reason for this was that 
Cadogan had been gravely displeased with, what was in his eyes, the bland 
explanation Shigemitsu had given Butler on 31 January when asked to comment 
on Matsuoka's recent speeches, and thought that Eden should see the 
Ambassador to impress on him Britain's strong dislike for the Japanese 
Foreign Minister's pont if-i-eot-ions. If Cadogan had reacted less
forthrightly, he might, however, have discovered that Shigemitsu's comments 
hinted at the real cause of the mixed signals coming from Japan, for the 
latter had observed to Butler that-
'... the crisis in Japan was as much on internal as on external issues ... 
and the anxiety of Japan's leaders could be seen by Prince Konoye's 
statement acknowledging his responsibility for the disasters in Japan.'61
The meeting between Eden and Shigemitsu on 7 February began with the 
Foreign Secretary stating that, since Matsuoka had entered the Japanese 
Government, relations had steadily worsened and that they had come to a new
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low with the Japanese mediation of the Thai-French dispute. He then 
continued by noting that Craigie had forwarded evidence of widespread 
rumours in Japan that a crisis was expected during the next few weeks, and 
proceeded to ask if there was any substance to this. Shigemitsu was, not 
surprisingly, rather taken aback by this sudden outburst and tried to 
convince Eden that the situation was not as serious as the Foreign 
Secretary had made it out to be.63 He also reacted to Eden's criticisms by 
launching into his own survey of Anglo-Japanese relations which included 
the usual observation that just as Japan could be accused of aiding Germany 
so Britain had aided Japan's enemy, China, and also that-
'... it is geographically quite natural that Japan should hold the leading 
position in East Asia, and this cannot be helped. It is no different from 
the special interests which Britain and the United States of America feel 
in the neighbouring geographical countries. ... In stating the crisis in 
Anglo-Japanese relations, you do not try to understand the other party’s 
standpoint but rather find fault with the Japan's policy [sic] and lay the 
blame on Japan. Do you think that such an explanation will serve to avert 
the impending crisis?'63
It may appear from the above, considering what Britain knew of the 
information received at the Japanese Embassy, that Shigemitsu was 
displaying the most flagrant duplicity in this interview. In fact, 
however, he was genuinely surprised by Eden's protestations; the impression 
gained in British circles of an atmosphere of crisis in the Japanese 
Embassy had been all along the result of bad intelligence. The agent 
responsible for the interception of the telephone calls was a foreign 
journalist who only knew colloquial Japanese and it appears that he either 
accidently mistranslated or, as M.I.2c later thought more likely, distorted 
messages deliberately to exaggerate his own importance.64 However, it was 
only in May 1941 that M.I.2c came to this conclusion and throughout the 
course of the crisis the information from this source was assumed to be 
reliable. Other indicators could have shown from the start that Japan did 
not intend war in the immediate future, the most obvious being that the 
Japanese merchant fleet had not been called back into home waters, but this 
information was only related by the Director of Naval Intelligence to other 
departments on 12 February, when the decision had already been taken to use
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the propaganda weapon.65 The British were therefore labouring for about a 
week under the false premise of an imminent assault, although there is a 
distinct element in this of wilful ignorance.
To Craigie, as well as the Japanese, the spiralling of the situation into a 
full-scale war scare was difficult to understand and, in particular, he was 
puzzled at a message sent on 11 February ordering British merchant ships 
over 4000 tons not to proceed into waters north of Hong Kong.66 He 
observed to the Foreign Office on 14 February-
'This would seem to be indicative of fear of some more immediate outbreak 
of hostilities in Far East than would be justified by anything I have said 
in my recent telegram. Possibly . . . action is based on disturbing 
information contained in your most secret telegrams... No evidence 
available in Tokyo suggests however that Japanese are preparing for an 
immediate attack on British territory either in conjunction with German 
offensive elsewhere or independent of it...’67
Craigie's concern was heightened further by the fact that due to Eden's 
talk with Shigemitsu he had been presented to the Japanese as the source of 
Britain’s sudden panic. In a talk with Ohashi Chuichi, the Vice Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, on 12 February, he was faced with vigorous denials 
that Japan had any intention of going to war with Britain and received a 
stern questioning about the authenticity of his reports.68 In London too, 
there were some doubts about whether the press campaign was letting the 
crisis get out of hand, which led Butler to note to Eden on 14 February- 
'Now that the press has had its first fling on the Far East, we are trying 
to control it, particularly over the weekend. We do not want it to go too 
far. ’68
By 15 February, however, it was generally felt in London that the crisis 
was beginning to pass. To some degree this impression was influenced by a 
conversation that day between Craigie and Matsuoka where the latter had 
strongly confirmed the assurances given to the British Ambassador three 
days earlier by Ohashi that Japan had no intention of going to war with 
Britain.78 A more important factor was that evidence of a Japanese retreat 
was provided by further reports arising +from the interception of the 
Japanese Embassy's phone conversations. Information obtained from the
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Embassy source suggested that a telegram that had been expected had not 
arrived and that the Japanese were climbing down; the operator recorded- 
'T. [presumably the Military Attache, General Tatsumi Eiichi] ... could not 
understand how Britain had become aware of what was likely to happen . . . 
but said the Amb. [Shigemitsu] seemed relieved and was like a man who had a 
load lifted from him.'71
These signs were backed up by further evidence which included knowledge of 
Matsuoka's intention to visit Europe in the near future, presumably 
obtained from interception, either by the Americans or Bletchley Park, of 
cables on the Tokyo-Berlin c i r c u i t . 72 This helps to explain Churchill's 
deeply cryptic message to Cadogan on 16 February, in which he noted- 
'These conversations and the delayed telegram have the air of being true, 
and make one feel the earlier conversations were real. If so, there is a 
decided easement, and the danger for the moment seems to have passed. The 
delayed telegram strongly favours this as naturally if they were not going 
to act, they would try to make amends to the Germans and Italians by 
sending their man on a diplomatic demonstration. Altogether I must feel 
very considerably assured. I have always been doubtful whether they would 
face it. '73
The belief that the worst was over was fortified in the next few days by a 
number of decrypted telegrams from the British equivalent of the American 
MAGIC information (which were referred to as BJs) confirming tl^t the 
GaimushS's sincerity when they assured Craigie that no attack was planned, 
which included one from Tokyo to the Consul-General Sydney, summarised by 
the FECB as stating that-
'All talk of impending crisis in Far East is nothing more than British 
propaganda aimed at winning over American public opinion, checking Japan's 
southward advance and hindering improvements of her relations with Thailand 
and Indo China; no action by Japan is i n d i c a t e d . *74
The apparent decision by Japan to postpone the next phase of its southern 
advance was believed in London to be a triumph for the policy of 
publicising Japan's activities and for the effects of American pressure. 
Even from Tokyo Craigie observed to the Foreign Office on 20 February- 
’ . . . the situation is today easier than it was a week ago, and that the 
combined firm stand by the United States, Australia, the Netherlands and
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ourselves has had a most salutary effect in calling bluff of the Japanese 
military is the opinion unanimously held by all colleagues with whom I am 
in contact. ’75
However, this was a rather dangerous lesson for Britain to draw from the 
crisis, for what the British authorities did not know was that the
pressure exerted by the Western powers had only led to Japanese indecision 
because of the internal divisions within Japan itself. In particular
splits had appeared within the Imperial Japanese Navy over the issue of 
whether to use military force to seize bases, with moderates such as
Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, now the commandei— in-chief of the Combined Fleet, 
still convinced that any action which risked war with America should be 
avoided. British ignorance of the internal debate in Japan was, of course, 
not altogether surprising, and even if Craigie had reported on it the
Foreign Office would on past form have probably doubted its significance. 
The result nevertheless was that Britain took away the false belief from 
this crisis that Japan could be deterred from further action by 
propaganda.7 6
The 'war scare' was an important watershed in Anglo-Japanese relations and 
on the road to the Pacific War; it was the last crisis that Britain had to 
face more or less alone and the manner in which it been solved had 
important ramifications for the balance of power in East Asia. The chief 
effect was that it finally pushed the United States into taking the lead in 
the region and co-operating more fully with Britain. As indicated above 
this had been one of the major British aims in publicising the Japanese 
threat, and progress was made in a number of fields. In the area of 
military relations, although there was no promise to station the American 
fleet at Singapore, there was a greater willingness to get involved in 
joint planning and co-operation in the field of intelligence.77 it also
provoked Washington in the economic field into increasing the range of raw 
materials put under licence and generally exerting greater pressure on 
Japan. In particular the increasing seriousness with which the United 
States viewed its role in standing up to the aggressor states was seen in 
its policy towards the Latin American countries where during the spring of 
1941 it brokered agreements for the pre-emptive buying of raw materials.78
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Another development in Anglo-American co-operation was the discussion of a 
joint declaration, which would also include the Dutch, designed to warn 
Japan that any further advance south would be treated as a matter of great 
concern. This was originally a British proposal which in early March, much 
to the surprise of Lord Halifax, was received favourably by Cordell Hull, 
with only the proviso that it should not be termed as an 'unqualified 
t h r e a t * . 7 9  The willingness of the Secretary of State to agree to such a 
move was greeted enthusiastically by Craigie who thought that the optimum 
time for such an announcement would be while Matsuoka was in Berlin as a 
means of countering Axis p r o p a g a n d a .80 Unfortunately by May Hull began 
once again to shy away from joint action and nothing came of this plan, 
although from intercepts the British were well aware how disturbed Japan 
was at such a proposal, as Matsuoka had told Shigemitsu in one telegram ’to 
squash the i d e a . ' 8 l  The war scare had thus led the United States to take a 
more active role in East Asia, but did not yet mean that the Americans were 
ready to agree to the establishment of a 'tripwire', which if crossed would 
ensure a military response.
Another important effect of the crisis in February was that it led to the 
exchange of a series of letters between Matsuoka and Churchill. This 
correspondence was initially begun by the Japanese Foreign Minister who on 
15 February communicated a message for Shigemitsu to pass to Eden. 
Matsuoka's letter, which in Eden’s absence was passed to Churchill on 16 
February, set the tone for his half of the subsequent correspondence, 
consisting largely of vague axioms; its only substantial proposal being a 
totally unacceptable plan for Japan to mediate a European peace 
s e t t l e m e n t  .82 The lack of substance in Matsuoka's letter did not come as 
any surprise to the Foreign Office and this impression was confirmed by a 
telegram from Craigie which noted-
'Most of my colleagues consider interview with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs on general questions of policy to be a waste of time. Certainly he 
has nailed his colours so firmly to the Axis mast that no amount of 
argument appears likely to achieve much r e s u l t . ' 8 3
Churchill, however, saw Matsuoka's letter as an opportunity to bring home 
to the latter the consequences of a Japanese alignment with Germany and on 
24 February handed his reply to S h i g e m i t s u . 8 4
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Over the next month the Japanese Ambassador acted as the postman for this 
correspondence, which brought him into close contact with Churchill, who 
formed a positive impression and noted at the end of his report on the 
first of their conversations that-
'His whole attitude throughout was most friendly and deprecatory, and we 
have no doubt where he stands in these matters.'85
Shigemitsu once again in these conversations with the Prime Minister raised 
the issue of British support for China, but to as little avail as before. 
The talks and the letters passing between Churchill and Matsuoka only 
helped to confirm the impression he had gathered from the war scare which 
was that Anglo-Japanese relations were beginning to approach the point of 
no return. This had the effect of making Shigemitsu increasingly 
despondent about the future and in a number of talks with Butler he began 
to express an almost fatalistic view. The most curious episode resulting 
from this tendency came in a talk with the Dutch Minister in London, 
Jankheer Michiels, when Shigemitsu advised that-
'... the Dutch negotiators in the Netherlands East Indies should be careful 
not to make any concessions to the Japanese delegation but should stand up 
to them with determination.'88
Shigemitsu*s distress was not lost on the British and when the head of the 
Far Eastern Department, John Sterndale Bennett, criticised the Ambassador 
for being insincere in espousing better Anglo-Japanese relations, R.A. 
Butler responded by producing a very accurate pen-portrait- 
'This is not a quite correct picture of S's mind ... I consider S's views 
are of a different Northern and anti-Soviet school as opposed to the 
Southern expansionists. He may have to make the best of the Southern 
school but he doesn't like it. Nor does he want to fight America + 
ourselves though he may have to.’8?
Shigemitsu had not, however, completely given up on his aim of achieving an
improvement of Anglo-Japanese relations, and on 10 March, in reporting a
speech in London by the Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies in which 
the latter had proposed that 'difficulties in the Pacific be overcome
through the frank exchange of views’, he noted to Tokyo-
' . . . I think that we can take this speech of Menzies as a gesture of 
friendship from Great Britain who earnestly desires peace in the Pacific
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Ocean.’88
This hope inspired Shigemitsu to reopen the link with Hankey in an effort 
to find common ground. A meeting subsequently took place on Saturday, 22 
March, at General Piggott's home in Ewhurst, and minutes of the meeting 
were taken by Piggott.69 The main content of the discussion rested on the 
Ambassador's complaint that Britain was not doing enough to help improve 
relations with Japan, and that this that was allowing the Axis powers to 
exert great influence over Japanese policy. To support this point 
Shigemitsu referred to a letter he had received from Kurusu Saburo, the 
former Japanese Ambassador to Germany, which stated that the former’s work 
had progressed so slowly that-
’ "whereas a hundred yen might have saved the situation before the Pact, 
many thousands would be necessary now to put matters right."'90 
The Ambassador was under no illusion as to where the present trend in 
Japanese foreign policy could lead, openly admitting that there could be 
war in the Pacific. He was also not blind to the fact that it would be a 
war that in the long run Japan could not win. The conversation was useful 
and frank but it was the events of the next day which were more
significant.
After pondering the discussion that had taken place, Shigemitsu came to the 
conclusion that one solution to the current difficulties was to take up a 
suggestion that had been made by Matsuoka's private secretary, Kase 
Toshikazu, previously Second Secretary at the London Embassy, and meet with 
Matsuoka while the latter visited Europe. He believed that this would be of 
use because he felt that one reason for the deterioration of relations was 
that the Foreign Minister had either not seen or not taken seriously his 
reports on the likelihood of British victory in the European war and thus 
had banked too heavily on an Axis triumph. Therefore on the Sunday
morning, with Hankey now gone, Shigemitsu came round once more to talk to 
Piggott and suggested that it would be a good thing for both sides if
Matsuoka could return to Japan from his European trip via London. Piggott 
passed this suggestion on to Hankey, while Shigemitsu himself wired back 
the idea to Konoe in Tokyo.91 The problem was that it soon transpired that 
Matsuoka had firmly decided on the need to return through the Soviet Union, 
and thus a visit to Britain could not be fitted into his schedule.
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Shigemitsu responded to this obstacle by proposing that instead he should 
meet the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Europe, and suggested that the 
most suitable place would be Berne at the time when Matsuoka would be 
returning from Italy to Germany.92
Once this proposal had been agreed upon, the problem was how Shigemitsu 
would be able to get from Britain to the rendezvous point in wai— time 
Europe. The only way that this could be achieved was if Shigemitsu could 
get a priority-passage flight from the British Government to travel to 
Lisbon and then another flight from Portugal to Barcelona and from there to 
Berne by train. To arrange permission for the first stage of his journey 
Shigemitsu explained his intentions to Butler, and asked Hankey to forward 
his request to Churchill. Both men subsequently wrote letters to the Prime 
Minister requesting permission for the flight on Shigemitsu's behalf and 
supported their case by praising the Japanese Amba'ssador. In his letter of 
28 March Butler observed-
'The only objection I can see is that he might take out material with him 
which would be of value to the enemy, but the great advantage of his giving 
to M. Matsuoka a proper view of the British war effort and the state of 
Europe outweighs the other risk. We have every reason for believing that 
M. Shigemitsu has a proper idea of our war effort and a true appreciation 
of the certain outcome of the war.'"
Hankey meanwhile on 31 March noted in support of the mission that- 
'Shigemitsu who professes (genuinely I think) to believe in the certainty 
of our victory is by no means certain that his reports are sufficiently 
read or taken to heart by Matsuoka and that is one reason he wants to make 
this contact.'9*
Churchill too, looked favourably on the idea of Shigemitsu meeting 
Matsuoka, not only for the above reasons, but also because the Ambassador 
could act as a direct messenger to Matsuoka for the latest letter from the 
Prime Minister, and therefore on 31 March Churchill persuaded the War 
Cabinet to agree to provide a flight to Lisbon.95
The hopes for a meeting were, however, to be dashed late on 31 March when a 
telegram from Matsuoka stated that once again he had changed his schedule 
and had decided to leave Italy earlier than originally planned. He would
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now be leaving Italy on 3 April and returning directly to Berlin. At such 
short notice it was impossible for Shigemitsu to get to Berne, a journey 
which he had found out would take him almost a week. In this situation 
Matsuoka suggested that Shigemitsu see him in Berlin, a proposal that was 
firmly rejected by the latter as it would clearly have been unacceptable to 
the British Government.96 The end result was that on 1 April Shigemitsu 
with some regret had to inform Butler that the proposal had been aborted, 
and Butler noted that in his report on the conversation-
'M r .Shigemitsu seemed to realise that the Japanese have messed things up 
and that he was losing a good opportunity of communicating with his own 
Foreign Minister.'97
Shigemitsu's disappointment at this episode was made all the more profound 
over the coming days with the news from Moscow on 13 April that Matsuoka on 
his return trip to Japan had signed a Neutrality Pact with the Soviet 
Union. This event, which must have been most distasteful for Shigemitsu 
with his finely tuned distrust of the Russians, did not augur well for 
Anglo-Japanese relations as it appeared to relieve Japan of the threat of a 
war on two fronts, and free her for a further campaign of southern 
expansion.98 Consequently Shigemitsu, who was also aware of the jrffect 
that German successes in Yugoslavia and Greece would have on the 
extremists, sent on 18 April a very carefully balanced cable to Japan which 
stressed the need for continuing caution-
'Assuming it is our duty to join this war, we should choose the moment 
judiciously. For us to plunge precipitately into the struggle at the 
present moment would not be to the best interests of the Axis powers.... 
However, when it appears that the war is reaching a conclusive stage, we 
should join the fight. I mean to say that when both England and the United 
States have exhausted their national strength and when the situation would 
be made decisive by Japan's participation we should certainly take the 
plunge...
In a word, the exercise of our basic policy must be determined first and 
foremost by our national strength. That is the primary consideration. 
Nations who now plunge hastily into this war, and I mean even the United 
States, are going to dissipate their stamina. Countries that remain aloof 
like Soviet Russia, and none save these, occupy a favourable position.
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Every indication points to this. I think this last point merits our most 
profound consideration.'"
On 7 May he expanded further on this argument by noting that the rigours of 
the European conflict were already exacerbating the racial divisions within 
the British Empire and that by encouraging the aspirations of Britain's 
Asian subjects Japan could achieve its aim of an Asia free of European 
power without the need to recourse to war. He also warned- 
’The exhaustion and destruction of the war are becoming grave. If we enter 
the war our national strength will be spent. The Italian defeat is an 
example. As time goes on, the British and American interest in the Far 
East will decline.'100(
Despite the logic of Shigemitsu's argument, his pleas for restraint were 
undermined by one major factor, namely that it appeared in Japan as if the 
Western powers were set upon a policy of encirclement and in particular of 
using their economic power to curb Japanese ambitions. The Ambassador was, 
of course, not unaware of this belief but still held out the hope that the 
impression of an economic siege could be overcome by persuading the British 
to take a more conciliatory line over the proposed Payments Agreement, and 
in particular to accept the draft that had been presented in December 1940, 
which would pave the way for a reopening of Anglo-Japanese trade. This 
optimism was once again misplaced, as British interest in a Payments 
Agreement had dwindled with the increase of restrictions on trade with 
Japan which had curbed the flow of sterling into Tokyo, and also the
cessation of the market in sterling at Shanghai.101 The British were also
wary of signing an agreement because of the uncertainty of the foreign 
reaction and in a meeting of the Far Eastern Committee on 8 May a general 
discussion agreed that-
'... any agreement with the Japanese at the present juncture would be 
likely to be misunderstood both in China and in the United States of 
America and would arouse suspicions (however groundless) that H.M. 
Government were embarking on a policy of appeasement vis a vis Japan.'102
The decision to bring the talks to an end was communicated by Butler to
Shigemitsu at a meeting on 16 May when he told the Ambassador that-
'... I did not think his Government could expect us to discuss the
301
improvement of trade relations between us, against the background of recent 
decisions of Japanese policy, which were punctuated by the unfriendly 
utterances of the Japanese Foreign M i n i s t e r 103
In response Shigemitsu asked whether a Payments Agreement could be 
concluded if the Japanese dropped the clauses in their draft linking 
sterling to a commitment to withdraw restrictions, and settled instead for 
merely a verbal agreement over the latter issue. In support of this 
proposal the Ambassador told Butler that-
'... he found in the Payments Agreement the only opportunity for 
maintaining discussion of any sort between our tw<p Governments in a period 
of crisis.'10*
This was, of course, grasping at straws and Butler was unable to agree to 
any such proposal. Shigemitsu's bitter reaction to this latest setback and 
to British policy in general was evident in a further talk with Butler at 
the end of the month, when he stated-
' . . . the China incident and the economic policy of Great Britain and 
America were both considerable impediments to any progress being made in 
Anglo-Japanese relations ... that our economic policy towards Japan was 
vindictive.'105
With the failure to initiate any new trade negotiations Shigemitsu's 
position in London looked increasingly hopeless; he was faced with the 
situation where he had a Foreign Minister who was concerned solely with 
flirting with the Axis powers and who ignored his advice, and with a host 
country whose attitude towards Japan was getting ever more rigid: the gap 
in Anglo-Japanese relations was thus widening, despite all his efforts. It 
was patently clear in this environment that there was little likelihood 
that he would be able to persuade the British to take a more conciliatory 
line, and he therefore noted in ’Japan and her Destiny’ that it was at this 
point that he decided that the most useful contribution he could make to 
the cause of continued peace with the West was to return to Tokyo. There 
he would be able to fulfil^ his desire, which had been frustrated in April, 
of meeting Matsuoka and persuading him that the threat of war had become 
increasingly serious, and thus hopefully precipitate a decisive volte-face 
in Japanese policy away from the Axis and towards the Democracies.i06
302
Shigemitsu's telling of this story is, however, somewhat economical with 
the truth,' far from returning to Japan to tell Matsuoka what was on his 
mind, the reality was that he had been recalled. On 22 May he had received 
from Tokyo a telegram informing him of Matsuoka's decision to relieve him 
and he was told-
’Your Honor will never return to your post, so please make arrangements 
with that in mind. Great Britain made an inquiry and in reply I informed 
Craigie that while in Europe, I had no opportunity to confer with Your 
Honor and consequently now am ordering you to return to get first hand 
reports from you. Will you please give the same explanation to the British 
Government.'107
As a result of these orders Shigemitsu saw Butler two days later and 
informed him that he had decided to return to Japan as he put it- 
' . . . to report personally to Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs about 
the position in this country, and the attitude which he thought Japan ought 
to take to Great Britain.'108
He then asked for facilities to be provided for him to return to Japan in
June via the United States.
This display did not fool the Foreign Office, who, due to their ability to 
read the Japanese diplomatic code, knew full well the real motive for 
Shigemitsu's departure. It was decided in the Foreign Office that the best 
policy in the circumstances was to fete Shigemitsu before he left and, 
after a request passed on from Arthur Edwardes that the Ambassador be
allowed to see the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister before he left, 
Eden wrote to Churchill suggesting that the latter should have a talk with 
the Ambassador, and noted-
'I have reason to believe that he does not at present intend to return to 
this country. As you know, he is personally a good friend of ours, so we 
may as well buttress him with a little attention here before he leaves.'109 
This obviously brings into play the question of how Britain knew that
Shigemitsu was genuinely friendly. It must be presumed that this was not 
simply based on the warm praise of Britain's war effort that he had 
expressed to Butler on a number of occasions, but more likely on 
information derived from the BJ source. In relation to this it is 
interesting to note that in his diary entry for 14 May 1941 Captain Malcolm
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Kennedy, who by this time was stationed at Bletchley, noted that Piggott 
had told him that-
' . . . both Shigemitsu and Tatsumi . . . have been very outspoken in their 
criticism of Matsuoka and his policy. This, of course, serves to bear out 
and amplify what one has learned from other sources.‘H O
The assessment of Shigemitsu as a 'friend' made Churchill agreeable to a 
meeting and also led to a farewell luncheon being arranged at the Foreign 
Office on 9 June which was attended by Eden, Butler and Lord Moyne, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. Shigemitsu at this lunch made a last 
forlorn attempt to persuade his hosts to compromise over the trade issue, 
but to no avail, i n  The Ambassador also bade farewell to other senior 
British figures in his last week in Britain, and this round of engagements 
included a lunch with Hankey at the Savoy where he told the latter, 
according to Hankey's diary, that he valued his 'opinion and friendship 
more than that of any other man in this country.’ H 2  On 12 June he met 
Leith Ross for the final time and engaged in his last bid to persuade 
Britain to relax its economic restrictions. Although he began by 
reiterating the usual Japanese line, towards the end of the conversation he 
veered towards what appears to be a more personal line and, according to 
Leith Ross's summary of the talk, he said that-
' [Japan] had made many mistakes in her policy towards China, but now both 
the civilians and the military were agreed that peace should be made 
without territorial gains and without indemnities. ... [Hie ... regretted 
that collaboration with us had not been arranged at the time when I went 
out to China.'113
Shigemitsu finally left Britain on a flight to Lisbon 17 June and his 
departure was marked by an officially inspired editorial in the Times 
praising his efforts for peace.
Shigemitsu's fears for the future of Anglo-Japanese relations were to a 
lesser degree mirrored in the spring and summer of 1941 by Craigie. The 
British Ambassador's doubts began to emerge after the 'war scare' largely 
as a result of the ever tightening economic noose being drawn around Japan. 
Like the Japanese Ambassador, he viewed the policy of economic restrictions 
as having the greatest potential to cause conflict7 this did not mean,
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however, that he was opposed to sanctions but rather that he was worried 
about the range of goods that they covered and the degree to which they 
were implemented. It would therefore be a mistake to contend that any 
fundamental difference over policy separated him from the Foreign Office 
during the period between March and June, the position was more subtle than 
that, but nevertheless the views that Craigie expressed over these months 
did anticipate the arguments that led to the deep split that developed in 
the autumn.
In the initial wake of the crisis in February Craigie kept up the tough 
stand towards Japan which he had espoused since October 1940. In a 
telegram of 22 February, when it still appeared possible that Japan would 
demand bases as payment for its mediation of the Thai-French dispute, he 
urged that Japanese control over Cam Ranh Bay or Saigon should be met by 
reinforcements for Malaya and the strengthening of economic sancti0ns.il4 
When subsequent to this the Ministry of Economic Warfare suggested the 
blacklisting of Okura, Mitsubishi and Mitsui, Craigie immediately notified 
them of his a s s e n t .  1 15 He also continued in his hostility to Matsuoka, 
believing that the Foreign Minister's visit to Europe was clear proof of 
the latter's pro-Axis attitude, and even went as far as to suggest to the 
Foreign Office on 18 March that-
'I ... hope that it may be possible to air raid Berlin during Japanese 
Minister for Foreign Affairs visit. In his conversations with me he has 
always tended to take my statements in regard to growing power of the 
R.A.F. with a grain of salt and I consider the effect of heavy raid would 
be very salutary.'116
Craigie also took a very severe view of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality 
Pact, which he saw as further evidence of Japan's ambition to expand 
southward, and he noted to London on 15 April-
'... we must now, more than ever, be on our guard against a Japanese move 
southward... . It is the moment to keep our powder dry; to make it clear 
that our policy in Far East has not been affected in the slightest by this 
development; and, while abstaining from unnecessary provocation and in 
particular from any further publicity in regard to our reinforcements in 
Malaya and Burma, to stiffen if anything our general attitude towards this
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country.'117
On the surface this reads as a call to arms, but in fact the most important 
feature to notice in explaining Craigie's attitude at this point is the 
proviso that British actions should avoid being provocative. This was to 
be the crux of the divisions between Craigie and London in the spring and 
summer of 1941.
There were a number of issues over which this split developed. As noted in 
the quotation above, one of these was the policy pursued by the Ministry of 
Information of loudly publicising the arrival of each new batch of
reinforcements in Malaya. Craigie felt this was mistaken, because he 
believed that those the British wanted to impress with their strength, the
Japanese Army and Navy, would learn of the arrival of these forces whether
it was publicised or not, and that to make a big event out of
reinforcements only contributed to the impression that either Britain was 
bluffing about its strength in the region or that the Western powers were 
intent on encircling Japan. To Craigie these constituted needless 
provocations, but in London the policy was viewed as a valuable weapon in 
restraining the Japanese, and Craigie was seen as being too sensitive to 
Japanese feelings.!18
Craigie also became involved in another defence controversy at this 
juncture, concerning the American decision in May 1941 to transfer part of 
the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor to the Atlantic. On 7 May, after being 
asked to forward his views on this matter, Craigie argued that any such 
American action would be taken in Japan as indicating that the United 
States was preparing to enter the European War, and that-
' . . . the belief in extremist circles that Japan could attack us without 
becoming involved with the United States would be greatly strengthened.'119 
The Far Eastern Department broadly concurred in this opinion, and on 8 May 
Eden used Craigie*s critique at a War Cabinet meeting to show the doubts 
that existed about the American proposal. This argument did not, however, 
convince Churchill, who was determined not to oppose any American 
suggestion for fear of antagonizing Washington and who subsequently decreed 
that the telegram should not be forwarded to the Dominions. 120 Thus for a 
second time the Prime Minister and Craigie had clashed over American policy
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in the Pacific, and just as in October 1940, the division between them had 
been due to Churchill's earnest desire to get the Americans into the war 
and his downplaying of the likelihood of Japan entering the war.
The chief focus of Craigie's fears was not over the military side of 
deterrence but over its economic manifestations. His first real doubts in 
this field came in March 1941 when Vice-Minister Ohashi complained to him 
about the Canadian decision to put licence restrictions on the export of 
wheat.121 Craigie took the Vice-Minister's complaint very seriously and 
consequently noted to the Foreign Office-
'... it may have unnecessarily harmful effects here, particularly as there 
is no reason to suspect enemy destination [Germany]: to give Japanese
pretext, however faint, for shifting to our shoulders, the blame for 
growing food shortage in Japan would be to play into German hands, so I 
suggest that restrictions on exports of food ... should as far as possible 
be avoided.'122
The doubts engendered by this issue were expanded further after another 
talk with Ohashi on 11 April in which the Vice-Minister had challenged 
Craigie about the motives for British trade restrictions, and the 
Ambassador consequently^ to reply with the official line that they were only 
designed to preserve vital raw materials for the war effort and to prevent 
the re-export of commodities to Germany, and not as sanctions against 
Japan.123 This unconvincing explanation of British policy allied with the 
dangers caused by the unilateral Canadian action over wheat made Craigie 
believe that the policy of economic sanctions was in urgent need of 
rat ionalizat ion.
The result was that on 30 April Craigie sent a memorandum to London, drawn 
up with his Canadian and Australian colleagues in Tokyo, that attempted to 
set out clearly the aims of British policy and the methods by which they 
could be achieved.124 The memorandum began by clearly differentiating 
between sanctions designed to influence Japan not to expand southwards and 
those to be introduced as reprisals against any further Japanese fait 
accomplis. In relation to the first scenario Craigie warned against the 
use of too provocative restrictions, and with the case of the Canadian 
wheat in mind, he stressed that it must be made clear to the Japanese as an
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incentive for peace that-
' . . . provided that Japan does not go further in her policy of southward 
expansion or in seeking a privileged position in Eastern Asia, there is no 
intention of interfering with the available food supply and raw materials 
for internal consumption in Japan or for supply of Japan's normal peacetime 
industry.'125
Over the issue of how to react in the face of another crisis, Craigie 
proposed that the best idea was to respond with a 'slight turn of the 
screw’, so that Japan would be aware of the cost of further expansion, and 
then, if Japan still moved forward, to take firmer action, but in the 
realization that it could lead to war. Craigie felt that these proposals 
would provide Britain with greater flexibility in its sanctions policy and 
allow for stricter co-ordination within the Empire and he concluded the 
memorandum by noting that-
'The Japanese realisation that such machinery had been perfected, combined 
with the knowledge that we were at present using our powers with discretion 
and moderation, would in itself constitute one of the best deterrents 
against unwise or hasty action by Japan in South Eastern Asia.'126
The reaction in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Warfare to 
Craigie's memorandum was to argue that the issues it raised, such as co­
ordination, had been dealt with already in the Far Eastern Committee, and 
that the difference he postulated between the two types of sanctions was 
artificial and unconvincing. John Troutbeck, the head of the Japan desk at 
the Ministry, noted in relation to the latter-
'The only limitation to our action should be the danger of forcing Japan to 
violent reactions, and that danger remains whether Japan makes a move or 
not. ... [Wie must get away from this false antithesis of a comparatively 
good Japan and a possibly bad Japan. Japan is already bad, and our whole 
policy is based on this obvious fact... '127
Another disagreement that London had with Craigie*s thinking was over his 
assertion that Britain should not restrict supplies of foodstuffs or raw 
materials designed solely for Japanese consumption. The Foreign Office 
told Craigie of their reservations in a telegram to Tokyo on 21 May, which 
informed him-
'We can only agree not to interfere with foodstuffs in so far as they are
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genuinely needed for internal consumption and not intended either for 
exports to the enemy or to replace exports to the enemy. Fats is a case in 
point. ... COlur attitude to raw materials must also be qualified by our 
desire to make Japan draw on her accumulated reserves as well as by our 
desire to make her feel the effects of ranging herself against the 
Democrac i es.'12 8
The issue of fats raised in the Foreign Office telegram was particularly 
important at this time because Britain had begun within the last month or 
so to restrict exports to Japan of copra (coconut oil) from its Pacific 
islands and North Borneo. This was part of an attempt to force Japan to 
cut back on the export of soya bean oil to Germany, which was woefully 
short of fats, as copra was used widely in Japan as a cooking oil. Craigie 
was, however, not convinced by this argument of strategic necessity and 
believed instead that this action was highly dangerous, because, like 
wheat, it could be presented by the Japanese Government to the people as 
clear evidence of the West's attempts to force Japan to its knees and thus 
with an opportunity to justify retaliation.129 Again he pressed the 
Foreign Office to show some leniency, advising that at the very least small 
consignments be allowed to reach Japan, but he received no satisfaction, as
the Ministry of Economic Warfare refused to compromise.l30
The dispute between Craigie and London over sanctions occurred 
simultaneously with a renewed atmosphere of crisis in South East Asia. By 
the end of May 1941 it was apparent that the Dutch-Japanese economic talks 
in Batavia were close to collapse, and that this could only lead to a 
further worsening of Japan's economic position. On 22 May, in anticipation 
of this event, Matsuoka asked Craigie to see him to discuss whether it
would be possible to use Britain’s good offices to rescue the talks.
Craigie did not support Matsuoka's proposal, but he did feel that the 
situation raised an opportunity for Britain and the Netherlands to make a 
joint enquiry to the Japanese about the quantities of each commodity that 
they wished to import and whether they were willing to give a guarantee 
against r e - e x p o r t . 131 The Foreign Office reaction to this idea was little 
short of consternation, and Henry Ashley Clarke of the Far Eastern 
Department noted-
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’ . . . bitter experience has shown that to engage in negotiations with the 
Japanese on a sore point, e.g. Customs (1938), Tientsin (1939), Burma Road 
(1940), so far from delaying or attenuating a crisis, usually precipitates 
one and relations with Japan become strained to the u t m o s t . '13 2  
When Craigie was informed that the Foreign Office deprecated any effort to 
negotiate, he quickly responded by arguing that-
’Admittedly, it would be difficult to secure these guarantees in the 
present circumstances, particularly if Japan is likely to be in a position 
to obtain her full supplies despite our efforts: but I am unable to
appreciate the force of the argument against even making the a t t e m p t . ' 1 3 3  
His pleas, however, fell on deaf ears, for what he was proposing clashed 
with the new basis of British policy which was that sanctions would, in 
fact, have to become harsher so that Japan would have to draw on the 
stockpiles collected in the autumn and winter of 1940/1 as a result of 
American tardiness in introducing proper restrictions.
There was then an accumulation of disputes between Craigie and London over 
the nature of economic sanctions in the summer of 1941 arising from their 
increasing range and effectiveness. This series of issues helped to 
concentrate Craigie’s doubts about the growing severity of the economic 
restrictions and led him to warn the Foreign Office in his reply to their 
telegram of 21 May that the sanctions policy was becoming ever more 
dangerous; in one passage he noted prophetically-
'To extend restrictions on Japanese imports to an extent that would force 
Japan to draw on her reserves on any considerable scale would at present be 
liable to produce those very reactions we wish to avoid. The elements here 
in favour of violent measures would be able to point out that we had in 
fact embarked on a policy of withholding normal current supplies from 
Japan, and that it was therefore essential to secure those supplies from 
sources outside our c o n t r o l . ’1 3 4
The warnings emanating from Craigie did not have any great effect on 
Whitehall. On 12 June the Far Eastern Committee considered his 30 April 
memorandum but his ideas were dismissed as being largely outdated and 
greater appreciation was shown a little later for a Ministry of Economic 
Warfare memorandum summarising the developments in the field of economic 
sanctions since October 1940. This paper noted the growing scale of the
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restrictions, the expansion of co-operation with the United States, the 
Dominions and the Dutch, and the steady easing of Japan out of Latin 
American markets, and concluded-
'The Japanese are, it may be hoped, finding it more and more difficult to 
avoid drawing on their reserves. In every part of the world they are 
meeting with obstruction ultimately caused either by British or United 
States action. . . While it would be foolish to claim that they are as yet 
seriously weakened, it would be equally foolish to deny that they are 
becoming increasingly a l a r m e d . ' l 3 5
This memorandum was correct in assessing that the Japanese were becoming 
alarmed; it was, however, wrong in its implication that this would lead to 
a less aggressive Japan. Increasingly in Japan, once it was clear that the 
Dutch talks had collapsed, there were calls from within both the Army and 
the Navy for a renewal of the southern advance in order to secure access to 
the strategic raw materials on which the 'self existence of the Japanese 
Empire’ depended. On 16 June at a Liaison Conference the Army Chief of 
Staff, General Sugiyama Gen, with the support of the Navy Chief of Staff, 
Admiral Nagano Osami, insisted that south Indo-China must be occupied by 
the end of July so that Japan would have the option of a military advance 
later in the year if the present level of economic pressure had not 
ceased, l36 This was the beginning of the final phase in the path to the 
Pacific War, and the development that both Shigemitsu and Craigie had 
feared would arise from the economic stranglehold that was developing 
around Japan. For as they had warned London, the policy of sanctions was 
not deterring the Japanese extremists from action it was rather provoking 
them to launch new adventures that would greatly increase the prospects of 
war.
NOTES
1. Captain Malcolm Kennedy diary entry for 12 February 1941, Kennedy 
Papers, Sheffield University Library, Diary 4/36.
2. See D. Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941. 
A Study in Competitive Co-operation. CEuropa, London, 1981) pp.137-141, 
and M.A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares For Total War. The Search For
311
Economic Security, 1919-1941. (Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, N.Y. 1987) 
pp.192-197.
3. PRO CAB96/1 FE(40)3 Ministry of Economic Warfare to R.A. Butler 5 
Sept ember 1940.
4. The idea for the setting up of the Far Eastern Committee originated 
with J. Sterndale Bennett, the head of the Far Eastern Department in
the Foreign Office who felt that the Burma Road crisis showed the need
for greater co-ordination, see PRO F0371/24670 F4489/43/10 J. Sterndale 
Bennett Memorandum 1 October 1940. For the work of the Far Eastern 
Committee see P. Lowe, Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific 
War. A Study of British Policy in East Asia 1937-1941. (Clarendon, 
Oxford, 1977) Appendix C pp.292-294, and W.N. Medlicott, The Economic
Blockade Vol.2. (HMSO, London, 1959) p.68.
5. PRO CAB65/9 WM 264(40) War Cabinet conclusions 2 October 1940.
6 . PRO CAB66/14 WP(40)484 Far Eastern Committee report 17 December 1940.
7. See W.N. Medlicott, op.cit. pp.70-72.
8 . PRO F0371/24722 F4626/4605/61 Lord Lothian to Lord Halifax 9 October
1940. See also R. Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign 
Policy, 1932-1945. (Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1979) p.242, and A. 
Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific. 
(Longman, London, 1987) pp.121-122, and D. Reynolds, op.cit. p.141.
9. PRO F0371/24710 F4888/193/61 N. Butler to Lord Halifax 23 October 1940. 
See also M. Barnhart, Japan Prepares For Total War. p. 195, and W.N. 
Medlicott, op.cit. p.71.
10. On the American presence at the Singapore Conference see PRO CAB79/7 
COS(40) Chiefs of Staff 360th meeting 26 October, and for the visit of 
Commander Wisden to the Philippines see ADM199/1477 Director of Naval 
Intelligence (Admiralty) to Commander— in-Chief China Station and 
Captain on Staff 22 October 1940, and Commander-in-Chief China 
station to Director of Naval Intelligence 3 November 1940.
11. PRO F0371/24710 F4710/193/61 Sir R. Craigie to Lord Halifax 14 October
1940.
12. PRO F0371/24736 F4811/626/23 Sir R. Craigie to Lord Halifax 16 October 
1940.
13. PRO F0371/24726 F5063/23/23 Sir R. Craigie to Lord Halifax 9 November
1940.
14. Ibid, see also K. Sato, Japan and Britain at the Crossroads, 1939-
1941. A Study in the Dilemmas of Japanese Diplomacy. (Senshu Univ. 
Press, Tokyo, 1986), and P. Lowe, op.cit. p.219.
15. A list of disturbing developments in German-Japanese relations is
included in PRO F0371/24737 F5696/626/23 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 21
312
December 1940. For information on British suspicions of Japanese 
collaboration with the activities of German raiders in the Pacific see 
the files F0371/25162, F0371/28814 and ADM1/10294. British ire was 
particularly raised by the bombardment of the island of Nauru on 27 
December 1940 by a raider which had approached the island flying the 
Japanese flag and calling itself the Nanyo Maru. It was thought very 
likely that the raider had recently taken on provisions in the 
Marshall Islands, which were a Japanese Mandate. See also J.W.M. 
Chapman (ed.), The Price of Admiralty. The War Diary of the German 
Naval Attache in Japan 1939-1943. (Univ. of Sussex Press, Lewes, 1984) 
entries for 28-30 December 1940, pp.343-344.
16. PRO F0371/24737 F5696/626/23 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 21 December
1940. Matsuoka had made his vague warning to Craigie eleven days 
earlier see F0371/24726 F5542/23/23 Sir R. Craigie to Lord Halifax 9 
December 1941.
17. On the background to the Thai-French dispute and the attitude of the 
Powers see S. Nagaoka, 'The Drive into Southern Indochina and 
Thailand' in J.W. Morley (ed.), The Fateful Choice. Japan's Advance 
into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941. (Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1980) 
pp.209-221, N. Brailey, Thailand and the Fall of Singapore. A 
Frustrated Asian Revolution. (Westview, Boulder, Col., 1986) pp.93-97, 
and E.T. Flood, 'The 1940 Franco-Thai Border Dispute and Phibun 
Sonkhraam's Commitment to Japan.' in Journal of Southeast Asian 
History Vol.10 No.3 pp.306-327.
18. On British and American differences see G.R. Hess, 'The Emergence of 
U.S. Influence in Southeast Asia’ in A. Iriye and W. Cohen (eds.), 
American, Chinese, and Japanese Perspectives on Wartime Asia 1931-1941 
(Scholarly Resources, Wilmington, DE, 1990) pp.187-192.
19. PRO F0371/24737 F5695/626/23 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 21 December
1940.
20. PRO F0371/24711 F5359/193/61 Lord Halifax to A.V. Alexander 26 
November 1940. See also A.J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The 
Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. Strategic Illusions, 1936-
1941. (Clarendon, Oxford, 1981) pp.138-139.
21. Ibid, A.V. Alexander to Lord Halifax 29 November 1940.
22. In one particular episode in January 1941 Churchill reacted violently
to a proposal contained in a draft letter from the Chiefs of Staff to
the Commander-in Chief Far East, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke- 
Popham, for air reinforcements to Malaya, by arguing that he could see 
no reason for the diversion of such large forces. See PRO PREM 3 
156/3 W. Churchill to General H. Ismay 13 January 1941.
23. PRO F0371/24726 F5173/23/23 Sir R. Craigie to Lord Halifax 4 December
1940.
24. PRO F0371/24711 F5426/193/61 Sir R. Craigie to Lord Halifax 4 December
1940. See also A.J. Marder, op.cit. p.138.
313
25. PRO F0371/24711 F5732/193/61 N. Butler to A. Eden 25 December 1940.
26. PRO F0837/530 T33/65/Z Vol.1 N. Butler to Ministry of Economic Warfare 
24 December 1940. See also W.N. Medlicott, op.cit. pp.72-73.
27. PRO CAB66/14 WP(40)484 Far Eastern Committee Report 18 December 1940.
28. A particular target of the Ministry of Economic Warfare was the trade 
between Latin America and Japan, and a number of ships such as the 
Kanto Maru and the Ana Maru were stopped at Cape Town. The British, 
however, did not have such great success in ships that opted to travel 
via the Panama Canal as the Americans were opposed to contraband 
control in the Caribbean and the Canadians were reluctant to agree to 
interceptions in the Pacific. See PRO F0371/20581 for details on the 
particular cases.
29. PRO F0371/20581 W12072/8/49 Sir R. Craigie to Lord Halifax 29 November
1940.
30. PRO T160/1094 F16244/2 S.D. Waley to R. Howe 20 December 1939.
31. PRO F0371/24732 F2335/103/23 M. Shigemitsu/R.A. Butler conversation
4 April 1940.
32. PRO F0371/24733 F3242/103/23 S.D. Waley memorandum 27 June 1940.
33. PRO F0371/24733 F4013/103/23 S.D. Waley to S. Okamoto 26 August 1940.
34. PRO F0371/24734 F4484/103/23 Sir R. Craigie to Lord Halifax 22 October
1940.
35. PRO F0371/24734 F5433/103/23 S. Kamimura to S.D. Waley 16 December
1940.
36. PRO F0371/24711 F5397/193/61 M. Shigemitsu/R.A. Butler conversation 
2 December 1940.
37. Ibid, Shigemitsu also raised the issue of British policy towards 
China in a talk with Butler on 1 November; for an account of this 
latter conversation see P. Lowe, op.cit. p.217.
38. PRO F0371/24711 F5283/193/61 M. Shigemitsu/R.A. Butler conversation
22 November 1940. On the Nanking Agreement which followed the failure 
of Japan to entice the Kuomintang into talks see K. Usui, 'The 
Politics of War, 1937-1941.' in J.W. Morley (ed.). The China Quagmire. 
Japan's Expansion on the Asian Continent, 1933-1941. (Columbia Univ. 
Press, New York, 1984) pp.394-435, and A. Iriye, op.cit. pp.123-126.
39. PRO CAB63/177 Hankey Papers, Major— General F.S.G. Piggott to Lord 
Hankey 30 September 1940,
40. Ibid, Lord Hankey to Major— General F.S.G. Piggott 8 October 1940.
314
41. PRO F0371/27901 F234/27/23 Lord Lloyd to Lord Halifax 4 December 1940. 
See also Lord Hankey affidavit for M. Shigemitsu, Defence Exhibit 
3547, in R.J. Pritchard & S.M. Zaide, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial
Vol.XIV (Garland, New York, 1981) p.34512.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid, Lord Halifax to Lord Lloyd 17 December 1940.
44. For details on the tide of events in January 1941 see S. Hatano & S.
Asada, 'The Japanese Decision to Move South' in R. Boyce & E.M.
Robertson, Paths to War. New Essays on the Origins of the Second World 
War. (Macmillan, London, 1989.) pp.392-394. S. Nagaoka, op.cit.
pp.222-231, and A. Iriye, op.cit. pp.131-132.
45. See S. Nagaoka, op.cit. pp.227-228, and K. Sato, op.cit. p.96.
46. For the split between the GaimushQ and the Services see J. Tsunoda,
'The Navy’s Role in the Southern Strategy' in J.W. Morley (ed.), The 
Fateful Choice, op.cit. pp.283-295.
47. PRO W0208/892 Captain of Intelligence Staff (Singapore) to Director of 
Naval Intelligence (Admiralty) 24 January and 25 January 1941. See 
also ADM199/411 War Diary of Admiral Sir G. Layton, January and 
February 1941. For general accounts of the February 'war scare' see 
C. Hosoya, 'Britain and the US in Japan's View of the International 
System, 1937-1941' in I. Nish (ed.), Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919- 
1952. (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1982) pp.66-70, A.J. Marder, 
op.cit. pp.185-187, and P. Lowe, op.cit. pp.220-225.
48. PRO W0208/892 Captain of Intelligence Staff (Singapore) to Director of
Naval Intelligence (Admiralty) 23 January 1941.
49. Ibid, BJ 087213 Japanese Minister (Bangkok) to Tokyo 28 January 1941,
no decryption date. One of the 'straws in the wind* that led to the
crisis in February was a report from the Dutch that they had
intercepted a telephone conversation in East Java between two Japanese 
who had talked of an attack to be launched on 10 February, see PRO 
F0371/27962 F523/523/23 Consul E. Meiklereid (Sourabaya) to Captain of 
Intelligence Staff (Singapore) 1 February 1941. On the general
exchange of intelligence between the Dutch and the British see
ADM199/1477. There was, however, a great deal of confusion 
about what exactly Japan was planning; on 24 January Lt. Col. D. 
Mackenzie of M.I.2c minuted after reading BJ 087059 [not traced] 'The 
Japanese do not seem to have made up their minds what policy to 
follow.', see W0208/1901.
50. PRO F0371/27760 F454/9/61 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 27 January 1941.
51. PRO F0371/27760 F540/9/61 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 3 February 1941.
This telegram was recommended for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff 
to the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee on 5 February 1941, see 
CAB79/9 COS(41) Chiefs of Staff 43rd meeting 5 February 1941 10.30 AM.
315
52. PRO PREM 3 156/6 'Japanese Intentions' Joint Intelligence Sub­
committee report 5 February 1941. Also quoted in A.J. Marder, op.cit. 
pp.186-187.
53. PRO CAB80/25 COS(41)73 Annex 1 'Measures to Avert War With Japan’ 
Chiefs of Staff report 6 February 1941.
54. PRO W0208/855 Entry for 5 February, in Summary of Intelligence 5 
February to 25 February 1941, M.I.2c undated report. This information 
was forwarded to Washington and Tokyo on 6 February, see F0371/27962 
F523/523/23 A. Eden to Lord Halifax 6 February 1941, Telegrams 714 and 
727. Churchill refused, however, to let these telegrams be forwarded 
to the Dominions, although there is no clear reason mentioned for this 
decision.
55. Sir A. Cadogan diary entry for 6 February 1941 in D. Dilks (ed.), The 
Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945. (Puttnam, New York, 1971) 
p.353.
56. See W0208/882 Lt. Colonel K.W.D. Strong to Director of Military 
Intelligence 8 February 1941. This report also noted that a reliable 
source had reported that the German build-up in S.E. Europe was a 
cover for a surprise attack on Britain.
57. The proposal to initiate a propaganda campaign came from the Joint 
Intelligence Sub-Committee, see 'JIC(41)61 'Possible Action Against 
Japan' 7 February 1941, enclosure in appendix to PRO CAB79/9 C0SC41) 
Chiefs of Staff 46th meeting 8 February 1941. The policy of pressing 
the Americans to restrain the Japanese was officially suggested by the 
Chiefs of Staff in a report oh 6 February and discussed by the Chiefs 
with Eden the next day, see PRO CAB80/25 C0S(41)73 Annex 1 'Measures 
to Avert War With Japan' Chiefs of Staff report 6 February 1941, and 
CAB79/9 A. Eden/Chiefs of Staff meeting 7 February 1941. On the 
general issue of how Britain used propaganda to manipulate the crisis 
for its own purposes see C. Hosoya, op.cit. p.70 and K. Sato, op.cit.
p.101.
58. The proposal for a Propaganda Sub-Committee was made at a meeting of 
the Far Eastern Committee on 6 February, see PRO CAB96/2 FE(41) 6th 
meeting 6 February 1941. The Propaganda Sub-Committee subsequently 
produced a report for the full committee, see CAB96/3 FE<41)38 Ad-hoc 
Sub-Committee report 11 February 1941.
59. H. Hopkins/R.A. Butler conversation 6 February 1941 in Butler Papers, 
Trinity College, Cambridge, RAB G/12.
60. Ibid. Arising out of the meeting between Eden and the Chiefs of Staff 
a long telegram was subsequently sent to Washington describing in 
detail the calamitous effect a war with Japan would have on Britain's 
strategic position, see F0371/27886 F677/17/23 A. Eden to Lord Halifax 
11 February 1941, telegram 693.
61. PRO F0371/27878 F529/12/23 M. Shigemitsu/R.A. Butler conversation 31 
January 1941. This then led to Cadogan minuting on 3 February- 'Like
316
all Japanese, he [Shigemitsu] thinks he can put over the most blatant 
nonsense, and I think he wants taking up gently when he does this.', 
see F0371/27886 F648/17/23 Sir A. Cadogan minute 3 February 1941.
62. PRO F0371/27886 F648/17/23 M. Shigemitsu/A. Eden conversation 7 
February 1941. See also P. Lowe, op.cit. p.222, and K. Sato, op.cit. 
pp.98-99.
63. M. Shigemitsu to Y. Matsuoka 8 February 1941, in R.J. Pritchard & S.M. 
Zaide, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Vol. IV (Garland, New York, 1981) 
pp.9792-9793. In the Foreign Office record of the talk Shigemitsu's 
comments are only summarised briefly.
64. PRO W0208/855 Minutes by Major J. Chapman and Lt. Colonel D. Mackenzie 
16 May 1941. In these minutes the two officers implied that this 
apparently false information had not significantly changed Britain's 
assessment of Japanese intentions, but this does not tally with the 
information from other sources quoted above, which suggest that the 
telephone intercepts did raise the level of British concern. The file 
is also interesting because Chapman tantalisingly notes at one point 
that 'At the time (5-21 Feb.) the PM's opinion was the whole story was 
a very clever Japanese "plant”.’
65. PRO F0371/27887 FI173/17/23 Director of Naval Intelligence to Far 
Eastern Department (Foreign Office) 12 February 1941. The Navy 
Department in Washington had informed the Australian Minister, Richard 
Casey, in January 1941 that they did not foresee a Japanese attack in 
the foreseeable future as the Japanese merchant fleet was 'still 
scattered over the globe', see CAB122/5 R. Casey/Admiral R. Turner 
and Admiral R. Ingersoll conversation 14 January 1941.
66. A summary of the order can be seen in PRO ADM199/411 The War Diary 
of the Commander— in-Chief China Fleet, diary entry for 11 February
1941.
67. PRO F0371/27785 F947/161/61 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 14 February
1941.
68. PRO F0371/27886 F895/17/23 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 12 February 1941.
69. R.A. Butler note for A. Eden 14 February 1941, in Butler Papers,
RAB G12.
70. PRO F0371/27878 F1009/12/23 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 15 February
1941. See also P. Lowe, op.cit. p.224.
71. PRO W0208/855 Entry for 15 February, in Summary of Intelligence 5 
February to 25 February 1941 M.I.2c undated report.
72. Ibid, J.R. [Captain Julian Ridsdale ?] note 15 February 1941, this 
note stated- 'It has been reported that Mr. Matsuoka is to visit 
Europe... ', it then listed what was believed to be his intended 
itinerary.
317
73. PRO PREM 3 252/6A W. Churchill to Sir A. Cadogan 16 February 1941.
74. PRO W0208/892 Captain of Intelligence Staff (Singapore) to Director of 
Naval Intelligence (Admiralty) 1 March 1941, but see also W0208/896 
'Short Summary of Recent BJ's on Japan' Major J. Chapman report 26 
February 1941. This information raises the important question of how 
early could Britain read the Japanese diplomatic code. The decrypted 
(or BJ) material up until February 1941 appears mainly to be from 
consular and other low-grade ciphers, but by late in the month some 
BJs are clearly from high level cables. The earliest dated BJ from 
the Tokyo-London circuit in the PRO files is BJ 087976 Tokyo to London 
21 February 1941, in W0208/892.
75. PRO F0371/27887 FU59/17/23 Sir R. Craigie to Foreign Office 20 
February 1941.
76. For more detail on Japan's hesitation in February 1941 see J. Tsunoda,
op.cit pp.284-286, S. Hatano and S. Asada, op.cit. p.394, and S.
Nagaoka, op.cit. pp.232-234.
77. See R.J. Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval 
Relations, 1937-1941. (Chapel Hill, NC, 1977) pp.234-266, A.J. Marder, 
op.cit. pp.195-196. P. Lowe, op.cit. pp.191-208, and D. Reynolds, 
op.cit. pp.225-229.
78. On the American expansion of economic restrictions, see J. Utley,
Going to War with Japan, 1937-1941. (Univ. of Tennessee Press, 
Knoxville, Tenn., 1985) pp.121-122, M.A. Barnhart, op.cit. pp.221- 
222, and W.N. Medlicott, op.cit. pp.96-99 & 129-131.
79. PRO F0371/27888 F1627/17/23 Lord Halifax to Foreign Office 5 March
1941.
80. PRO F0371/27888 F1764/17/23 Sir R. Craigie to Foreign Office 7 March
1941.
81. PRO W0208/892 BJ 089788 Tokyo to London 11 April 1941, decrypted 14 
April 1941. For Hull's backing down over the joint declaration see 
F0371/27891 F3612/17/23 Lord Halifax to A. Eden 4 May 1941.
82. PRO F0371/27787 F1069/17/23 Y. Matsuoka memorandum 16 February 1941.
On the Matsuoka-Churchill correspondence see P. Lowe, op.cit.
pp.225-230, and K. Sato, op.cit. pp.100-103.
83. PRO F0371/27878 F1072/17/23 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 17 February
1941.
84. PRO F0371/27887 F1239/17/23 W. Churchill memorandum 24 February 1941.
85. Ibid, M. Shigemitsu/W. Churchill conversation 24 February 1941.
Also quoted in P. Lowe, op.cit. p.227.
86. PRO F0371/27888 F1670/17/23 J.E. Michiels Van Verduynen/ R .A. Butler 
conversation 6 March 1941.
318
87. PRO F0371/27889 F2522/17/23 R.A. Butler minute 26 March 1941. For an 
account of Matsuoka*s visit to Europe see C. Hosoya, 'The Japanese- 
Soviet Neutrality Pact.' in J.W. Morley (ed), The Fateful Choice.
pp.71-74, and K. Sato, op.cit. pp.106-111.
88. The Magic Background to Pearl Harbor. Vol.l. (Department of Defense, 
Washington D.C., 1978) No.389 London to Washington (to Tokyo) 10 March 
1941 p.204.
89. PRO CAB63/177 Hankey Papers Major-General F.S.G. Piggott record of M. 
Shigemitsu/Lord Hankey conversation 22 March 1941. See also Lord 
Hankey affidavit for M. Shigemitsu, Defence Exhibit 3547, in R.J. 
Pritchard & S.M. Zaide, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Vol.XIV. ( 
Garland, New York, 1981) p.34512. See also M. Shigemitsu, Japan and 
Her Destiny. (Hutchinson, London, 1958) pp.215-216, and F.S.G.
Piggott, Broken Thread. (Gale & Polden, Aldershot, 1950) pp.350-351.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid, Major— General F.S.G. Piggott to Lord Hankey 30 March 1941. See 
also M. Shigemitsu, op.cit. pp.215-216.
93. PRO PREM 3 252/6A R.A. Butler to W. Churchill 28 March 1941.
94. PRO CAB/177 Hankey Papers, Lord Hankey to W. Churchill 31 March 1941.
95. PRO CAB65/18 WM 33(41) War Cabinet conclusions 31 March 1941.
96. M. Shigemitsu to Lord Hankey 2 April 1941. Enclosed in Lord Hankey 
Affidavit for M. Shigemitsu, op.cit. pp.34519-34520
97. PRO PREM 3 252/6A R.A. Butler to W. Churchill 1 April 1941.
98. For the details of the Neutrality Pact see C. Hosoya, ’The Japanese-
Soviet Neutrality Pact.' pp.74-82.
99. Magic Background Vol.l. No.306 London to Washington (to Tokyo) 18 
April 1941 p.160.
100. Magic Background Vol.l. No.307 London to Washington (to Tokyo) 7 May 
1941 p.161.
101. PRO T160/1033 F15194/026/4 S.D. Waley to Wilson Smith 26 April
1941.
102. PRO CAB96/2 FE(41) Far Eastern Committee 16th meeting 8 May 1941.




105. PRO F0371/28020 F4737/4564/23 M. Shigemitsu/R.A. Butler conversation 
30 May 1941.
106. M. Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, p.216.
107. Magic Background Vol. III. No. 491 Tokyo to London 22 May 1941 p. 243.
108. PRO F0371/27907 F4658/4564/23 M. Shigemitsu/R.A. Butler conversation
24 May 1941.
109. PRO PREM 4 20/1 A. Eden to W. Churchill 27 May 1941. It is also
worth noting that when Craigie reported in June that Matsuoka had
told him that Shigemitsu was returning for an exchange of views, a 
member of the Far Eastern Department minuted-'We know more of the
story than Matsuoka thinks.' see F0371/27909- F4973/4564/23 L. Foulds
minute 11 June on Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 7 June 1941.
110. Captain Malcolm Kennedy diary entry for 14 May 1941, in Kennedy
Papers, Sheffield University Library, Diary 4/36.
111. PRO F0371/27892 F5019/17/23 M. Shigemitsu/A. Eden, Lord Moyne, R.A. 
Butler conversation 9 June 1941. For the talks Shigemitsu held 
before his departure see K. Sato, op.cit. pp.114-115. After his 
departure Churchill paid tribute to Shigemitsu in a speech to the 
House of Commons referring to him in passing as 'a man most friendly 
to peace between our countries', see W. Churchill, War Speeches 1939- 
1945 Vol.II. (Cassell, London, 1952) p. 15.
112. Lord Hankey diary entry for 9 June 1941, in Hankey Papers, Churchill 
College Library, HNKY 1/7.
113. PRO CAB96/3 FE(41)111 M. Shigemitsu/Sir F. Leith-Ross Conversation 
11 June 1941.
114. PRO F0371/27761 F1193/9/61 Sir R. Craigie to Foreign Office 22 
February 1941.
115. PRO F0371/27894 F2591/18/23 Sir R. Craigie to Foreign Office 2 April 
1941.
116. PRO F0371/27926 F2073/137/23 Sir R. Craigie to Foreign Office 18 
March 1941. For more on this episode see P. Lowe, op.cit. pp.228- 
229.
117. PRO F0371/27956 F3031/421/23 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 15 April 1941.
118. See in particular PRO F0371/27789 F3688/158/61 Sir R. Craigie to A.
Eden 3 May 1941, and also F0371/27777 F3626/54/61 M.E. Dening Minute 
3 May 1941. .
119. PRO F0371/27843 F3820/2967/61 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 7 May 1941.
120. PRO CAB65/22 WM 48(41) Secretary's standard file of War Cabinet
conclusions 8 May 1941. The decision not to distribute Craigie's
320
telegram to the Dominions was a reflection of a desire by Churchill 
to deny ammunition to the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, 
who had already clashed with him over this issue, see CAB69/2 DOC41) 
21st Meeting 30 April 1941 and 22nd Meeting 1 May 1941. For more on 
this episode see D. Day, The Great Betrayal. Britain, Australia and 
the Onset of the Pacific War 1939-42. (Angus & Robertson, London, 
1988) pp.133-134, W. Heinrichs, Threshold of War. Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II. (Oxford Univ. Press, 
New York, 1988) pp.69-70, and D. Reynolds, op.cit. p.228.
121. PRO F0371/27918 F1836/122/23 Sir R. Craigie to Foreign Office 11
March.
122. Ibid.
123. PRO F0837/526 T33/36 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 11 April 1941.
124. PRO F0371/27894 F3593/18/23 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 30 April 1941.
See also W.N. Medlicott, op.cit. pp.101-102.
125. PRO F0371/27895 F3647/18/23 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 30 April 1941.
126. Ibid.
127. PRO F0837/533 T33/65/Z Vol.3 J. Troutbeck Minute 10 June 1941.
128. PRO F0371/27895 F3647/18/23 A. Eden to Sir R. Craigie 21 May 1941.
129. PRO F0371/27895 F4694/18/23 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 30 May 1941.
130. PRO F0837/533 T33/65/Z Vol.3 Ministry of Economic Warfare to Sir R.
Craigie 7 June 1941. The Ministry’s reluctance to provide Japan with 
copra was also influenced by secret information that had been 
received indicating that Japan was expecting a large delivery of
the commodity from New York.
131. PRO F0371/27833 F4345/1732/61 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 22 May 1941.
For details on the breakdown of the talks in Batavia see S. Nagaoka,
'Economic Demands on Dutch East Indies', in J.W. Morley (ed.), The 
Fateful Choice, pp.146-153, and W.N. Medlicott, op.cit. pp.81-86.
132. PRO F0371/27833 F4376/1732/61 H. Ashley Clarke Minute 31 May 1941.
133. PRO F0371/27834 F4919/1732/61 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 6 June 1941.
134. PRO F0371/27895 F4810/18/23 Sir R. Craigie to A. Eden 3 June 1941.
135. PRO CAB96/3 FE(41)113 Ministry of Economic Warfare Memorandum 18 June 
1941. Also quoted in part in P. Lowe, op.cit. p.294. For the 
discussion of Craigie's memorandum see CAB96/2 FE(41) 21st Meeting 12 
June 1941.
321
136. For the renewed pressure to turn South see S. Nagaoka, 'The Drive 
into Southern Indochina and Thailand.' p.234-235, M. Barnhart, 
op.cit. p.208, and S. Hatano & S. Asada, op.cit. p.396-398.
322
CHAPTER EIGHT 
■NISHI NO KAZE HARE’
'ULTRA On 19 Nov. Tokyo told Charge d'Affaires in London that the 
international situation is tense. When diplomatic relations are on the 
point of being severed, following phrases will occur in the middle and 
end of Japanese Broadcasting Service in the form of a weather report.
(1) With U.S.A. The words - HIGASHI NO KAZE AME (easterly winds rain).
(2) With SOVIET. Words KITA NO KAZE KUMORI (north winds cloudy)
(3) With BRITAIN, including invasion of THAILAND. Words NISHI NO KAZE
HARE (westerly winds fine)
On receipts books are to be burnt.'
Admiralty to Captain on Staff Singapore 25 November 19411
In June 1941 it was not just the Japanese who were contemplating the 
necessity of a further advance, Germany too was on the verge of a new 
offensive, this time directed east against the Soviet colossus. Operation 
Barbarossa began on 22 June, and once more 'a unilateral action by Germany 
threw Japanese policy-making into confusion. Matsuoka, through reports 
received from Oshima, was aware for at least two months beforehand of the 
general intentions of Germany, and British code-breakers had intercepted on 
28 May an appeal from the Japanese Foreign Minister to Ribbentrop calling 
for the German Government-
'... to avoid conflict with Russia in view of the international situation & 
the internal conditions of Germany and J a p a n . '2
This warning had, however, failed to deter Hitler and his minions, and once 
the German assault had begun Matsuoka changed his tack from opposing the 
attack on the Soviet Union to lobbying actively for Japan to stand by its 
Tripartite Pact ally and launch its own offensive against Siberia. The 
Foreign Minister's policy change was not, however, just the result of 
loyalty to Germany, it was also influenced by his opposition to the renewed 
pressure from the armed forces for southward expansion, which he believed 
carried with it the danger of war with the United States.3 His conversion
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led to a week and a half of intense debate in the highest circles in Japan 
as to the future policy of the Empire, which was finally settled by an 
Imperial Conference on 2 July at which it was decided as a compromise that 
the plan for occupation of south Indo-China should be put into operation as 
an interim measure and that preparations should be made for an offensive in 
the north in case of Soviet collapse.*
The confusion engendered in Japan by the German action attracted a great 
deal of interest from the Western powers. To Craigie the obvious shock 
that had been delivered to the Japanese provided Britain with an 
opportunity to wean the Konoe Government away from the dire influence of 
Germany, and on 25 June he proposed to the Foreign Office that this be 
achieved through a slight relaxation of the economic r e s t r i c t  i o n s .5 
Certainly the start of the Russo-German War offered a legitimate excuse for 
such action, as the conflict had made negligible the chances of Japanese 
re-export of goods to Germany due to the closure of the Trans-Siberian 
route. This pressure for a conciliatory gesture was also mirrored by the 
actions of the Japanese Charge d'Affaires in London, Kamimura Shinichi, who 
on 27 June reported to Leith-Ross that a lessening of the restrictions on 
copra would be welcomed, particularly in the light of indications that the 
Government might fall and that then-
'.. . Baron Hiranuma might become Prime Minister and it was rumoured that 
Mr. Shigemitsu might become Minister for Foreign Affairs and that there 
might be a favourable alignment vis-fi-vis the democracies.*6 
However, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Warfare remained 
opposed to any relaxation of sanctions as this would interfere with their 
policy of forcing Japan to draw on its stockpiles of raw materials, and 
also because there was no guarantee that, in the case of a quick Soviet 
defeat, the Trans-Siberian Railway would not once again come into operation 
as a route linking east with w e s t . 7
The opposition to any measure of conciliation was also influenced by 
British knowledge of Japanese intentions towards south Indo-China. Through 
the reading of the B.J. intercepts »it was obvious that a move was being 
planned, and on 25 June the Director of Military Intelligence, Major- 
General Francis Davidson reported to the Chief of the Imperial General
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Staff, General Sir John Dill, about the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee’s
thoughts on this new threat. He began by stating-
'We know from unimpeachable sources that the Japanese Government
(a) Have asked for German help in "squaring" Vichy to agree to recognise 
Japan’s "rights" to have eight air bases and two harbours in Indo- 
China.
(b) Have further instructed their Ambassador in Berlin that if the 
suggested German approach to Vichy is likely to fail, that the matter 
should be dropped as Japan is determined to achieve her object by armed 
force.'8
In the face of these plans for expansion it had been decided that there was 
no justification for any concessions to Japan and that instead policy 
should concentrate on the necessity of deterring Japan from a move into 
south Indo-China. This had then led to a debate over the best means for 
achieving this aim; Major— General Davidson's initial response was to 
suggest that the best plan was for Britain to deliver a warning to Japan in 
concert with the United States, outlining the consequences of a Japanese 
occupation of Saigon. This plan had, however, he reported to Dill, been 
rejected as impracticable by the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Sub- 
Committee, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, who noted the difficulty in getting 
co-operation with Washington over such a declaration and the danger that a 
clear warning would compromise Britain's reading of the Japanese diplomatic 
code. It was therefore agreed that instead-
’... we should open up a vigorous Press Campaign against Japan; such action 
has already succeeded once in January/February of this year - and may 
succeed again.'9
Dill passed this proposal on to his fellow Chiefs of Staff and it was 
adopted at their meeting on 25 June.io
As well as launching a press campaign it was also necessary to consider 
what action Britain would take if Japan still decided to proceed with the 
occupation of south Indo-China. At a War Cabinet meeting on 7 July the 
issue of retaliation was discussed against recommendations from the Far 
Eastern Committee for the response to come mainly in the economic sphere, 
and specifically to abrogate the 1911 Commercial Treaty with Japan and to 
undertake a slight tightening of sanctions.il The War Cabinet recognized
325
clearly the need to take some action in response to further Japanese 
expansion but, in line with the Far Eastern Committee, rejected the need 
for a very harsh policy and instead approved the comparatively muted 
actions recommended to them. In this decision they were influenced by the 
general consensus that had developed in the meeting that-
' . . . the general situation did not justify us in taking strong deterrent 
measures to prevent further Japanese encroachments. Our policy must be, 
for the present, to take appropriate counter-action after each 
encroachment, calculated to play on Japanese reluctance to come into the 
war against an unbeaten and still formidable power.'12
On 10 July the intended measures were communicated to Craigie; he too 
recognized the need for retaliation and already on the same day he had 
advised the Foreign Office-
'It is ... of the utmost importance that we should make up our minds 
beforehand and take immediate counter— action in the event of the Japanese 
occupying bases in Indo-China.’l3
Three days later he reported his concurrence with the War Cabinet's 
proposals, while stressing that it was extremely important to ensure that 
the United States collaborated fully in the implementation of these
measures.
However, by the time Craigie's telegram arrived at the Foreign Office the 
United States had already substantially changed the nature of the debate 
about how to respond to the Japanese move. This was owing to a report from 
Lord Halifax on 10 July that the State Department were considering a total 
embargo on goods to Japan which was to be introduced without giving any 
prior indication to Tokyo that such action was contemplated. This was 
followed by a further telegram on 17 July indicating that this policy was 
to be achieved through a complete freezing of Japanese assets in the United 
States.15 This was a marked contrast to the carefully balanced policy 
agreed to by the War Cabinet and the serious implications of this proposed 
move were not lost on the British officials concerned with Far Eastern 
policy. S. Waley of the Treasury noted succinctly to Sterndale Bennett- 
' In short, the effect of freezing Japanese assets would be to suspend 
economic relations and thus to declare economic war.'15
On 13 July the Foreign Office, in a state of some concern about the
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American plan, observed to Halifax-
' . . . while we are reluctant to discourage the United States from strong 
measures provided they are prepared to face the consequences, we felt that 
such an embargo imposed at one blow ... would face the Japanese with only 
two alternatives, either to reverse their policy completely or to exert 
maximum pressure southwards.'1?
The greatest concern caused by the American plan was that it implied the 
introduction of a complete embargo on sales of oil to Japan. Petroleum had 
been one commodity which the Ministry of Economic Warfare, a hawk in so 
many areas of policy, had always treated with due sensitivity. Richard 
Heppel of the Far Eastern Department had noted as late as May 1941, when 
the Ministry had expressed disapproval of an American proposal for the 
restriction of oil sales to Japan to ’normal’ levels, that- 
'MEW are still addicted to the indirect method, (tankers and containers) 
except where aviation spirit is concerned, + are apprehensive of the 
consequences of a rationing policy. They appear to contemplate without any 
misgiving the prospect of Japan continuing indefinitely to take from 
America as much oil, except aviation spirit, as she can lift in her 
tankers.’ 18
The new United States policy did not brook such timidity, for although it 
was clear that the American proposals had the potential to tip the 
confrontation in the Pacific towards war, it was equally apparent that 
Britain, to ensure itself of Washington's support in the case of attack by 
Japan and in the war against Germany, had to follow the State Department’s 
lead. On 20 July Eden, in supporting the adoption of a parallel line to 
that of Washington, warned the War Cabinet that-
'... I cannot conceal from my colleagues the dangers inherent in our 
lagging behind the United States Government in dealing with Japan, a 
fortiori in our actually attempting to dissuade them from firm action. The 
risk of creating another Simon-Stimson incident and of seriously weakening 
the ties between us and America is real.'*9
The danger with the American policy did not, however, lie merely with its 
effects once introduced, but also with the fact that Japan was to be given 
no warning that its next step would lead to such severe chastisement. This
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decision was made in the belief that Japan would be so surprised by the 
ferocity of the American action that it would repent of its sins. This 
thinking was at fault in two respects; first it presumed that economic 
sanctions could deter even though they were not supported by an adequate 
military presence in the region, and second, to paraphrase an observation 
made by Leith-Ross on 14 July, it ignored the fact that it would be much 
easier to deter occupation of south Indo-China through the use of a warning 
than it would be to use sanctions to prise Japan out after an o c c u p a t i o n . 20 
The lack of a warning was also important because, while the drama over 
south Indo-China was being played out, the crisis in Japanese politics had 
led to the resignation of the Konoe Cabinet and its speedy reconstruction 
with Admiral Toyoda Teijiro replacing Matsuoka as Foreign M i n i s t e r . 21 This 
change of personnel was a sign that the new Government was willing to 
approach the West with a more positive attitude, but unfortunately it 
inherited the decision to occupy South Indo-China and, without knowing the 
consequences of this action, proceeded with its implementation, and by so 
doing damned, from virtually the first day of its creation, its chances of 
ever achieving any lowering of tensions with the West. In this context Sir 
Robert Craigie noted to the Foreign Office on 26 July, after a talk with 
Toyoda, with whom he was favourably impressed, that-
'It may be asked why a Minister desiring to improve relations should agree 
to embark on a course which was bound to lead to their serious 
deterioration. My surmise is that Japanese Government, despite periodical 
warnings of my colleague [Grew] and myself, were totally unprepared for 
anything more than the usual protests and that the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, new to the job and new to diplomacy, had inherited a policy of 
whose dangers he was only dimly a w a r e . '22
The apparent revival of the moderate faction was not lost on Craigie and in 
late July 1941, despite the events in Indo-China, his reports began to show 
a muted optimism for the future for almost the first time in a year. To 
some extent this can be seen simply as relief at the passing from the 
Japanese political scene of Matsuoka, who had developed in his time as 
Foreign Minister into the bete noire of Craigie and Grew. His removal from 
the Gaimusho seemed to indicate that Japan was in a position to reverse the 
trend of the previous twelve months, and augured a possible retreat from
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the commitment to the Tripartite Pact and a return to a more genuinely 
neutral stance towards the European War. This, however, only indicated a 
potential for easing tensions without any definite guarantee that it would 
take place. A more positive sign of a change in mood in Tokyo, that added 
weight to the enthusiasm generated by Matsuoka's ousting, came from 
Shigemitsu in conversations he held with Craigie on his return to Japan.
Shigemitsu had travelled back from Britain to Japan via the United States, 
and while in Washington consulted with Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo, the 
Japanese Ambassador, about the conversations the. latter had been holding 
with Cordell H u l l . 23 He eventually arrived back in Tokyo towards the end 
of July only to find that the original reason for his recall had been 
negated by the enforced resignation of Matsuoka. Despite this, the 
Ambassador still met the ex-Foreign Minister, and was taken aback when the 
latter, instead of defending the radical policy he had pursued in office, 
claimed that he had in fact done all he could to adjust relations with the 
United States and warned that Japan was at the edge of a p r e c i p i c e . 24 in 
addition to this meeting with Matsuoka, Shigemitsu also conveyed his 
impressions and advice to the Emperor, Prince Konoe, Admiral Toyoda, the 
Army General Staff and the participants of a Liaison C o n f e r e n c e .25
As he wrote later in Japan and Her Destiny the main gist of all his reports 
was to correct what he saw as the mistaken interpretation of the European 
War that had become orthodox in Japan due to the string of German 
v i c t o r i e s . 2 6  He spoke first of the remarkable endurance of the British in 
the face of German aggression and how Britain was steadily building up its 
forces. He then went on to study the German position and noted that 
Germany was running the risk in the Soviet Union of fighting a conflict in 
vast unconquerable territories which would degenerate into a war of 
attrition, just as Japan had been entrapped in China. He also noted that 
as the war progressed the likelihood of American intervention increased and 
that-
'The attitude of America is the decisive factor and under Roosevelt's 
guidance they are already for all intents and purposes in the war. Actual 
participation is merely a question of time and opportunity. German 
difficulties in the occupied territories are bound to grow. That Russian,
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American and British encirclement of Germany will lead to ultimate victory 
is a foregone conclusion.’27
To counter any accusation that in assessing the European situation he was 
touching on military issues in which he had little expertise, Shigemitsu 
had brought with him a supporting statement from Major— General Tatsumi 
Eiichi, the Military Attache in London. His conclusion from the above 
observations was that-
'Japan must not enter the war. It must be her absolute determination not 
to enter the war. She must bring her negotiations with the U.S. to a 
successful termination and go on from there to solve the problem of China 
and clear up her relations once and for all. Non-entry into the war, and a 
policy of straightening out her difficulties by diplomatic machinery, would 
bring Japan's standing in Europe after the war to new heights.'28
The reception to Shigemitsu's observations varied; he noted later in Japan 
and Her Destiny that the Army was little moved from their allegiance to the 
Axis and responded to what was considered his pro-Western leanings by 
having him tailed by the g e n d a r m e r i e .29 However, his audience with the 
Emperor on 23 July made a more positive impression, and Kido Koichi, the 
Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, who was present at this meeting, observed 
later at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial that the Ambassador's words reminded 
him of the tenaciousness of the British, and that-
'I also became aware of America's fighting will, and in view of our 
national strength I felt that we should try to make peace as quickly as 
possible.’30
Perhaps more important than this was that Shigemitsu also received a 
sympathetic hearing from Konoe and Toyoda who, like Kido, realized that his 
observations were important for relations with the West in general and not 
with Britain alone, and that they showed the urgent necessity of achieving 
success in the talks with the United S t a t e s . 31
Shigemitsu reported the hopeful signs in Japan and the interested response 
to his observations on the course of the European War to Craigie in a 
conversation on 29 July, and noted-
'Even in the ranks of re-actionaries and younger officers, he was given.a 
more friendly reception than at any time since he had occupied the post of
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Vice-Minister.*32
He also told Craigie that he was relieved to find on his return to Japan 
that the situation was not as bleak as he had imagined and that he had not 
found anywhere a desire for war with Britain and the United States. 
Shigemitsu's apparent enthusiasm, which dovetailed with the positive 
utterances emanating from Toyoda, encouraged Craigie to report back to the 
Foreign Office-
'It is ... valuable that Mr. Shigemitsu should be here at this juncture and 
I endorse his view that, despite the bleak outlook, it may still be 
possible, by keeping our measures of retaliation strictly within the 
economic field, to bring about a change for the better in Japanese foreign 
policy.'33
It is worth noting in the above statement that the reappearance of a 
moderate faction in Japan did not lead Craigie to turn his back on the need 
to deter Japan or to espouse a policy based solely on conciliation. He 
still believed strongly that war with Japan could only be avoided if the 
West adopted a ’carrot and stick* approach to Japan, in which both elements 
would be equally important. Despite his record of clashes with London over 
sanctions in the spring of 1941, there is little evidence that Craigie 
disagreed with the hardline policy forced on Britain by Washington in July, 
and certainly there were not the stream of protests sent to the Foreign 
Office that, from his past performance, one would have expected had he had 
any serious reservations. Even with the advantages of hindsight he wrote 
approvingly in his Final Report in 1943 that-
’Such action, of course, involved a risk of immediate war, but it averted 
what was at that time an even greater risk, namely, that the Japanese 
Government should be left to assume that they could proceed with complete 
impunity along their path of territorial aggrandisement in South Eastern 
Asia. It also had the merit of removing from the minds of the more 
responsible Japanese leaders the lingering hope that any further southward 
advance could be made without the virtual certainty of war with the United 
States.'34
He also recognized clearly at the time the need for a sustained build-up of 
military forces in the region, and on 25 August he made a familiar appeal 
to the Foreign Office-
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' . . . the stationing of even a powerful force of minimum size at Singapore 
might be enough to lead the Navy, who are especially strong in the present 
Government to advise decisively against risking any further adventure in 
the South. It is important to bear constantly in mind, not only the 
advantage of having such a force on the spot, should war break out, but the 
possibility that^ its mere presence will tip the scales in favour of 
peace.'35
However, he was convinced that to balance these measures of coercion it was 
necessary to take advantage of the revival of the moderates' fortunes in 
Japan and to show that the West was willing to negotiate seriously. It was 
here that he came up against the opposition of the Foreign Office. The 
refusal of the latter to countenance any positive response to the overtures 
reaching Craigie was the result of a number of factors. First, there was 
the legacy of the Burma Road crisis and the other previous exercises in 
compromise, which had led the Foreign Office to the conclusion that there 
was no point in negotiating with Japan. Second, this firm stance was given 
an apparent justification by the rapidly expanding ability of the British 
authorities, through the reading of Japanese diplomatic codes, to 
'understand' and anticipate Japanese intentions. This information, which 
seemingly related the thoughts of the GaimushQ directly to the Foreign 
Office, meant that there was less need to rely on the observations of an 
Ambassador who was seen as having a sentimental and naive faith in the 
nebulous Japanese 'moderates', and also confirmed the prejudice that had 
built up in the Far Eastern Department that no Japanese 'moderates’ worth 
cultivating actually e x i s t e d . 36 The third and final reason was that it was 
feared that any attempt by Britain to try to influence events towards a 
peaceful conclusion would be resented by the United States.
The belief in London that the Americans would look askance at any British 
intervention was not just the result of the desperate need to get the 
Americans into the European War or even a legacy of the Simon-Stimson 
controversy, but rather had its roots in the excessive sensitivity of the 
State Department about the talks that had been taking place between 
Ambassador Nomura and Secretary of State Hull since March. The Foreign 
Office appear to have learnt of the existence of the Hull-Nomura talks at
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some time during April or May of 1941, and arrived quickly at the 
conclusion that these conversations were most likely an elaborate trap 
drawn up by Matsuoka to buy off the United States, and therefore 
represented a grave threat to Anglo-American solidarity in the region. 
These doubts led Lord Halifax to pass to Sumner Welles on 24 May a 
memorandum from Eden for the Secretary of State which warned of the dangers 
of the Japanese using the talks to attempt to push a wedge between London 
and Washington. The next day Halifax was called to see a furious Cordell 
Hull, who expressed his outrage at Britain's apparent lack of faith in his 
diplomacy.37 When this was reported to the Foreign Office there was 
consternation that the Americans had been offended, and in a note that 
summed up the attitude that Britain took thereafter to the Hull-Nomura 
talks, Ashley Clarke of the Far Eastern Department noted-
' . . . it is obviously deplorable that we should have any disagreement with 
the Americans over our Far Eastern Policy: the Japanese initiative was in 
fact designed to produce such a result and it must not be allowed to 
succeed.'38
After this episode the Foreign Office was far more circumspect and, even 
though still deeply suspicious of the Hull-Nomura talks and resentful that 
they were not privy to their contents, did not attempt to press Washington 
over the issue.
With this background it was only natural that the Foreign Office viewed 
Craigie's reports on the re-emergence of the moderates with a good deal of 
suspicion and did not order the Ambassador to begin any negotiations of his 
own. Craigie was, however, uncomfortable with the lack of direction 
emanating from London and, in particular, the failure to make clear to 
Japan the consequences of any further expansion. On 12 August, after an 
interview with Toyoda the day before, he wrote-
'I am more than ever confirmed in my view that any policy of "keeping 
Japanese Government guessing" as to our real intentions in the Far East is 
an erroneous one in the present circumstances, and that we stand to gain 
more by discussing our mutual difficulties and intentions as frankly and 
openly as circumstances permit.'39
He then proceeded on 25 August to observe that, though he recognized that 
the United States was taking the diplomatic lead in the Pacific, it was
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still essential for him to hold regular meetings with the Foreign Minister, 
and that this was especially necessary as the impression had grown in 
Toyoda’s mind that it was the British who were forcing the Americans to 
take a tough line in n e g o t i a t i o n s . 40 There was some sympathy with these 
views in the Far Eastern Department, but also a realization that, however 
well reasoned the opinions expressed by Craigie, he failed to acknowledge 
that Britain was no longer in control of its destiny in East Asia.
While Craigie pondered on the chances of a relaxation of tensions, the tide 
of events seemed to promise an ever greater chasm between East and West. 
In the economic field, after the introduction of the freezing order on 26 
July, there were a few days of uncertainty about how severe the American 
restrictions were going to be, but it soon became apparent that a complete 
embargo had been introduced which included a freeze on the sale of oil to 
Japan, and that the American lead was going to be followed strictly by both 
the British and the Dutch.41 In the political field, at the end of July 
and into early August there was a new scare that Japan was on the verge of 
moving into Thai land; this coincided with the meeting of Churchill and 
Roosevelt at Plac^enta Bay and led the Prime Minister to propose to the 
President that Japan be given a parallel warning from Britain and the 
United States outlining the consequences that would arise from any further 
Japanese e x p a n s i o n . 4 2  When Roosevelt returned to Washington he took with 
him a declaration to read to the Japanese Ambassador, and on 17 August met 
with Nomura at the White House. However at this meeting the gravity of 
Roosevelt's warning was blunted almost immediately by Nomura's 
communication of a new proposal from Tokyo that called for a summit meeting 
to be held between the President and Prime Minister K o n o e . 4  3
The Japanese plan had originally been cabled to Nomura on 7 August. It was 
far more than merely the result of a resurgence in moderate opinion in 
Japan, for its origins lay in the realization that the West's freezing of 
Japan's assets faced the Japanese Government with a choice between 
negotiating a settlement with the United States or going to war. The 
proposal was therefore viewed by Konoe as the last chance to avoid war, as 
an opportunity to break free from the limitations of the Hull-Nomura talk, 
to tackle the issues head-on and, if successful, a chance to present the
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Army with a fait accompli.44 Shigemitsu wrote in Japan and Her Destinyr- 
' . . . he CKonoe) appeared to be thinking that there was nothing for it but 
to make this the turning point, to make such concessions at the meeting as 
would bring the talks to a satisfactory ending, in accordance with the 
Emperor’s instructions, and force the Army to agree... '*5
Shigemitsu was in a good position to know Konoe's feelings about the 
meeting because he had been chosen to act as the personal diplomatic 
adviser to the Prime Minister, another indication of the weight given to 
his views after his return from Britain.46
At first Roosevelt displayed some enthusiasm for Konoe's bold plan but this 
initial interest was soon dispersed by the State Department, which took the 
position that before any meeting could take place Japan must first commit 
itself to accept the 'Four Principles’ which Hull had outlined at the start 
of his talks with Nomura as the basis of the American negotiating position, 
and show a willingness to compromise over its policy towards China and its 
links with the Axis.47 This was at cross-purposes with Konoe's original 
plan which, due to the necessity to present the Army with a sudden fait 
accompli, had been drawn up on the basis that there be no preconditions to 
the meeting, lest they might justify the Army stepping in to prevent a 
meeting between the two leaders from ever taking place. Konoe's 
desperation for a meeting was exacerbated further when, at an Imperial 
Conference on 6 September, it was decided that if talks had not been 
concluded by early October then Japan should be ready to go to war before 
the end of that month.46 This was a tight deadline, and that day Konoe 
invited Grew to dine secretly at his house and there expressed orally to 
the American Ambassador his acceptance of the 'Four Principles' and 
emphasized his belief that a meeting with Roosevelt could turn the corner 
in Japanese-American relations.4^
The deliberate policy of pressing the diplomats in Tokyo to communicate 
Japan's enthusiasm for a meeting was not limited to Grew and his Embassy 
but also involved Craigie, in the hope that British pressure on Washington 
would lead the Americans to take a less rigid stance. On 8 September 
Shigemitsu arranged a secret meeting with the British Ambassador, at which 
he assured Craigie that the moderates were beginning to regain control over
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Japanese policy and that the link with the Axis was steadily growing 
weaker. Shigemitsu also raised the point that the Atlantic Charter, which 
Churchill and Roosevelt had drafted at their Placentia Bay meeting, with 
its promise of free access for all nations to raw materials contrasted 
greatly with the policy now being pursued by the Anglo-Saxon powers towards 
J a p a n . 50 This latter point was emphasized again a week later in a talk 
that Craigie held with Shigemitsu's protege, Amau Eiji, the new Vice- 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, who told him-
'You ... have now lived in Japan some years, and I believe you have 
observed the condition of the people in their daily lives; I wonder if you 
think these people are really adequately compensated for their capacity and 
effort. Though they work from morning to night, still they are only barely 
at the level of subsistence, whilst virtually every Englishmen, working 
less than the Japanese, enjoys a life of relative ease. In a word, whilst 
the Japanese are in a life and death struggle, the English give their 
thought to how they may live more l u x u r i o u s l y .'51
Influenced by this growing pressure on him to assist in a reconcilition 
between the West and Japan, Craigie began in the early autumn of 1941 to 
press London ever harder for the need to come to some kind of understanding 
with Japan. The first sign of this came on 9 September when he forwarded 
to the Foreign Office the contents of a telegram which Grew was sending to 
the State Department. Grew had written in this note that he believed that 
Konoe and Toyoda were sincere in their wish for peace, but that they were 
hindered in this by the rest of the Japanese Cabinet and that therefore the 
United States should try to do its best to encourage the peace process by 
explaining to the Japanese people the advantages which would accrue from a 
policy of friendship with the D e m o c r a c i e s . 52 Craigie noted in his telegram 
his complete agreement with this approach and also wrote-
'Neither my United States colleague nor I are suggesting any relaxation at 
this stage of measures our two countries have taken against Japan: but it 
stands to reason that in a confused situation such as exists today in Japan 
the more clearly we can bring home to the Japanese public the advantage's 
of a break with Matsuoka’s policy the b e t t e r . ' 5 3
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This communication led to a debate in the Foreign Office about the correct 
way to react to the apparent change of mood in Tokyo. On 12 September Eden 
wrote to Churchill-
'It is clear that the Japanese are hesitating but this better mood has only 
been brought about by the contemplation of the forces that may possibly 
confront them. Russia, the United States, China and the British Empire, to 
say nothing of the Dutch, is more than this probably over-valued military 
power is prepared to challenge. Our right policy is, therefore, clearly to 
keep up the pressure.... We are now engaged in examining Craigie's 
telegrams. It is important that we should not be too forthcoming to 
Japanese approaches, even through Shigemitsu. We want the Japanese to feel 
that we are in a position to play our hand from s t r e n g t h . '54 
From these remarks it is clear that the view in London was still 
fundamentally different from that taken by Craigie. The Foreign Office, 
partly due to the need to do nothing to offend Washington, but also because 
of a belief that Japan would not make the mistake of risking war against 
the powerful combination grouped against her, continued to reject the need 
for a 'carrot' to go with the 'stick'. The policy towards Japan continued, 
as it had since October 1940, to be based on the need to deter Japan, but 
without any apparent awareness that the nature of the dispute with Craigie, 
which in the spring had been concerned merely with the appropriate ceiling 
of sanctions, had now changed and that the choice being offered Japan, 
after the introduction of a full embargo, was to fight or accept the end of
its Great Power status. The result of this was that on 18 September Eden
informed Craigie-
'Mr Shigemitsu evidently wishes to persuade us that the cooling off towards 
the Axis is prompted by a desire to re-establish friendship with the
democracies. There is every reason to think, however, that it springs from 
a growing conviction that the Tripartite Pact has lost its value as a means 
for the promotion of Japanese ambitions and that a temporary compromise 
with the United States and ourselves would provide a better chance of 
ultimately achieving Japan's aims.... [W]e cannot think the moment is 
opportune to hold out inducements to the Japanese ... It is I think
important at the present stage not to give the impression to any Japanese, 
however friendly, that we are thinking even of r e l a x a t i o n . '55
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Over the next week and a half Craigie contemplated his reply to this 
negative response to his proposal from London, and during this period he 
held further talks with the Japanese diplomats. By this time the pro­
negotiation faction in Tokyo was becoming increasingly desperate due to the 
failure of the Americans to agree to the summit proposal, and this led to 
the pressure on Grew becoming ever stronger. Shigemitsu made an important 
contribution to this campaign, and on 18 September he held his own talk 
with the American Ambassador, in which he reiterated the arguments used 
previously by Toyoda and urged Grew to realize that time was running short. 
He also stressed the sincerity of Japan's desire for an understanding and 
noted-
' . . . the Japanese Government could be compared with someone who had scaled 
a high fence and had his feet planted on the other side on new ground. He 
said in addition that although it was a physical impossibility to set down 
ahead of time all details relative to the carrying out by Japan of the 
undertakings which the Japanese Government might assume, the sincerity and 
will of the Konoye Government is such that the faithful execution in the 
course of time of any agreement which may be reached can be counted on with 
complete confidence.'56
Shigemitsu*s concern about the future of the Hull-Nomura talks was also 
shown in a conversation he had with Kido on 26 September, in which, 
according to the latter*s testimony at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, he 
talked again of the likely outcome of the European War, and- 
' . . . earnestly pleaded that Japan should settle outstanding problems with 
America and that Japanese-American diplomatic relations should be 
adjusted. ’57
The urgency for a settlement meant the attention paid to Craigie was also 
increased, and on 26 September he was called to the Gaimusho for meetings 
with Toyoda and Amau. In his talk with the Foreign Minister, Toyoda 
attempted to impress the British Ambassador with Japan’s sincerity by 
noting that he was considering whether the moment was opportune for 
Shigemitsu to return to London, and told Craigie-
*He realised how well Mr. Shigemitsu had done in London and spoke of him as 
"one of our best Ambassadors", but it was a question whether his health was 
good enough to justify his being asked to return to so strenuous a post at
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so difficult a t i m e . * 5 8
Amau tried a different tack and, after describing Japan’s aims in seeking a 
meeting with Roosevelt, stressed that great pressure was being exerted by 
the German Government on Konoe to give up his diplomacy with the United 
S t a t e s . 59 On 27 September the pressure continued with another meeting 
between Shigemitsu and Craigie, at which the former revealed for the first 
time that, should the proposed summit take place between his Premier and 
the American President, Shigemitsu would accompany Konoe as his personal 
adviser.60 Two days later the campaign to win over Craigie took another 
turj\ with a tea party, arranged by Shigemitsu, where once again he met with 
Toyoda and Amau.5l
This series of discussions encouraged Craigie, in his reply to Eden, to 
press even harder for the Foreign Office to support a policy of negotiation 
in Japan, and he noted-
’With his [Matsuoka* s] departure a very considerable - though not yet a 
radical change - has occurred in the political situation here, and there 
exists a more real prospect ... of setting in motion a steady swing away 
from the Axis and towards more reasonable policies.... Main difficulty 
appears to be that while Japanese want speed and cannot yet afford to go 
beyond generalizations, the Americans seem to be playing for time and to 
demand the utmost precision in definition before agreeing to any outward 
step of rapprochement.... If persisted in, it bids fair to wreck the best 
chance of bringing about a just settlement of Far Eastern issues which has 
occurred since my arrival in Japan.... [M]y United States colleague and I 
are firmly of the opinion that on balance this is a chance which it would 
be the hight [sic] of folly to let slip. Caution must be exercised, but an 
excess of cynicism brings stagnation.’62
The effect that these conversations had on Craigie's outlook was also shown 
in another field. On 21 September he had written to Cadogan requesting 
that, after four strenuous years in Tokyo, he be allowed two months leave 
in the United States beginning in early October, and in support of his 
application he noted-
’Present negotiations in Washington seem to afford good opportunity for me 
to be absent not only because they tend to exercise a delaying effect on
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developments here but because for the present at least we must leave 
diplomatic leading to Americans.'63
This suggestion initially received some sympathy from London, but when it 
became clear in the following week that Japanese desperation was growing, 
and that the new Counsellor at the British Embassy in Tokyo, William
Houston-Boswall, would, due to an attack of septicaemia, be too ill to take
charge in Craigie's absence, approval was withdrawn.64 His reaction to 
this decision on 29 September was to report to London that even before he 
had received their telegram he had already decided that, due to the
seriousness of the present situation, his presence was needed in Tokyo.65
Despite the agreement between Craigie and London that the prospects for the 
future were looking very grave, his observations on the Hull-Nomura talks 
still fell on deaf ears in the Foreign Office, and in the minutes made on 
his 30 September telegram the usual motives for British inaction were 
repeated; the only real point of note being that Sterndale Bennett raised 
the important question of what the West could in fact offer Japan which 
would justify that country’s withdrawal from China and the end of the
Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.66 There was, however, by this 
stage another reason why the Foreign Office felt that it could refuse to
countenance any mark of conciliation, and this was that a marked
improvement in the military position of the Western powers was beginning to 
take place. Already at the Placentia summit the American Joint Chiefs of 
Staff had indicated to their British counterparts that they were going to 
reverse their policy of only a minimal defence for the Philippines, and in 
early October this policy came to fruition with the stationing of B-17 
Flying Fortress bombers at Clark Field on Luzon.6? On 11 October Lord 
Halifax wrote a personal letter to Churchill in which he reported on a 
conversation he had with Roosevelt about the effects of this deployment, 
and also noted that Henry Stimson, the Army Secretary, had- 
' . . . showed me various maps and circles that they had prepared,
illustrating the extent to which bombers based on the Philippines could get 
at the Japs and told me that they had information that the Japs were
greatly affected in their judgement by this move.'66
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The arrival of American reinforcements in South East Asia had an important 
effect in London, as it justified and indeed made it politic for Britain to 
deploy its own deterrent force in the region, and in mid-October Churchill 
and Eden forced a reluctant Admiralty to agree to the sending of a squadron 
based on the battleship HMS Prince of Wales to S i n g a p o r e . 6 9  This was, of 
course, a move that Craigie had been urging on London ever since his 
arrival in Tokyo and had recommended as recently as August. The problem 
was, however, that he had always viewed the stationing of such a force at 
Singapore as only one element in his 'carrot and stick' approach to Japan, 
and had hoped for it to be balanced by indications of what Japan could gain 
through a policy of compromise, but in the autumn of 1941 the decision for 
deployment was made by Churchill, with Eden's support, with only coercion 
in mind. The attitude of the Foreign Office was such that even when a 
report was received from Lord Halifax on 17 October endorsing a very 
limited plan from Hull for the barter of American cotton for Japanese silk, 
it was greeted with the greatest suspicion; an opinion that was supported 
strongly by Churchill, who noted on his copy of Halifax's telegram that 
'This is the thin edge of the appeasement wedge.'70 The result was that 
Halifax was duly told on 21 October that-
'Our experience has been that any obvious concession to a Japanese 
Government has the effect of stiffening the extremists rather than 
encouraging more moderate elements. We also doubt whether an exchange on 
the limited basis proposed would be sufficient to deflect Japanese 
policy.'7l
The day before Halifax’s telegram was received in the Foreign Office news 
was received from Tokyo of the resignation of the Konoe Cabinet. This had 
taken place due to the Army’s refusal to allow more time for negotiations, 
and their insistence that the Government abide by the decision that had 
been taken at the Imperial Conference on 6 September. On 18 October the 
formation of a new Cabinet was announced with the former Army Minister Tojo 
Hideki as Prime Minister and with Togo Shigenori as Foreign Minister. The 
Emperor had agreed to the formation of this Cabinet on the proviso that the 
policy decided upon at ^ Imperial Conference would not now be regarded as 
binding and that the attempt to seek an acceptable compromise with the 
United States would continue.72 Despite this attempt to keep Japan’s
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options open, the appointment of a hardline figure such as To jo did not 
augur well for the future, and suggested that the brief resurgence of the 
moderates was now over.
The trend in Japan towards a more fatalistic attitude was displayed not 
only in the political transition, but also in the military field, where the 
preparations for war were steadily making progress. As early as 19 
September Craigie had forwarded a report from his Naval Attache, Rear 
Admiral Hector Boyes, which mentioned that a number of developments 
indicated that the Japanese merchant marine was being prepared for 
hostilities.73 This was followed a month later by a brief telegram in 
which Craigie noted simply-
’From various indications Naval Attache considers all units of Japanese 
Navy are mobilised and on a complete war footing.'7*
These signs of Japanese mobilization, added to the information on the call- 
up of reservists and other sundry intelligence, led Craigie to feel that he 
had to challenge the assumptions made by Sir Robert Brooke-Popham in a 
telegram the latter had sent to the Chiefs of Staff on 1 October, in which 
he had urged that the pressure on Japan to retreat should be increased 
still f u r t h e r . 7 3  In his observations on this telegram Craigie wrote that 
he felt that the Commander— in-Chief Far East had underestimated the
'strength and desperation' of Japan and noted that-
’ . . . it would take very little further pressure to drive Japan to rash 
enterprises ... in fact Service Attaches consider, and I agree, that she is 
capable if she felt it necessary of undertaking simultaneous operations 
both in the North and in the South while continuing to hold China.'76
This growing pessimism about the future of Japan's relations with the West 
was further underlined by two conversations that Craigie held with 
Shigemitsu in October. In a meeting on 8 October Craigie found his
Japanese counterpart devoid of the enthusiasm that he had so recently 
shown, and when Craigie had asked to be kept informed of the progess of the 
Japanese talks in Washington, he received an example of one of Shigemitsu's 
blunt retorts-
'Your point is completely missing the mark. It is you [Britain] who, just
before I left London, advised us to approach the United States rather than
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you in order to bring about a settlement in East Asia. If you want to get 
any information at all, why not get it from your ally the Americans.'77 
He also reacted angrily to a comment from Craigie about the continuing 
preponderant influence of the Army in Japanese politics by telling him that 
Japan’s domestic affairs were none of Britain’s business.78 This unhappy 
interview was followed by another on 23 October, after the formation of the 
Tojo Cabinet, in which Shigemitsu noted bitterly to the British Ambassador—  
'If the United States without modifying their main principles and 
conventions had acted with a little more understanding of the Japanese 
Government's difficulties, the Prince's position would not have been 
rendered impossible and a great opportunity would not have been missed.’79 
In reporting this conversation to the Foreign Office Craigie wrote- 
’I gained the impression from his manner rather than his words that he was 
disappointed at the turn of events, and looked at the future with more 
misgiving than at any previous time.'80
This was the last meeting that the two diplomats were to hold, ^fter this 
Shigemitsu, with little hope of averting war, faded into the background and 
tendered his resignation to the Gaimusho.81
On 29 and 30 October the impression that a decisive turn had taken place in 
Japanese politics was confirmed by two interviews that Craigie held with 
Togo. In the first of these meetings Craigie protested about the build-up 
of Japanese troops in Indo-China, which the Foreign Minister unconvincingly 
explained away as being necessary to defend the security of J a p a n . 82 In 
the second talk Togo complained about the dilatoriness of the Americans and 
repeated the request that had been made before by Shigemitsu and others 
that Britain should seek to use its influence with Washington to push for a 
more conciliatory l i n e . 8 3  The dour nature of these two conversations 
brought home to Craigie that the time left in which to secure a settlement 
was growing dangerously short and, in a spirit of some desperation himself, 
he drafted a long telegram to the Foreign Office warning of the 
consequences of the failure of the talks in Washington, which followed in 
the tradition of those he had sent previously during the Tientsin and Burma 
Road crises.
343
The telegram was sent from Tokyo on 1 November and, owing to its importance 
as an indicator of Craigie* s views only a month before war began, it is 
worth dwelling on at length. He began by stating-
'I have for some time felt it was unfortunate that matters of vital concern 
to us should be under discussion between the United States and the Japanese 
Government, not only without consultation with His Majesty's Government but 
without our being given anything but the barest outline of what was 
happening.* 8 4
He then proceeded to note that this lack of dialogue was an important 
problem because Britain and the United States simply did not have the same 
interests in East Asia and that, in addition to the fact that Washington 
could not be expected to negotiate for Britain, it also threatened to 
diminish Britain in Japan's eyes and also lead to difficulties with the
Dominions. From this point he turned his attention to the method that the
Americans had used up to this time in the talks, observing critically- 
' . . . little attention seems to have been paid in Washington to Japanese 
psychology and to the facts of the international situation here, which 
forbid so sudden and drastic a change in policy as the United States 
Government appear to demand. Feeling is being worked up in both the United
States and Japan to such an extent that an explosion could occur at any
time. This might take the unpleasant form of a direct attack on British 
territory, from which Japan might hope to achieve the first results before 
the ponderous machinery of the United States Government had had time to 
project the United States into active participation of the w a r . ' 8 5  
The potential for an attack on Malaya, he held, demonstrated the importance 
to Britain of receiving a much fuller account of the talks from Washington 
than had been the case up to now. In his conclusion he brought the threads 
of this argument together and set out his views on how the West should deal 
with Japan-
'Every act of the United States Government and ourselves in reinforcing our 
military position in the Far East, and the imposing of economic sanctions 
for specific misdeeds, has been excellent and salutary: but I have always 
recommended that simultaneous steps should be taken to convince the 
Japanese Government and people that there is a better way out for their 
country than a resort to arms, and that the door to it remains always open; 
in particular it is important to convince the Japanese that there is no
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truth in the repeated German assertion that a democratic victory would 
reduce Japan to the status of a third-rate power. It is in this latter 
direction that American diplomacy has seemed to me to be a little lacking 
in vision. In particular I feel that about the worst mistake that we and 
the Americans can make at this juncture is to underestimate the strength 
and resolution of this country and its armed forces, in the event - perhaps 
now not far distant - that it may feel itself driven to desperation.*86
This comprehensive analysis of the current situation was followed over the 
next few days by further telegrams from Craigie adding extra emphasis to 
the points he had already made. On 6 November he noted prophetically- 
’One of the tragedies of the situation is that most Japanese, including 
many in high places, appear to undei— estimate America's naval and air 
strength and endurance of Japan. The belief that I have frequently 
expressed in the past year that Japan would avoid war with America at 
almost any cost, no longer holds good t o - d a y . '87
Again, however, these pleas from Craigie for the Foreign Office to take a 
more positive stance failed to have the desired effect in London, and 
succeeded only in initiating a series of minutes in which the officials of 
the Far Eastern Department described Japanese pressure on Craigie as only 
part of a war of nerves and reiterated the reasons why Britain could not 
take the Ambassador's a d v i c e . 8 8  As a result of these deliberations, Eden 
sent Craigie a telegram on 15 November informing him that it was the 
Foreign Office's intention to maintain its current policy and to adhere 
strictly to a 'firm and united front' with the United S t a t e s . 8 9  in 
justifying this approach the Foreign Secretary noted-
'The maintainence of our present policy admittedly involves a risk of war, 
though with a good prospect of active American participation. With the 
Japanese in their present mood there is no alternative for us except 
appeasement which is of course what the Japanese are hoping for. But there 
can be no assurance that concessions to Japan, which would have to be made 
certainly at the expense of China, and probably of others, would stave off 
the risk of war. On the contrary Japan would then be confirmed in the 
conviction that aggression pays, and would be ready to resume her southward 
thrust at the first opportunity, perhaps when we are being hard pressed at
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home. We should find that we had merely bought a short respite at the cost 
of forfeiting both the respect and material assistance of our friends.’90
By the time this communication arrived in Tokyo Craigie had received 
further evidence of the drift towards a breakdown in the Washington talks 
which filled him with foreboding. On 11 November he had seen Togo at a 
meeting in which the latter complained that the Americans were treating the 
talks as if they were still at a preliminary stage whereas the Japanese 
viewed them as actual formal negotiations.9! This was followed three days 
later by a talk with an unnamed but well placed source who passed on very 
accurate information about the current attitude of the Japanese cabinet. 
This conversation was also important because it involved an exchange 
between the two interlocuters that went to the very heart of the Japanese 
dilemma-
'On my observing that a country did not plunge into a great war and face
desperate risks unless its existence was at stake, informant replied that
it was precisely because powerful elements here considered Japan's very 
existence to be endangered by our economic measures that they believed 
there was no alternative to war.92’
Faced with this evidence of Japan's growing impatience Craigie responded to
the stonewalling of the Foreign Office by writing again on 18 November of 
his disagreement with America's negotiating tactics and defending his call 
for Britain to use its influence with Washington. In particular he noted- 
'I agree that it would be better to face war than to contemplate 
appeasement in the sense in which I understand the word, namely buying off 
an aggressive state by offering unworthy concessions at the expense either 
of ourselves or others. But I do not consider we would be justified in 
taking it for granted that "with Japanese in their latest mood there is no 
alternative for us except appeasement". The situation which confronts us 
here is one which admittedly contains element of so direct a clash that war 
may be inevitable. But there are influential elements in this country 
still working for peace...'93
It might be thought that in the face of this continued refusal by Craigie 
to accept that Britain could not intervene in the Washington talks, the 
Foreign Office would show some irritation at his intransigence. This was
not the case, however, for the Far Eastern Department realised that Craigie 
was restricted in his assessment of the situation due to the lack of 
information available to him. Indeed on receipt of the telegram of 18 
November, Sir Horace Seymour, who oversaw the activities of the Department, 
noted-
'I sympathize with Sir R. Craigie - the trouble is the American stipulation 
that we must not tell him what they tell us.'94
This withholding of information did not include only the details of the 
course of the Hull-Nomura talks but also the diplomatic intelligence data 
derived from the American use of MAGIC and the British B.J. source, and 
much of the military and naval intelligence, all of which indicated Japan's 
growing readiness and desire to take the offensive. That Japan was on the 
verge of entering the war was, of course, not lost to Craigie, but he did 
not know the full history of how Japan was publicly claiming a desire for 
peace while at the same time preparing its military machine for action, a 
device which appeared to be designed to gain Japan time and to lull its 
intended victims into a false sense of security.
The clearest evidence of Japan’s aggressive intentions came from the 
military build-up in Indo-China in the autumn of 1941. At first the main 
influx of troops and materiel was located in the north of the French 
colony, which led to fears in late October that the next Japanese move 
would be an offensive into Yunnan province to cut the Burma R o a d . 95 By the 
middle of November, however, it became evident that the deployment of 
Japanese forces was beginning to change, and on 15 November the Deputy 
Director of Military Intelligence at Singapore, Colonel G.E. Grimsdale, 
informed the War Office that SIS operatives in Indo-China had just reported 
a marked increase in activity in Cambodia which suggested that the intended 
target was now T h a i l a n d . 96 The situation was such that by 19 November the 
Far East Combined Bureau noted in its weekly report-
'Japanese preparation in French Indo-China apparently designed for 
alternative plans of attack against China or Thailand but impossible yet to 
assess relative probability. Probable Japanese themselves still undecided 
pending outcome latest Washington negotiations. Anxiety apparent in Tokyo 
for early and favourable result of these.'97
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As the above report indicates it was clear by the third week in November 
that the talks in Washington were coming to a climax. To facilitate the 
negotiations the Gaimusho had decided to send a seasoned diplomat to assist 
the inept Nomura. This idea had first been mooted while Toyoda was still 
Foreign Minister and his first choice for this mission had been Shigemitsu, 
but Army opposition had quashed that proposal and instead in November Togo 
chose Kurusu Saburo, the diplomat who had signed the Tripartite Pact on 
behalf of Japan.9 8 The events that subsequently took place in Washington 
have been analysed extensively by historians and there has been much debate 
on the question of what would have happened if Cordell Hull had on 26 
November presented Nomura and Kurusu with the State Department's plan for a 
modus vivendi, in answer to their proposal of 20 November for a temporary 
settlement.99 There has also been some controversy about the British role 
in this affair and particularly over the effect of Churchill's message to 
Roosevelt on 26 November in which he noted-
'Of course, it is for you to handle this business and we certainly do not 
want an additional war. There is only one thing that disquiets us. What 
about Chiang Kai-shek. Is he not having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is 
about China. If they collapse, our joint dangers would enormously 
increase. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese 
cause will govern your action.'100
Certainly Craigie's view of these events at the time, and later in his 
final report, was that this was a real opportunity to halt the drift 
towards war. He himself played little part in the proceedings, although he 
received word of the Japanese and American proposals for a temporary 
settlement from the Foreign Office on 24 and 25 November, and sent his 
observations back to London on 27 November. 101 in this cable he noted his 
agreement with the American plan and stated that with some amendments it 
would probably be acceptable to the Japanese Government.102 However, by 
the time his views arrived in the Foreign Office it was too late; Churchill 
had already made known his doubts to Roosevelt^ and Hull had already 
decided, in his famous words, 'to kick the whole thing over' with the 
presentation of his uncompromising note on 26 November. The talking was to 
all intents and purposes over.
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In his final report Craigie held firm to his view that Britain should have 
taken a more positive line over the Japanese proposal for a temporary 
settlement, claiming that it was-
' . . . the last throw of the Emperor and the moderates in their effort to 
avert the disastrous war into which the Japanese army were seeking to 
project their country.'103
He asserted that he had heard from sources in Tokyo that the Japanese armed 
forces had given a firm guarantee to the Cabinet that they would halt their 
preparations for war, if an agreement were reached on the basis of the 20 
November proposals, and noted that if Japan had undertaken to withdraw from 
Indo-China it would have 'meant a dislocation of the Japanese army's plans 
for an attack on Malaya'. He also wrote of his conviction that in the last 
months of 1941 there was a feeling in Tokyo that the tide of the war in 
Europe was changing and that, through its reverses in the Battle of the 
Atlantic and the Soviet Union, Germany was no longer in the ascendant.104
There is, of course, a strong argument for saying that the last Japanese 
efforts for peace should have had a more positive reception, but in dealing 
specifically with Craigie's critique one has to concentrate attention not 
on those who were in the best position to act, the Americans, but instead 
on the reaction in Whitehall. It must first be acknowledged that there was 
in London a grave suspicion of the Hull-Nomura talks and a fear, as one 
writer has put it, of 'the ghost of appeasement.'105 This, indeed, has 
been the main accusation from historians of the British Government's 
actions, that the latter was too hemmed in by the past and through an 
excess of caution assisted in the demise of the modus vivendi.106 The 
Foreign Office's case has not been helped by the fact that in two post- 
Pearl Harbor accounts of the final days it justified its actions by 
criticizing the content of the American proposal as too generous; it was 
described in one memorandum as only likely to lead to an 'inglorious and 
unworkable compromise'.107 This analysis, when put beside Craigie's 
'evidence' that the Japanese Government were sincere in their desire for a 
settlement, can seem overly cynical and inflexible, but before making such 
a judgement one has to understand the wider context against which the 
decision to give only grudging support to the modus vivendi was made.
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The first point to make is that Craigie*s contention that it appeared in 
the autumn of 1941 that the tide in Europe was turning in Britain's favour 
may have been the feeling among his circle in Tokyo, but it was certainly 
not the way events appeared in London or, as Waldo Heinrichs has recently 
made clear, in Washington. Although the Battle of the Atlantic might have 
eased, the titanic struggle in the Soviet Union was reaching a climax and 
in the last week of November German troops were poised in front of Moscow. 
Churchill was in no doubt that a Soviet surrender would lead to Germany 
turning westwards once again to extinguish British resistance. It might be 
thought that such a danger actually argued in favour of a temporary 
settlement in East Asia, but this is to miss two vital factors. First 
there was a fear that if Japan was diverted from a southern advance it 
might instead strike north against the Soviet Union, thus aiding the German 
cause. Second there was no guarantee that an American-Japanese settlement 
would necessarily preclude an attack on British territory; in November 1941 
Britain still had no firm promise of support in case of Japanese attack.
In addition to these general points it is also essential to look at the 
intelligence material passing into British hands during these seven days 
(20-26) in November, to see whether this could have influenced Churchill to 
take a hard line. In this context it must be remembered that on first 
hearing of the modus vivendi on 23 November the Prime Minister had told 
Eden-
' . . . I should feel pleased if I read that an American-Japanese agreement 
had been made by which we were to be no worse off three months hence in the 
Far East than we are now.'ios
Certainly the information received was disturbing; there were further 
reports from the FECB documenting the build-up of Japanese forces in south 
Indo-China, and evidence that the South China fleet was being expanded and 
prepared to move south. On 26 November the Far East Weekly Report noted- 
'Estimated 10,000 withdrawn from Central China during week. Some in 
tropical kit. 3 withdrawals of M.L.C. [Military Landing Craft] from 
Central China since 1st October now total 330, but no indication of 
destination. Arrival of aircraft indicates near completion of preparations 
for operation based on Indo-China should Japanese policy so require. Only 
Japanese merchant ships outside Japan and China Seas are eleven in South
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Seas and one in South America.’110
This report obviously indicated that Japanese preparations were almost 
complete, but to this piece of military intelligence must be added 
something from the diplomatic field. On 25 November Britain decrypted the 
’Winds' message.111
Unfortunately, due to the excessive secrecy of the British Government over 
security matters, the impact of this message on Churchill and his advisers 
cannot be properly assessed, but it is hard to believe that such a cable, 
with its reference to the severing of diplomatic relations, would not have 
raised fears of war. Also, of course, it needs to be understood that war 
with Britain and war with the United States were treated in it as two 
separate entities; could this have provoked a fear that Japan was still 
trying to drive a wedge between the two countries? That Japan was using 
the talks in Washington as a camouflage for its aggressive intentions and 
would strike no matter whether an agreement was reached or not? This is 
speculation but it is nevertheless a possibility that the message would 
have caused such a debate and it would have confirmed the belief in London 
that it was too late to talk of mutual compromise.
The situation in late November was thus more complex than Craigie believed, 
and the dangers very great. There was a chance that, if events went 
drastically wrong, Britain could find itself alone in a war against Japan, 
with the possibility in the near future of a renewed German interest in 
invasion. In these circumstances it was considered safest to continue with 
the policy of a hard line towards Japan and urge caution on the United 
States to forestall its being mollified by false assurances. It must be 
remembered that Britain was fighting a war to the death and could not 
afford to take risks; America was at peace, and it is on Washington that 
any blame lies for the premature death of the modus vivendi.
On 27 November, after this last diplomatic flurry of activity, Craigie 
reported that an informer who was close to Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal 
Kido had told him that the Emperor was very concerned about the course of 
events, but that it was very difficult for him to veto an occupation of 
Thailand because it was by no means clear that this would lead to conflict
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with the West. The British Ambassador therefore suggested to London that 
to deter a Japanese move into Thailand it was necessary to make clear that 
such action would entail a great risk of war with Britain and the United 
States.112 This proposal, though it met with some scepticism in the 
Foreign Office, concurred with Churchill's view of the situation, and on 30 
November the latter forwarded the idea to Roosevelt.112 This was Craigie's 
last major contribution to the cause of peace between Britain and Japan, 
and it is somewhat ironic, and a clear sign of how things had come to pass, 
that this proposal led in the end to a letter from Roosevelt to Emperor 
Hirohito on 6 December, rather than a letter from King George VI.114
By this late date, however, it was obvious from the interception of 
Japanese telegrams that the time for diplomacy was over. In the first days 
of December, as the final preparations were completed by the Japanese 
forces for the impending onslaught, Craigie received instructions from the 
Foreign Office to ready the Embassy for the order to withdraw from 
Japan.116 It is not clear though whether in these final days Craigie ever 
received a clear warning from the Foreign Office that relations were about 
to be severed, which would have taken the form either of a telegram 
containing the single word 'Plumper' or a broadcast on the BBC including 
the coded message 'Aunt Jemima will not give her talk to the children this 
afternoon'.116 Nevertheless the necessary precautions for withdrawal, such 
as the burning of code-books and the destruction of the Embassy archives, 
were carried out. While this activity took place Craigie, in a last 
effort, saw Togo on 5 December and pleaded with him to make a radical 
change in Japanese foreign policy before it was too late, but this request 
was cast aside by the Foreign Minister, who showed a 'marked hardening of 
his attitude.'1 Early on the morning of 8 December, Craigie was called 
again to the Gaimusho to see Togo and on this occasion was told of the 
Japanese decision to break off the negotiations with the United States. He 
returned from Kasumigaseki to the Embassy to be met with the news that 
hostilities had broken out in Malaya and at Pearl Harbor, and soon an 
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CONCLUSION
The war which began in December 1941 brought disaster to both Japan and 
Britain. For the former a series of quick victories could only delay the 
inevitable as the military and industrial might of the United States girded 
itself to crush the Japanese Empire: for the British, despite their finally 
emerging on the winning side, the conflict was a turning point in the 
history of its Empire; the humiliating surrender at Singapore in February 
1942 shattered Britain's prestige in South East Asia and India and presaged 
the steady retreat of the post-war era. In the face of these calamities 
the fact that the warnings emanating from Craigie and Shigemitsu were 
ignored can be interpreted as the result of a blinkered and foolhardy 
attitude on the part of their respective governments, not simply in 1941 
itself but during the entire period from 1937 onwards. However, this 
argument only holds water if it can be established that, as well as warning 
of the dangers of mutual antagonism, the two ambassadors also provided 
practical solutions to the problems in Anglo-Japanese relations and 
alternative paths to progress: to say that a war should be avoided is easy; 
to say how it should be averted is a different matter altogether.
There was, of course, a whole range of issues separating Britain and Japan, 
such as the differences over trade, the nascent naval rivalry, and the 
controversy over Japan's links with the Axis, but underlying all of these, 
at least initially, was the issue of China. Britain and Japan may have 
liked at times to suggest that this was a moral divide, but in essence it 
was about power and in particular power over the commercial destiny of 
China. To this problem both Craigie and Shigemitsu had their own answers.
For Craigie the solution to the split over China once the Sino-Japanese 
conflict had begun was for Britain to recognize that Japan would be the 
most likely victor of this contest and that, if Britain were to emerge 
after the war with its stake in China maintained, it would have to act as a 
strict neutral and not assist Chiang Kai-shek. This was a view greeted
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with horror by the China hands of the Far Eastern Department and by those 
with a political interest or economic stake in China, who foresaw that in 
this future world Japan would dominate the China market with Britain left 
as a very junior partner. It was such judgements by Craigie that earned 
him the accusation that he was an outsider, inexperienced in East Asian 
affairs; to an extent this is true, but the reason for his somewhat 
cavalier attitude towards the fortunes of British merchants in China was 
not due to any lack of understanding of the problems of the East, it was 
rather a result of his consciousness of Britain's global insecurity.
To come to any conclusion about Craigie one has to realize that he saw an 
Anglo-Japanese rapprochement as his goal not for sentimental reasons but as 
a necessity, hoping that at least this part of Britain's 'strategic 
nightmare' could be vanquished. It is obvious from his reports to London 
that he was deeply concerned at the drift of Japan into the Axis camp and 
saw the countering of this tendency as one of his greatest 
responsibilities. From the first reports of the abortive German mediation 
of the Sino-Japanese war in autumn 1937 to his accounts of German pressure 
on Japan in autumn 1941 to end the Hull-Nomura talks he consistently urged 
the Foreign Office to take positive measures to counter the Reich’s 
influence. In his final report in February 1943 he wrote-
’ . . . the burden of my advice during the years 1937 and 1941 has been that
we could not afford to follow a purely idealistic policy or to deal with
Japan according to her merits so long as we remained under the threat of
war with Germany - a proposition that became still more obvious after the
actual outbreak of war in Europe, followed by the collapse of France.'1 
This approach meant that Craigie felt that the problems over China always 
had to be set against the wider perspective, and this is what led him to 
preach caution over the loan to China in summer 1938, over Tientsin in 1939 
and over the Burma Road in 1940. In each of these cases his advice exerted 
a strong influence over Britain's eventual decision to take the line of 
least resistance and his arguments proved to be a useful and necessary 
antidote to the not infrequently myopic vision of the Far Eastern 
Department.
In his views on British policy towards East Asia Craigie's judgements were 
also shaped heavily by his assessment of the United States. In this field 
he was, of course, not without experience, having held the reins of the 
American Department in the Foreign Office for almost ten years. His 
conviction was that, although it would make sense for Britain to act 
jointly with the United States if the latter showed any inclination to do 
so, London should never bank on Washington’s support since to do so would 
leave Britain dangerously exposed as the Americans were masters of 
moralistic rhetoric but loath to take action. This belief was again 
important in influencing his reaction to the crises that Britain met 
between 1937 and 1940, and underlined his certainty that if Japanese 
pressure were resisted and no compromise made then Britain would be on its 
own.
In contrast to Craigie's attempt to play down the importance of China, 
Shigemitsu saw it as the central issue of Anglo-Japanese relations. In 
meeting after meeting with R.A. Butler and others he emphasized that a 
British willingness to meet Japan over China would clear the main obstacle 
to the development of a new understanding. In the short term his aim in 
presenting this argument was to assist Japan in ending the war in China by 
persuading Britain to curb its support for Chiang Kai-shek and return to a 
truly neutral stance, a point he was very keen to link with Japan's
relations with Germany once the war in Europe had begun. This may give the
impression that he was in favour of the war with China and perhaps, as some
have claimed, sympathetic towards the Army's ambitions, but in essence he 
still held to the beliefs that had guided his conduct as Minister to China 
and Vice-Minister at the Gaimusho. In other words he was heavily 
influenced by his consistently held belief that the West was exerting a 
baleful influence in China, encouraging the latter to resist Japan for the 
selfish motive of defending the West's stake in the East, and by his hope 
that Japan and China would, once the West had been forced to retreat
politically from East Asia, eventually co-operate to their mutual benefit. 
This policy was not the same as that held by the dominant faction in the 
Army, and it is noticeable that in August 1940 Shigemitsu urged Matsuoka to 
conclude a liberal peace agreement with China and that in 1942, as 
Ambassador to Nanking, he tried to effect a radical change in Japan's China
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policy and to establish the Wang Ching-wei regime as a truly independent 
sovereign government.
In espousing the view that Britain should take a neutral stance towards the 
Sino-Japanese war Shigemitsu's views were, of course, close to those of 
Craigie and to his backers in London such as Sir Warren Fisher, and it 
might seem that there was here a real possibility of compromise but, even 
ignoring the weighty moral objections to a British withdrawal of support 
from Chiang Kai-shek, there remained a deep divide between the British and 
Japanese positions. For Britain any settlement on these lines would be 
designed to maximize the British stake in China once the war there had 
ended; the Japanese aim, however, was to achieve the opposite and to expel 
British political influence from the region and to minimize its economic 
hold. The problem that had doomed the Leith-Ross mission in 1935/6 was 
still applicable in the war years in China. To have come to a settlement 
it would have been necessary for one side to change fundamentally its 
policy towards East Asia: for Britain to have accepted Japanese
predominance rather than simply displaying a willingness to treat her as an 
equal partner, or for Japan to have given up the gains it had gathered from 
the decline of the Washington system.
This question of whether Japan could have sacrificed its dominant position 
in China for the sake of peace with the West leads on to the problem that 
behind the disagreements over China lay an even more fundamental divide. 
This was the question of how to deal with the fact that the Japanese felt 
their rapidly expanding economy was stultified by the obstacles inherent in 
the Anglo-American status quo, namely the lack of free access to raw 
materials and markets. Both Shigemitsu and Craigie recognized that it was 
this issue which was at the centre of Japan's revisionism and that only a 
settlement of this problem could ever lead to Japan once again taking its 
place as a pillar of the world order. This was the issue which Shigemitsu 
addressed in his memorandum of August 1935 and in his letter to Arthur 
Edwardes in June 1936, and in the former he had argued strongly that if the 
status quo powers insisted on keeping their empires, of whatever sort, 
intact, and denied other nations the right to trade on equal terms in their 
economic blocs, then it was a recipe for conflict. Craigie too realized
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that this was the case, and in his response to Sir Robert Vansittart's 
memorandum on Germany in December 1936 he wrote of the dangers of Britain 
espousing a policy of ’what we have we hold'.
However, Craigie did not leave the issue there; in June and July 1940, when 
the Burma Road crisis had revealed the folly of Britain’s flank being 
threatened by a revisionist Japan threat on ing— i-te— flunk, he built on this 
germ of thought to construct an image of how Japan's economic dilemmas 
could be answered. In his telegram of 22 June he sketched a plan in which 
Britain and the United States would give Japan financial assistance in 
return for a peace settlement with China, and on 14 July went further and 
proposed that Japan should be allowed free trade with Indo-China and the 
Dutch East Indies, concessions over raw materials and immigration, the 
lowering of British and American tariffs, and increased access to credits 
to finance imports. This comprehensive list went to the heart of the issue 
and was intended to right many of the inequalities in the inter— war 
international economy. Apart from the question of whether Britain, or 
indeed the United States, would ever have had the vision to implement such 
a policy, there was one major problemjr it was far too late. In wartime the 
concessions envisaged by Craigie were simply impossible to realize.
The start of the war in Europe was the crucial dividing line in Anglo- 
Japanese relations. Craigie was certainly right in arguing that the 
conflict made it even more necessary for Britain to assure itself of 
Japan’s neutrality, but the whole nature of the war with Germany made an 
understanding more difficult rather than easier to achieve. Britain could 
not pursue its policy of economic warfare, which was considered one of the 
major weapons in its armoury, without placing restrictions on the ability 
of neutrals to trade with the Reich, and also could not fight the war 
without increasing markedly its control over and use of Imperial raw 
materials. Both these requirements had a severe effect on Anglo-Japanese 
relations and squeezed ever harder Japan's already limited access to raw 
materials. Against this background Craigie’s proposals in July 1940 were 
simply impractical; the stocks needed for the British war effort, let alone 
the lack of desire in the government for such a policy, defeated the plan 
from the very start.
Apart from this problem there was also the difficulty that Britain’s war
effort was so ineffectual in the first two years of the conflict that it
only helped to encourage Japan to look south and to seek the acquisition of
vital raw materials through the threat of force or force itself. In the
Cs
development of the pursuane of this quest it was the collapse of France
K
that acted as the critical catalyst; in June 1940 it appeared to Japan as 
if the role of the dominant power over South East Asia was her's for the 
asking, and with' it the economic riches which would fulfil Japan's 
requirements. Shigemitsu was aware that this was an excellent opportunity, 
and advised the Gaimusho to take advantage of it and seek the expansion of 
its influence through political pressure on the region. However, his 
support for this policy was conditional, and he emphasized that there was a 
strong need for caution in order to avoid arousing Anglo-American 
suspicions. His advice was rejected, and in the Matsuoka period Japan 
blustered its way into the region at the same time as it linked itself ever 
more closely to Britain's enemies in Europe and thus helped to solidify the 
Anglo-American combination in the Pacific.
The events in Europe thus provided a momentum to the estrangement between 
Britain and Japan, which Craigie and Shigemitsu were increasingly powerless 
to stop. As sanctions began to bite into the Japanese economy, Japan was 
forced to try to improve its position in South East Asia which in turn led 
to firmer sanctions, starting a downward spiral towards war. Both 
ambassadors advised their hosts and their own governments of the risks of 
war and preached the need for caution, for Japan to stop advancing and for 
Britain to show some flexibility in the economic field, but to no avail. 
The years of suspicion and unsatisfactory compromises had bred a contempt 
for concessions in London, and in Tokyo the Japanese Government was 
increasingly faced with a choice between giving up at a stroke all the
gains of the previous ten years or going to war. In these circumstances
conflict was inevitable unless (yet again) one of the two sides chose to
fundamentally change its policy towards East Asia.
There were then potentially insurmountable obstacles to Britain and Japan 
ever coming to an understanding whether over China or, during the war, over 
the economic difficulties. That, however, still leaves the question of why
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on the British side the will to make a fundamental change to British policy 
was wanting. To a degree the answer can be found within the Far Eastern 
Department where the influence of those who could only see as far as 
Britain's interests in East Asia was paramount. It is disturbing to see 
that on a number of occasions the views expressed by the two ambassadors 
did not receive the requisite attention in the Foreign Office for reasons 
that were at best questionable. In the case of Shigemitsu there was a 
tendency to dismiss his views which rested on the fact that he had not been 
in Japan since 1936 and therefore did not comprehend fully the making of 
Japanese policy. As for Craigie, during the crucial years from 1937 to 
1939 his recommendations, if seen to be too weighted towards compromise, 
could be written off as no more than the result of exposure to 'Piggottry'. 
This questioning of the validity of the ambassadors' comments was most ill- 
considered and unfortunate, weakening their ability to influence policy, 
and allowing the Far Eastern Department to air their stock cliches without 
fear of challenge.
This, however, was only part of the story; there was another reason during 
the entirety of this period for Britain's refusal to attempt seriously to 
come to terms with Japan, and that was fear of an adverse reaction from the 
United States. Washington hung over Britain’s East Asia policy like some 
Victorian morality painting warning of the dire consequences of veering 
from the road of righteousness. Britain's concern was not that its policy 
was immoral, it was that America might see it as immoral, which could have 
serious repercussions not only in the region itself but also in Europe. 
Britain knew that in a war with Germany it would at the very least need the 
benevolent neutrality of the United States, and this perception of the 
necessity to assure American support grew ever greater as the threat to 
Britain grew ever closer. Particularly by mid-1941, with Germany's 
conquest of the Balkans and the probable defeat of the Soviet Union, there 
was a belief that Hitler could only be defeated through the entry of the 
United States into the war. All aspects of British policy were subservient 
to that essential goal, and that included the question of Japan. Craigie 
may have been right in all the crises up to the Burma Road in urging the 
British government to avoid war, but in 1941 his ability to see the wider 
perspective, which had served him and Britain so well until then, failed.
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Churchill declared in 1943, in disagreeing with the case argued in 
Craigie's final report-
'It was ... a blessing that Japan attacked the United States and thus 
brought the United States wholeheartedly and unitedly into the war. 
Greater good fortune has rarely happened to the British Empire than this 
event which has revealed our friends and foes in their true light...'2 
This time Churchill was right.
However, admitting that Craigie was wrong in 1941 does not invalidate the 
work he, and for that matter Shigemitsu, had done in earlier years. Both 
men had striven hard to improve Anglo-Japanese relations, had eased 
tensions during difficult crises, and had sought out areas of possible 
convergence such as mutual antipathy towards the Soviet Union. They were 
certainly both ambitious men and their desire for a rapprochement was 
influenced by their wish to achieve a personal success for themselves. 
Nevertheless, sentiment did play some role and they were both to some
extent the victim of the 'ambassador's disease', that after a few years the 
diplomat begins to represent the interests of his host as well as those of 
his own country. Despite this it is wrong to state that Craigie was a mere 
appeaser or that Shigemitsu was a moderate unrepresentative of his 
country's expansionist designs, both diplomats were more complex than a 
simple label would suggest.
Sir Robert Craigie was without doubt a most able negotiator; time and time 
again he saved Britain from the consequences of its own follies. He came 
to Japan in 1937 with the clear aim of trying to restore some degree of 
friendship with that country and prevent it drifting into the clutches of 
the Germans, and pursued this goal for the next four years. At times 
flights of fancy would lead him to propose policies that were clearly
unacceptable, such as that in autumn 1938 for an Anglo-German mediation of 
the Sino-Japanese war, and he on occasion either over— emphasized the 
influence of or placed too much faith in the Japanese moderates, but in the 
main his sense of perspective was crucial in adding a sense of realism to 
Britain’s policy in East Asia. In his first years in Japan he gained from 
having a Prime Minister in London who was sympathetic to his arguments and
appreciated his efforts, although it must be understood that there is no
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evidence suggesting that he was placed in Tokyo at Chamberlain's request. 
After May 1940 the situation began to change and increasingly his advice 
fell on deaf ears; the need to rely on his assessments of Japanese thinking 
was weakened by the reading of the Japanese diplomatic code and he was seen 
as weak and vacillating. It is a matter of shame that in the end, after 
his mission had tragically failed, the only reward he was given by the 
British Government was the lowly position of the British representive to 
the War Crimes Commission in Geneva.
Shigemitsu Mamoru is a difficult figure to assess. Any judgement of him is 
in danger of being influenced by the very great controversies over his 
reputation. To read the warm remarks made about him by the likes of Kase, 
Piggott and Hankey alongside the prosecution’s claims at the Tokyo War 
Crimes Trial makes for a very odd experience, and it is difficult to 
believe that they are talking about the same man. To come to any 
understanding of Shigemitsu one has to break from these extremes; he was 
neither the Anglophile liberal portrayed by his admirers nor the militarist 
diplomat painted by his detractors. He was first and foremost a 
nationalist, and as Ambassador to the Court of Saint James from 1938 to 
1941 he did his best to improve relations with Britain on terms beneficial 
to Japan. When from August 1940 he began to warn of the need for caution 
in relations with Britain it was not because of any deep longing to avoid 
war with that country, it was a matter of calculation, the calculation 
that the United States was beginning to side with Britain and that the 
combination of these two powers would eventually cause the downfall of 
Hitler and the defeat of Germany leaving Japan alone against two of the 
most powerful countries in the world. His espousal of a policy of peace 
was not due to his being affected by pro-Western sentiment but because he 
saw continued peace as in Japan's best interests. It is only right that at 
the Tokyo War Crimes Trial he was found innocent of the charge of 
conspiring to wage an aggressive war; that was far too crude a weapon for a 
diplomat as astute as Shigemitsu.
It is interesting to note in the end that the two ambassadors can be seen 
as representatives of the factions on both sides who desired rapprochement 
for reasons of necessity. The proposals put forward by them tried to
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address the fundamental reasons for the divide between the two former 
allies, but it needs to be emphasized that, though they shared the same 
method of achieving their aims, the aims themselves were very different. 
For Craigie the matter of greatest importance was that Japan should be 
neutralized so that Britain could concentrate on the European situation, 
while Shigemitsu consistently saw friendship with Britain as a means of 
legitimizing and securing Japanese control over East Asia and blunting the 
threat of the formation of an Anglo-American combination against Japan. To 
have merged these two separate goals together and produced a mutually 
acceptable compromise would have been incredibly difficult but whether it 
would in the end have been impossible is a question that cannot be 
answered; what is certain is that in the tense climate of the 1930s there 
was no-one at the highest levels with the selflessness and vision necessary 
to address these problems and without that leap of faith war could not be 
avoided.
NOTES
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